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Thesis Abstract 
Title: Equality Act 2010: Law, Reason and Morality in the Jurisprudence of Robert P. 
George 
This thesis provides a critical application of Robert P. George’s views to English 
equality law. The research question is what George, with his view of religion as a 
basic human good, might think about the religious liberty cases taken under the 
provisions of the Equality Act 2010. 
In addressing this question, it will be necessary to look at those - to some eyes - 
irreconcilable tensions which have emerged between laws protecting religious 
freedom. A number of legal claims have been brought by employees who have been 
instructed to carry out new legal obligations which they have been unwilling to 
perform. Questions have arisen regarding the current state of reasonable 
accommodation and proportionality analysis within indirect discrimination law. To 
examine these questions, this thesis will be in two parts: first, it will consider Robert 
George’s distinctive contribution to new natural law theory (NNL) and critically 
analyse George’s NNL approach that arises from this. To do so the key themes: a) 
practical reason and b) natural rights, will be considered in George’s work. Second, 
by reading George’s views on practical reason in line with his approach to natural 
rights, from this position this thesis will give an applied example of NNL, displaying 
George’s critique of the relevant equality law and arguing for an innovative 
understanding and approach to religious equality law. This is in an effort to find 
whether George’s theory is useful in exploring English religious equality law. By doing 
so this will reconstruct George’s NNL approach through using religious equality law 
as an applied example. 
This thesis argues that at a time when religious liberty often loses out in a balancing 
of rights, legitimate interests and protected characteristics, a superior way to 
approach equality law in this area may be through an application of a modified 
version of George’s NNL thought presenting religion as a public good. This will 
emphasise the priority of the good in religious conscience over legal rights within law 
viewed by George as a public morality. Viewing religion not only as a basic human 
good but also as a public good could provide the basis for future accommodation 
towards freedom of religious conscience and solve the tensions regarding the 
protection of religion or belief at work. Religion and religious freedom will be shown 
to be a form of flourishing within an understanding of the public good. 
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Definitions  
Aristotelian – refers to the work of, or work carried out in the tradition of, Aristotle.  
Basic human goods (also referred to as ‘basic goods’) – self-evident ends that 
provide basic reasons for action as they are constitutive aspects of human 
flourishing. 
Consequentialism (Antonym: Non-Consequentialism) – a class of normative 
ethical theories holding that the consequences of one's conduct provide the 
ultimate basis for any judgement about the correctness of that conduct. 
EAT – Employment Appeal Tribunal. 
ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 (officially titled The 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
1950). 
ECJ – European Court of Justice. 
ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights. 
Epistemology – the philosophical theory and study of knowledge.  
Equality Law – numerous array of Acts and Regulations, which formed the basis 
of English anti-discrimination law protecting against discrimination in employment 
on the grounds of religion or belief, sexual orientation and age. The relevant law 
is now to be found in the Equality Act 2010. 
ET – Employment Tribunal. 
Freedom of Religion – a principle that supports the freedom of an individual or 
community, in public or private, to manifest religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship, and observance. The concept is generally recognised also to include the 
freedom to change religion or not to follow any religion (Art 18 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). 
First Principle of Morality – an ethical principle that one always ought to choose 
and otherwise will in a way that is compatible with integral human fulfilment. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  10 
First Principle of Practical Reason [FPPR] – the intrinsic, basic goods that render 
human choices intelligible by providing ultimate reasons for action. The first 
principle is: ‘good is to be done and evil is to be avoided’. 
Grisez School – a group of scholars, initially consisting of Joseph Boyle, John 
Finnis and Germain Grisez. 
HRA – Human Rights Act 1998. 
Human Flourishing (Eudaimonia/Eudaimonaiea) – The ultimate good for human 
beings. 
Hume’s Law – a meta-ethical problem identified by David Hume, this highlighted 
the problem of moving from a normative statement on the basis of a descriptive 
statement. 
Incommensurability – the inability to weigh one good against another. 
Incommensurability Thesis – a device within NNL which prevents comparison 
between the basic goods. 
Integral Human Fulfilment – an ideal that guides the standards by which choices 
under the first principle of morality are made. 
Legal Positivism – the position that law and morality are not intrinsically linked. 
This often involves the rejection of any moral consideration within the law and law 
making. 
Naturalistic Fallacy – G.E.Moore identified the problem of a philosopher 
attempting to prove a claim about ethics by appealing to a definition of the term 
"good" in terms of one or more natural properties. (Also see Hume’s Law for other 
common use of the Naturalistic Fallacy.) 
New Natural Lawyers – natural lawyers following in the tradition of the Grisez 
School. 
NNL – New Natural Law theory. 
NLNR – John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 
1980). 
Phronesis – Ancient Greek word for wisdom or intelligence/the virtue of practical 
thought. It is often translated as ‘practical wisdom’. 
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Practical Reason – the philosophical use of reason to decide what to do and how 
to act. 
Prudentia – See Phroenesis 
Public Reason – a common mode of reasoning used by members within a society 
to reach a majority consensus. It was developed by John Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971). 
Political Liberalism – philosophy set out in John Rawls, Political Liberalism 
(Columbia University Press, 1993). The theory of public reason derives from 
political liberalism. 
Scholasticism – a system of theology and philosophy arising from medieval 
sources, based on Aristotelianism. Thomas Aquinas is considered to be a leading 
figure within scholasticism. 
Rawlsian – work conducted by, or following in the theory, of John Rawls. 
Religious Liberty (see Freedom of Religion). 
Self-evident – is known to be true by understanding without proof or argument. 
Speculative Reason – a form of reasoning that involves the intellect acting in a 
hypothetical mode to guide the practical reasoning. 
Synderesis – the natural capacity or disposition (habitus) of the practical reason 
to apprehend intuitively the universal first principles of human action. 
Theoretical Reason – see Speculative Reasoning. 
Thomist Moral Realism – a form of moral theology following that of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas. 
Thomist/Thomism – the theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas or of his followers. 
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
Virtue Ethics – a theory that sees the primary focus of ethics to be the character 
of the person rather than that person’s actions or duties. 
 
 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  12 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Aims and objectives .................................................................................... 13 
Outline ........................................................................................................... 14 
Introduction to Robert George ....................................................................... 16 
1.2 Methods ...................................................................................................... 18 
1.3 Introduction to the problems facing religious freedom within equality law .. 21 
Introduction to religious freedom ................................................................... 21 
The dispute surrounding the protection given to religious freedom ............... 24 
Introduction to Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom ............................ 25 
The applicants within Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom ................. 27 
1.4 Introduction to New Natural Law/Lawyers .................................................. 34 
Introduction to the Grisez School’s Ethic ....................................................... 36 
Basic Human Goods within NNL ................................................................... 38 
The NNL understanding of the FPPR ............................................................ 39 
Intentional action and the FPPR within NNL ................................................. 42 
The rejection of human nature within NNL .................................................... 46 
Human flourishing and NNL .......................................................................... 49 
1.5 Introduction to John Finnis ......................................................................... 51 
Introduction to Finnis’ Ethic ........................................................................... 54 
Final causality and the basic human goods .................................................. 57 
Introduction to legal validity within Finnis’ work ............................................. 63 
Introduction to practical application of natural law within legal adjudication .. 66 
Introduction to Finnis’ interpretation of Aquinas ............................................ 68 
Introduction to Finnis’ use of natural rights .................................................... 73 
Introduction to religious liberty within the work of John Finnis ....................... 75 
1.6 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................... 78 
 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  13 
1.1 Aims and objectives 
This thesis uses Robert George’s new natural law (NNL) thought to analyse the 
right to religious freedom in the Equality Act 2010 and related cases. With 
George’s view of religion as a basic human good,1 can this thought be useful to 
critique the religious liberty cases taken under the provisions of the Equality Act 
2010? Although George develops his account of NNL reasoning in the context of 
US law, my claim is that his work can be used to help resolve problems and 
tensions within English equality law, particularly the insufficient weight given to 
religious liberty. To achieve this aim, George’s thought is applied to the Equality 
Act 2010 in this thesis. George’s work is not without problems, however, and 
modification of George’s thought is necessary in order to mount a telling critique 
of the place of religious liberty within equality law.  
George embodies a natural law tradition that has always resisted moral relativism 
and defended certain moral absolutes.2 George has, for example, contributed to 
ethical debates surrounding abortion, human cloning and sexual morality.3 This 
has provided a notable exposition of the practical legal implications within NNL. 
In this thesis I will not explore the practical outcome of these debates because as 
outlined below they are focused upon US law. Rather, the integration of 
philosophy, theology and jurisprudence in George’s work will be the key focus for 
this thesis. It is these areas - in particular his treatment of practical reason and a 
non-theological designation of natural rights jurisprudence - that will receive 
criticism in order to provide an approach that can successfully be transferred to 
English law, so as to provide an effective critique of the right to religious freedom 
within equality law. This is because George’s contribution to religious and ethical 
                                                          
1 See R P George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (Isi Books, 
2013) 119. 
2 For example: J Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Georgetown University Press, 1983); G Grisez, Way of 
the Lord Jesus: Christian Moral Principles (Franciscan Press, 1983); and J Finnis, Moral Absolutes: 
Tradition, Revision and Truth (The Catholic University of America Press, 1991). 
3 For instance, see: R P George, ‘Law, Liberty and Morality in some Recent Natural Law Theories’ (DPhil 
Thesis, University of Oxford, 1986) 354 [sexual ethics]; R P George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties 
and Public Morality (Oxford University Press, 1994) 112-114 [abortion]; R P George, The Clash of 
Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis (ISI Books, 2001) 72-73 [human cloning]; and R P 
George and P Lee, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 118 [abortion]. 
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debates make him the ideal scholar through whom to analyse the right to religious 
freedom within a legal context. 
Outline 
This introductory chapter begins by presenting the broad outline of the thesis. 
This chapter will, first, provide a short introduction to Robert George; second, 
introduce the methods employed in this thesis; third, introduce the tensions 
surrounding the right to religious freedom, by way of an introduction to religious 
liberty and equality law; fourth, this introduction will outline the individual chapters 
and summarise anticipated outcomes which detail the way that the tensions 
surrounding religious freedom will be analysed.  
As mentioned George’s critique of US discrimination law is not without its flaws. 
This thesis will inter alia attempt to trace these through a critique of George’s 
approach regarding the natural rights discourse present within his work and his 
departure from Thomas Aquinas’ understanding surrounding practical reason, 
through George’s use of practical reason in his own work.4 These themes will be 
addressed in further detail in chapters 2 and 3. Despite these problems, however, 
the central claim is that key features of George’s NNL reasoning can be improved 
upon and usefully applied to cases on religious liberty. This will be utilised 
because the development of a new classical theory of natural law has presented 
a contentious theologically-informed, systematic philosophical explanation for 
human life and action. It is one that can offer an integrated account of law, 
practical reason, and morality.  
By critically analysing George’s work, this introduction and then wider thesis 
provides an opportunity for research which seeks to analyse problems that 
straddle philosophy and law, for instance, problems impacting religious freedom 
and equality legislation. In this way a modified natural law perspective will be 
developed, one which is then applied to equality law in chapters 4 and 5. The 
earlier critical analysis of George’s theoretical work thus reinforces the later 
jurisprudential critique. In other words, the critical analysis of George’s work 
informs the modified natural law account advanced in this thesis which is then 
applied to English equality law in order to shed new light on freedom of religion. 
                                                          
4 For example, see George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 3) 39; George, In 
Defense of Natural Law (OUP, 1999) 3; R P George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (ISI Books, 2001) 195. 
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This will address problems identified both within George’s jurisprudential thought 
and problems impacting religious freedom within equality law. It is in this way that 
George’s thought will be argued to provide a justification for the greater protection 
of religious freedom. 
To this end, the thesis examines a range of problems associated with religious 
liberty present in English religious equality law. For instance, legal claims have 
been brought by employees who have been required to carry out new legal 
obligations which they have been unwilling to perform.5 
Claimants alleging religious discrimination have often lost their case in religious 
liberty litigation. For example, the vast majority of the cases brought with 
reference to the religion clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950 (ECHR) have failed in English domestic courts.6 It is not that there is not 
respect for religion,7 but that when balanced against other competing rights and 
considerations it tends to lose out. As such, in a human rights context, the 
problem with proportionality analysis involving religion is that religious freedom 
loses out within indirect discrimination law. It loses out in the balancing of human 
rights in a conflicted rights discourse. Religious freedom further loses out in 
adjudication concerning the protected characteristics listed in the Equality Act 
2010. Therefore, insufficient weight is given to religious freedom. Below will detail 
the irreconcilable tensions which have emerged between laws protecting 
religious freedom. 
By way of modifying George’s thought to present a critique of religious liberty, this 
thesis will thereby solve tensions facing freedom of religion that arise in the 
application of the EqA 2010. It will do so by addressing problems such as 
reasonable accommodation and proportionality analysis in indirect discrimination 
law.  
In order to meet this central thesis, the overarching research question is: how can 
George’s thought provide a justification for the greater protection of religious 
freedom in English law? In other words, with George’s view of religion as a basic 
                                                          
5 For instance, see: Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357 and McFarlane v Relate 
Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880. These cases will be introduced and analysed in section 1.3. 
6 J Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (Oxford University Press, 2010) 320. 
7 For instance, the right to freedom of religion is secured by Article 9 of the ECHR. 
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good, is this thought capable of helpfully being modified in order to critique the 
religious liberty cases taken under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010? In 
order to answer this central thesis I will address the following specific research 
sub-questions which are divided into two categories. First, in the earlier chapters: 
how does George contribute to NNL jurisprudence? This will require an 
examination of whether his work is largely derivative and whether he correctly 
reads the work of key natural law figures such as Thomas Aquinas. Further, 
George’s contribution will be analysed by considering whether he stands in a 
natural law tradition that narrows natural law jurisprudence towards a natural 
rights discourse?  
Next, in the later chapters it will be considered whether George’s natural law 
theory helps to provide a solution to the identified tensions and problems facing 
religious freedom within English equality law? Does George’s approach to US 
law provide a set of transferable criteria and concepts that are capable of 
presenting a coherent understanding surrounding contemporary religious liberty? 
This requires analysis of how George’s understanding surrounding this notion 
engages with anti-discrimination and religious equality law. Is freedom of religious 
conscience also currently a problem for equality law? The answers to these 
questions will establish if the application of George’s NNL views can successfully 
provide a critique of the current interaction surrounding law and religion in order 
to analyse the right to of religious liberty? 
These questions will form the spine of the discussion in the following chapters. 
By addressing them, this thesis will provide analysis surrounding NNL 
jurisprudence. The analysis will show how George’s thought can provide a 
justification for the greater protection of religious liberty. Therefore the 
presentation will be one that is focused primarily on the contribution of an 
individual, and one that provides contributions in both practical case law 
application and analytical legal theory, in order to analyse the right to religious 
freedom within equality law.   
Introduction to Robert George 
It will be argued in this thesis that George has made a distinct contribution to NNL 
as both a lawyer and legal philosopher. Throughout George’s work he seeks to 
provide a ‘sound exposition of the natural law tradition and of the new classical 
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theory’.8 George views NNL as a theory that he seeks to ‘defend and apply’9 and 
one that he has ‘been able to contribute to the development of some aspects of 
the theory’.10 As such, George acknowledges NNL scholarship but boldly claims 
that he is consolidating and advancing natural law jurisprudence.11  
George here seems a little hesitant. I suggest that this is because he is not the 
creator of the New Natural Law Theory. NNL was originally formulated and 
pioneered by the theologian Germain Grisez.12 The term ‘New Natural Law 
Theory’ was instead coined by Joseph Hittinger.13 Although the Grisez School 
was started by Germain Grisez, it was subsequently developed through 
collaboration with Joseph M Boyle and John Finnis.14 These theorists, together 
with George,15 have been termed the Grisez School.16 The natural law 
jurisprudence provided by the Grisez School allows a starting point to assess and 
engage critically with George’s thought throughout this thesis. 
The natural law jurisprudence that George advances is an account of basic 
human goods and reasons for action that they provide.17 There is a central focus 
upon practical reason in his work,18 which is a clear reflection of the centricity of 
practical reasoning to the Grisez School.19 That being said, it can be identified at 
the outset that while George’s work is closely related to others in the Grisez 
School, his work is not ‘consistently at one’ with the others.20 This is an important 
observation for work that follows criticising George’s thought in this thesis. 
Consequently my analysis will point to a concern for justice,21 human liberty22 and 
                                                          
8 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 229. 
9 Ibid 1. 
10 Ibid. 
11 R P George, Natural Law, Liberalism and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1996) 5. 
12 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 1. 
13 R Hittinger, Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 5. 
14 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 1. 
15 George was supervised by John Finnis during his DPhil studies and this likely established the long-
standing academic connection. 
16 The Grisez School will be introduced and their contribution will be analysed in chapter 3. 
17 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 229. 
18 See George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 3) 39; George, In Defense of 
Natural Law (n 4) 3; George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 4) 195. 
19 G Grisez, ‘Natural Law, God, Religion and Human Fulfilment’ (2001) 46 Am. J. Juris 3, 12-14. 
20 D N Robinson, ‘In Defense of Natural Law: Robert George’s Jurisprudence’ (2000) 45 Am. J. Juris. 117, 
120-121. 
21 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 130. 
22 George, ‘Law, Liberty and Morality in some Recent Natural Law Theories’ (n 3) 219. 
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ultimately protection against the state in George’s work.23 For instance, George 
is very clear in that he draws from a ‘tradition of natural law thinking about 
morality, justice and human rights’.24 It is these factors that substantiate the 
central claim that key features of George’s NNL reasoning can be improved upon 
and usefully applied to cases on religious liberty. A function of legal thought can 
be to stabilise and resolve ambiguities.25 As such, a display of law and practical 
reason will address the lack of weight given to religious freedom within equality 
law.  
Two important observations need to be made about George’s work at the outset. 
First, George’s public law contribution can, broadly speaking, be solely found in 
a US context. This is to be expected, George is a US citizen working from a US 
University engaging with the US legal system. He therefore focuses upon US 
constitutional law. Second, as a Roman Catholic jurisprudential scholar (and 
member of the aforementioned Grisez School) this helps to explain his adherence 
to Roman Catholic ethical thought in his writings. In particular, George has 
adhered to the Second Vatican Council and like Grisez and Finnis engages with 
Thomistic ethics.26 George is a committed Thomist.27 Nevertheless, chapter 3 will 
criticise the way that George interprets Thomas Aquinas. It will later be argued 
that the prevalence of Roman Catholic thought in his writings has further 
significantly impacted George’s work. 
1.2 Methods 
This thesis incorporates elements of both jurisprudence and equality law to 
analyse the right to religious freedom through Robert George’s NNL reasoning. 
George’s work is not without problems, and neither is equality law, and so this 
thesis will inter alia attempt to employ methods best suited to critique the 
identified flaws and tensions. The methodological challenge presented by 
                                                          
23 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 1) 114. 
24 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis (n 4) 51. 
25 R Adhar & I Leigh, ‘Post-Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights: or How God Never 
Really Went Away’ (2012) 75(6) MLR 1064, 1098. 
26 N Bamforth and D Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 167; S Coyle, ‘Natural Law and Goodness in Thomistic Ethics’ 30(1) 
The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 77. 
27 See R P George, ‘Kelsen and Aquinas on “the Natural Law Doctrine”’ (2000) 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
1625; George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 38; George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the 
Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 1) 75. 
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critiquing George’s thought (which is mainly focused on US law) and applying this 
to English equality law is a real one. The methods that I will use to analyse the 
right to religious freedom in the EqA 2010 are those appropriate to the broad 
discipline of jurisprudence. The focus upon jurisprudence in this thesis is a very 
deliberate choice. While theological and philosophical texts will be analysed 
throughout, I will not be presenting this thesis as a theologian, historian or 
philosopher. Rather, I will objectively be focusing upon jurisprudence,28 which 
denotes a lawyer using philosophy to come to conclusions about the law, as 
opposed to legal philosophy – a philosopher who uses law to come to 
philosophical conclusions. That said, it is certainly the case that a jurisprudential 
approach will involve consulting a wider variety of interdisciplinary texts. In my 
case, these will include legal philosophical, theological and moral philosophical 
texts in order to successfully modify George’s thought to provide an effective 
critique surrounding the right to religious freedom. 
As I seek to address my research questions, I will draw upon an array of both 
primary and secondary legal sources and the use of legal rules, precedent and 
principles.29 For example, this will involve detailed textual analysis of Robert 
George’s work and a detailed analysis of the legal arguments expressed in 
selected equality case law, such as one of the most significant religious liberty 
cases of recent years: Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom.30 To 
demonstrate the flaws within George’s account of NNL reasoning in the context 
of US law, it will also be necessary to give an account of the relevant US 
discrimination law. To this end, a primarily jurisprudential consideration will lead 
to theoretical conclusions about George’s work, natural law and equality 
legislation. 
Furthermore, the reason that this thesis will provide a detailed textual analysis of 
George’s work and critique the leading religious liberty case law is to analyse 
contemporary religious freedom. This will be realised through applying George’s 
                                                          
28 Within the broad discipline of jurisprudence, I argue that there is room for philosophical reasoning 
that ultimately provides conclusions about the law. 
29 For instance, chapter 2 will discuss Ronald Dworkin’s approach to legal principles within adjudication, 
see: R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 1977). 
30 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). It will be claimed in section 1.3 that this is one of the most significant cases because it 
was the first adverse determination for the United Kingdom government regarding religious liberty - M 
Hill, ‘Religious Symbolism and Conscientious Objection in the Workplace: An Evaluation of Strasbourg’s 
Judgment in Eweida and others v United Kingdom’ (2013) 15(2) Ecc. L.J. 191, 193. 
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NNL views to equality law. To achieve this two steps need to be taken. First, the 
work should include understanding of the basic debates surrounding equality law 
and human moral reasoning. To do so will require a consideration of legal 
argumentation in, for instance, post-Hartian analytical jurisprudence and cognate 
interdisciplinary research. This will situate the thesis. Second, in the analysis of 
religious freedom George’s unique contribution will need to be shown. In order to 
achieve this aim, the work provided by this thesis will analyse Robert George’s 
scholarship. 
To gain context for this analysis contemporary jurisprudential scholarship has 
influenced a distinct legal positivist/natural law conceptual debate.31 This 
provides an approach upon which I will reflect32 and I will seek to demonstrate - 
and draw upon - understandings of different natural law themes. This will provide 
a basis to carry out the detailed textual analysis that was mentioned above. To 
do so will require that I also directly incorporate analysis gathered from Thomas 
Aquinas’ original texts and may also require that I draw an original natural law 
approach. Such an approach will be drawn from critical engagement with 
George’s work. Moreover, I will use a further method, engaging in what the 
philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff has termed ‘dialogic pluralism’.33 By adopting 
a dialectic approach, this process will involve weighing different perspectives and 
appropriating insights from philosophical colleagues and their predecessors 
through rejecting empirical assumptions. This is possible because George’s 
method may be identified as primarily dialectical.34 In this way novel conclusions 
about George’s NNL approach to English religious liberty case law will be 
presented. These conclusions will be presented in chapters 4 and 5 in order to 
analyse the right to freedom of religion.  
                                                          
31 For instance, see: J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980); Hittinger (n 
13); M Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge University Press, 2001); N Simmonds, 
Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford University Press, 2007). This literature will be considered throughout the 
Introduction and in chapter 2. 
32 Issues of equality and moral reasoning present some of the central problems of jurisprudence for the 
present day. Coyle has observed that central problems within jurisprudence can be termed ‘Protestant’. 
As such, my analysis will follow this ‘Protestant’ reflection – S Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A 
Philosophical Guide (Hart, 2014) 50. 
33 N Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton University Press, 2008) XI. 
34 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 1. 
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1.3 Introduction to the problems facing religious freedom within equality 
law 
Introduction to religious freedom 
To apply George’s thought to an analysis of the right to religious freedom within 
equality law it will be necessary to consider those irreconcilable tensions, which 
have emerged in the first decade of the twenty-first century, that impact laws 
protecting religious freedom. The right to religious freedom stems from the 
international human rights treaties of the 1950s and their ideals, typified by the 
ECHR. The Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), the codifying legislation for the 
ECHR, has implemented an approach that promotes religious freedom as a 
human right, particularly under Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion) and Article 14 (freedom from discrimination) of the ECHR. As such, it is 
clear that religious liberty is actively promoted as a positive right.35 At the outset, 
however, it is clear that there are limitations. Religious liberty is widely considered 
to be a limited right.36 For instance, the limitations upon manifestation of religion 
and belief in Article 9(2) of the ECHR are detailed as those necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety. These are: for the protection 
of public order; for the protection of health or morals; or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. It is therefore clear that a balance is struck so that 
while freedom of religion is a general right, the manifestation of such freedom can 
be limited.37 
Although there is a right to religious freedom, a number of legal claims have been 
brought by employees who have been required to perform new legal obligations 
which they have been unwilling to comply with because of a conflict with their 
religious beliefs.38 In addition, the vast majority of the cases brought with 
reference to the religion clauses of the ECHR have failed in English domestic 
                                                          
35 Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 205. 
36 M Connolly, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 313. 
37 J Dingemans, ‘The need for a principled approach to religious freedoms’ (2012) 12(3) Ecc. L.J. 2012 
371, 371-372. 
38 For example, see: Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357; McFarlane v Relate 
Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880; and Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications 
nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10). These cases will be introduced and analysed in this 
section 1.3. 
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courts.39 As such, it has been suggested that overall Article 9 rights are becoming 
‘insufficiently and erratically protected in the courts’.40 The problem is that when 
religious claimants attempt to defend their rights, they lose in human rights 
litigation. It is suggested, therefore, that more weight is required to be given to 
protect religious liberty. Better protection is required for religious liberty to redress 
the balance that has been struck and resolve the tensions that will be outlined 
below. 
Below is an indicative example of the law which will be focused upon in chapter 
4, and to an extent, in chapter 5. Chapter 4 aims to provide the substance for the 
theoretical critique, providing a legislative and case law basis adapted from 
George’s work and to which, in the fifth chapter, theoretical critique can be 
applied. Doing so is an attempt to resolve the tensions impacting freedom of 
religion. The cases and legislation focused upon below (and in the wider thesis) 
will be a selective grouping, logically based upon the cases being leading 
contemporary religious liberty and equality judgments, and also related through 
the jurisprudential themes found in legislation which lend themselves to a suitable 
critique. Through this focus I will analyse the right to religious freedom. 
Religious freedom is protected by, for instance, freedom to change belief being 
secured by Article 9 (there is no restriction upon changing a belief),41 and also in 
the EqA 2010, religion or belief sitting alongside eight other ‘protected 
characteristics’ under s.4 of the EqA 2010. This designation as a protected 
characteristic is designed to prevent and protect against religious discrimination. 
It is also arguable that religious freedom is further promoted within the HRA by 
s.13(1) of the HRA which requires that ‘particular importance’ should be accorded 
to Article 9.42 All of these points further emphasise the protection available for 
religious freedom. 
A critique drawing on George’s thought is required because the right to religious 
freedom is arguably a contested one. It is true that the HRA has been termed a 
                                                          
39 J Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14(3) Ecc. L.J. 371, 380. See also C Cross, 
J Dingemans, H Masood and C Yeginsu, The Protections for Religious Rights: Law and Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 2013) 292.  
40 A Donald, ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights: Grounds for 
optimism’ (2013) 2 (1) OJLR 50, 51. 
41 D Hoffman and J Rowe, Human Rights in the UK: An Introduction to the Human Rights Act 1998 (3rd 
edn, Pearson, 2010) 278. 
42 C McCrudden, ‘Religion, Human Rights, Equality and the Public Sphere’ (2011) 13 Ecc. L.J. 26, 36. 
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‘watershed’ moment by providing the domestic courts with the opportunity to 
directly enforce ECHR rights43 and that the HRA has also ushered in a new rights 
driven approach, promoting religious freedom and the right to, and respect for, a 
private life as protected universal human rights.44 However, as part of this 
evolving legal culture, it is now considered the norm to speak about the balancing 
of these rights, in an attempt to resolve inevitable tensions between them. For 
example, a proportionality test applied under Article 9(2) of the ECHR, by which 
the manifestation of Article 9 rights is permitted to be infringed if the action is 
justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.45 
Russell Sandberg has suggested that domestic courts can create tensions by 
underplaying the importance attached to preventing religious discrimination.46 For 
instance, Article 9 rights can frequently be contested and this can lead to legal 
uncertainty for these rights.47 In addition to uncertainty for religious rights, it was 
earlier identified that religious freedom often loses out when balanced against 
other competing rights and considerations in indirect discrimination law and this 
may be why overall there is insufficient protection for Article 9 rights in the 
courts.48 As such, it is evident that the problem with proportionality analysis 
concerning religion is that individual religious freedom can be infringed upon. This 
occurs in the balancing of human rights in what has become a conflicted rights 
discourse. Religious rights can be limited if there is sufficient justification.49 This 
also impacts religious freedom which loses out in adjudication concerning the 
protected characteristics in the EqA 2010. This legislation provides part of the 
source of tensions to which my analysis of George’s critique will be applied in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
The source of these tensions can be attributed to the creation of new obligations 
within the workplace. An interesting and important development within 
                                                          
43 Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 35) 36. 
44 For instance see: Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493; Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 
17 EHRR 397; Gillan and Quinton v The United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 28; Eweida v United Kingdom 
[2013] ECHR 37. 
45 Connolly, Discrimination Law (n 36) 313. 
46 Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 203. 
47 L Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (2010) 12 Ecc. L.J. 280, 
298. 
48 Donald, ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights: Grounds for 
optimism’ (n 40). 
49 Connolly, Discrimination Law (n 36) 313. 
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discrimination law, one particularly relevant to NNL reasoning, is that, in 
compliance with EU Council Directive 2000/78/EC, a large body of equality law 
was implemented. For example, firstly, employment discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation and religion or belief was prohibited, with the 
implementation of Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 SI 
2003/1660 and the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 
SI 2003/1661. Then, secondly, discrimination was prohibited in relation to goods 
and services in the Equality Act 2006 (Part 2) and the Equality Act (Sexual 
Orientation) regulations 2003 SI 2003/1661. The admirable aim of these 
provisions centred upon reducing discrimination within the workplace. This 
extensive anti-discrimination law, now found in the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010), 
has, however, arguably caused a problem and exacerbated tensions in relation 
to religious freedom and religious discrimination adjudication. 
The dispute surrounding the protection given to religious freedom 
The problem with English equality law as it pertains to religion has been disputed. 
For instance, it is suggested that there is definite ‘protection available under 
Article 9’50 for religion and belief. This may initially highlight a strong mantle of 
protection for religion. Further, Christopher McCrudden argues that within a 
proportionality analysis, ‘the European Court of Human Rights seems to give 
particular weight to the importance of the religious beliefs in relation to competing 
Convention provisions.’51 Here McCrudden is suggesting that religion or belief is 
given particular protection. If these were to be viewed as the only responses, then 
the law surrounding freedom of religion does not seem to be problematic. There 
would be no need to apply George’s thought here. 
However, critics have equally identified a problem facing freedom of religion. 
Gwyneth Pitt argues that listing religion or belief as a protected characteristic has 
made it impossible for courts to avoid religious liberty litigation.52 It has been 
argued that within this litigation, the obligations on employers not to discriminate 
on grounds of sexual orientation have ‘trumped the rights of the employee not to 
                                                          
50 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 47). 
51 McCrudden, ‘Religion, Human Rights, Equality and the Public Sphere’ (n 42). 
52 G Pitt, ‘Keeping the Faith: Trends and Tensions in Religion or Belief Discrimination’ (2011) 40 ILJ 4, 
384. 
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be discriminated against on grounds of religion or belief’.53 This highlights the 
extent to which Article 9 rights are being infringed. Hepple has suggested that 
this may be because the harmonisation of equality law within the area of religion 
and belief has progressed too far54 and so equality law tends to challenge Article 
9 rights. For instance, the way that equality law has been connected to religion 
and belief may lead to the legal obligations presented in equality arguments being 
much more precise,55 and so result in religious equality law preventing claimants 
from effectively being able to rely upon Article 9 of the ECHR. As such, it is clear 
that the views presented on the problems facing religious equality law are 
contradictory. This highlights the tension present in the law and the problem 
facing freedom of religion and that significant problems and unresolvable 
tensions have been created within the legal framework.56 The aim of this this 
thesis is to resolve these tensions impacting religious freedom and present a 
constructive resolution. 
Introduction to Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom 
This thesis will illustrate the problems that can arise for religious freedom in light 
of religious equality law by drawing upon a number of legal claims that have been 
brought by employees who have been forced to carry out obligations from new 
law protecting rights. To address the problems and tensions that can arise for 
religious freedom in light of equality law, the relevant litigation arising from the 
EqA 2010 needs to be presented to provide an area upon which George’s thought 
can be applied. The leading equality law case concerning freedom of religion is 
now Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom.57 Here, Ms Eweida, a British 
Airways employee, advanced a claim of discrimination based on a breach of her 
right to manifest her religion by wearing a cross within the workplace, contrary to 
                                                          
53 R Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13(2) Ecc. L.J. 157, 172. See further, Sandberg, Religion, 
Law and Society (n 46) 214. 
54 B Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Hart, 2011) 177. 
55 J Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (2012) 1 Ox. J Law Religion 2, 399.  
56 P Edge and L Vickers, ‘Equality and Human Rights Commission Report 97 – Review of Equality and 
Human Rights Law relating to Religion and Belief’ Equality and Human Rights Commission (Manchester, 
September 2015) 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/RR97_Review%20of%20equ
ality%20and%20human%20rights%20law%20relating%20to%20religion%20or%20belief.pdf> 
accessed 5th December 2015, 40.  
57 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). This will be considered at length in chapters 4 and 5; however, what follows will serve as 
a brief introduction to the law.  
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Article 9 of the Convention. In other words, Ms Eweida claimed that equality law 
did not protect her right to exercise religious liberty. 
In Eweida58 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that Ms Eweida, 
had a right to manifest her religion in the workplace:59 by denying Ms Eweida her 
right to wear a cross, domestic law did not strike the right balance between the 
protection of Ms Eweida’s right to manifest her religion and the rights of others.60 
It is clear that the ECtHR had to weigh the restriction of Ms Eweida’s religious 
rights. This was weighed against the UK government’s competing submission 
that, by restricting her right to wear a cross, British Airways were correctly 
justifying a legitimate aim, namely enforcing a corporate professional image.61 In 
the alternative, it was argued that, even if wearing a cross was motivated by 
religion or belief, it was not a generally recognised act of observance and so fell 
outside the protection of Article 9.62 In recognition of Ms Eweida’s Article 9 rights, 
the ECtHR held that the UK government had not put in place ‘legislation adequate 
to enable those in the position of the applicant to protect their rights.’63 In other 
words, domestic law did not provide adequate protection of freedom of religion 
for Ms Eweida. However, this case benefits from deeper analysis as the headline 
judgment is not really reflective of the wider case – here there were four conjoined 
applicants. Only one applicant won her claim – Ms Eweida. It was thus held that 
Ms Eweida’s Article 9 right to wear a cross upon her work uniform was not 
adequately protected by either a) her employer or b) English law.64  
The importance of this decision for analysing freedom of religion is highlighted in 
the stark fact that Eweida was the first adverse determination for the United 
Kingdom government regarding Article 9.65 As such, a right is established to 
                                                          
58 Ibid. 
59 Eweida has clarified the meaning of ‘manifestation of belief’: conduct is not restricted to acts of 
worship or devotion but needs to have a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the practice and 
underlying belief. However, a religious practice does not need to be prescribed by the religion in 
question – ibid [82]. Here conduct is tied closely to belief.  
60 Ibid [79]. This highlights the affirmation of Article 9 and the place of religion.  
61 Ibid [61], [94]. 
62 Ibid [58]. 
63 Ibid [66]. 
64 Ibid [79]. 
65 M Hill, ‘Religious Symbolism and Conscientious Objection in the Workplace: An Evaluation of 
Strasbourg’s Judgment in Eweida and others v United Kingdom’ (2013) 15(2) Ecc. L.J. 191, 193. 
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manifest religion in the workplace.66 The structure of Article 9 provides that 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion is a general freedom not subject to 
limitation. There is, in other words, no restriction upon holding a belief. It has been 
shown above that the right is limited in accordance with Article 9(2), however, 
when the belief is manifested. Hoffmann and Rowe uphold this distinction 
because, while it would be wrong in principle for the state to legislate how people 
should think, it may be entitled to regulate how they act, where such action may 
harm others.67 This right is a contested one because the ECtHR’s explicitly found 
that Ms Eweida’s manifestation of belief should not be limited.68 Despite the 
protestations by British Airways and the UK government, Ms Eweida established 
her right to wear a cross. This right will be important later in the application of 
George’s thought to the analysis of religious freedom. 
As noted, within Eweida,69 the other three conjoined applicants lost their claims 
before the ECtHR. To understand why religious liberty was restricted for the other 
three applicants, this introduction will provide context by analysing the earlier 
domestic law hearings. For the purposes of this introduction the applicants will be 
divided into two categories: 1) provision of services; and 2) wearing of religious 
symbols.  
The applicants within Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom 
To start with the provision of services, two of these applications concerned legal 
claims brought by employees forced to carry out obligations from new law 
protecting rights. First, the Court of Appeal decision in McFarlane v Relate Avon70 
involved a Christian counsellor dismissed for refusing to counsel a homosexual 
couple, and second, Islington Borough Council v Ladele (Liberty Intervention)71 
concerned a registrar threatened with dismissal because she refused on 
conscience grounds to perform civil partnership ceremonies, which would, in her 
opinion, contradict her religious belief. Within both cases, the Court of Appeal 
held that claims of direct discrimination on grounds of religion failed because the 
                                                          
66 D McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (2013) 2 Ox. J Law Religion 1 211. 
67 Hoffman and Rowe (n 41) 277-279. 
68 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [95]. 
69 Ibid. 
70 McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] IRLR 872. 
71 Islington Borough Council v Ladele (Liberty Intervention) [2010] 1 WLR 955. 
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employer did not treat the employee unfavourably on grounds of religion. In a 
similar vein, claims of indirect discrimination failed on the basis that any 
disadvantage was justified. For, in the case of Ladele,72 the effect of implementing 
the policy on the claimant, Ms Ladele, was held to not impinge on her religious 
belief as she was still able to hold those beliefs. As such, the policy pursued by 
the employer was a legitimate aim.73 Here Sandberg analyses that the EqA 2010 
consolidated the substantive law74 concerning religious discrimination and the 
exceptions that exist for religious groups in the area of indirect discrimination.75 
Arguably this justifies the alleged infringement of rights: it has been suggested 
that this pays little attention to religious rights.76 For instance, the consequences 
for Ms Ladele were serious: even though the job requirement was introduced by 
the employer at a later date and stage in her employment, Ms Ladele still lost her 
job given her beliefs because of her inability to carry out what was seen to be part 
of her job.77 It can be identified that the severity of losing employment was 
considered to be a justified restriction upon the right to freedom of religion. 
Sandberg has suggested these legislative developments culminating in the EqA 
2010 have brought about a significant shift from ‘non-discrimination to anti-
discrimination’,78 whereby a shift from passive tolerance to the active promotion 
of religious freedom (Article 9 of the ECHR) and sexual orientation anti-
discrimination (Article 14 of the ECHR) as positive legal rights has now 
occurred.79 The impact is that both religious freedom and sexual orientation are 
more frequently defended by claimants within litigation. For instance, the majority 
of relevant claims are taken under the protected characteristic of religion and 
belief within equality law.80 It is evident that this presents freedom of religion as 
an enforceable, contested right. This presentation provides a basis for the 
                                                          
72 Ibid.  
73 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [105]. 
74 Such as the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. 
75 Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (n 53) 157, 159. 
76 Sandberg, Religion, Law and Society (n 46) 203. 
77 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [106]. 
78 R Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (n 53) Ecc. L.J. 13(2) 157, 180. 
79 Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 213) 81. This claim will be discussed in chapter 5. 
80 M Gibson, ‘The God ‘Dilution’? Religion, Discrimination and the case for Reasonable Accommodation’ 
(2013) 72(3) CLJ 578, 590. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  29 
deployment of George’s thought to analyse the right to religious freedom in the 
EqA 2010 and related cases, within this thesis. 
An infringement of rights via indirect discrimination appears to be justified by the 
ECtHR in Eweida,81 at least in relation to the protection of rights concerning 
sexual orientation. Ms Ladele’s and Mr McFarlane’s religious beliefs were held to 
be the direct motivation for their objection to carry out work tasks. This was held 
to be sufficient to engage Article 9 in Eweida.82 The government argued that the 
right to manifest religious beliefs and the rights of individuals not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of sexual orientation were matters failing within 
the margin of appreciation.83 This margin of appreciation was given to the 
jurisdiction of national authorities to derogate from their obligations under Article 
9. In contrast, Mr McFarlane’s submission highlighted the need to maintain 
religious pluralism when determining the margin of appreciation given to the 
state.84 This call for pluralism highlights that there should be tolerance within 
society of a diversity of cultural or ethnic groups and the beliefs they express 
regarding religion.85 However, the ECtHR held in Eweida86 that for both Ms 
Ladele and Mr McFarlane, equality legislation led to the justification of prima facie 
discriminatory acts requiring the identification of a legitimate aim and a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim and discriminatory 
effect within the state’s margin of appreciation.87 This legitimate aim positively 
ignored the religious difference in favour of a conception of proportionality 
favouring rights relating to sexual orientation. This further highlights the tensions 
                                                          
81 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
82 Ibid [103, 108] (Fourth Section). 
83 Ibid [63]. 
84 Ibid [73]. 
85 Hoffman and Rowe, Human Rights in the UK: An Introduction to the Human Rights Act 1998 (n 41) 
277-278. This call for pluralism was similarly supported by the ECtHR finding for Ms Eweida’s religious 
freedom, whereby it was noted: ‘On one side of the scales was Ms Eweida’s desire to manifest her 
religious belief…[which] is a fundamental right: because a healthy democratic society needs to tolerate 
and sustain pluralism and diversity;’ by doing so this emphasises the connection between religious 
pluralism and religious freedom - Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 
48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [94]. See further Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (2002) 
34(6) EHRR 1339 [62]. 
86 Ibid.  
87 J Rivers, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 409, 422 – see section 149(1) of the 
Equality Act 2010. 
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between laws protecting religious freedom and those prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation.88  
The question then becomes: have laws protecting sexual orientation constrained 
religious freedom? The appellate courts have encountered significant difficulty 
addressing this issue.  Case law and legislation are conflicting on this issue. 
Religious discrimination legislation and sexual orientation legislation are 
perceived to be acutely irreconcilable by both claimants and academics. For 
example, the 2015 Equality and Human Rights Commission Report - Review of 
Equality and Human Rights Law Relating to Religion and Belief - has noted the 
difficulties and tensions created within the legal framework by equality law 
addressing freedom of religion.89 I argue this is because future courts are likely 
to follow the Court of Appeal decisions in McFarlane90 and Ladele91 in that the 
significant need to eliminate discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is 
likely to trump the equally significant need to prevent discrimination on grounds 
of religion or belief. This is because the later decision in Eweida92 still held that 
religious freedoms were categorised as choices by the employees.93 In other 
words, individual choices were balanced against the deprivation of services and 
in the end lost out.94 This conflict will be discussed at length in chapter 5 when 
George’s view of equality legislation is considered.  
It must be noted as will be discussed further in chapter 4, that in the EqA 2010 
religion and belief sits alongside eight other ‘protected characteristics’, including 
sexual orientation. This is noteworthy because there are concerns that religion or 
belief is different from the other characteristics and thus ought to be protected 
differently. Indeed, Sedley LJ held in Eweida v British Airways PLC95 that while 
                                                          
88 Sandberg, ‘The right to discriminate’ (n 53). 
89 Edge and Vickers, ‘Equality and Human Rights Commission Report 97 – Review of Equality and Human 
Rights Law relating to Religion and Belief’ (n 56).  
90 McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] IRLR 872. 
91 Islington Borough Council v Ladele (Liberty Intervention) [2010] 1 WLR 955. 
92 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). Later in chapter 5 we will see that the ‘choice’ for individuals to resign from their job 
and seek another job (a ‘specific situation rule’ submitted by the UK government) was only narrowly 
rejected by the ECtHR.  
93 See further R McCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ (2014) 77(2) 
MLR 277, 279. 
94 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). Partly dissenting judgment at [6]. See also Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73. 
95 Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80. 
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all the other protected characteristics apart from religion or belief ‘are objective 
characteristics of individuals; religion and belief alone are matters of choice.’96 
This is an interesting comment. Are the courts actively treating religion and belief 
differently? George’s treatment of religion may differ as he debates categorising 
religion as a basic human good within his NNL. The good of religion has been 
relentlessly debated between the new natural lawyers and its meaning and 
purpose have caused significant discussions, in a similar vein to the problematic 
decisions found in case law. The relationship between the good of religion and 
the protected characteristics within the EqA 2010 will form an important part of 
the discussion and critique involved in the modification and application of 
George’s NNL views in chapters 4 and 5, to critique the place of religious liberty 
within equality law.97 The notion of the ‘good of religion’ within George’s thought 
will be argued to be crucial in securing freedom of religion within equality law.  
I now move, secondly, to the protection of religious symbols. To understand the 
situation facing equality law surrounding religion,98 it is first necessary to take into 
consideration the wider European tensions surrounding religious human rights 
and religious symbols. This can be observed through the leading case of Lautsi 
and Others v Italy99 concerning the place of the crucifix in Italian schools. The 
ECtHR ruled that the requirement in Italian law that crucifixes be displayed in 
classrooms of state schools did not violate Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to 
education) of the ECHR. With such an approach, the presence of the crucifix, 
falling within the state’s margin of appreciation, did not breach the competing right 
of a parent to have her children educated in accordance with her convictions.100 
This highlights a protective stance taken by the ECtHR towards religious liberty. 
                                                          
96 Ibid [40]. 
97 As an example, Finnis compares the incommensurability of the goods with a proportionality analysis 
surrounding the protected characteristics - J Finnis, (2011) ‘Equality and Differences’ 56 Am. J. Juris. 17, 
35. 
98 A range of other cases related to religion will be noted throughout the thesis. For instance: Williams v 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2002] EWCA Civ 1925; R (E) v Governing Body of JFS 
[2010] IRLR 136 (SC); Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73; R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar 
General of Births, Death and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77; MBA v London Borough of Merton [2013] EWCA 
Civ 1562; Shergill v Khaira [2014] UKSC 33; Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68; 
Ebrahimian v France (2015) ECHR 370.  
99 Lautsi and Others v Italy (30814/06) [2011] E.L.R. 176. 
100 Lautsi and Others v Italy (30814/06) [2011] E.L.R. 176 [68-70]. 
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The issue of crosses is a recurring one in law: the remaining two conjoined 
applicants in Eweida v United Kingdom,101 Ms Chaplin and Ms Eweida, both 
brought claims regarding wearing the Christian cross at work. It was held in the 
earlier case of Chaplin v Royal Devon & Exeter NHS Foundation Trust102 that Ms 
Chaplin’s claim failed, following precedent set in Eweida v British Airways PLC.103 
The domestic courts dismissed Ms Eweida’s claim that her employers (British 
Airways) had discriminated against her on the ground of her religious belief, within 
the meaning of regulation 3 of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003/1. The claim was dismissed on the ground that the provision, 
criterion or practice that jewellery or religious items should be concealed was 
applicable to all employees regardless of their faith and did not put Christians as 
a group at a ‘particular disadvantage when compared with others persons’ as 
required by regulation 3(1)(b). With this very restrictive approach regarding 
religious symbols, the Court of Appeal’s judgment further held that Article 9 was 
inapplicable since the restriction on wearing a cross visibly at work did not 
constitute an interference with the manifestation of belief.104 Yet, even if it did, the 
court considered this limitation to be proportionate.105 As a result, both Ms Eweida 
and Ms Chaplin complained that domestic law failed adequately to protect their 
right to manifest their religion, contrary to Article 9 of the Convention, taken alone 
or in conjunction with Article 14. The distinction was that, unlike Lautsi, these 
claims involved an individual manifesting their religion, and unlike Ladele and 
McFarlane, this manifestation of religion was dependent upon an individual 
wearing a particular religious symbol (a cross) in the workplace. 
The decision handed down by the ECtHR was a particularly anticipated, intriguing 
judgment. As noted above, within Eweida,106 the ECtHR found that Ms Eweida 
had a right to manifest her religion in the workplace. By a 5-2 majority the ECtHR 
found that the domestic courts had given too much weight to BA’s wish to protect 
                                                          
101 Eweida v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 37. But not, it seems, in the ECtHR: the case of Eweida and 
Others v United Kingdom was the first time that the ECtHR addressed the question of applicants wearing 
crosses - P Smith ‘Book Review: E Howard, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols: European Bans on 
the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Education by Erica Howard (Routledge, 2011)’ (2014) Ecc. L.J. 226, 
227. 
102 Chaplin v Royal Devon & Exeter NHS Foundation Trust (2011) 13 Ecc. L.J. 242. 
103 Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80. 
104 Ibid [22] (Sedley LJ). 
105 Ibid [38]. 
106 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
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its corporate image.107 However, manifestation of religion may be limited because 
the ECtHR found otherwise for Ms Chaplin. The refusal by the health authority to 
allow Ms Chaplin to remain in post while wearing her cross was found to be an 
interference with her freedom to manifest her religion.108 Nevertheless, the health 
and safety concerns of the employer (preventing infection on a hospital ward) 
amounted to a legitimate aim and a proportionate restriction on Ms Chaplin’s 
freedom to manifest her religious belief within the margin of appreciation given to 
the state.109 In short, analysis points to manifestation being limited for both 
proportionate reasons and justified as part of a legitimate aim.110 These 
decisions, following in the vein of Lautsi,111 relied upon jurisprudential balancing 
of a conflicting rights discourse. It is these conflicting jurisprudential approaches 
(including the tensions they highlight for freedom of religion) which provide the 
basis for the analysis of the right to religious freedom in the EqA 2010.  
To enable this central thesis, an analysis of George’s NNL approach needs to be 
presented. This is in order to mount a telling critique of the place of religious 
liberty within English law. The key points that are required to be drawn from 
George’s thought were outlined earlier in this chapter. By exposing the flaws 
within George’s analysis of US equality laws (which can be traced to the general 
weaknesses within George’s approach explored within chapters 2 and 3 of the 
thesis), then, as a result, the earlier critique of George’s natural law will reinforce 
the later jurisprudential critique. By doing so, this approach will analyse freedom 
of religion within equality law.  
The relevant religious equality law is explored here. My critique of George’s 
thought has been briefly started in section 1.3 of this introduction and will be 
considered in far more depth in chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. I will argue that 
George’s consideration of the legal issues and concepts raised in these religious 
discrimination cases, suitably modified, would lead to a radically different process 
and form of judicial thinking. Can a solution to the outlined tensions be provided? 
Why would this interpretation be appropriate to secure religious freedom? To 
arrive at this position, chapters 2 and 3 will analyse George’s NNL jurisprudence 
                                                          
107 Ibid [112]-[114]. 
108 Ibid [97]. 
109 Ibid [99]. 
110 Ibid [100]. 
111 Lautsi and Others v Italy (30814/06) [2011] E.L.R. 176. 
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and consider problems evident within his thought. They will do so by considering 
his views upon two key themes: practical reason and natural rights. This 
modification of George’s thought is necessary to provide a coherent critique upon 
the place of religious freedom within the EqA 2010. This will lead directly into 
chapters 4 and 5, which will discern whether such an analysis of George’s thought 
provides a novel, innovative approach providing theoretical answers to religious 
liberty and religious discrimination problems – problems which pose necessary 
theoretical solutions. 
1.4 Introduction to New Natural Law/Lawyers 
For the purposes of analysing George’s thought, it is necessary to analyse NNL. 
This section will introduce and critique the main concepts and main contributors 
within NNL in order to understand the place of religion in NNL. This is so that 
throughout this thesis I can engage with this particular jurisprudence and thereby 
provide a telling account upon the right to religious liberty in the EqA 2010. First, 
I will introduce the main contributors. Second, I will provide an introduction to the 
NNL ethic. Third, I will introduce basic human goods within NNL. Fourth, I will turn 
to the NNL understanding of the First Principle of Practical Reason (FPPR). Fifth, 
I will consider how the FPPR relates to intentional action within the FPPR. Sixth, 
I will detail that NNL does not entail the claim that morality can be read from 
human nature and finally I will consider the place of flourishing in NNL. 
Robert George is not the creator of The New Natural Law Theory (NNL). NNL, 
which George defends and utilises, was originally formulated and pioneered by 
the theologian Germain Grisez.112 However, Grisez strictly denies being 
associated with the name or term ‘new natural law’. Grisez instead maintains that 
he has never regarded his work ‘as a contribution to “New Natural Law 
Theory”’.113 As was established in the last chapter the term ‘New Natural Law 
Theory’ was instead coined by Joseph Hittinger in his critique of the Finnis – 
Grisez position.114 Although Grisez’s opposition to the term may just be a matter 
of semantics, for how long can the Grisez School deny the name NNL theory, 
when all other parties refer to the theory by that name? I suggest that Grisez’s 
opposition to the name stems from, first, his position as a theologian rather than 
                                                          
112 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 1. 
113 Email from Germain Grisez to author (26 May 2011).  
114 Hittinger (n 13) 5. 
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a legal philosopher and, second, his opposition to Hittinger’s critique of the Grisez 
School’s position.115  
Although the Grisez School was started by Germain Grisez, it was subsequently 
developed through his collaboration with John Finnis and Joseph M Boyle.116 
These theorists together have been termed the Grisez School. Equally, as 
previously mentioned the theory has been referred to as ‘New Natural Law 
Theory’. This is a term that more accurately reflects the contemporary 
restatement of philosophical techniques being used and one that will be used in 
what follows.  
For the purposes of analysing George’s thought, we have already identified the 
Grisez School, yet the other new natural lawyers, such as: Russell Shaw, Patrick 
Lee, Christopher Olaf Tollefsen and Robert George, have contributed writings 
together and with the three primary Grisez School theorists.117 George claims 
that even though he has contributed to the development and application of certain 
aspects of NNL, yet, because the theory was originally created by Grisez, he can 
claim little credit for it.118 My objective is to show that George, to my mind, is being 
modest here. 
From the outset it is important to note that NNL has traditionally been viewed as 
a Roman Catholic ethical theory. The leading individuals are practising Roman 
Catholics. Indeed, the philosopher Jonathan Crowe suggests that the NNL 
theory, then, is strongly Thomist in methodology and content, while the views of 
its proponents tend to fall ‘within the mainstream of Catholic ethical thought.’119 
This has led to widespread perceptions of natural law theory as a ‘distinctively 
                                                          
115 Ibid. 
116 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 1. 
117 See for instance: G Grisez & R Shaw, Beyond the New Morality: The Responsibilities of Freedom 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1974); G Grisez and R Shaw, Fulfilment in Christ: A Summary of 
Christian Moral Principles (University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); R P George & C Wolfe, Natural Law 
and Public Reason (Georgetown University Press, 2000); Lee & George, Body-Self Dualism in 
Contemporary Ethics and Politics (n 3); and R P George & C O Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense of Human 
Life (Doubleday Books, 2008). 
118 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 1. 
119 J Crowe, ‘Natural Law Beyond Finnis’ (2011) 2(2) Jurisprudence 293, 294. However, prima facie, even 
if one rejects Catholic ethical teaching, I suggest there is no need to reject the jurisprudential theory; 
rather, a separation between the jurisprudence and the Catholic ethical theory can be achieved. This 
enables, at first instance, the merits of the jurisprudential theory to shine through, without the Catholic 
ethical teaching that many may reject. This will be argued in chapter 2.3. 
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and perhaps necessarily Catholic viewpoint.’120 Crowe here identifies the 
common assumption that natural law theory is associated with Roman 
Catholicism. Nicholas Bamforth and David Richards in Patriarchal Religion, 
Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural Law, develop this argument 
further through arguing that the jurists George and Finnis hold prominent 
conservative moral views on issues such as sexuality, making the theory ‘appear 
at first sight, to constitute a Catholic form of fundamentalism.’121 This criticism 
overstates the role and form of Catholicism – in particular Roman Catholic ethical 
thought - within the theory. Can it be denied, however, that there is a significant 
Roman Catholic influence within NNL writings? 
There is a sense that writing in a Roman Catholic vein, George and Finnis have 
contributed to the ethical debates surrounding abortion, nuclear deterrence and 
sexual morality have provided a notable and controversial exposition of the 
practical implications of the NNL theory. Throughout these writings, Biggar and 
Black believe there is an underlying Roman Catholic narrative.122 This is because 
conclusions are drawn that match and favour Roman Catholic teaching. From this 
narrative, it may be seen that, on balance, there is a consistent Roman Catholic 
influence and connection running through the scholarship indicating a form of 
bias. This may lead to conclusions favouring Roman Catholicism. As such, it may 
also be more appropriate to term this work a form of Roman Catholic or a 
Christian ethic. This recurring theme of a possible Roman Catholic bias will be 
discussed in greater depth in chapter 2, chapter 4 and also in the remainder of 
the thesis. 
Introduction to the Grisez School’s Ethic 
Even if it is suggested that NNL is influenced by Roman Catholic thought, 
Germain Grisez makes no claim that NNL is a Christian ethic in the sense that 
                                                          
120 Ibid. This pre-conception that academics with an interest in natural law must be Roman Catholic or 
must hold conservative views of moral issues is rejected by Crowe, who believes that this is to ‘throw 
out the baby with the bathwater.’ Ibid 294. Crowe identifies a phase of writing that diverges in 
important respects from both Aquinas’ writings and Catholic ethical teachings, he terms this the era of 
natural law beyond Finnis – ibid 294-295. As shown in this section, particularly in NNL writings I take a 
more critical view to the role of Roman Catholic thought.  
121 Bamforth and Richards (n 26) 30, 279. There is a sense in this work that, much in the same way as 
they criticise Finnis and George, Bamforth and Richards are driven by their own ideological secular 
humanist impetus to criticise NNL in an effort to justify their own beliefs. 
122 N Biggar & R Black (eds), The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses 
to the Finnis-Grisez School (Ashgate, 2000) 179, 180. 
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direct appeal is made to God’s self-revelation in Christ – instead, for Grisez, 
Christian ethics arise when a Christian world view transforms an ethic 
surrounding creation.123  Can it be denied then that NNL is a Christian ethic? 
Looking at the theory, for Grisez human well-being is human fulfilment found 
within religion. Because of this, the first principle of morality, which guides 
towards integral human fulfilment,124 is transfigured into the first principle of 
Christian morality.125 
Despite this engagement with religion, it is theologically possible for NNL theorists 
to engage with secular ethics and they frequently do so.126 Some critics have, 
however, suggested the Grisez School fails to present a Christian ethic. For 
instance, Black has suggested in Christian Moral Realism that while NNL work 
may be ethics written by a Christian, it may not be theological ethics, and thus is 
not an explicit form of Christian ethics, rather a form based upon the gospel.127 
Black suggests that understanding why Grisez’s theory is not more explicitly a 
Christian ethic is to understand that he desires to avoid ‘reinstating a conception 
of the Christian life that is shaped by another worldly focus.’128 As such, Black 
attempts to portray NNL as a form of Christian ethics,129 though comes to the 
conclusion it is a form of ‘Christian moral realism’.130 I suggest this portrays 
Black’s struggle to engage with the variety of NNL thought,131 which arises from 
the overt NNL engagement with secular ethics, built upon the earlier identified 
Roman Catholic bias.  
The problem here is that although it is a very attractive position to take 
(reconciling both secular and Christian ethics), it does not conclusively provide a 
solution to reconcile the presentation of moral theology and practical reason given 
                                                          
123 Black, Christian Moral Realism (Oxford University Press, 2000) 115. 
124 Biggar & R Black (eds), The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses 
to the Finnis-Grisez School (n 122) 67-68. 
125 Black, Christian Moral Realism (n 123) 145. 
126 For instance: J Finnis, J Boyle and G Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Clarendon 
Press, 1987); George, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (n 117); Finnis, The Collected Essays of John 
Finnis: Volume 5 – Religion and Public Reasons (Oxford University Press, 2011) 80. 
127 Black, Christian Moral Realism (n 123) 7, 8, 180, 181. A lack of consensus is shown because the 
theologian Oliver O’Donovan contrastingly believes that the theory is a Christian ethic to the extent that 
tradition has entered to reinforce the deliveries of practical reason - Biggar & Black, The Revival of 
Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School (n 122) 127. 
128 Ibid 167. 
129 Black, Christian Moral Realism (n 123) 140. 
130 Ibid 7, 8, 180, 181.  
131 Ibid 118. 
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the apparent Roman Catholic bias, in order to conclusively term NNL a Christian 
ethic. Could following the Roman Catholic Church’s teaching here be leading 
astray members of the Grisez School in their approach to moral philosophy? If 
so, will any analysis of George’s approach automatically prove fruitless because 
of the identified Roman Catholic bias? As such, the lack of consensus here 
presents a problem that needs to be resolved in George’s thought. This thesis 
will attempt to reconcile this ethic through the analysis of George’s thought, which 
is necessary in order to mount a coherent critique of the place of religious liberty 
within equality law. 
Basic Human Goods within NNL 
George believes that natural law theories are accounts of basic human goods 
and reasons for action that they provide.132 This is a very simple synopsis for 
NNL. It has merit in my view because the concept of the basic human goods is 
central to NNL and so the basic goods feature prominently in the writings of new 
natural lawyers. It is noted that the pluralistic goods first appeared as basic goods, 
then as basic human goods and latterly in Finnis’ work as ‘basic reasons for 
action.’133 George adopts these terms and so to adequately analyse George’s 
thought (in preparation for later deployment toward religious equality law) his 
interpretation of ‘basic goods’ will be introduced below and discussed in-depth in 
chapters 2 and 3.134  
For this introductory chapter, the first principles of natural law are not themselves 
moral principles, nor are they legal principles. Rather, they are philosophical 
principles that extend to and govern all intelligent practical deliberation, through 
the process of directing action towards possibilities that offer some intelligible 
benefit.135 Such principles refer to non-instrumental (‘basic’) reasons for action. 
These basic reasons for action are termed by NNL as ‘basic human goods.’136 To 
outline George’s thought surrounding the basic human goods, in Body Self 
                                                          
132 R P George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 229. 
133 Biggar & Black, The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the 
Finnis-Grisez School (n 122) 11. 
134 While George uses these terms interchangeably, he does tellingly note that: ‘Grisez, Boyle and Finnis 
call them “basic human goods’” and so this may indicate the preferred terminology - George, In Defense 
of Natural Law (n 4) 231. 
135 Ibid 105. 
136 Ibid 105, 128. 
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Dualism,137 George has presented the set of goods that constitute the flourishing 
life as follows: human life and health, speculative knowledge or understanding, 
aesthetic experience, friendship of personal community and harmony among the 
different aspects of the self.138 Importantly here there is no basic good of 
religion.139 This is because of the new natural lawyers’ interpretation and use of 
religion. George’s interpretation of the basic good of religion will be discussed in 
depth in chapter 2.2, chapter 4.4 and chapter 5 as a whole. George’s approach 
to the basic goods (through analysing his approach to practical reasoning) will 
also be criticised in the next chapter. 
The NNL understanding of the FPPR 
With the basic goods being basic reasons for action140 this helps to highlight the 
agent’s practical reasoning. In preparation for later analysing George’s position 
regarding the right to religious liberty, it is helpful here to comment on NNL and 
George’s/his understanding of the First Principle of Practical Reason [FPPR]. 
Aquinas’ statement of the first precept of the natural law was ‘good is to be done 
and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.’141 This formulation has been termed 
‘novel’ at its own time142 and scholars of Aquinas have explicated his meaning 
here. For instance, it has been suggested that principles of the natural law are 
based upon the FPPR143 and further that the FPPR is prior to the deliverances of 
practical reasoning, since it provides the foundation for them and directs towards 
some good.144 The centrality of this process within the exercise of our practical 
reason can be seen because through the FPPR one grasps the intelligible point 
of certain possible actions for ends (goods, values, purposes) which qua 
intelligible provide “reasons for choice and action’.145 In other words, the first 
                                                          
137 George & Lee, Body-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (n 3). 
138 Ibid 91. 
139 Chapter 2 will note that George does list a basic good of religion in his later work. See George, 
Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 1) 119. 
140 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn Oxford University Press, 2011) 443. 
141 ‘Good is to be done, and pursued, and evil is to be avoided’ - ST I-II q.94 a. 2c. - T Aquinas, The 
Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (Henle R J ed, University of Notre Dame Press 1993) 
262.  
142 R McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (rev edn, The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1997) 38. 
143 Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (Oxford University Press, 2002) 
216. 
144 Porter, “Basic Goods and the Human Good in Recent Catholic Moral Theology” Thomist 47 (1993), 
27, 29-30. 
145 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 4) 65. 
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principles of practical reason that direct action towards goods and reasons outline 
the range of possible rationally motivated actions.146 As such, it is clear that the 
exercise of our practical reason engaging with the good is important to the above 
established non-theological understanding of NNL jurisprudence. 
To deploy George’s thought to the Equality Act 2010 later in this thesis, chapters 
2 and 3 will detail that George broadly speaking follows NNL’s Thomistic147 
interpretation of the FPPR.148 This section will show that a difficulty with the NNL 
contribution is the connection between this FPPR and the basic reasons for 
action/basic good/goods. To establish this, the NNL approach to the FPPR leads 
to Finnis again drawing upon ST I-II q. 94 a. 2c and writing the ‘first principle of 
practical reason is ‘Good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided”.149 For 
instance, Finnis suggests that the FPPR prescribes: ‘one is to interest oneself in 
and act to instantiate intelligible goods’.150 The FPPR directs one to action. This 
helps to explain how according to Grisez’s interpretation of Aquinas, the FPPR is 
‘a principle of action.’151 Grisez further maintains that the FPPR provides a basic 
reason for action by prescribing rational pursuit be intentional toward ends and 
so making human action possible.152 For our purposes, according to Grisez’s 
interpretation of Aquinas, this is because the basic goods (treated as ends in 
themselves) render human choice intelligible by providing ultimate reasons for 
action.153 In other words, an item of behaviour is termed an action, when it is 
consciously directed towards some good.154 As such, the FPPR’s primacy is 
established. 
Moreover, the plurality of these basic human goods has a number of implications 
for George’s own NNL approach towards US discrimination law and the attempt 
to provide a superior critique of issues pertaining to religious liberty within equality 
                                                          
146 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 233. 
147 R McInerny, ‘The Principles of Natural Law,’ (1980) 25 Am. J. Juris. 1, 15. 
148 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 37. 
149 (bonum est prosequendum et malum vitandum) – Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social 
Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 1998) 95. 
150 Ibid 95. 
151 G Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 
Question 94, Article 2’ (1965) 10 Natural Law Forum, 168, 191. 
152 Ibid 190. 
153 G Grisez, Christian Moral Principles: The Way of the Lord Jesus. Vol 1 (Francisco Herald Press, 1983) 
180 relying upon T Aquinas, Summa Theologica (D Bourke & A Littledale eds, Blackfriars, 1963) I-II q. 14 
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law. The leading collaborative NNL restatement by Finnis, Grisez and Boyle: 
‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends’155 provides further insight 
into the connection between practical reason and the basic human goods. The 
article outlines that the basic goods are basic reasons for acting ‘because they 
are aspects of the fulfilment of persons, whose action is rationally motivated by 
these reasons.’156 Basic goods are intrinsic and constitutive aspects of human 
well-being and fulfilment.157 Finnis further writes that through said process 
‘practical reason gives participation to the end of flourishing within NNL.’158 For 
our purposes, it is evident that the ‘FPPR that directs [human] action to the basic 
human goods’159 points to ‘realising aspects of human flourishing’.160 This 
indicates that within NNL, as these basic human goods are constitutive aspects 
of the well-being and fulfilment of the individual; basic human goods provide 
reasons for action precisely insofar as they are intrinsic aspects of human well-
being or flourishing (Eudaimonia/eudaimonaiea). This displays consensus that 
the FPPR is rooted in the nature of the concept of the good which leads to 
flourishing. 
The important point for the upcoming thesis chapters is that it is arguable that this 
NNL theory of rationality and human flourishing is dependent upon the practical 
reasoning developed by Aristotle and especially his understanding of 
eudaimonaiea.161 Thus George and Finnis refer to requirements of practical 
reasonableness to mean the specifications of the (earlier identified) first principle 
of morality which guide action ‘by excluding options that seem reasonable only if 
one’s reason has been fettered.’162 They provide conclusive second-order 
reasons not to choose certain practical possibilities, in accordance with human 
flourishing. As such, drawing upon the classical tradition positions human nature 
in line with practical reason according to what is good. This position, built around 
                                                          
155 J Finnis, G Grisez and J Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (1987) 32 Am. J. 
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the concept that the FPPR directs to action, will further be seen as important in 
chapter 2’s analysis of practical reasoning in the work of Robert George. 
Intentional action and the FPPR within NNL 
If action that can be understood as conforming to the FPPR can be understood 
as intelligible rational pursuit toward ends,163 then the FPPR further prescribes 
intentional action by suggesting that it be intentional.164 Grisez believes that the 
first principle of practical reason expresses intentionality, which is the ‘first 
condition for conformity to mind [sic] on the part of works and ends.’165 This 
ensures that practical reason intentionally directs toward ends.166 The centrality 
of intention can be seen in the following comment: 
‘Intention is a tough, sophisticated, and serviceable concept, well worthy 
of its central role in moral and legal assessment, because it picks out the 
central realities of deliberation and choice: the linking of means and ends 
in a plan or proposal for action adopted by choice in preference to 
alternative proposals (including to do nothing).’167 
These words by Finnis clearly demonstrate the centrality surrounding intention 
and action within NNL jurisprudence. Where is this intentional direction toward 
ends within NNL drawn from? This is drawn from Aquinas stating: ‘[o]ne is said 
to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention,’168 which 
connects practical reason toward ends. A theory of action can also be brought 
out from Aquinas stating: “intention” indicates an act of the will, presupposing the 
act whereby the reason orders something to the end.’169 An agent further ‘does 
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not move except out of intention for an end.’170 I suggest this follows from: ‘all 
human actions must be for an end.’171 It becomes apparent that for Aquinas 
intentional action must be compatible and directed to ‘attainment of the final 
end.’172 By drawing upon original writing by Aquinas, we can further understand 
practical reasoning.  
The exercise of practical reasoning is linked to intentional action. Rodriguez-
Blanco argues that practical reason is ‘conceived as a form that is displayed in 
our intentional action’.173 For instance, the ‘sound structure of practical reason 
and the exercise of this capacity can be understood through the structure of 
intentional action.’174 It follows, to act for reasons is to act intentionally.175 
Intentional action is therefore very clearly found to be the paradigm of action.176 
This process intertwining practical reason and intentional action, draws upon the 
tradition evident in Aristotle, Aquinas and contemporary interpretations forwarded 
by Anscombe.177 For instance, Anscombe believes that ‘what Aristotle meant by 
practical reasoning certainly included reasoning that led to action.'178 Intentional 
action is thus successfully shown to derive from a rich philosophical history and 
is a key feature in any discussion surrounding practical reasoning and, in my 
view, so also any discussion involving NNL.  
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George identifies intentional action and is also very clear that the FPPR states 
that practical thinking requires one’s reasoning to be directed toward ‘some end 
that is pursuable by human action.’179 George arguably follows the Grisez School 
here through understanding that for ‘Aquinas, as Grisez reads him, the ends that 
the practical intellect grasps as ultimate reasons for action are properly 
understood as intrinsic human goods and, as such, aspects of human 
fulfilment.’180 It is evident that human fulfilment can be realised through human 
action.181 It is therefore apparent that following the Grisez School’s interpretation 
of Aquinas, the FPPR also draws connections in George’s thought directing 
rational pursuit toward ends.  
Importantly for our later analysis of the right to religious freedom, it was earlier 
established that for the Grisez School the FPPR that directs action to the basic 
human goods outlines the range of possible rationally motivated human actions. 
As such, criticism begins to arise because the FPPR is presupposed in acts of 
practical thinking;182 the FPPR ‘operates in all practical reasoning.’183 In other 
words, human action is possible precisely because we have seen that the 
overarching FPPR provides basic reasons for action by, once again, prescribing 
rational pursuit be intentional toward ends.184 The problem may be that in writing 
about the pursuance of the FPPR,185 Finnis, and the other new natural lawyers, 
have insisted that the reference to the ‘ultimate end’ of human life should be 
referred to in the plural: referring to ends.186 It has been argued that for Finnis 
this is analogous to goods, which provide the basis of the first principle.187 Within 
NNL, Lisska has similarly identified that practical reason is directed towards 
action for ends, and every end has the nature of good.188 Seeking the good is 
realised in terms of seeking the basic goods. This is a controversial approach 
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taken by the Grisez School and the alleged ‘modification’ of the FPPR by George 
will be the subject of debate in George’s work in chapter 2.2. 
Finnis within Natural Law and Natural Rights holds there to be seven basic forms 
of good.189 According to Finnis’ justification for the basic goods there is ‘magic in 
the number seven, and others who have reflected on these matters have 
produced slightly different lists, usually slightly longer.’190 The basic model 
present in intentional action and by which practical reason moves from principles 
to conclusions follows the practical syllogism.191 This is because the FPPR is the 
major premise of the practical syllogism and is the active principle when one 
deliberates and engages with the good (as seen by the agent). This practical 
syllogism shows the sound structure of practical reason and so is a ‘rational 
discourse at the service of [intentional] action and to guide choice.’192 The set of 
goods that are constitutive of a flourishing life are the result of this exercise of 
practical reason. For example, in Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis 
categorises these ‘basic human goods as: ‘life (and health); knowledge; play; 
aesthetic experience; sociability (friendship); practical reasonableness; and 
religion.’193 Mark Murphy, on the other hand, argues that natural law theorists 
‘disagree in their catalogs of basic goods’.194 He argues this emerges because a 
task is posed by ‘forming propositionally, and in as illuminating a way as possible, 
what items need be affirmed as intrinsically good in order to make sense of our 
inclinations.’195 The view put forward by Murphy is that within the exercise of our 
practical reason the new natural lawyers disagree on the categorisation of the 
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basic goods (that are constitute of a flourishing life). The basic human goods have 
altered over the course of the Grisez School’s writings and the scholarly input of 
different NNL theorists. Finnis himself has debated the inclusion of marriage 
between the publishing of Natural Law and Natural Rights196 and the publication 
of the Fundamentals of Ethics.197 The set of goods that are constitutive of a 
flourishing life are, however, the result of our exercise of practical reason and not 
the result of different categorisation/consensus. It will be shown in section 1.5 
that Finnis has also used different basic human goods.  
The rejection of human nature within NNL 
Further contentious issues in NNL could be considered, not least that NNL does 
not reach conclusions from human nature. As George states, NNL does not 
‘propose to judge the morality of acts by their conformity to human nature.’198 
Reasons for action are once more to be considered important because George 
maintains that we cannot deduce or infer reason for action from premises that do 
not include reasons for action. Rather our knowledge of basic reasons is 
underived from anything other than reason or an innate understanding of practical 
reasonableness:199 the basic good of practical reasonableness plays an 
‘architectonic role in guiding worthwhile human action.’200 George’s related claim 
is therefore that human fulfilment is directly linked to reasons for action, oriented 
toward what is good.  
This disassociation with human nature can be stressed further. It is because of 
the focus upon practical reason throughout this thesis that it can be re-
emphasised that intrinsic goods are basic reasons for action precisely because 
‘they are constitutive aspects of human flourishing (emphasis in original)’;201 they 
are intrinsic aspects of human well-being202 and human flourishing – the highest 
form of the good.203 NNL does not build or derive moral conclusions from 
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observations about human nature but by way of deductions from the basic 
goods.204  
This stance with respect to the basic goods provides the backdrop against and 
means by which NNL theorists have countered at least some criticisms laid 
against natural law traditions. For instance, the background to NNL not reaching 
conclusions from human nature flows from criticism directed towards natural law 
that human nature should warrant an ‘ought’ built into it.205 Debate arises because 
NNL maintains that we cannot infer or deduce the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’ of human 
nature.206 George’s rejection of the so-called is/ought dichotomy will be analysed 
in chapter 2.2. It can be noted here, however, that this is a rejection of the is/ought 
problem as articulated by David Hume and subsequently restated by G. E. Moore 
in his account of the naturalistic fallacy.207 For instance, Grisez attacks the 
suggestion that Aquinas identified moral norms by reference to knowledge of 
human nature208 He is concerned to ‘show how far this interpretation misses 
Aquinas's real position.’209 Similarly, Finnis is very clear: ‘the objection that 
Aquinas’s account of natural law proposes an illicit inference from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ is 
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quite unjustified.’210 As we ‘cannot deduce or infer the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’ of 
human nature’,211 it is argued that conclusions are not derived from premises that 
omit reasons for action – there is no movement from is to ought (facts to 
norms).212  
George’s rejection of the is/ought dichotomy will be analysed in chapter 2.2. For 
present purposes, if NNL does not build from human nature, but rather an 
understanding of practical reason, the question is what controversy arises within 
the theory regarding other factors present in rationally motivated action. In other 
words, do NNL proponents believe that the practical principles concerning the 
basic goods require other factors? It is important to clarify that while theorists 
writing in the NNL tradition believe that the practical principles concerning the 
basic goods do not state moral propositions, they still assume that desires and 
other factors (tastes, preferences) are essential ingredients, even in rationally 
motivated actions.213 NNL represents a set of general moral principles in order to 
structure and guide human choice between intelligible human goods. In Natural 
Law and Natural Rights214 Finnis labelled these principles the earlier mentioned 
‘requirements of practical reasonableness’.215 The controversial claim made by 
Finnis and George is that people sometimes desire to pursue certain ends or 
purposes precisely because of the reasons constituted and supplied by these 
ends or purposes themselves - intrinsic human goods can be sought as ends in 
themselves.216 For instance, one may want to learn more about John Locke’s 
political theory not as a matter of brute desire but precisely because of practical 
judgement that such knowledge is ‘humanly enriching and therefore worth 
pursuing quite apart from any instrumental value it might have.’217 George 
believes that learning more about John Locke is enriching for its own sake, rather 
than for any other more complicated desire.  
By doing so, it is clear that George accepts Grisez and Finnis’ presuppositions 
because practical reason is not merely dictated by reason/emotions, a ‘mere 
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instrument in the service of desire, which would prevent rationally motivated 
choice guided by practical intellect.’218 Adopting this position has led to criticism 
that not all basic spheres of human experience are covered, which highlights the 
lack of a ‘well-balanced view of human flourishing that interweaves the basic 
components of human anthropology, like reason, desires and passions.’219 
Rather, a very inclusive non-instrumental position is adopted where basic 
reasons for action and intrinsic human goods can be sought as ends in 
themselves while still holding a place for morality and desires. In chapter 3 this 
position will be analysed in relation to George’s thought. 
Human flourishing and NNL 
NNL scholars are very alert to the controversy surrounding the basic human 
goods and the connection to human fulfilment. For instance, controversy 
surrounding the basic goods can be seen within In Defense of Natural Law220 
through George’s adoption of the ‘incommensurability thesis.’221 This requires a 
defence of the proposition ‘that basic values [basic human goods] are 
incommensurable’.222  This is suggested to be contentious because the 
incommensurability of basic values provides ultimate reasons for action (with the 
focus placed upon the realisation of the basic good not focusing upon other 
reasons for action).223 As such, basic values cannot necessarily be calculated in 
accordance with an objective standard of comparison, and so if basic values are 
irreconcilable, criticism surrounds why one good cannot be selected at the 
expense of others.224 The answer provided is that with any derivation taken away 
from other more fundamental reasons via incommensurability,225 the focus is 
clearly placed upon the FPPR and realisation of the basic good towards the 
fulfilment of human living,226 that is, a life that flourishes and where the 
teleological orientation of human life toward fulfilment provides moral orientation; 
where human flourishing ‘can provide standards capable of guiding choice and 
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action despite the impossibility of comparisons of value.’227 Such a focus here 
places high dependency upon human fulfilment. 
Given that there is incommensurability between the basic human goods, this 
focus upon human fulfilment (which was explicated earlier), has further been 
identified by Hittinger as being “taken too far”.228 Here Hittinger criticises human 
fulfilment being linked to incommensurable basic values. For instance, Hittinger’s 
claim can be seen by new natural lawyers stating an ‘understanding of human 
flourishing as constituted by incommensurable values,’229 which again connects 
incommensurability of the goods directly to human flourishing. This contentious 
non-consequentialist approach towards the incommensurability of the basic 
goods and human flourishing will be reviewed in chapter 2.2.  
Within this thesis determinations of the FPPR will further be seen to be important. 
These determinations serve as first practical principles within practical reasoning 
– ‘the most basic precepts of natural law’230 – and they refer to the intrinsic goods 
which render human choices intelligible.231 For our purposes this is because 
George outlines that the natural law is made effective through choosing subjects 
bringing the principles of natural law into consideration in connection with human 
flourishing. For instance, in situations requiring moral choice, George argues that, 
even though practical reasoning has its own underived first principles, which 
include propositions concerning specific moral norms,232 termed ‘pre-moral’, 
individuals are still required to seek after the basic goods relevant to the particular 
situation.233 This is something that ‘every rational agent does to an extent, and 
every responsible agent does to a large extent.’234 I argue in chapter 2.2 that this 
is a contentious position following the treatment of the basic human goods.  
A difficult, broad scope and projection for the theory is here drawn at the outset: 
it is broad because it is one that applies to all rational agents, deliberating in 
situations of morally significant choice, and it is difficult given that moral 
conclusions will not be derived from premises that do not include reasons for 
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action,235 while at the same time not directly stating moral propositions. It is 
important to emphasise that George recognises that some natural law theories 
provide ways to identify basic principles of practical reasoning and morality.236 
The most contentious claim made here is that from these principles can be 
derived norms to distinctly guide legislators and, to an extent, judges in their 
judicial decision making process.237 For instance, George has suggested that 
others seek to guide legal interpretation, adjudication, and reasoning on the basis 
of a theoretically necessary connection between morality and law.238 This chapter 
will later adumbrate this particular reliance upon legal reasoning and natural law 
in order to reach pragmatic legal conclusions in line with the common good.  
Therefore, this is an introduction to a few of the problematic ways in which 
principles of NNL thought are brought into consideration. As such, this section 
has provided an introduction to the main concepts and a brief introduction to the 
main contributors in NNL. The next section will focus on the most prominent and 
prolific member, namely John Finnis. 
1.5 Introduction to John Finnis  
To critique George’s NNL thought, we need first to understand George’s most 
significant influence, namely John Finnis. Finnis is a leading member of the so-
called Grisez School.239 Finnis’ contribution to natural law jurisprudence In 
Natural Law and Natural Rights240 has been termed ‘a systematic and accessible 
defence of natural law’,241 that is, he has been deemed to engage with criticism 
facing contemporary natural law jurisprudence. His influence in natural law theory 
can be further seen in the edited collection of essays engaging with his work – 
Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis.242 Historically, natural 
law themes have been widely articulated as part and product of a philosophical 
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critique of ethical scepticisms (whether nihilism, relativism or subjectivism).243 
However, Lloyd Weinreb has suggested that, ‘in his book Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, John Finnis has developed the most substantial and serious 
contemporary theory to which the label of natural law attaches.’244 I broadly 
accept Weinreb’s conclusion in what follows and suppose that Finnis’ natural law 
theory of morality provides a foundation for kind of political theory and 
jurisprudence that he defends. 
The perceived importance derived from Finnis’ work is demonstrated by Robert 
George’s Natural Law, Liberalism and Morality.245 Here George maintains that 
Finnis, in Natural Law and Natural Rights,246 dramatically revived the tradition of 
natural law theorising, while concurrently contributing to an unprecedented and 
highly fruitful engagement of philosophical liberalism and natural law theory in the 
second half of the twentieth century. This influence upon George has persisted 
to the present day. For instance, natural law theorising continues to be utilised, 
defended and reinvigorated – in ways that distinctly converge and diverge from 
Finnis - by George.247  
One reason for this influence is the voluminous, wide-ranging scholarship.248 
Finnis is a prolific writer. His scholarship ranges from moral, political and legal 
philosophy to constitutional law and Roman Catholic theology (and even 
Shakespeare).249 We have already seen the NNL theory at the beginning of 
Natural Law and Natural Rights is, however, suggested to be ‘squarely based’ on 
the work of Germain Grisez.250 As such, would this necessarily prevent Finnis 
from being distinguished from other new natural lawyers? We will now move on 
to see the extent to which this claim is true. 
I presuppose in what follows that Finnis may be one of the many new natural 
lawyers, with each of whom providing different contribution. Although this detracts 
                                                          
243 J Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume I - Reason In Action (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 201. 
244 L L Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (Harvard University Press, 1987) 108. 
245 R P George, Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1996). 
246 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31). 
247 George, Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality (n 245) V. 
248 For a five-volume collection of Finnis’ essays, see J Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: 
Volumes 1-5 (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
249 See J Finnis, “’The thing I am”: Personal Identity in Aquinas and Shakespeare’ (2005) 22(2) Social 
Philosophy and Policy 250. 
250 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) vii. 
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from a single focus, the main unifying factor pulling together the wide-ranging 
contributions is NNL. 
This said, an express contrast between members of the Grisez School needs to 
be made: while Finnis is often also referred to as a constitutive member of the 
Grisez School, this School represents Grisez’s collaboration with Finnis and also 
with Joseph Boyle, such as in Grisez, Boyle and Finnis’ interdisciplinary ethical 
work: Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism251 and the further leading 
restatement of NNL ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’.252 This 
contrast is also shown in their individual academic fields: Finnis is a legal 
academic; Boyle is a philosopher; and Grisez is a theologian. While much of 
NNL’s philosophical theory was formed by Grisez, it is traditionally Finnis that 
receives much of the acclaim, particularly after the publication of Natural Law and 
Natural Rights.253 How much does Finnis recognise the influence of Grisez and 
other members of the Grisez School? While Grisez is referred to only 
intermittently throughout Finnis’ recent publication - The Collected Essays of 
John Finnis,254 I argue that Finnis owes a large debt to the Grisez School. For the 
natural law theory of morality that Finnis here proposes, providing his foundation 
for the political theory and jurisprudence he defends, is again ‘squarely based on 
the work of Germain Grisez.’255 Therefore, while the focus upon legal philosophy 
and the possibility of legal application in Natural Law and Natural Rights256 and 
The Collected Essays of John Finnis257 can be attributed to Finnis, the formation 
of the theory needs to be attributed to Grisez.  
Whereas Finnis has provided legal scholarship, Grisez’s contribution has largely 
been in the area of Roman Catholic moral theology/philosophy. I suggest this 
prevents any significant single focus within the Grisez School’s contribution. For 
instance, Robert George’s distinct contribution has taken NNL into the areas of 
American constitutional law.258 He has also devoted a monograph to the subject 
                                                          
251 Finnis, Boyle and Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (n 126). 
252 Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (n 155). 
253 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) vii.  
254 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volumes I-V (n 248). 
255 Ibid vii.  
256 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31). 
257 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volumes I-V (n 248) 201. 
258 See R P George, Great Cases in Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press 2000). 
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of moral paternalism.259 The contribution is a piecemeal, discipline specific one, 
with the only central thought being portrayed in Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and 
Realism260 and ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’.261 The main 
unifying factor here is the new natural law theory. This consequently provides 
scope for the wider application of NNL in later chapters. 
Introduction to Finnis’ Ethic  
Finnis, like the other members of the Grisez School, writes from a Roman 
Catholic theological perspective.262 This is an important unifying factor within NNL 
and also raises again the earlier discussion surrounding potential Roman 
Catholic bias, which is an important factor when considering influence upon 
George. Finnis does not expect his readership to be Roman Catholic, or to have 
any prior belief in a Judaeo-Christian deity. This is because, for Finnis, philosophy 
and theology are intrinsically linked.263 This is important to our understanding of 
Finnis’ writings for the question of whether it is a philosophical matter to suggest 
that the ‘existence and character of our universe give cogent reason for affirming 
the existence of such a transcendent explanation [of God]’.264 For Finnis, the 
existence of God can be discovered through nature, using the process of human 
reason.  
This positive association of nature and reason, traditionally associated with the 
Roman Catholic Church, invokes criticism from a Reformed theological position 
for which the teaching of total depravity mires any conclusion formed on the basis 
of an agent’s reason alone.265 For instance, Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black draw 
                                                          
259 R P George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 3) 105, 150.  
260 Finnis, Boyle and Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (n 126). 
261 Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (n 155). 
262 Ibid vi. 
263 It is evident that because the natural law theory adopted by Finnis draws heavily from Thomist and 
Aristotelian sources, this is why it is often referred to as the new classical theory of natural law. George 
follows this influence, for instance, George has also similarly acknowledged the ‘broad revival’ of 
Aristotelian-Thomism that occurred in the late 1970’s in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Elizabeth 
Anscombe, John Finnis and Philippa Foot - R P George, ‘Introduction’ in Keown and George, Reason, 
Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (n 242) 1. This highlights the rich philosophical and 
theological traditional drawn upon by Finnis and George in their work, which allows a deep engagement 
with a wide range of influences? 
264 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume 5 – Religion and Public Reasons (n 126) 80. 
265 Romans 3:23 Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Collins, 2002). For instance, as the ‘human moral 
order’ has been intrinsically corrupted from the fall, humans cannot know human nature and this has 
led Rufus Black to question whether NNL is a Christian ethic. His conclusion follows that whilst NNL work 
may be ethics written by a Christian, it may not be theological ethics, and thus is not an explicit form of 
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upon the theologian Karl Barth’s challenge to natural law and transfer this to NNL. 
Barth’s challenge is to build from Christian scripture.266 Biggar suggests that 
because of the traditional allegiances to different Christian traditions (Barth was 
a Protestant and NNL follows Roman Catholicism), it follows that Protestants are 
conventionally more sceptical than Roman Catholics of the abilities of sinful 
human beings to grasp religious or moral truth apart from spiritual conversion and 
enlightenment by scripture. This presents a problem for a Protestant 
interpretation of Catholic natural law theory.267 Once again, this draws upon the 
alleged Roman Catholic bias running through the work of the Grisez School. It is 
suggested by Biggar and Black that, because Finnis relies on human reason, he 
will not be able to determine basic goods, as any goods, apart from those dictated 
by scripture, will be tainted with sin. As Karl Braaton writes: ‘It is a longstanding 
commonplace in Christian thought that Protestantism distinguishes its moral 
theology from that of Roman Catholicism by its rejection of natural law’.268 His 
moderate suggestion for compromise is that natural reason alone and without 
revelation is not to be considered sufficient. In other words, there are some moves 
toward healing between Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions with respect to 
the relationship between revelation and reason. For present purposes, however, 
I merely note this longstanding tension and draw attention to the response given 
by Finnis.  
Finnis’ own response is to search for a reflective equilibrium between, first, 
revelation in the authoritative teaching of the church and, second, what would be 
judged morally reasonable even without revelation.269 In my view this draws some 
similarity with Braaten: he attempts to interrelation philosophy and theology, 
reason and revelation, within an account of natural law.  
                                                          
Christian ethics, rather a form of ‘Christian moral realism’ based upon the gospel - Black, Christian Moral 
Realism (n 123) 7, 8, 180, 181. This criticism will also be further discussed in chapter 2. 
266 Biggar & Black, The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the 
Finnis-Grisez School (n 122) 169. Essentially, Barth’s criticism is that, apart from revelation, we cannot 
know our own good, or goods, because of human sinfulness - Ibid 173. See also S Grabill, Rediscovering 
the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2006) 30. 
267 See also C E Braaten, ‘Protestants and Natural Law’ (1992) 19(1) First Things 20. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume 5 – Religion and Public Reasons (n 126) 10. 
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This acknowledged, Finnis’ Roman Catholic religious claims have become more 
explicit in recent years.270 Within the final chapters of Natural Law and Natural 
Rights271 and also in Aquinas,272 Finnis sought to provide arguments to affirm a 
divine creator and providential maintainer of the universe.273 Within a recent work, 
The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volumes I-V he does not only do this,274 
however, but further outlines arguments for refuting atheism and agnosticism 
(Volume V). Several of the essays in this collection indicate ways in which they 
open up the grounds for learning more about God’s nature. For Finnis, a deity 
can be approached through human rationality alone, that is, without explicit 
reference to revelation. Religion shares in reason’s radically public character.275 
This needs to be distinguished from a Rawlsian public reason approach because, 
unlike Rawls, Finnis’ position with respect to the authority of reason is rooted in 
Roman Catholic teaching. Indeed, for Finnis, there is ‘no need for the [Rawlsian] 
phrase public reason.’276 Ultimately, Finnis’ belief in the divine ordering of creation 
allows him to support a position with respect to practical reasonableness that 
further allows human beings to engage with the basic goods; there is he 
supposes a ‘basic intelligible good to which a distinct practical first principle 
                                                          
270 Finnis has become more confident in his explicit communication of public theology in recent years. 
Publications such as Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision and Truth (n 2); and Finnis, The 
Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume 5 – Religion and Public Reasons (n 126) have communicated 
Roman Catholic theology and ethics to non-theological academic audiences.  
271 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 231). 
272 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(n 149). 
273 Indeed, Michael Freeman believes that ‘God is Finnis’ conclusion, not his premise.’ By this Freeman 
means that, like Grotius, Finnis believes a theory of natural law does not have to stipulate God. For the 
theory ‘stands without need of a religious doctrine.’ M D A Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to 
Jurisprudence (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) 132. Whilst this may appear appealing to a non-
believer, Finnis within Natural Law and Natural Rights held that if you ‘accept the arguments of the 
book you will have a strong reason to believe in an Uncaused Cause of the Universe.’ Finnis, Natural Law 
and Natural Rights (n 31) Ch. XII. For a more recent restatement see J Finnis, ‘Does free exercise of 
religion deserve constitutional mention?’ (2009) 54 Am. J. Juris. 41, 56. This suggests that belief in a 
deity, in particular the Judaeo-Christian Roman Catholic conception, underlies Natural Law and Natural 
Rights – ibid (n 31). 
274 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volumes I-V (n 248). 
275 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume 5 – Religion and Public Reasons (n 126) 3. 
Bamforth and Richards maintain that Finnis’ work in Natural Law and Natural Rights is religious, despite 
Finnis’ claim they are of a secular nature – Bamforth and Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and 
Gender: A Critique of New Natural Law (n 26) 125. Given Finnis’ most recent publications combined with 
the earlier identified Roman Catholic bias point, I suggest this criticism is valid.  
276 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume 5 – Religion and Public Reasons (n 126) 4. This is a 
rejection of the ‘Public reasonableness’ concept argued by John Rawls most famously in A Theory of 
Justice (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971); J Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia 
University Press, 1993); and J Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ 64 Chi, L. Rev 765 (1997). This 
concept will be discussed at length in chapter 2.5. 
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directs us.’277 Hence his rejection of the Rawlsian position regarding public 
reason is identified.278  
As will become apparent below, Finnis’ stance with respect to the Rawlsian 
position significantly influences George. George’s approach to Rawlsian public 
reason will be discussed at length in chapter 2 where I shall offer a critique of 
George’s understanding of practical reasoning that draws attention to how 
George modifies the Rawlsian concept of public reasoning and traces 
consequences that follow for this own approach to US discrimination law.  
 Final causality and the basic human goods 
This section considers basic human goods within Finnis’ work. Of relevance to 
this topic is, first, the form of interpersonal communion shown by marriage as a 
basic human good. Second, the theory of final causality will also be considered. 
The modification required toward Robert George’s work later in this thesis stems, 
in part, from problems found in Finnis’ approach to this account of practical 
reason. So the foundational steps outlined here are important for my later critique 
of George’s analysis of the right to religious liberty. 
It was seen earlier in this chapter that the FPPR is the major premise of the 
practical syllogism in practical reasoning when one engages with the good and 
that the basic goods that constitute the flourishing life and provide reasons for 
action are the result of our exercise of practical reason. The NNL theory proposed 
by Finnis in Natural Law and Natural Rights279 is essentially a theory of practical 
rationality, and a difficulty may be that, as seen in the last section, Finnis’ 
acknowledged a list for the first principles of practical reasoning (basic goods) in 
1980.280 Finnis’ most recent publication, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: 
Volumes I-V,281 conveys, in part, however, how Finnis has altered his account. 
First, he has widened the basic good of play to include skilful performances 
included in work. Second, he has included the unique form of interpersonal 
communion that he calls ‘the marital good’ as a distinct form of basic good.282 
                                                          
277 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume 5 – Religion and Public Reasons (n 126) 4. 
278 Ibid 4. 
279 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31). 
280 As set out earlier, this included life, knowledge, aesthetic experience, play, practical reasonableness, 
friendship and community and religion - Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 85-90. 
281 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume I - Reason In Action (n 243). 
282 Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volumes I-V (n 248).  
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These are clear alterations, but the significance with respect to the overarching 
account of the basic good and practical reason is debatable. More important, 
perhaps, than the particular changes made is Finnis’ position with respect to the 
possibility that such changes can be made. So, for instance, in Volume I, Finnis 
helpfully acknowledges his failure to include the good of marriage as a basic 
human good within Natural Law and Natural Rights.283 The inclusion of marriage 
has been relentlessly debated by the new natural lawyers, and its omission is 
frequently questioned by critics. Finnis’ exercise of practical reason has here 
attracted criticism.284 In response, Finnis and the new natural lawyers have 
objected to attacks made upon the Roman Catholic Neo-Scholastic moral 
philosophical-theology.285 Finnis wanted to produce an ethical theory based upon 
practical reason that could instead withstand such an assault.286 This is why in 
engaging with the exercise of practical reason Finnis provides this account within 
NNL, because Finnis is insistent on the philosophically absolute nature of the 
theory.287  
I argue that the basic good of play and the ‘marital good’ are examples of Finnis 
trying to accommodate modern influences into the theory, all the while attempting 
to maintain the self-evident, morally absolute and universalist nature of the 
theory. It has already been established that Finnis frequently provides NNL 
scholarship. It is therefore possible through this scholarship for Finnis to engage 
with the good and remain (as earlier identified) both a faithful contributor to NNL 
jurisprudence and also a fervent Roman Catholic. 
This section will now move to analyse the relationship between the theory of final 
causality and the basic human goods. An examination of the theory of final 
causality will show the philosophical presuppositions that inform and shape 
Finnis’ approach to practical reason. The NNL account of the FPPR and 
connection with the good288 has been criticised for allegedly presenting natural 
                                                          
283 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31). 
284 M Murphy, ‘The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics’ (n 163). 
285 A contemporary type of moral theology arising from medieval sources, based on Aristotelianism and 
in which Thomas Aquinas is a leading figure. 
286 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 124. 
287 See Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision and Truth (n 2).  
288 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(n 149) 80. 
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law without nature.289 Although it was denied earlier in this chapter that NNL 
builds conclusions from human nature,290 it has, however, been maintained that 
neither Grisez nor any of his principal followers (George included) have ever 
denied that basic human goods and moral norms have grounding in human 
nature.291 The new natural lawyers are perfectly clear here. It is identified that 
NNL advocates in the Finnisian tradition, believe that basic goods and moral 
norms are what they are, precisely because human nature is what it is.292 Even 
though it is denied therefore that NNL builds conclusions from human nature, this 
rejects any notion that NNL is natural law without nature.293  
As such, it has further been consistently maintained in this chapter that NNL does 
not propose to judge by conformity to human nature but consistently by way of 
engagement with the good.294 For instance, Finnis derives knowledges of the 
basic goods from his teleological worldview.295 It was identified earlier in the 
chapter that this is by the focus upon the self-evident nature of the good as the 
ultimate end. A version of the natural law tradition is connected to conceptions of 
‘nature’ but there is also a more sophisticated version connected to the idea of 
‘practical reason’.296 For instance, in developing this connection between human 
nature and practical reason the theory of final causality entails the view that the 
agent does not need to infer the good from theoretical perspectives about nature 
(her own nature as theoretical). In order for this to be established it will now be 
                                                          
289 Bamforth and Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural Law (n 
26) 182; George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 158) 33. 
290 See section 1.4 – ‘The rejection of human nature within NNL’. It was established that NNL does not 
build from human nature but rather from an understanding of practical reason – as a reminder George 
states: NNL does not ‘propose to judge the morality of acts by their conformity to human nature.’ 
George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 34; George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 158) 
31; Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, 
Question 94, Article 2’ (n 151). 
291 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 158) 33. 
292 Ibid 33. 
293 Ibid 31. 
294 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 140) 443. 
295 There is dispute surrounding this classification. Finnis, Grisez and Boyle deny that NNL is teleological 
because unlike teleological theories, they believe that NNL shows why there are absolute moral norms - 
Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (n 155) 101. George 
contrastingly takes a more traditional position here by following Aquinas. This clarifies the matter 
because he views Aquinas as logically presenting a ‘teleological’ view based upon the theory of final 
causation - George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 41. 
296 V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Book Review: E Pattaro, The Law and The Right: A Reappraisal of the Reality 
that Ought to Be (Springer, 2007)’ (2009) 22(2) The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 451, 453. 
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shown that the final cause is understood by both Aquinas and Finnis to be 
important in the exercise of practical reason.  
I turn first to Aquinas. In a normative view of nature, the first of all causes is held 
by Aquinas to be the final cause.297 This is made very clear by the original text: 
‘[n]ow the first of all causes is the final cause.’298 Final causality is one of the ways 
in which Aquinas viewed the movement from potency to act in which change 
consists.299 NNL has similarly recognised how important the concept of final 
causality is to Aquinas’ understanding of natural law.300 The natural law theory 
advanced by Thomas Aquinas therefore holds an important place for final 
causality.  
Final causality also has an important role to play in Finnis’ thought. Indeed, to 
analyse practical reason and the basic goods in Finnis’ thought requires an 
understanding of final causality. It has been identified that Finnis reads Aquinas 
to invoke a philosophy that appeals to formal and final causality.301 This is why it 
was established above how ‘important the conception of end, or final causality, is 
to Aquinas's understanding of natural law.’302 Aquinas’ natural law understanding 
                                                          
297 D J O’Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (n 191) 14. J Bobick, Aquinas on Matter and Form and the 
Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione 
Elementorum of St Thomas Aquinas (University of Notre Dame Press 1988) 9. 
298 ST I-II q 1. a2 - T Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province tr, Burns, Oates and Washbourne Ltd, 1920) 4. See also: ‘Although the end be last in 
the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way that it is a 
cause’ Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (n 168) ST I-II q.1 a.1.  
299 O’Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (n 191) 14. J Bobick, Aquinas on Matter and Form and the 
Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione 
Elementorum of St Thomas Aquinas (University of Notre Dame Press 1988) 9. 
300 Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Q94, 
Article 2’ (n 151). See also V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘The Why-Question Methodology, The Guise of the Good 
and Legal Normativity’ (2017) 8(1) Jurisprudence 127, 136. Grisez goes so far as to suggest ‘that final 
causality underlies Aquinas’s conception of what law is.’ Ibid 182. See Aquinas, Commentary on the 
Sentences (first published 1253-1256, D Schrader tr, Mardonnet-Moos ed, 1956) bk. 3, d. 33, q. 2, a. 4, 
q'la. 4, c. The importance attached to final causality by Aquinas (and also NNL) is clear.  
301 J Finnis, ‘Aquinas' Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy’ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2014 Edn), E N Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/aquinas-moral-
political/> accessed 4th December 2016; J Goyette, M S Latkovic, R S Myers (eds), St Thomas Aquinas & 
The Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives (Catholic University of America Press, 2004) 9. 
See further Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal 
Theory (n 149) 170 drawing upon Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (n 168) ST I 
q.83 a.I ad 3. It is clear that George also traces final causality to Aquinas - R P George, ‘Kelsen and 
Aquinas on the Natural Law Doctrine’ in St Thomas Aquinas & The Natural Law Tradition: Contemporary 
Perspectives (eds, J Goyette, M S Latkovic, R S Myers, Catholic University of America Press, 2004) 237. 
302 Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Q94, 
Article 2’ (n 151) 181. See further Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: 
Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 149) 60. 
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leads Finnis to present practical reasoning with the good connected to an end.303 
It is suggested that the reason that final causality is important in Finnis’ work is 
precisely because basic goods are treated as ends.304 
Practical reason requires that reasons for action should be transparent to the 
agent.305 For individual agents, it was earlier identified that the goods, as reasons 
for action, provide reasons for agents to act.306 Certainly, reasons for action are 
limited by NNL to the basic human goods307 (presented as ultimate ends.)308 For 
our purposes this is because practical reason understands its objects in terms of 
good - through the FPPR practical reason acts on account of an end309 in all 
practical reasoning.310 This is made plain by Grisez writing that ‘all subsequent 
direction must be in terms of intelligible goods, i.e., ends toward which [practical] 
reason can direct.’311 It is thus clear that for NNL (and Finnis) final causality 
involves the self-evident FPPR directing in terms of goods: ends towards which 
reason can direct. The good as an end gives one a reason for action.312 This 
analysis shows that an engagement by Finnis with practical reason is present 
here with the good connected to an end. 
This reading from Aquinas and latterly Finnis connecting basic goods, human 
action and causality in NNL, again depends upon a theory of rationality. It has 
been established there is a clear link between final causality and the action 
oriented basic human goods. In order to further analyse Finnis’ NNL thought 
                                                          
303 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(n 149) 79-80. Finnis relies upon Aquinas ST I-II q.94 a. 2c and I-II q.56 a.3c. 
304 Finnis and Grisez and Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,’ (n 155) 100. Finnis 
elsewhere writes that “[s]ince ‘good’ and ‘end’ are interdefinable, they are equally our basic ends.” 
Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 
149) 80. See Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (n 168) ST I-II q.56 a.3C. 
305 V Rodriguez-Blanco & G Pavlakos (eds), ‘Introduction’ in Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical 
Agency (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 4. 
306 Murphy, ‘The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics (n 163). See also Finnis, Founders of Modern Political 
and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 149) 95. 
307 Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (n 155) 115. 
308 Ibid 133.  
309 Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Q94, 
Article 2’ (n 151) 181. 
310 Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (n 155) 119. 
311 Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Q94, 
Article 2’ (n 151) 181. 
312 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(n 149) 95. Further support can be found for this connection. The Grisez School have termed NNL a 
‘theory of some of the principles of human action’ – Finnis and Grisez and Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, 
Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,’ (n 155) 100.  
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surrounding final causation and action, a theory of rationality drawing upon 
practical reason (like that proposed by Finnis) is framed from what Rodriguez-
Blanco terms the deliberative point of view.313 In the philosophy of action, 
Rodriguez-Blanco asserts that description of the action can be held to be from 
the point of view of the person who performs the action.314 It follows that the form 
of intentional actions is given by description provided by the agent.315 As such, 
there is connection in human rationality between action and causation.316 
More specifically, Finnis shows how the deliberative point of view is connected to 
practical reason. For Finnis, practical reasoning is ‘deliberating about what to 
want and choose to try to have.’317 A theory of rationality (such as practical 
reason) requires the notion that that agent herself engages with human action. 
The agent’s practical reasoning thus requires the deliberative point of view to be 
known through the end or goal of intentional action and this provides the form of 
the action.318  
                                                          
313 Rodriguez-Blanco, Law and Authority under the Guise of the Good (n 173) 28. Rodriguez-Blanco 
identifies that the central description of the action comes from the deliberative point of view because it 
is the perspective that ‘truly grasps the action as intentional.’ Ibid 59. This coherently attempts to weave 
together the deliberative point of view and intentional action.  
314 Ibid 28. 
315 Ibid 37. 
316 Indeed, Raymond Stout additionally identifies in the philosophy of action an Aristotelian focus upon 
agents as causes - R Stout, Action (Acumen, 2005) 61. For a compelling account drawing upon 1048a15-
21 (Metaphysics IX) to establish links between intentional action and causation in Aristotle, see Charles, 
Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action (n 191) 108. See further in the original text Aristotle, Physics, Book II, ch. 
3, 194b-195a in Aristotle, The Basic Works of Aristotle (R McKeon ed, Random House 1941) 240-242. 
317 J Finnis, ‘Law and What I Truly Should Decide’ in The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume IV – 
Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 41. See also J Finnis, ‘On Hart’s Ways: Law as Reason 
and as Fact’ in The Collected Essays of John Finnis: Volume IV – Philosophy of Law (Oxford University 
Press 2011) 235-236, 256. 
318 V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Does Kelsen’s Notion of Legal Normativity Rest on a Mistake?’ (2012) 31 Law 
and Philosophy 725, 727-728. For Rodriguez-Blanco, the deliberative point of view can be further used 
to criticise Finnis. By using the Aristotelian notion of central analysis, Finnis tries to show that the 
‘deliberative point of view is the central or paradigmatic case to determine the nature of law.’ 
Rodriguez-Blanco, Law and Authority under the Guise of the Good (n 173) 77. (Finnis set out the ‘central 
case’ in Natural Law and Natural Rights - Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 14-15.) Yet it is 
suggested that this ‘central case’ approach does not sufficiently assist us in showing the primary role of 
the deliberative point of view that Finnis aims to defend - Rodriguez-Blanco, Law and Authority under 
the Guise of the Good (n 173) 77. It is questionable whether this sufficiently shows a theory of rationality 
drawing upon practical reason is from the deliberative point of view. This is therefore modified through 
suggesting that ‘the paradigmatic case of creating and following legal rules is the case of legal 
authorities and citizens who engage with objectively sound grounding reasons as good making 
characteristics of legal rules’ - ibid 206. See also V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Is Finnis Wrong? Understanding 
Normative Jurisprudence’ (2007) 13 Legal Theory 257, 259. Rodriguez-Blanco does well here to identify 
a problem with Finnis’ approach to practical reason and further integrate the deliberative point of view 
in practical reasoning. 
318 Rodriguez-Blanco, Law and Authority under the Guise of the Good (n 173) 28.  
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To recap: in this section it has been shown that the theory of final causality entails 
the view that the agent does not need to infer the good from theoretical 
perspectives about nature (her own nature as theoretical). It follows, therefore, 
that the agent actualises her practical reasoning capacities to apprehend the 
form319 and bring about the result.320 As the connection between the form of the 
action and the end of intentional action was earlier established,321 final causality 
can stem from the individual’s form.322 As such, it is my view in this section that 
manifestation in action does not build from nature. It has been argued that, 
instead, it is through a theory of rationality which is from the deliberative point of 
view and reliant upon the agent via practical reasoning. Chapter 2.3 will argue 
that such reliance upon human rationality throughout George’s writings may be a 
flaw in his thought. 
This emphasis upon human rationality and final causality has been shown to draw 
from an account of practical reasonableness. Arguably this theory of basic human 
goods contributes to Finnis providing the most recognisable323 and contentious324 
form of Roman Catholic moral teaching in contemporary jurisprudence. The 
philosophical presuppositions that underline Finnis’ approach to practical reason 
have been highlighted. My working assumption in what follows is therefore that 
Finnis’ account of practical reasonableness provides the most considered recent 
defence of the natural law. This position is very influential. It is a substantial 
influence upon George. As such, it was earlier identified that George’s thought 
indicates that human fulfilment is directly linked to reasons for action, according 
to what is good. The next section will consider whether this account given by 
Finnis provides a sustainable approach toward legal validity. 
Introduction to legal validity within Finnis’ work  
As will be shown in chapter 2.3, George and Finnis hold dissimilar positions 
concerning legal validity. George’s view upon legal validity is important when 
applying George’s thought to equality law. To this end, Finnis’ position towards 
                                                          
319 Ibid 73. 
320 Ibid 68. 
321 Ibid 103. 
322 J Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (William B. Eerdman 2005) 296. 
323 Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (n 244) 108. 
324 See Hittinger, Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (n 13); Black, Christian Moral Realism (n 123); 
and Bamforth and Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural Law 
(n 26). 
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legal validity will be analysed, to enable the later critique of George. In this 
section, I shall analyse Finnis’ position on legal validity and look at application 
following this position. There is a range of thought surrounding legal validity in 
NNL jurisprudence, and George’s work is a clear example. For George, legal 
validity depends upon a ‘minimum standard of reasonableness’325 and so then 
this arguably creates the ‘moral reading’ of the natural law thesis. This follows 
from George’s conditional nature of obligation viewpoint, which suggests that all 
the natural law theorist wants is to issue a reminder that adherence to some laws 
would constitute such a departure from reasonableness that there could not be 
adequate reason to obey them, and so the only law that merits our obedience is 
law that meets a certain minimum standard of reasonableness in line with the 
common good.326 With this viewpoint it is evident that George believes that legal 
validity depends upon law that contains a ‘certain minimum standard of 
reasonableness’.327 For Mark Murphy, this is termed the ‘moral reading’ of the 
natural law thesis.328 This ‘moral reading’ will receive detailed analysis in chapter 
2.3 when critiquing George’s approach to practical reasoning, which will be 
essential in applying George’s thought to analyse the right to religious freedom 
within the EqA 2010. 
In contrast, for Finnis, there is not a simple and universal moral criterion for the 
validity of every law.329 Instead, legal validity imposes obligation. Finnis’ position 
towards legal validity will be analysed here, so that in chapter 2.3 critique can be 
applied to the contrasting standard adopted by George. For Finnis, validity has to 
do with the observance of proper procedures. Whereas ‘an unjust law is no longer 
legal but rather a corruption of law’330 is a teaching of Aquinas, Finnis 
distinguishes that this is not a thesis about the validity of law in the technical 
sense.331 Rather, validity depends upon the observance of proper procedures by 
persons having appropriate competence: obligation. As the validity of the relevant 
statutory norms is not put in doubt by their injustice, it is reasonable to suggest 
that they can instead be defective or corrupt legal rights or legal duties. Finnis 
                                                          
325 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 158) 68. 
326 Ibid 51. 
327 Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 9. 
328 Ibid. 
329 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 158) 108. 
330 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 4) 139. 
331 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 357–360. 
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holds that this defectiveness weakens and, in very serious cases, negates any 
moral case for obedience.332 As such, Finnis is termed a ‘weak natural law’ 
theorist by Crowe.333 A rule or command that does not provide decisive reasons 
for action is defective under the ‘weak reading.’334 By drawing a position that 
obligation depends upon legal defectiveness, this distinguishes Finnis’ position 
towards legal validity. This focus upon defectiveness, rather than a conditional 
evaluation of the law’s merits, is an important way Finnis is distinguished from 
George. 
However, the ‘weak’ designations given (by Crowe and Murphy) to Finnis 
does(may) not accurately display the breadth of Finnis’ thought. In a moral sense, 
legal validity imposes obligation. For Finnis, ‘legal obligation is treated as at least 
presumptively a moral obligation’.335 This is a ‘viewpoint [which] will constitute the 
central case of the legal viewpoint.’336 This ‘central case’ may be read as: 
those who … treat law as an aspect of practical reasonableness, there will 
be some whose views about what practical reasonableness actually 
requires in this domain are, in detail, more reasonable than others. Thus 
the central case viewpoint itself is the viewpoint of those who not only 
appeal to practical reasonableness but also are practically reasonable.337 
                                                          
332 Ibid 108. 
333 J Crowe, ‘Between Morality and Efficacy: Reclaiming the Natural Law Theory of Lon Fuller’ in ‘Review 
Symposium – K Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon Fuller (Hart Publishing, 
2012)’ (2014) 5(1) Jurisprudence 96, 114–115.  
334 Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (n 327) 48. Murphy makes clear that a central 
thesis of natural law political philosophy and jurisprudence can be independent from a central theses of 
the natural law account of practical rationality – ibid 4. As such, Michael Freeman has suggested that 
Mark Murphy’s work is the most significant natural law work since Finnis published Natural Law and 
Natural Rights – Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (n 273) V. Murphy has also (here) 
termed NNL a form of the weak natural law thesis, see: Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (n 
31) 26. Yet, Murphy does not consider any problems associated with defective law here. To invoke the 
positivist critique – what does it matter if valid law is defective, is it not still law? Murphy’s criticisms 
towards George will be addressed in chapter 2.3. 
335 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 14. 
336 Ibid 14–15.  
337 Ibid 15. Rodriguez-Blanco broadly agrees with NNL that ‘the paradigmatic case of law is from the 
point of view of the man exercising practical reason.’ Rodriguez-Blanco, Law and Authority under the 
Guise of the Good (n 173) 206. For Rodriguez-Blanco, by using the Aristotelian notion of central analysis, 
Finnis tries to show that the ‘deliberate point of view is the central or paradigmatic case to determine 
the nature of law.’ Ibid 77. Yet Rodriguez-Blanco does not believe that this ‘central case’ approach 
sufficiently assists us in showing the primary role of the deliberate point of view that Finnis aims to 
defend – ibid. So Rodriguez-Blanco does very well to modify this by suggesting that ‘the paradigmatic 
case of creating and following legal rules is the case of legal authorities and citizens who engage with 
objectively sound grounding reasons as good making characteristics of legal rules’ - ibid 206. See also 
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It is clear that, as a moral realist (believing that there are set moral truths),338 
Finnis demonstrates that law is a moral phenomenon within the ‘central case’ 
viewpoint.339 The presentation of law as a moral phenomenon, ensures that 
Finnis holds there is still place for evaluating content within legal adherence. This 
may position Finnis’ reading closer to George’s ‘moral reading’. This ‘central case’ 
demonstrates how moral obligation is further inherently tied to practical 
reasonableness. For this thesis it is key therefore that through this practical 
reason directs the obligation created by laws to enable the participation in human 
flourishing. This will be key in the application of George’s thought towards the 
Equality Act 2010 in order to analyse the right to religious freedom. 
Introduction to practical application of natural law within legal 
adjudication 
To further see how George’s position will arguably differ from Finnis, although 
Finnis does not say much about the practical application of his theory to legal 
adjudication, Finnis has anticipated and responded to the issue of application 
later in Natural Law and Natural Rights. In a verbose manner Finnis demonstrates 
that law co-ordinates behaviour so that members of the community can enjoy the 
good life, to the extent that law is: 
…Rules made, in accordance with regulative legal rules, by a determinate 
and effective authority for a complete community and buttressed by 
sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of adjudicative 
institutions, this ensemble of rules and institutions being directed to 
reasonably resolving any of the community's coordination problems for the 
common good of that community,340 
Here, I argue this provides Finnis with a broad-brush approach to law which 
allows wider interpretation and legal application in line with the community’s 
common good. For instance, Finnis provided a NNL critique to question whether 
the Supreme Court proposed to replace proportionality with rationality as the 
standard of review of primary legislation341 in R (on the application of Nicklinson) 
                                                          
Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Is Finnis Wrong? Understanding Normative Jurisprudence’ (n 317) 259. Once again 
the centrality of practical reason is maintained. 
338 My thanks goes to Professor Julian Rivers for this classification. 
339 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 14-15.  
340 Ibid 276. 
341 J Finnis, ‘A British “Convention Right” to Assisted Suicide?’ (2015) 131 LQR 1, 3.  
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v Ministry of Justice,342 which concerned s.2 of the Suicide Act 1961.343 As such, 
it is apparent that Finnis’ view of law as a moral phenomenon provides discretion 
towards adjudicative consequences within the legal process. This is exactly what 
many legal statutory tests employ with the concept of ‘reasonableness’.344 Yet, 
even if it is suggested that Finnis may not say much of practical value, it does not 
follow that this is also the case for George. 
This thesis will show that George brings practical application built on practical 
reasoning from NNL. It is arguable that George elaborates upon the practical 
application of his theory through believing that authority to enforce the natural law 
may be vested with the legislature as a check on law making power.345 The 
natural law acts as a check upon its own enforcement. I also suggest George 
goes further and states that the legislator follows the practical intellect346 – 
‘determinatio’347 (earlier identified as Aquinas’ first practical principles) – to derive 
the positive law from the natural law.348 George believes that the degree of law-
creating power is a matter of both the ‘positive law of the constitution’349 and is 
purely determinable by the natural law alone. This is one method that is applied 
to the creation of law in both statutory and case law form. As will be analysed 
further in chapter 4, this may well present a justiciable form of natural law. I 
believe that this shows George’s reliance upon scholastic legal reasoning and the 
natural law to reach pragmatic legal conclusions in line with the common good.350 
As such, although Finnis’ influence is significant, this is one area in which 
George’s thought is distinct. In the critical application of George’s NNL views to 
equality law throughout this thesis, chapter 4 will note the limits that this places 
                                                          
342 R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38. 
343 This section reads: ‘s2 (1) A person (“D”) commits an offence if — (a) D does an act capable of 
encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person, and (b) D's act was 
intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.’ 
344 For instance: s.14 (2A) Sale of Goods Act 1979 – (satisfactory quality of goods); s.76(4)(a) Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (self-defence); s.98(4)(a) Employment Rights Act 1996 (unfair 
dismissal). 
345 R P George, The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford University Press, 1996) 329. 
346 R P George, ‘Natural Law’ (2007) 31 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 171, 189. 
347 Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (n 168) ST I–II, q. 95, a. 2. 
348 George, ‘Natural Law’ (n 346) 171, 190. 
349 Ibid 171, 191-192. 
350 It should be noted that unlike the United States of America, the UK does not have a written 
constitution. An analogous method to solve this jurisdictional problem will be shown in chapter 4. 
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upon adjudication, and George’s applicatory method will be further discussed in 
chapter 2.3.  
Introduction to Finnis’ interpretation of Aquinas 
The thought, or perhaps the interpretation, of Thomas Aquinas is a central feature 
of this thesis. This section will consider how far John Finnis differs from Aquinas. 
It will consider Finnis’ approach to human reasoning and the way Finnis 
approaches the good in light of Aquinas’ work.  
John Finnis, has published widely concerning Aquinas. For instance, Finnis’ 
extended contributions in Natural Law and Natural Rights and perhaps most 
notably Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory351 where he proposes a NNL 
exposition to Aquinas’ treatise on law and government. To comment briefly on 
the latter theme here – government – a standard liberal objection to Aristotelian 
and Thomistic political thought is that it licenses an excessively expansive and 
intrusive role for political authorities.352 Finnis accepts that ‘there are some 
serious flaws in Aquinas’ thoughts about human society’353 and that ‘my 
exposition quite often goes beyond what Aquinas says’.354 Within this important 
work concerning Aquinas, Finnis argues that norms of natural law limit the scope 
and potential for intrusiveness of government in a variety of significant ways.355 
In other words, the natural law provides an obstacle for the state. This highlights 
how natural law can provide a political limitation and this influence will be 
important in George’s critique towards the state, as will be shown in chapter 5. 
It is debatable, however, whether the Grisez School take themselves to be 
developing, and building upon, the classical theory expounded by Aquinas.356 
Indeed the neo-naturalism of John Finnis et al. is a development of classical 
natural law theory. However Hall has suggested that the Grisez School have 
                                                          
351 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(n 149). 
352 K Greenawalt, ‘What are Public Reasons?’ (2007) 1 J.L. Phil. & Culture 79, 82.  
353 Ibid vii. 
354 Ibid viii. For one situation in which Finnis openly departs from Aquinas, see Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (n 31) 94-95. 
355 George, Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality (n 245) v. 
356 For instance, the extent to which new natural law theory is Neo-Thomist, and whether it is a good 
representation of Aquinas, has been debated by Ralph McInerny, ‘The basic dimensions of human 
flourishing: a comparison of accounts’ in N Biggar & R Black (eds), The Revival of Natural Law: 
Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School (Ashgate, 2000).  
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given up any claim that their natural law is Aquinas’.357 In contrast a derivational 
claim moving from Aquinas was made in: Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, ‘Practical 
Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’.358 Here the authors note that whilst 
some language used is broadly speaking ‘Thomistic’ they ‘differ in various ways 
from….Thomas Aquinas’.359 For instance, it was established above that Finnis 
admits his ‘exposition quite often goes beyond what Aquinas says’.360 It is clear 
by their own admission, that although Aquinas features centrally in the work of 
John Finnis and the wider Grisez School, there are significant differences. As 
such, chapter 2 will show that George’s NNL significantly differs from Aquinas’ 
natural law theory, and this critique will be important in highlighting the flaws in 
George’s thought for the purposes of later application. The accuracy of the claim 
that new natural law theory is Neo-Thomist will also be a large part of the debate 
in chapter 2.2 – ‘Robert George’s interpretation of Practical Reasoning in 
Aquinas’.  
A brief analysis of Finnis’ approach to Aquinas’ reasoning can be outlined here. I 
will further develop this in chapter 2.2 and chapter 3 to analyse George’s thought. 
The role of human rationality is a central tenet in the writings of both Aquinas and 
Finnis.361 Finnis interprets Aquinas as suggesting that the role of reason in NNL 
takes a forward role to divine revelation. Moreover, he suggests this mode of 
natural law reasoning taken from Aquinas, as well as Aristotle, does not 
presuppose any form of revelation. The elements of what is proposed to us by 
divine revelation are neither opposed nor incompatible with any truth accessible 
to natural reason.362 It is clear that within Finnis’ account this puts general 
                                                          
357 See P M Hall, Narrative and the Natural Law: an Interpretation of Thomistic Ethics (University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1998) 74. 
358 For a classic treatment of new natural law theory citing Aquinas see Finnis, Grisez and Boyle, 
‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (n 155). 
359 Ibid 99. 
360 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(n 149) viii. This is surprising, given that in Natural Law and Natural Rights Finnis terms Aquinas to be ‘a 
paradigm ‘natural law theorist’’ - Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 28. 
361 This introduction will necessarily be brief and the role of human rationality will be developed in 
chapter 2. 
362 Finnis’ reading does suggest, however, that some truths proposed by divine revelation, are 
altogether inaccessible to philosophical reasoning, and that there is no reason for believing them, save 
that God ‘directly or through the divinely established Church, has proposed them to us as true.’ Finnis, 
Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 149) 296 
quoting T Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (Aeterna, 2015) I c.3 n. 2 [14], c. By doing so, Finnis provides 
an escape for controversial religious practices that may (and perhaps should) be questioned on the basis 
of rational objection. 
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revelation ahead of special revelation. Finnis believes that rational argument will 
heat the conflict, yet also resolve any conflict between revelation and 
philosophical conclusions termed ‘natural reason.’ This indicates that natural law 
is the resolution to any conflict. Natural reason is able to ‘defend divine revelation 
against all rational objections.’363 Given that natural reason is philosophical 
reasoning based on ordinary experience of natural things, which are unaided by 
any divine revelation, then natural reason is in theory capable of meeting rational 
objections.364 As such, this is why Finnis suggests in Natural Law and Natural 
Rights that if you ‘accept the arguments of the book you will have a strong reason 
to believe in an Uncaused Cause of the Universe.’365 In addition to again 
indicating possible favouritism for religious belief, this is a clear instance whereby 
natural reason works alongside (divine) revelation.  
Though, it needs to be remembered that the NNL interpretation of Aquinas relies 
upon distinguishing a class of practical principles that Aquinas considered self-
evident. According to Aquinas, ‘[t]he good of the human being is in accord with 
reason, and human evil is being outside the order of reasonableness.’366 As such, 
Finnis points out that ‘for Aquinas, the way to discover what is morally right (virtue) 
and wrong (vice) is to ask, not what is in accordance with human nature, but what 
is reasonable’.367 Once again, this highlights human reason, which can be read 
together with the earlier need for nature within natural law.368 This is evidently a 
common theme within Finnis’ interpretation because Finnis’ account of the 
‘common good’ links to human reasoning:  
…a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain 
for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realise reasonably for 
                                                          
363 Ibid. 
364 Ibid 296. This has led Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black to criticise NNL. They believe an underlying Roman 
Catholic narrative to be employed because NNL cannot present a ‘coherent body of knowledge about 
the human good, its components and its moral implications, which is sound per se, and to which reason 
can in fact attain ‘naturally’ that is, without illumination by revelation.’ Biggar & Black, The Revival of 
Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School (n 122) 179, 
180. Chapter 2.3 will show that this critique has merit because George moves beyond reliance solely 
upon revelation in his claims about legal moral reasoning. This observation by Biggar and Black also 
highlights, once again, the recurring Roman Catholic bias that will be identified throughout this thesis. 
365 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) Ch. XIII. 
366 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 298.  
367 Ibid 298. 
368 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 158) 31. 
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themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to 
collaborate with each other (positively or negatively) in a community.369  
To build on Finnis’ conclusion, George highlights a dominant issue – a central 
tenet of scholasticism and post-Hartian370 natural law theory – which is a belief in 
a universal human nature in line with the common good.371 The interpretation 
here again brings out the criticism provided by Biggar and Black toward Roman 
Catholicism: following from the teaching of total depravity, the ability of human 
reason to reach conclusions on the basis of human nature is compromised.372 
The Thomistic influence Finnis draws may further realise this criticism 
surrounding human reasoning. This can be seen through Finnis, following 
Aquinas, with the ‘first principles of natural law’, principles that can be grasped 
by ‘anyone of the age of reason … [and] are per se nota (self-evident) and ... 
underived.’373 As such, the centricity of human reasoning seen through practical 
reasoning in Finnis’ thought, will carry over into the criticism of George’s thought 
in chapter 2. This is because moral reasoning will be shown to be essential in the 
analysis of George’s thought in order to establish a better critical understanding 
towards the place of religious liberty within equality law. 
We have seen above that Finnis frequently derives his thought surrounding 
reasoning from Aquinas.374 Questions arise, however, about his reading of 
Aquinas and his use of his basic concepts in the development of the New Natural 
Law theory. To conclude this section I will show that Finnis may misread Aquinas 
in the development of the basic human goods. Work in a collection of essays 
edited by George helps highlight an inconsistency between Finnis and Aquinas. 
From Finnis’ reading of Aquinas, Finnis suggests that: ‘A Natural Law theory in 
the classical tradition makes no pretence that natural reason can identify the one 
right answer to those countless questions which arise.’375 To answer these 
questions, Finnis assumes that, in the classical view expressed by Aquinas, 
‘there are many ways of going wrong and doing wrong; but in ... perhaps most 
                                                          
369 Ibid 235. See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 155. 
370 See Crowe, ‘Natural Law Beyond Finnis’ (n 199). 
371 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 235 quoting Aquinas, ST I-II q. 71, a. 2c. 
372 Biggar & Black, The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to the 
Finnis-Grisez School (n 122) 169, 173; Black, Christian Moral Realism (n 123) 7, 8, 180, 181. 
373 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 33.  
374 Ibid. 
375 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 158) 151, 152. 
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situations of personal and social life there are a number of incompatible right (i.e. 
not-wrong) options.’376 This leads Finnis to the conclusion that prior personal 
choice ‘can greatly reduce the variety of options for the person who has made 
that commitment,’377 in the later exercise of practical reason and engaging with 
the good. Thus, we can see that Finnis, a Thomist, develops his theory of basic 
human goods upon themes which are to be found in Aquinas.378 But no 
description or recognition of basic human goods is specifically outlined by 
Aquinas. As we have seen, Aquinas merely held the principles to be ‘self-evident’ 
and ‘indemonstrable’.379 This reading is also supported by the Aquinas scholar 
Ralph McInerny. McInerny notes that there is not any form of list in Aquinas’ 
work.380 Rather Aquinas listed precepts of practical reason without, purposefully, 
listing human goods. For instance, it is suggested that although the outline of the 
FPPR in ST I-II 94.2 is the most fundamental precept of the natural law, Aquinas 
does not state that basic goods are then self-evident to all persons.381 
Schockenhoff further provides clarity here by suggesting that Aquinas did not 
intend to present a complete list of all the intermediary principles of practical 
reason but instead intended to discuss their necessary interplay with the natural 
ends of human striving.382 The good is connected to the end without specifying 
the basic goods. As such, Finnis incorrectly builds from Thomas. By explicitly 
listing basic human goods here then we can see a significant issue has been 
raised in Finnis’ development of Thomistic natural law theory. The claim is that 
this theory depends upon a logical interpretation of Aquinas’ theory, and yet it 
appears to struggle to adequately incorporate the essence of Aquinas’ writing 
concerning the good. This has led to a potential incorrect movement concerning 
the human goods which may be a misnomer. This will be an important 
                                                          
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid. 
378 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 85-90. In the monograph Aquinas, Finnis further draws 
doubt upon his interpretation of the basic human goods. He concedes that Aquinas has no word or 
phrase literally corresponding to ‘reason for action’ and does not use the adjectival metaphor ‘basic’ but 
then goes on to assert that there are ‘basic reasons for action’ by reading Aquinas, ST I-II q.94 a. 2c and 
ST I-II q.14 a.2c - Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and 
Legal Theory (n 149) 95. 
379 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 4) 108. 
380 R McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2012) 121. See Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (n 168) I-II. Q. 94; ST II-II q. 
108. a2.  
381 J Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (n 204) 92-93. 
382 E Schockenhoff, Natural Law and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in a Historical World (B O’Neill trs, 
Catholic University of America Press, 2003) 162. 
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consideration for analysing George’s own interpretation regarding practical 
reasoning following Thomas Aquinas’s thought. Chapter 2.2 will show how 
George’s understanding surrounding the basic human goods similarly misreads 
Aquinas through listing specific basic human goods.383 
Introduction to Finnis’ use of natural rights 
The influence of Aquinas is also necessary for Finnis’ doctrine of natural rights. 
Finnis uses a doctrine of natural rights, drawing on older Thomistic theory of 
natural rights, and then applies this to a Western rights theory in order to come 
to applied conclusions concerning current legal matters. This is necessary to 
explain Finnis’ Neo-Scholastic theory of natural law and natural rights, which is a 
central part of NNL. This is also important for understanding George’s natural 
rights doctrine which will be analysed in chapter 3. Tierney, in the Idea of Natural 
Rights,384 finds there to be considerable disagreement among scholars who have 
tried to relate the Judeo-Christian religious tradition to the growth of Western 
rights theories.385 One school sees all modern rights theories as rooted in the 
‘atheistic’ philosophy of Hobbes386 and so regard them as incompatible with the 
whole preceding Christian tradition.387 Yet another school of thinkers, perhaps 
most famously Jacques Maritain,388 sees a doctrine of individual rights as always 
implicit in the Christian emphasis on the dignity of human personality. There is a 
division in the scholarship here. 
Finnis, George and Maritain instead see a relationship between modern rights 
theories and the more classical doctrines of natural law. Natural rights are shown 
to be essentially a) implicit in the Christian emphasis on the dignity of human 
personality and b) out workings from principles that are always inherent in the 
natural law tradition.389 This may align Finnis and George with the second school 
                                                          
383 Chapter 2.2 will argue that George misreads inclinations within Aquinas’ work (see ST I-II q. 91 a.2) 
and finds them to be analogous to the basic human goods.  
384 B Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-
1625 (Wm. B Eerdmans Publishing, 1997). 
385 Ibid 214, 215. 
386 Thomas Hobbes’ ‘social contract theory’ (outlined in T Hobbes, Leviathan (C B Macpherson ed, 
Pelican, 1968) Ch. XIII) contributed to a natural rights theory which will form discussion in chapter 3.  
387 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-
1625 (n 384) 214, 215. 
388 A Thomist political philosopher who was instrumental in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948. See J Maritain, Man and State (University of Chicago Press, 1951) 76-107. 
389 Ibid 4-5. 
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outlined above, one which embraces the Christian tradition. In rejection of the first 
school, Finnis has recently termed Hobbes’ theory of natural rights to be 
‘rationally ineligible, an outrageous muddle…in which there are…no human or 
natural rights.’390 Instead, allegiance towards more classical doctrines is often 
dependant on the interpretation of Aquinas.391 In contrast, however, Tierney 
critically believes that Aquinas did not teach any doctrine of ‘subjective natural 
rights’,392 nor had any theory of natural rights.393 Villey’s interpretation provides a 
basis for denigrating subjective, individual natural rights:  
A key-word for Villey is Aristotle’s dikaion – the just – usually rendered into 
Latin as ius. Aristotle understood the term in two senses, neither of them 
equivalent to the idea of a subjective right. He distinguished between 
justice as a moral virtue and justice as an objectively right state of affairs 
in a particular context, something inherent in the nature of a situation, or 
“in the nature of the case”.394 
For Tierney, this provides no concept of modern, subjective natural rights and he 
has further read this into Aquinas. This would dismiss any concept of subjective 
natural rights in Aquinas. Moreover, Villey asserts that for Thomas, the meanings 
of ius and lex were quite different. Thomas did indeed distinguish between the 
two terms in his definition of ius within the Summa Theologica.395 But he followed 
this at once in the next article with a sentence in which the terms seem equated 
with one another, and elsewhere in the Summa he used them interchangeably.396 
This initially presents a difficulty in tracing Finnis’ natural rights basis back to 
Aquinas. 
However, given the breadth of scholarship focusing upon Scholasticism and 
natural rights, it is not difficult to find conflicting scholarship. Brett has seen 
Aquinas as adapting Aristotle to view ius or right objectively as the iustum, the 
‘right thing’ in a given situation. The notion of right as the object of justice is laid 
                                                          
390 J Finnis, ‘Grounding Human Rights in Natural law’ (2015) 60(2) Am. J. Juris. 199, 217. 
391 E D Reed, Theology for International Law (Bloomsbury, 2013) 142. 
392 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-
1625 (n 384) 257. 
393 Ibid 88. 
394 Ibid 24. 
395 Ibid. See T Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (n 168) ST II-II q.57.1.  
396 Ibid 24. Villey considered that to a modern jurist a right is a power; to a classical jurist a ius was ‘a 
thing.’ Ibid 16. 
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out in Book V of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics.397 Brett also supports the 
common assumption that Aquinas exhibits Aristotelian intentions within his work. 
If this is justified, then Aquinas may be said to rely upon a doctrine of natural 
rights. For Aquinas opens his treatment in Summa Theologica not with a definition 
of the virtue itself but with a definition of its object,398 according to the principle of 
Aristotelian science that the ‘identification of the object logically precedes that of 
the faculty or habit.’399 Aquinas establishes the nature of ius as the object of 
justice.400 Accordingly, he takes note of the Aristotelian concept of justice as ‘the 
constant and perpetual will of rendering to each his right.’401 Finnis conversely 
translates the Thomistic iustum within Natural Law and Natural Rights, translating 
iustum as ‘the fair’ or the ‘what’s fair’.402 This is particularly indifferent to whether 
the iustum is a thing or an action.403 So Finnis may overlay Aquinas’ approach to 
natural justice with a modern and substantive account of natural rights. As such, 
this allows Finnis to derive a natural rights basis from the natural law tradition 
following Aquinas. George’s own natural rights position and his position in relation 
to natural rights within NNL will be the focus of concern in chapters 2.2/2.3 and 
chapters 3.3. Here I will argue George further diverges from Finnis and may take 
his natural rights basis from what I will term the ‘secular humanist tradition’, which 
includes Thomas Hobbes. This allows George to go further in applying natural 
rights. This key difference between Finnis and George will be argued to make 
George the ideal candidate in order to help analyse religious freedom within the 
EqA 2010. 
Introduction to religious liberty within the work of John Finnis 
The sections above have presented the Thomistic interpretation and natural 
rights basis used by Finnis. How then has Finnis applied his position in 
subsequent literature? This section will show the consideration Finnis gives to 
religious liberty in his work. Establishing this will provide context for analysing the 
                                                          
397 A Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 88. 
398 Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (n 168) ST I-II q. 55, a. 1. 
399 Brett (n 397) 92. 
400 T Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas (n 168) ST II-II q. 57 a. 1. See Finnis, 
‘Grounding Human Rights in Natural law’ (n 390) 214. 
401 Brett (n 397) 92. The object of justice, according to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, is the iustum or 
just thing - ibid 91. 
402 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 31) 206. 
403 Brett (n 397) 91. 
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flaws within George’s own approach towards US discrimination law, in order to 
provide a superior critique surrounding religious liberty within equality law. When 
Finnis considers religious liberty, his consideration of religion depends upon the 
value given to the subject by society. If religion is considered by society as ‘just 
one among the deep passions and commitments that move people’ then for 
Finnis this would lead to the conclusion that ‘it does not deserve constitutional 
mention on account of any special dignity or value.’404 Indeed, Finnis rejects this. 
For Finnis, religion is a basic human good and thus does deserve dignity and 
value. In contrast, the religious liberty scholars Einsgruber and Saber strictly deny 
to religion and religious liberty any moral or constitutional status distinct from 
other ‘deep commitments.’405 Accordingly, at the outset, there may be no reason 
why religion and religious liberty deserve particular protection, or indeed any 
protection at all. By his own admission, Finnis recognises that there need to be 
‘necessary and appropriate limits [imposed] on the right to religious freedom’.406 
This thesis will attempt to explain the reason why, and the process as to how, 
new natural lawyers have regard for this ‘good.’ Chapter 4.4 will build upon this 
‘good’ and apply this understanding to English religious liberty case law in chapter 
5, in order to analyse the right to religious liberty.  
The new natural lawyers provide fundamental rights for religious liberty. The 
arguments that George uses when defending religious liberties are built upon 
these fundamental natural rights. For instance, chapter 4.2 will show that for 
George, the right to religious liberty is preceded by the basic good of religion.407 
In addition, for Finnis, the first amendment of the American Constitution and the 
European Convention on Human Rights both intrinsically associate religious 
liberty with freedom of conscience.408 This is more easily established within the 
Article 9 title: ‘Freedom of thought, conscience and religion’. It will be argued in 
chapter 4 and chapter 5 that this rights basis, grounded in a basic good approach, 
allows religious judgements to be made in line with individual conscience. Yet, 
why is religious liberty important to natural law? The answer given by the Grisez 
School is that religious matters allow divine creativity and intelligence to ‘provide 
                                                          
404 J Finnis, ‘Why Religious Liberty is a Special, Important and Limited Right’ (2008) Notre Dame Law 
School Legal Studies Research Papers 09 (1) 5. 
405 Ibid 4. 
406 Ibid 14. 
407 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 1) 117. 
408 Ibid 7. 
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[the] ability [for us] to make judgements that link us with real opportunities of 
flourishing.’409 Religious liberty is linked to flourishing. Therefore religious liberty 
is essential to NNL.  
In Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political 
and Legal Theory,410 Finnis emphasises the Scholastic interpretation used in 
NNL reasoning. This Thomistic interpretation is important in the context of 
religious liberty reasoning. For Aquinas, the fundamental proposition about 
human freedom was that it is ‘through one’s will, that one’s reason has the power 
to move one to action, and one’s ‘will’ is the capacity to share by responding to 
reason.’411 As a result, human freedom is fundamentally linked to the combined 
action of will and reason. This is a process of having ‘free-will and control’ of one’s 
actions.412 Within religious liberty and discrimination law, we can see all three 
engaged. In this section, Finnis’ analytical contribution to moral, political and legal 
philosophy and substantive case law has been shown to be grounded in a NNL 
basis. Moreover, even if it is suggested that Finnis does not say much of practical 
value, it has been shown that this is not also the case for George - although Finnis 
is a significant influence, George diverges significantly from this influence. This 
provides a platform to comparatively display and analyse Robert George’s 
approach in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. This required improvement of 
George’s thought consequently provides scope for the application of NNL thought 
in later chapters.  
Now that the contribution of the Grisez School and its most prominent member 
has been considered, in order enable a possible application of George’s NNL 
views towards equality law, the next section will highlight where this work will be 
carried out. 
                                                          
409 Ibid 9. It is from this basis that Finnis has termed religious truth to be a ‘higher good’, this is because 
‘religious truth, and the religious community organized around it, is in some important ways higher and 
of higher significance – that is, rationality has a more directive, because all-embracing, status in 
deliberation – than the requirements of one’s political community’. J Finnis, ‘Reflections and Responses’ 
in Keown and George, Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (n 242) 574. Once again, 
this is a controversial position and the favouritism towards the good of religion may further indicate a 
Roman Catholic bias. George’s approach to the basic good of religion will be analysed in chapter 2.2.  
410 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(n 149). 
411 Ibid 70 quoting Aquinas, Summa Theologica (n 153) ST I-II q. 90, a. 1 ad 3; ST I q. 19, a. 1c. 
412 Aquinas, Summa Theologica (n 153) ST I-II pr. 
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1.6 Chapter Summary 
The work provided by this thesis will be the first time that a detailed examination 
of Robert George’s work in relation to the Equality Act 2010 has been compiled. 
It is anticipated that this will form a comprehensive reference point for future 
examination of the jurisprudence of Robert George in relation to analysing the 
right to religious freedom within the Equality Act 2010. This initially presents a 
broad scope to the thesis. The thesis title: ‘Equality Act 2010: Law, Reason and 
Morality in the Jurisprudence of Robert P. George’ is also ideally suited to analyse 
the thoughts, ideas and academic contribution provided by George. This process 
significantly narrows the scope of the thesis and by doing so this chapter has 
established that this work will improve upon George’s thought to provide a unique, 
novel approach. 
While the academic contribution by George is sizeable; the academic literature 
written on George, particularly in the areas of moral philosophy and religious 
liberty/employment law is significantly smaller. This is shown by an extended 
focus on the new natural lawyers, with particular reference to the Grisez School 
- there have been whole works devoted to the subject - such as Hittinger’s 
Critique of the New Natural Law Theory413 and Bamforth and Richards’ 
Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural Law.414 
There has also been plenty written surrounding Finnis’ individual contribution.415 
It is an expected outcome; however, that there has been no such focus on 
George’s contribution as a new natural lawyer. There is certainly far less attention 
paid to George than Finnis - there has been very little written about George’s 
thought. George has published widely – so why then has there not been such a 
focus?  
Why is there a disproportionately small focus upon George? Is it because George 
is the forgotten brother of the Grisez School? Do academics view George’s 
                                                          
413 Hittinger, Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (n 13). 
414 Bamforth and Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural Law (n 
26). 
415 For instance, a small sample: A J Lisska, ‘Finnis and Veatch on Natural Law in Aristotle and Aquinas’ 
(1999) 36 Am. J. Juris. 55; Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Is Finnis Wrong? Understanding Normative Jurisprudence’ 
(n 357); M Wright, ‘The aim of the Law and the Nature of Political Community: An Assessment of Finnis 
on Aquinas’ (2009) 54 Am. J. Juris. 133; Crowe, ‘Natural Law Beyond Finnis’ (n 119); Keown & George, 
Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (n 242); and P Yowell, ‘Book Review: J Finnis, 
Collected Essays: Volume I-V (Oxford University Press, 2011)’ (2013) 2(1) Ox. J Law Religion 247, 254. 
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contribution as largely derivative and so not worthy of discussion? Is this because 
there are large tensions present in George’s jurisprudence that prevents analysis 
surrounding this jurisprudence from being applied to the Equality Act 2010? Has 
George not contributed to the discussion of discrimination/equality law? Are 
George’s views so reviled that they are not deemed worthy of discussion? This 
has identified an area of research that needs to be conducted. By introducing the 
problem facing religious liberty and introducing the new natural lawyers 
(particularly John Finnis), this chapter has provided a platform to delve deeper 
and analyse George’s thought.    
George’s specific analytical NNL jurisprudential contribution will therefore be 
analysed in the thesis in order to resolve substantive and conceptual tensions 
that arise for religious freedom in the application of the EqA 2010. This gives 
scope for the analysis of George’s thought as well as its application. To improve 
upon, analyse and modify George’s thought, Chapter 2 will be entitled ‘Robert 
George as New Natural Lawyer – The Importance of Practical Reason’. This will 
consider George’s use of practical reason and the tensions that this causes in his 
work. To this end, the chapter will demonstrate that George stands in a position 
subtly different to that of the rest of the Grisez School. The chapter will critically 
analyse, first, George’s unique contribution to NNL and use of reason (particularly 
his approach to Aquinas’ understanding of the good which will present his 
interpretation of practical reasoning within Thomas Aquinas’ work). Secondly, the 
chapter will consider George’s work beyond Aquinas focused around debate 
about the validity of laws. To achieve this I will consider the sources of George’s 
approach to moral reasoning, which are: a) divine revelation, b) moral realism, c) 
human reason and d) value – with particular focus upon Ronald Dworkin’s 
approach to religion in Religion Without God.416 Finally, this chapter will consider 
George’s use of practical reasoning through the challenges posed by the 
Rawlsian public reasoning critique and the subsequent liberal critique that this 
has drawn. By doing so, this chapter will begin to critically apply George’s thought 
in order to later analyse religious liberty within the EqA 2010. 
Chapter 3, entitled ‘Robert George as New Natural Lawyer – Source and 
Development of Legal Rights’ is necessary to present significant influences upon 
                                                          
416 R Dworkin, Religion Without God (Harvard University Press, 2013).  
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George’s work in the context of his natural rights basis. This chapter will consider 
aspects of George’s unique contribution drawn from the secular humanist 
tradition, for example: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Samuel Von Pufendorf and 
Huge Grotius. Despite claims that George’s work is largely derivative of other 
new natural lawyers, it will be argued that George’s use of the secular humanist 
tradition is illustrative of the unique contribution that he has made to the NNL 
tradition. It will be argued that this is through his rights discourse. As such, this 
chapter will show George’s narrowing of natural law jurisprudence towards a 
natural rights discourse. It is anticipated that chapter 3 will analyse George’s 
contribution by detailing the transformation of natural law reasoning into natural 
rights jurisprudence. 
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 are required to prepare for the application of Robert 
George’s NNL views to religious liberty law in chapters 4 and 5. The anticipated 
outcome, if as expected, will open the way for the substantive case law analysis 
carried out in the later chapters which will assess the right to religious freedom 
within equality law. This is because these chapters will highlight and critique two 
key themes and tensions within George’s thought: practical reason (chapter 2) 
and natural rights (chapter 3). These themes will be shown to be fundamental in 
the application of George’s views when assessing religious equality law. Within 
chapters 4 and 5, through critically analysing George’s NNL approach towards 
substantive law, conclusions will be drawn about George’s use of discrimination 
law on grounds of religion and belief. This is in order to solve the tension 
surrounding the protection of religion and belief at work. 
As such, Chapter 4 entitled ‘Robert George’s Approach to Discrimination and 
Equality Law’ brings an innovative approach to NNL jurisprudence. Within recent 
religious equality law cases, it has been noted in this chapter that particular 
jurisprudential tensions have arisen and it may be suggested that a natural law 
approach holds the key to these problems. So the question is how has George 
dealt with discrimination/equality law, particularly discrimination on grounds of 
religion and belief? Chapter 4 will focus upon George’s approach to discrimination 
law to provide analysis and begin the application of George’s approach to equality 
law. In particular, this chapter will critique George’s thought surrounding US 
discrimination law, where George has considered constitutional matters, natural 
law ethical debates and religious communication. From this, the interpretation 
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and reasoning employed by George in cases such as Griswold v Connecticut,417 
and Romer v Evans418 is expected to show a novel, innovative approach. This is 
an approach from which I can analyse problems within George’s jurisprudence 
and provide theoretical answers to the tensions faced by religious freedom 
generated by equality law which, as identified earlier, pose necessary theoretical 
solutions. Chapter 4 will show that this theoretical critique is applicable across 
both jurisdictions. Through analysing George’s approach, chapter 4 is necessary 
to derive a set of transferable concepts and criteria that can be applied in chapter 
5.  
Within chapter 4 I will, firstly, analyse George’s methodology towards 
discrimination and equality law; secondly, introduce George’s approach to US 
religious liberty case law; and thirdly, present the ‘natural rights and the common 
good’ approach George applies to US and European constitutional case law to 
highlight the tensions within applied NNL. This will therefore make it possible to 
determine whether the modification of George’s thought is necessary in order to 
provide a telling critique of the place of religious liberty in equality law. 
Following this Chapter 5, entitled ‘Possible Application of Robert George’s 
Approach to Religious Liberty and Religious Discrimination’, will seek to show 
whether the analysis in the previous chapters can be applied to the equality law 
issues at hand. These are the important equality law issues in relation to religious 
liberty issues that the English legal system faces. Such an approach will provide 
a stronger, richer understanding surrounding equality. This will further improve 
and support the concept of equality in modern public discourse. Building from the 
critical analysis already applied to George’s work, can the modification of his 
theory be effectively applied and relied upon to resolve the tensions evident in 
the law and George’s theory? This chapter will therefore show George’s critique 
of equality law. This will include George’s critique of religious liberty cases taken 
under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010.  
This section will do so by addressing a number of concepts that currently feature 
in the discourse surrounding the right to religious freedom. At this outset this later 
work requires clear identification. For instance, through focus upon the 
                                                          
417 Griswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479.   
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manifestation of religion and belief under Article 9 in Eweida, it will be claimed 
that under George’s use of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act 1993, 
natural rights are held by individuals as protection against the state. Through a 
focus upon the concept of individual autonomy, it will be established that this 
posits a right for individuals to manifest their religion in the workplace. As such, 
George’s thought will analyse the right for individuals to manifest religion. 
Another example will be that by a critique of the ‘specific situation rule’,419 
George’s thought will be further analysed in relation to choice in chapter 5. Here 
it will be argued that in a ‘goods based’ opposition towards laws restricting 
religious liberty, the concept of ‘legal liberty’ offers a balance to individuals forced 
to change jobs. Freedom to change jobs will not be shown to be a form of religious 
freedom within equality law. 
Further it will also be suggested in chapter 5 that freedom of religion is not 
currently accommodated within the law. This thesis will arrive at this position 
through: first, critically engaging with George’s use of the ‘goods-rights’ synthesis; 
and second, analysing the presentation of religion as a public good in light of both 
Bull v Hall420 and Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan.421 This will be shown 
to accommodate matters of conscience. Here the concept of ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ will be shown to be important when discovering whether there 
is, or should be, a right to religious freedom. 
Finally, the judgment in Eweida will further inform the discussion surrounding 
whether freedom of religious conscience presents a problem for equality law. To 
do so will require engagement with the concept of conscience. Chapter 5 will 
critically analyse George’s NNL thought to suggest that presenting religion as a 
public good presents law as a form of public morality and religious freedom as a 
part of political morality. This will result in an obligation towards freedom of 
conscience securing human fulfilment. It is anticipated that such an express 
position for the concept of conscience, will secure religious freedom and the 
protection of religious liberty as a public good.  
                                                          
419 A position impacting religious freedom, which indicates that if the possibility of changing jobs is 
available, then this option guarantees an individual freedom of religion - Eweida v British Airways PLC 
[2010] EWCA Civ 80 [22]. See also Pearson, ‘Article 9 at a Crossroads: Interference Before and After 
Eweida’ (2013) HRLR 1, 10. 
420 Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73. 
421 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68. 
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Through engaging with the above concepts, an insightful critique surrounding the 
right to religious freedom within the EqA 2010 will be established. From this will 
be drawn George’s religious liberty law conclusion. This application will be then 
used to draw a critique of George’s thought, freed from the identified problems of 
NNL jurisprudence and ready to use in equality case law. This thesis will argue 
in chapter 5 that although there are many problems with George’s thought, the 
modified analysis of these NNL views can nonetheless provide solutions to 
religious equality law tensions. 
Chapter 6 will serve as a conclusion. This will seek to draw together the individual 
conclusions drawn in each chapter.  
All of the above will provide an answer to the analysis of the right to religious 
freedom within equality law, with particular reference to Robert George’s thought. 
Now that the contribution of the Grisez School and its most prominent member 
has been considered alongside the relevant law in this chapter, in order enable a 
possible application of George’s NNL views towards equality law, this thesis will 
move in the next chapter to introduce George’s approach to practical reason, 
which will trace flaws in George’s thought that are crucial in his views surrounding 
US discrimination law. 
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Chapter 2 – Robert George as New Natural Lawyer – The Importance of 
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2.1 Introduction  
The aim of this thesis is to critique and apply Robert George’s new natural law 
(NNL) views to religious discrimination law. One part of this is to consider 
George’s approach to jurisprudence. In this process, George is used as the 
primary dialogue partner partly because of his approach to practical reason. From 
this it is necessary in this chapter to examine, critique, and utilise George’s theory 
of practical reason to provide the modified NNL basis. This understanding of 
practical reason is necessary to enable, and prepare the reader for the application 
of George’s NNL views to religious liberty law in chapters 4 and 5.  
This chapter falls into four parts. First, I will discuss Robert George’s 
interpretation of practical reason in the work of Thomas Aquinas at 2.2. This will 
show that George’s notion of practical reasoning departs from Aquinas’ position 
in several key respects. To achieve this, I will first consider the modification of the 
first principle of practical reason (FPPR); secondly, George’s movement from 
Aquinas’ concept of the good to the basic goods; thirdly, George’s elevation of 
the principle of ethical autonomy; and fourthly, the inclusion of the basic good of 
religion within practical reasoning in George’s work. 
I will next argue in 2.3 that George moves beyond Aquinas in the areas of 
revelation and reason. These moves are focused around debate about the validity 
of laws. To achieve this I will consider the sources of George’s approach to moral 
reasoning: a) divine revelation, b) moral realism, c) human reason, and d) value. 
Section 2.3 will finish by considering Robert George’s ‘minimum standard’ of 
practical reasonableness. This is an independent form of practical moral 
reasoning within NNL. This approach will be viewed as a form of moral reasoning 
in light of the positivism/natural law debate. 
Third, and finally, this chapter will provide an address to the challenges of the 
Rawlsian critique from public reason at 2.5. This will begin by outlining George’s 
rejection of Rawlsian public reason. This will be followed through a consideration 
of the expansive pluralist modification to public reasonableness and the concept 
of Political Liberalism. Public reasoning orientated towards a religious consensus 
will then finally be proposed before this chapter concludes at 2.6 with an 
assessment of George’s use of practical reason. 
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George’s use of practical reason will inform an analysis of his thought which will 
be applied to critique religious liberty case law within the jurisdiction in chapters 
4 and 5. George’s value system will provide a basis to engage contemporary 
religious equality case law. From this basis, it will be argued in chapter 4 that a 
modified NNL theory is adequate to solve religious liberty case law tensions within 
English law. Practical reason is critical to any application drawn from George’s 
thought and so this chapter will begin to analyse this concept and provide a 
coherent, improved way forward for natural law reasoning within George’s 
jurisprudence.  
 
2.2 Robert George’s interpretation of practical reasoning in Aquinas 
Modification of the first principle of practical reason  
This section falls into four parts to argue that, while the influence of Thomas 
Aquinas is central to Robert George’s jurisprudence, George’s understanding of 
practical reasoning departs from Aquinas’ position in several key respects. It will 
be shown that George incorrectly reads Aquinas here. To achieve this I will 
consider; first, the modification of the first principle of practical reason; secondly, 
George’s movement from Aquinas’ concept of the good to the basic goods; 
thirdly, the elevation of the principle of ethical autonomy; and fourthly, the 
inclusions of the basic good of religion within practical reasoning in George’s 
work. 
Robert George has described the philosophies of Thomas Aquinas as the 
philosophia perennis – the perennial philosophy.1 A wide literature has 
established that Aquinas’ influence upon natural law theory continues to the 
present day2 and so the following section will argue that this influence is 
fundamental3 as it pertains to the approach taken by George regarding the good 
and practical reasoning. George’s approach frequently cites and modifies 
                                                          
1 R P George, Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1996) 95. 
2 See, for instance J Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (Wm.B.Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2005); A MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality (2nd edn, Duckworth, 2001); A J 
Lisska, Aquinas’ Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (Oxford University Press, 2002); J 
Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(Oxford University Press, 1998); and P M Hall, Narrative and the Natural Law: an Interpretation of 
Thomistic Ethics (University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).  
3 S Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Clarendon Press, 1991) 24. 
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Aquinas, notably key parts of the Summa Theologica,4 to supplement, improve 
and sustain his key arguments regarding practical reason. This understanding of 
practical reasoning will be key for the application of George’s NNL views to 
religious liberty law in order to analyse religious freedom in the later chapters. 
In contemporary Thomism there is a central understanding that certain 
fundamental practical truths are available to anyone,5 regardless of allegiances.6 
George has argued that these practical truths are expressed and captured in 
sound practical judgements. They are not deduced or inferred from other 
theoretical or practical truths, but rather they are per se nota (self-evident). As 
part of the critique to George’s thought, a contentious aspect of the NNL is that 
these practical truths may be formed by any thinking person.7 They are 
accessible to rational agents. 
The FPPR reading provided by George 
It can be identified in George’s writing that it is among the self-evident truths that 
the basic principles referred to by Aquinas as the ‘first principles of practical 
reason’ occur.8 As such, it will first be shown that through the first principles of 
practical reason [FPPR],9 Thomist thought has provided a direct influence on the 
interpretation of practical reasoning within NNL theory. This will help to analyse 
George’s interpretation of practical reasoning in Aquinas’ work. 
Throughout George’s work, with particular reference to In Defense of Natural 
Law, he seeks to provide a ‘sound exposition of the natural law tradition and of 
                                                          
4 T Aquinas, Summa Theologica (D Bourke & A Littledale eds, Blackfriars, 1963) I-II q.90 a.4. The first and 
second responses within Question 90 are most frequently highlighted. 
5 L Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial (University of Chicago Press, 1997) 45. 
6 Such as, cultural or intellectual heritage. 
7 R P George, In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford University Press, 1999) 254. 
8 Ibid 254. George interestingly uses the first principle of practical reason/first principles of practical 
reason interchangeably. However he does highlight that the ‘determinations’ of the first ‘principle’ of 
practical reason refers to basic goods. As such, the determinations are the first practical principles of 
natural law – the ‘most basic precepts of natural law’ - ibid 45. This will be shown to be important later 
in this chapter. 
9 Aquinas accepted Aristotle’s conception of phronesis. This is translated in Aquinas’ Latin as prudencia. 
This is the virtue translated as practical reasonableness - Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social 
Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 2) 167. George fetters his discretion in his 
narrow interpretation of Aquinas here: MacIntyre has suggested that prudential/prudencia is exercised 
so that human law accords with the divine law, particularly so that human law accords with the 
divine/natural law nexus. From this, MacIntyre notes that Aquinas reads prudencia as always having a 
theological dimension when applied to the right reasoning generated from practical reasoning. This is 
not evident in George’s approach. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica (n 4) S.T. IIa-IIae, 47, 8. This chapter 
will develop George’s approach to practical reason.  
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the new classical theory’.10 To do this George criticises the NNL approach11 
towards Aquinas in certain respects, such as the application of the good, which 
involves debate, and application, of Christian ethical theory.12 Nevertheless direct 
Thomist influence upon George’s NNL views is arguably evident when comparing 
Thomas’ approach to that of George. For Aquinas believed that reasons 
constituted the most fundamental principles of practical reason and precepts of 
natural law by virtue of their intrinsic value and choice worthiness.13 The same 
process is applied by George. 
George draws upon Aquinas’ non-exhaustive list of fundamental principles.14 It 
was outlined in chapter 1 that these principles act as a list of moral norms/the 
good for Aquinas. I suggest that this is important for George’s understanding of 
practical reasonableness because Aquinas’ principles have been re-interpreted 
in NNL as basic human goods.15 When these principles are specified, it is evident 
that they constitute the body of moral norms available to guide human choosing 
toward integral human fulfilment.16 Directly from this listing of the good George 
has drawn his list of the basic goods. In short, George interprets Aquinas’ moral 
norms to guide his own formulation of the basic human goods.17  
George’s understanding of the first principle of practical reason is based upon his 
interpretation of Aquinas. Interpreting Aquinas leads George to the Good, based 
upon Aquinas’ formulation of the first principle of practical reason: ‘good is to be 
done and pursued; and evil is to be avoided.’18 All other precepts of the natural 
                                                          
10 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 229. Hittinger has criticised proponents of NNL for following 
Aquinas yet not willing to be termed ‘Thomist’ - R Hittinger, Critique of the New Natural Law Theory 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) 8. This is a telling observation in our analysis of Robert George’s 
thought following Aquinas. 
11 Daniel N. Robinson has noted that although George is ‘closely associated’ with the other NNL, his 
work is not ‘cloned’ from or ‘consistently at one’ with the others – D N Robinson, ‘In Defense of Natural 
Law: Robert George’s Jurisprudence’ (2000) 45 Am. J. Juris. 117, 120-121. As such, the claim made 
concerning George’s original contribution in chapter 1 is substantiated. 
12 Ibid 229. 
13 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 38. See Aquinas ST I-II q.94 a.2. 
14 These are: human life, marriage and the transmission of life to new human beings, and knowledge, 
particularly of religious truth - T Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (R J 
Henle ed, University of Notre Dame Press, 1993) Summa Theologica, Ia Iiae, q. 94, a. 2. 
15 R P George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (ISI Books, 2001) 65, 66. The basic human goods were listed 
in chapter 1.4. 
16 Ibid 65, 66. 
17 The FPPR is recognised by identifying the irreducible aspects of human well-being and fulfilment, eg. 
the basic human goods. 
18 ‘Good is to be done, and pursued, and evil is to be avoided’ - Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa 
Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (n 14) 262. Ralph McInerny has observed that in Question 94, Article 2, 
Aquinas makes the transition from ‘the good is that which all things seek’ to ‘the good is to be done and 
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law are based upon this.19 This is why George argues that he gives a faithful 
account of the natural law tradition in NNL. I identify that the central factor here 
is the reliance on Thomas’ scholasticism. This reliance is a central observation in 
this thesis. Below I will cast doubt upon George’s belief that proponents of NNL 
have followed Aquinas ‘exactly’ on the first principle of practical reason20 and I 
will argue instead that George has modified the FPPR. 
George’s modification occurs through suggesting that practical reasoning has its 
own underived (i.e. per se nota and indemonstrabilia) first principles.21 These first 
principles provide reasoning that includes propositions concerning specific moral 
norms.22 Eberhard Schockenhoff has suggested that within NNL, practical reason 
is articulated in a plurality of individual moral precepts.23 These precepts are 
guiding moral norms, which George links to empirical knowledge.24  
It was shown in chapter 1 that this key movement from practical reason to first 
principles is used widely within NNL.25 For instance, Finnis has expressly noted 
that Germain Grisez’s analysis of the FPPR influenced his own reinterpretation 
of Aristotle and Aquinas.26 In his later book Aquinas,27 in the passage concerning 
                                                          
pursued and evil avoided.’ R McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (rev 
edn, The Catholic University of America Press, 1997) 38. 
19 From this all the things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good belong to the 
‘precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done or avoided.’ Aquinas, The Treatise on 
Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (n 14) Ia IIaw, q. 94, a.2. 
20 G V Bradley & R P George, ‘The New Natural Law Theory: A Reply to Jean Porter’ (1994) Scholarly 
Works Paper 853, 305-306. Though George believes that NNL has always asserted the FPPR is: ‘Good is 
to be done and pursued; the bad is to be avoided’ - ibid 305-306. Hittinger also notes that new natural 
lawyers here believe they follow Aquinas in their understanding of the FPPR - R Hittinger (n 9) 8. 
21 Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (n 14) Ia Iiae, q. 94, a. 2. 
22 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 91. 
23 E Schockenhoff, Natural Law and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in a Historical World (B O’Neill tr, 
Catholic University of America Press, 2003) 162. 
24 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 128. 
25 It is worth re-stating here that both George and Finnis include ‘practical reasonableness’ in their list of 
basic human goods. 
26 A J Lisska 161. Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (n 14) 262. Anthony 
Lisska is incorrect in his assertion that Finnis never expressly states that he is offering a defence of 
Aquinas and Aristotle, instead both Finnis and George offer a critique and this is still to be considered an 
engaging, deferential critique - A J Lisska (n 2) 141. Finnis is quite cunningly careful never to claim that 
he is offering a defence of Aristotle and Aquinas. However he has written that ‘Aristotle and Aquinas, I 
believe, both accepted the thesis [on practical reason] I have just put forward.’ J Finnis, Fundamentals of 
Ethics (Georgetown University Press, 1983) 12. It is unfortunate that neither Aquinas nor Aristotle have 
the recourse available to respond to Finnis. If practical reason is shown to be central to natural law, then 
the central arguments put forward on practical reasonableness would be largely parallel. This chapter 
suggests that George, to a greater extent than Finnis, diverges in key interpretation. 
27 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 
2) 79. 
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the FPPR,28 Finnis insisted that the reference to the ‘ultimate end’ of human life 
should be referred to in the plural: referring to ends. This for Finnis is analogous 
to goods, which provide the basis of the first principle.29 The FPPR (as the pursuit 
of good and avoid evil) is clearly morally prescriptive. In Natural Law and Natural 
Rights, for example, Finnis attributed to Aquinas the first principles which ‘specify 
the basic forms of good and evil and which can be adequately grasped by anyone 
of the age of reason … are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable’.30 It is 
from this basis that a theory of practical reasonableness can for Finnis be called 
a theory of ‘natural law.’31 This shows the centrality of both practical 
reasonableness and the first principle to NNL. It also shows that the FPPR 
provides a direct influence on the interpretation of practical reason within NNL, 
which will be important when considering NNL in the context of religious equality 
law 
Problems with the modified reading of the FPPR 
Sean Coyle has observed that NNL ‘mischaracterizes Aquinas’ first principle of 
practical reason.’32 Coyle argues this is because to follow Aquinas practical 
reasonableness should be taken to include the governance of human action by 
virtues.33 Instead of finding a route within the nature of the concept of the good, 
                                                          
28 Aquinas, Summa Theologica (n 4) I-II. 94. 2.  
29 S Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (Hart, 2014) 191. 
30 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) 33, 34. 
31 There is consistency in Finnis’ account here because practical reasoning’s first principles are those 
basic reasons which identify the basic human goods as ultimate reasons for choice and actions. This is 
precisely because participating in these goods leads to realising aspects of human flourishing. As such, it 
is logical that practical reason gives participation to the end of flourishing within NNL - J Finnis, ‘Natural 
law and legal reasoning’ in R P George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford University 
Press, 1992) 135-136. Rodriguez-Blanco does well to carefully provide another approach towards 
practical reasoning. This approach requires a reason for action to be presented as a good-making 
characteristic - V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Does Kelsen's Notion of Legal Normativity Rest on a Mistake?’ 
(2012) 31 Law and Philosophy 725, 728. This is Rodriguez-Blanco’s ‘guise of the good model’ and is the 
main explanation given for complying with legal rules - V Rodriguez-Blanco, Law and Authority under the 
Guise of the Good (Bloomsbury, 2014) 152. This model does not show that there are basic goods like 
within NNL - ibid 178. Rather, Rodriguez-Blanco opts for the good-making characteristics – V Rodriguez-
Blanco, ‘Book Review: N Roughan, Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation and Transnational Legal Theories 
(Oxford, 2013)’ (2016) 79(1) MLR 183, 197-198. See further Rodriguez-Blanco, Law and Authority Under 
the Guise of the Good (n31) 21-24, 71, 73-74, 206; Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Does Kelsen's Notion of Legal 
Normativity Rest on a Mistake?’ (n31) 736; V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Book Review: E Pattaro, The Law and 
The Right: A Reappraisal of the Reality that Ought to Be (Springer, 2007)’ (2009) 22(2) The Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 451, 454; and V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Reasons in Action v Triggering 
Reasons: A Reply to Enoch on Reason-Giving and Legal Normativity (2013) Problema 7, 10-11, 14. 
32 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 29) 191. Similarly see: M Pakaluk, ‘Is the New 
Natural Law Thomistic?’ (2013) National Catholic Bioethics Centre 57, 60. 
33 Ibid. 
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or as ‘modes’ of realising basic goods, the FPPR must include rational actions 
‘essential to our nature as rational beings.’34 This is because NNL’s approach 
does not argue from what is to be considered ‘natural’ to what is ‘reasonable and 
right’. Rather the reverse: ‘what is reasonable and right’ is ‘therefore natural’.35 
Practical reason thereby guides nature. Coyle believes that by this process NNL 
‘overstates the position in making “nature” a mere conclusion of the inquiry.’36 
Natural law should be based from the beginning in the nature of the good leading 
to flourishing. 
Ralph McInerny has disagreed with Coyle’s observation by noting that, for 
Aquinas, when goods come under the guidance of reason they come to be 
constituents of the human good.37 This finds the FPPR to be rooted in the nature 
of the concept of ‘the good’ and also the reasonableness of the human good.  
In order to critique George’s approach to practical reason w does George fit into 
this debate? This may more accurately represent George’s position: practical 
reason is directed towards action – every agent acts for an end, and every end 
has the nature of good.38 It was argued in chapter 1 that final causality involves 
the FPPR directing in terms of goods, with the good as an end providing a reason 
for action. George goes so far as to suggest that this very formulated approach 
is a law for practical reason.39 This legalistic approach to the concept of the good 
– the ‘good is that which all things seek after’40 – is essential to practical reasoning 
and central within George’s work and so is a key observation in the analysis of 
George’s thought. 
As such, we have seen in this section how George has a particular understanding 
of the FPPR in relation to the good. All other principles of the natural law are 
based upon the first principle and so all actions which the practical reason 
                                                          
34 Ibid 191n. 
35 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 
2) 153. 
36 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 29) 191n. 
37 McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (n 18) 46. 
38 Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (n 2) 216. This is an attempt to 
follow Aquinas, for whom ‘in acting every agent intends an end.’ T Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 
Book Three: Providence, Part I (V J Bourke tr, University of Notre Dame Press, 1975) Chapter 2 [1], 34.) 
39 R P George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford University Press, 1993) 42. 
See also George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 37-38. 
40 Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica (n 14) 262 I-II q. 94 a 2. 
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undertakes are perceived as belonging to the human good.41 This locates the 
FPPR firmly in the good.  
If this first principle is located with respect to the nature of the good, with all other 
principles based upon the first principle, then it will be logical to consider George’s 
analysis of the good/goods next. The purpose of this is to further understand the 
presentation of practical reasoning that is critical to George’s critique of equality 
law impacting religious freedom. 
Movement from the good to basic goods 
In this section I will argue that George moves from a Thomist conception of the 
good to a related but different way of conceiving basic human goods. As earlier 
outlined,42 George perceives the self-evident goods to be drawn from Thomas’s 
reading of practical reason.43 As George puts it, ‘For Aquinas…the ends that the 
practical intellect grasps as ultimate reasons for action are properly understood 
as intrinsic human goods.’44 George’s premise is that practical reason requires 
that basic goods be treated as ends in themselves, which is what they are if the 
incommensurability thesis is valid. Given that the FPPR is rooted in the nature of 
the good, this demonstrates its essential nature to practical reasoning.45 
Following this premise, Lisska reads Thomas to suggest that all actions which the 
practical reason undertakes are necessarily perceived as belonging to the human 
good, in terms of both actions to be done and actions to be avoided.46 It has been 
shown in chapter 1 that George holds the human good to be intrinsically 
                                                          
41 Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (n 2) 216. In terms of actions to be 
done and actions to be avoided. 
42 See chapter 1.4 – ‘Basic Human Goods within NNL’. 
43 If knowledge is a basic value and so an intelligible reason for action, then as we have seen George’s 
reliance stems from Aquinas’ reading first principles of practical thinking: being self-evident (per se nota) 
and indemonstrable (indemonstrabilia) - George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 108. See Aquinas ST I-II 
q. 91 a.3c; q. 58 aa.4c. 
44 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 38. 
45 Ibid 37. 
46 Lisska, Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Reconstruction (n 2) 215. This is a reading of 
Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (n 14) I-II q. 94 a 2. It was noted in 
chapter 1 that Aquinas’s moral doctrine invokes practical reason directed towards an end. McInerny and 
O’Callaghan put this well: ‘Human beings always act for an end that is conceived of as good…What binds 
together all the acts that humans perform is the overarching goodness they seek in this, that, and the 
other thing. That overarching goodness, what Thomas calls the ratio bonitatis, is the ultimate end. It 
follows that anything a human agent does is done for the sake of the ultimate end.’ R McInerny and J 
O'Callaghan, ‘Saint Thomas Aquinas’ (The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016) 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/aquinas/> accessed 22nd January 2018. See 
further in George’s thought - George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 38, 41. 
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variegated: ‘people must choose between incompatible options offering different, 
or different possible instantiations of, basic human goods.’47 Logically, this entails 
that one should avoid choosing deliberately to destroy or damage a basic good – 
thus one ought to avoid acting against a basic reason for action (a basic good).48 
We will see that this approach to the goods creates considerable problems for 
the theory. For many, these problems have provided a stumbling block in their 
acceptance of NNL.49  
It has been shown that the first principle is for NNL located in the good.50 Aquinas 
notes that, ‘the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but good itself, as 
common to all things.’51 This is helpful for seeing then how Grisez establishes 
that the FPPR ‘articulates the intrinsic, necessary relationship between human 
goods and appropriate actions bearing upon them’52 and determinations of the 
first principle render choice intelligible for action. The determinations of the FPPR 
refer to the basic goods.53 This raises the issue of whether or not the intrinsic 
ends generated by NNL provide ‘fundamental determinations’54 of the FPPR, and 
so provide the basic precepts of natural law.55 In other words, can the premise 
match the ends? George’s interpretation rests upon the ends grasped by the 
practical intellect, understood as practical reasons for action. If the first principle 
outlines a range of possible rationally-motivated action and points to an ideal of 
‘integral human fulfilment’, then for George, principles generated by practical 
intellect provide fulfilment and flourishing. Therefore these determinations serve 
as first practical principles – ‘the most basic precepts of natural law’56 – the basic 
human goods as ends are intrinsic aspects of human well-being and flourishing.57  
                                                          
47 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 294. 
48 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 11) 294. For instance, George states: ‘Catholics and other natural 
law theorists hold that one can and should avoid choosing deliberately to destroy, damage or impede 
any basic good.’ George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 11) 294. 
49 N Biggar & R Black (eds), The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses 
to the Finnis-Grisez School (Ashgate, 2000) 10. 
50 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 38. 
51 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book Two: Creation (Trans James F. Anderson, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1975) Chapter 48 [6], 146. 
52 G Grisez, Christian Moral Principles: The Way of the Lord Jesus. Vol 1 (Francisco Herald Press, 1983) 
180. 
53 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 45. 
54 Ibid 38. 
55 Ibid. 
56 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 45. 
57 Ibid. 
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Based upon George’s logic this creates a distinct space for ethically autonomous 
moral decision making; however, Porter has criticised the NNLT approach to the 
basic goods. In an article by Porter58 and subsequent reply by Bradley and 
George,59 Porter offers three main criticisms. First, Porter believes NNLT rests 
on claims of ‘self-evidence’ and argues that it might not be irrational to act against 
one of the basic goods.60 Second, Porter suggests that Grisez and Finnis could 
counter-argue that if an agent cannot see the irrationality involved in acting 
against a basic principle then this means that the agent is not sufficiently self-
reflective. Porter is unsatisfied with this answer.61 Third, Porter considers that 
NNLT does not provide a satisfactory account of the moral life – Porter is 
uncertain about the logical/ontological status of the basic human goods.62 In this 
debate George and Bradley think that Porter seriously misunderstands NNLT. 
This is to the extent that ‘Porter’s critical appraisal so misses the mark that it 
simply fails to contribute to the vigorous debate about Grisez’ project.’63 This 
leads to George and Bradley opposing many of the criticisms that Porter offers. 
For instance, George and Bradley argue that Porter does not correctly 
understand the notion of ‘self-evidency’, which applies to the FPPR and not the 
basic goods.64 Instead, they say that ‘for NNL, the first principles [of practical 
reason], not the basic goods, are self-evident’.65 This distinguishes the basic 
goods because it is evident that the FPPR, not the basic goods that they specify, 
are self-evident.66 George and Bradley provide a reading here that is consistent 
with the presentation in Natural Law and Natural Rights67 and the article, 
                                                          
58 J Porter, ‘Basic Goods and the Human Good in Recent Catholic Moral Theology’ (1993) 47 The Thomist 
27. 
59 G V Bradley & R P George, ‘The New Natural Law Theory: A Reply to Jean Porter’ (1994) Scholarly 
Works Paper 853, 305-306. 
60 Porter, ‘Basic Goods and the Human Good in Recent Catholic Moral Theology’ (1993) (n 58) 36. 
61 Ibid 37. 
62 Ibid 37-39. This criticism is not particularly original, see: Lisska, Aquinas’ Theory of Natural Law: An 
Analytic Reconstruction (n 2) 158. 
63 Bradley & George, ‘The New Natural Law Theory: A Reply to Jean Porter’ (n 20) 304. 
64 Ibid 305. Porter appears to change her opinion and adopt the NNL reading in Natural and Divine Law - 
J Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (William B. Eerdmans, 
1999) 92-93, but then maintains her earlier (1994) reading in the later Nature as Reason - Nature as 
Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (n 2) 127, 263. 
65 Bradley & George, ‘The New Natural Law Theory: A Reply to Jean Porter’ (n 20) 305. 
66 See further R McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (The Catholic University of 
America Press, 2012) 113. 
67 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 33. Here citing Aquinas, in Eth. V, lect. 12, para. 1018; 
S.T. I-II q.94 a. 2; q. 91 a. 3c; q. 58 aa. 4c, 5c. 
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‘Practical Principles, Moral Truths, and Ultimate Ends’.68 As such, it is clear that 
George undermines Porter’s critique, by adopting a consistent position over the 
presentation of self-evidency. It is thus clear that George and Bradley advance 
debate over the basic goods and FPPR in the wider NNLT discourse. That being 
said, Porter’s critique does have merit. Porter does particularly well to engage a 
contemporary debate at the heart of Roman Catholic moral theology, and by 
doing so further force George to maintain a robust defence of NNLT, which is 
useful for our purposes because it forces George to explicate his ideas. How then 
do the basic precepts of natural law impact upon the self-evident interaction 
between the first principles and the basic goods, which leads to flourishing? 
George expressly combines the basic goods with human fulfilment. For George, 
practical reason pursues the goods which lead to human well-being. Chapter 1 
noted George’s preference for flourishing based upon the Aristotelian notion of 
Eudaimonia and the Thomist understanding of the good, which is the ultimate 
end of happiness. For instance, in chapter 1 it was identified for George that basic 
goods are intrinsic and constitutive aspects of human well-being and fulfilment.69 
For our purposes, it is evident that the ‘FPPR that directs [human] action to the 
basic human goods’70 points to ‘realising aspects of human flourishing’.71 But as 
the article, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ makes clear, the 
basic goods are basic reasons for acting ‘because they are aspects of the 
fulfilment of persons, whose action is rationally motivated by these reasons.’72 As 
it was established in chapter 1 there is a parallel between practical reason and 
intentional action.73 Given that practical reason grasps as self-evidently desirable 
a number of basic goods74 it is not the goods leading to human fulfilment that 
constitutes the logos of intentional action. Indeed, Chapter 1 argued that the 
                                                          
68 J Finnis, G Grisez and J Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (1987) 32 Am. J. 
Juris. 99, 106. 
69 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 45, 103.  
70 Ibid 233. 
71 J Finnis, ‘Natural law and legal reasoning’ in R P George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 
31) 135-136. 
72 J Finnis, G Grisez and J Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’ (n 67) 114. See 
further George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 103. 
73 V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency’ 
in P Banas, A Dyrda and T Gizbert-Studnicki (eds), Metaphilosophy of Law (Hart, 2016) 178.  
74 G Grisez, ‘The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2, Q94, 
Article 2’ (1965) 10 Nat. L. F. 168, 181. See further that basic goods: ‘come to be known in non-
inferential acts of understanding wherein one grasps, in reflecting on the data of one’s experience, the 
intelligible point of possible action…directed towards the realization of (or participation in) the good in 
question by oneself or others.’ George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 231. 
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FPPR directs in terms of goods, with the good as an end providing a reason for 
action. In NNLT the fulfilment of the basic goods qua basic goods is a crucial part 
of integral human fulfilment.75  
Coyle has critically observed that this NNL movement towards flourishing - 
flourishing provided by the FPPR pointed to action via ‘integral human fulfilment’ 
- is based upon Finnis’ incorrect movement from the good to goods.76 By noting 
that the FPPR should be read as referring to the pluralised ends, Coyle has 
suggested this may be a mistaken reading of Aquinas’ statement in the Summa 
Theologica, at I-II. 1. 4-7 that ‘there is only one possible final end of human life, 
that of happiness: beatitudo.’77 Furthermore, within Ethica Thomistica: The Moral 
Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas,78 McInerny has identified that for Aquinas, 
although ‘natural law precepts are rational directives aiming at man’s 
comprehensive good’, law is the work of reason and as man recognises life as 
good and ‘devises ways and means of securing it in shifting circumstances’, this 
should be at the expense of forming a plurality of goods.79 For this reason, any 
movement by George to a pluralised form of the good requires more investigation 
into the role of fulfilment and the basic goods in order to continue critiquing 
George’s thought and later apply this to religious equality law. 
The moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has further criticised the movement to 
goods. MacIntyre notes that his ‘account [is] … at variance with some modern 
Thomistic writers on natural law’80 and by this he refers to Finnis. In doing so, 
MacIntyre has further criticised NNL’s reliance upon Aquinas and Aristotle to 
present telos. To achieve this, MacIntyre puts forward a framework which 
presents ‘a fundamentally Aristotelian account … into which are integrated both 
an Augustinian conception of the will and … concepts [such] as those of intention 
                                                          
75 J Finnis, G Grisez and J Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,’ (n 67) 118. A good 
example of the way that basic goods (seen as good-making characteristics) connects to intentional 
action can be seen in Rodriguez-Blanco’s work. This draws upon Rodriguez-Blanco’s ‘guise of the good 
model’ and is the main explanation given for complying with legal rules - Rodriguez-Blanco, Law and 
Authority under the Guise of the Good (n 31) 152. It is argued that the grounding reasons/logos of the 
rules guide the agent - ibid 39. This is because they constitute the reason for the agent’s intentional 
action to follow the rule – ibid. As such, because of the way that good-making characteristics function in 
this model, there is no longer seen to be a dependence upon human fulfilment to provide the 
underlying logos of intentional action. 
76 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 29) 191, 192. 
77 Ibid. 
78 McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (n 18). 
79 Ibid 46. 
80 MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality (n 2) 188.  
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and synderesis and conscientia.’81 MacIntyre suggests this account was 
achieved through Aquinas conversely accepting the substance of what Aristotle 
had to say on three central issues: first, the theoretical and practical relationship 
of subordinate goods to the supreme good; secondly, the process of deliberation, 
where argument as to how the best means to achieve the good is identified; and 
thirdly, the organisation of the reasoning in pursuit of the good which ‘generate[s] 
the right action as the conclusion of practical reasoning.’82 There is not a clear 
distinction here between the good or the goods. That being said, this treads closer 
to the notion of the good rather than the goods. 
MacIntyre’s criticism of NNL follows a rejection by Aristotle of human goods 
forming the telos of human life, which MacIntyre identifies was extended to 
Aquinas.83 MacIntyre believes that Aquinas shows Aristotle’s account of the 
teleology of human life to be ‘radically defective’.84 The focus upon the good by 
MacIntyre may be a misreading because Thomas’ ultimate end is nothing except 
the state of perfect happiness: the contemplation of God, in which contemplation 
all of human nature finds its completion.85 Instead Thomas writes, ‘[e]veryone 
desires perfect happiness, and everyone has as the true end of their nature, that 
for the sake of which they move toward all other goods in the way that they do, 
the goodness of God.’86 This is important because George presents a 
combination of eudaimonia with the human good and goods. This is not, however, 
to overstate the role of fulfilment. It was earlier suggested that in NNLT the 
fulfilment of the basic goods acting as basic reasons for action is an essential 
aspect of integral human fulfilment.87 MacIntyre’s criticism given to the NNL 
account of the good can be clearer. Natural law should be based from the 
beginning in the nature of the good leading to flourishing. MacIntyre has, for 
instance, not identified the same misreading in George’s later work or in any other 
NNL work. For the purposes of analysing George’s thought, George’s approach 
to practical reasonableness can therefore be seen to combine the basic goods 
with human fulfilment and flourishing, which as we have seen by drawing upon 
                                                          
81 Ibid 188. 
82 Ibid 189. 
83 Ibid 192. 
84 Ibid 205. 
85 Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (n 14) 262, I-II q. 94 a 2, I-IIae, 5, 4. 
86 Ibid Ia, 6, 1 – A MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality (n 2) 192 [emphasis added]. 
87 J Finnis, G Grisez and J Boyle, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,’ (n 67) 104. 
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the thought of Coyle, MacIntrye and McInerny in this section may indicate a 
movement from the good to the goods.88 George’s approach to the good (linked 
to fulfilment and flourishing) is an important observation for later application in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
This combination has attracted further criticism. It has been argued by the 
theologian Nigel Biggar that Grisez rejected Thomas’ formulation of practical 
reasoning as a moral principle, instead preferring a ‘First Principle of Morality’ to 
guide human fulfilment.89 For George, the first principle of morality ensures that 
one ought always choose and otherwise will in a way that is compatible with a 
will towards integral human fulfilment.90 To enable this, basic human goods must 
be arrived at through a process of normative reasoning providing conduct for 
human action. As highlighted above, this is not the case because George’s NNL 
is a mixture of the FPPR and the first principle of morality – practical reason is 
articulated in a plurality of individual moral precepts.91 George distinguishes, 
within practical reason, between the “first principles of practical reason” as pre-
moral (that the good(s) ought to be pursued) and the first principle of morality 
(that they should be chosen in a way that respects the integrity of human well-
being).92 This distinction differentiates clearly between natural law as involving 
material principles of practical rationality, and ‘natural law as involving specifically 
moral principles governing choice.’93 These are moral norms which George would 
link to empirical knowledge. This differs from the pursuit of intrinsic value strictly 
                                                          
88 George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 39) 102-103. 
89 Biggar & Black (eds), The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological and Ethical Responses to 
the Finnis-Grisez School (n 49) 67-68. See further J Boyle, ‘On the Most Fundamental Principle of 
Morality’ in J Keown and R P George (eds), Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis 
(Oxford University Press, 2013) 69. 
90 R P George, ‘Introduction’ in J Keown and R P George (eds) Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy 
of John Finnis (n 88) 2. George here relies upon Finnis’ development of the first principle of morality: 
George believes that Finnis’ ‘failure’ to articulate the first principle of morality within Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, was rectified by terming “openness to integral fulfilment” the status of the “master 
principle of morality” in J Finnis, The Fundamentals of Ethics (n 26) 70-74, 120-124, - R P George, 
Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (Wilmington, Delaware: Isi 
Books, 2013) 272. To my mind this is an instance whereby George fails to fully criticise Finnis, most likely 
because of George’s connections to the Grisez School. See also R P George, ‘Introduction’ in J Keown 
and R P George (eds) Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (Oxford University Press, 
2013) 2.  
91 Schockenhoff (n 24) 162.  
92 R Hittinger, Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (n 10) 13. 
93 Ibid 13. 
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adhered to by Thomas. In George’s NNL the first principles provide reasoning 
articulated in a plurality of basic goods. 
It has also been shown that George develops his theory of basic human goods, 
themes of which are to be found in Aquinas, even though no description or 
recognition of basic human goods are outlined specifically by Aquinas. Chapter 
1 considered this issue in the work of Finnis, and I now turn to criticise George’s 
reading. As it was established in chapter 1, Aquinas merely holds the good to be 
‘self-evident’ and ‘indemonstrable’ leading to ‘fulfilment’ and ‘integration’ instead 
of listing specific human goods required for practical reason.94 The difference 
may be, as Jean Porter notes, due to George finding inclinations to be analogous 
to the basic goods.95 Does George overstep Aquinas’ understanding of the good 
here? 
Finnis reads Aquinas’ understanding of practical reason as stating that we are 
directed by the inclinations mentioned in the Summa Theologica I-II 94.2 towards 
the basic goods.96 For Aquinas these natural inclinations provide connections 
between the individual precepts of natural law.97 George and Finnis, however, 
reject the terminology of ‘inclinations’.98 The rejection of natural inclinations 
instead leads to an adoption of the incommensurable basic goods, which lead, 
via a number of further intermediary principles, to norms of conduct.99 George 
rejects the terminology of ‘inclinations’ by finding them to be analogous to the 
basic goods (and so terming them ‘basic goods’).100 Schockenhoff has 
suggested, however, that Aquinas did not intend to present a complete list of all 
the intermediary principles of practical reason but instead intended to discuss 
their necessary interplay with the natural ends of human striving.101 Whereas 
                                                          
94 McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (n 67) 121. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica 
(n 4) I-II. q. 94; ST II-II q. 108. a2. 
95 Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (n 2) 37-38. 
96 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 
2) 56-84. For an outline of this process see: Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law 
(n 2) 37-38. 
97 Finnis, The Fundamentals of Ethics (n 26) 69. See Aquinas ST I-II q. 91 a.2-a.3. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Schockenhoff (n 24) 162. The basic goods lead to norms of conduct, based upon the further 
intermediary principles, such as: a starting point in a coherent plan for life; no arbitrary preferential 
treatment of individual basic values or persons; a balance between distance and dedication to the 
fundamental values; respect for every fundamental value in every action; promotion of the common 
good; and obedience to one’s conscience. These have a distinct Catholicised approach. This once again 
raises the Roman Catholic bias criticism identified in chapter 1. 
100 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 38-39. 
101 Ibid. 
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George develops legal application on the basis of seven, specific basic goods, 
Aquinas does not list human goods for application. By listing basic goods, George 
arguably allows the good to be recognised on a practical, basic level. The 
connections between the individual precepts of natural law are removed in order 
to allow incommensurability between the basic goods for application. This is why 
George does not adopt the term ‘inclinations’, in order to move the basic goods 
towards practical outcomes. This is a movement from Aquinas. However, is this 
an acceptable clarification of the good shown by George? Or, does a theory of 
practical reasonableness demand even more ‘practical’ specification? In other 
words, does George here overstep Aquinas’ previous understanding of the good 
here? 
The application of the good 
George has attempted to provide an answer to the meaning and application of 
the good in everyday situations. This is one of the reasons he is the ideal 
candidate for our purposes in chapters 4 and 5. From Finnis’ reading of Aquinas, 
it is asserted that ‘a Natural Law theory in the classical tradition makes no 
pretence that natural reason can identify the one right answer to those countless 
questions which arise’.102 To answer these questions Finnis assumes that, ‘there 
are many ways of going wrong and doing wrong; but in … perhaps most situations 
of personal and social life there are a number of incompatible right (i.e. not-wrong) 
options.’103 However, Finnis is frequently criticised for providing no practical 
application for NNL. Chapter 1 highlighted that as a moral realist,104 Finnis 
demonstrates that law is a moral phenomenon within the ‘central case’ 
viewpoint.105 This is because practical reason directs the obligation created by 
laws to enable participation in human flourishing. This leads Finnis to the 
conclusion that prior personal choice ‘can greatly reduce the variety of options for 
the person who has made that commitment,’106 in later deliberating and engaging 
                                                          
102 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 31) 151, 152. 
103 Ibid. 
104 My thanks goes to Professor Julian Rivers for this classification. 
105 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 14-15. George believes that Finnis’ central case is one 
‘in which legal rules and principles function as practical reasons for citizens as well as judges and other 
officials because of people’s appreciation of their virtue and value i.e. Their point’- George, 
‘Introduction’ in Keown and George (eds) Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John Finnis (n 88) 
4. 
106 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 80) 151, 152.  
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with the good as part of the process of the exercise of practical reason.107 This 
conflicted set of choices within ethics presents a problem. This chapter has 
outlined that the NNL approach to the good leads to human flourishing but does 
not prima facie give rise to explicit application.108 For instance, it was established 
in chapter 1 that Finnis’ view of law as a moral phenomenon only provides 
discretion towards adjudicative consequences within the legal process.109 The 
lack of explicit application in NNL is purposeful but does not readily help the 
agent. The problem is that a set of choices provides an area of ‘grey’ within legal 
penumbra, which gives ambiguity and variety to moral decision making.110 As 
such, this directly draws Ronald Dworkin’s criticism within Taking Rights 
Seriously111 and Law’s Empire:112 in this case can there be one direct answer (i.e. 
a right answer to a hard case)?113 Finnis is clear, for instance, that under his NNL 
views the ‘search for the one right answer is practically incoherent and 
senseless’.114 There is not a definitive answer to be given by a theory of human 
goods working as principles of practical reasoning.115 From this position, which 
presents a conflicted set of choices, the practical application of NNL to areas such 
as abortion, euthanasia and sexual ethics can be seen as conflicted. I will go on 
to argue how George may fix the problem surrounding application by providing 
practical application built on practical reasoning. 
It was argued in the Introduction that George goes further and states that the 
legislator follows the practical intellect116 to derive the positive law from the 
natural law.117 This is a method that is applied to the creation of law in both 
statutory and case law form. The application of laws for George may be ‘rationally 
guided and criticized in light of those principles; and legal right … can be judged 
morally good or bad … by reference to standards of the higher [natural] law’.118 
The categorisation of the basic goods allows more specific application. It will be 
                                                          
107 This process was introduced and analysed in chapter 1. 
108 George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 39) 103. 
109 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 276. 
110 For instance, this uncertainty and ambiguity may again invoke the criticism made throughout this 
thesis that there is a Roman Catholic bias present in the causes supported and engaged in NNL. 
111 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977). 
112 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart, 1986). 
113 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 110) 105-130; R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 111) 99-100. 
114 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 31) 144. 
115 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 31) 138, 151. 
116 R P George, ‘Natural Law’ (2007) 31 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 171, 189. 
117 Ibid 190. 
118 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 17) 155. 
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shown in section 2.3 and chapter 4 that George has transferred this analysis of 
the good into contemporary NNL application which will be used to critique English 
religious liberty law. 
George argues, following Aquinas, that what he calls the ‘first principles of natural 
law … can be grasped by anyone of the age of reason ... are per se nota (self-
evident) and ... underived.’119 The centricity of human reasoning seen through 
practical reasoning and the good was established in chapter 1. A common theme 
which determines the practical application of the good within jurisprudence120 is 
‘will’ seen as a desire of reason.121 As Aquinas notes, ‘[t]here is a desire for good 
in everything: good, the philosophers tell us, is what all desire…In things with 
understanding it is called intellectual or rational desire: will.’122 How then does this 
work within adjudication? As was established above, there is a connection 
between will and reason in the exercise of practical reason. An example within 
the English legal system will be used to show this point. In practice, the English 
and United States legal systems show many elements combining will and human 
rationality. For instance, Mark Murphy has suggested that ‘statutory law is 
primarily will, whilst common law reasoning is often a matter of “reason”’.123 To 
show how this is the case, it is evident that judicial reasoning, based upon 
statutory interpretation factors heavily, for instance in criminal law. The 
sentencing guidelines are a good example of this: a judge sentencing for a 
criminal offence, committed after 6th April 2010, must follow s.125(1) of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which states: ‘(a) follow any sentencing guideline 
which is relevant to the offender’s case’. These sentencing guidelines provide the 
judge with a range of sentences appropriate for each type of offence. Within each 
offence, there are three specified categories which reflect varying degrees of 
                                                          
119 Ibid 33. 
120 A theme that also runs through George’s discussion on practical reason and a factor in deploying 
George’s thought to analyse religious equality law. 
121 V Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘Book Review: T Macklem, Law and Life in Common (Oxford, 2015)’ (2016) 75(2) 
C.L.J. 440, 442-443. See further: Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (n 2) 253-
254. 
122 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 2.47-48. Summa Contra Gentiles (Opera Omnia, Leonine 
edn. vol. xiii) (1264) in Aquinas, Selected Philosophical Writings (trans T McDermott, Oxford University 
Press, 1993) 169. See Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence, Part I (n 38) Chapter 3 
[11], 38; Aquinas, ST I-II q. 8, a. 1; I–II, q. 12, a. 1. In chapter 1 it was established that Finnis’s reading of 
Aquinas (St. Thomas Aquinas; ST I-I q. 19 a. IC) indicates that it is through an agent’s will that reason has 
the power to move to action as a desire of reason – Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social 
Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 2) 70. 
123 M C Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 139. 
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seriousness. To decide upon the appropriate category, harm and culpability are 
considered. The starting point defines the position within a category range to 
calculate the provisional sentence. This decision also considers aggravating 
factors, which increase seriousness, and mitigating factors, which reduce 
seriousness and reflect offender mitigation. Here a judge, while bound by the 
certain facts of the case, has the ability to apply a range of sentences within the 
judicial reasoning.  
The process here involves a high dependence of will and reason, a mix of 
statutory analysis and case law precedent. The criminal justice system allows for 
conflict, which takes into account human error by allowing recourse to the Court 
of Appeal for erroneous sentencing.124  Man-made ‘positivist’ theories work best 
with the ‘will’ aspects of law. Indeed, the phrase ‘positive law’ is itself a reference 
to the setting down, the positing by human rule-makers of legal standards, such 
as criminal offence standards. Natural law also recognises that ‘the discovery of 
“natural” or “divine” legal standards through the operation of reason.’125 In this 
sense, it is suggested that George’s understanding of practical reasoning allows 
discretion in the implementation of will and reason, centred on the good. As such, 
in the analysis of George’s thought it is identified that there is a separation 
between will and reason in discernment of the good. 
George brings practical application built on practical reasoning from NNL. This is 
a key observation in order to transfer George’s thought to critique religious 
equality law. George deliberately makes the claim that by presenting a number 
of ‘incomparable right’ options,126 legal obligation within NNL can be directed 
towards: ‘resolving any of the community’s coordination problems for the common 
good of that community.’127 George goes further with United States constitutional 
law. He sees the creation of such law a matter of both the ‘positive law of the 
constitution’128 and determinable by the natural law alone. Within the moral 
natural law thesis129 this necessitates a finite conclusion – the community and 
                                                          
124 The Attorney General will consider unduly lenient sentences under s.36(1)(a) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988. For instance – R v Connors [2013] EWCA Crim 324. 
125 Ibid 140.  
126 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 31) 151, 152. 
127 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 276. 
128 George, ‘Natural Law’ (n 88) 191-192. 
129 It was identified in chapter 1 that, within Murphy’s categorisations, George’s ‘moral reading’ of the 
natural law theory differs from Finnis’ ‘weak reading’ - Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and 
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constitution bind all – natural law is binding upon all. For George, this would 
extend to binding precedent derived from case law setting ratio decidendi if in 
accordance, and derived from, the natural law. This will be the subject of 
discussion in chapter 5. I will next show George’s process may misrepresent the 
good due to the incommensurability of the goods. 
Development of the good 
The incommensurability of the goods may show incorrect development of the 
good from Thomas because the morally guided ends differ. The Introduction 
presented the incommensurability of the basic goods within NNL. NNL’s basic 
form of human good is derived upon a universal value – the reliance upon 
practical principles here is contentious. For instance, in his In Defense of Natural 
Law, George, presents: 
A set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain 
for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realise reasonably for 
themselves the value(s)…to collaborate with each other (positively or 
negatively) in a community.130  
Reasonable objectives differ in the community. Aquinas’ scholastic values differ 
from Robert George’s twenty-first century postmodernist community.131 The 
guidance of practical reason determines what counts as an appropriate action in 
each choice. This leads to an end focused upon moral reason. While George 
believes that the process may be similar, as Porter argues, morally guided ends 
differ in their application.132 A universal value of the good cannot have definitive 
application. This is because of incommensurability of the goods, and so may be 
seen as a difficult movement from Aquinas by George.  
Finally the development of the good may invoke the is-ought problem often called 
the naturalistic fallacy. Like most contemporary philosophers, George has 
worried about the is/ought dichotomy so forcefully articulated by David Hume and 
                                                          
Politics (n 122) 9; M C Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
26. 
130 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 235. 
131 As shown in the differentiation between the first practical principles and their subsequent widening 
within NNL to the basic human good formulation. 
132 J Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 162. 
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reinvested with authority through G. E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy.133 That is, the 
problem with deriving moral conclusions from factual premises.134 Grisez and 
George suggest that any reductivist position ascribed to Aristotle or Aquinas 
entails deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ based upon a natural property.135 However, 
the development between practical reason, the good and the basic human goods 
may circumvent the naturalistic fallacy. It has been argued that George’s 
distinction between practical reasonableness and the basic goods is satisfactory 
in circumventing the naturalistic fallacy of identifying good with a natural fact. This 
is because George believes that the first practical principles and basic precepts 
of natural law do not state moral propositions, they are ‘pre-moral’.136 As ‘pre-
moral’, this overcomes David Hume’s fact-value dichotomy and G. E. Moore’s 
formulation of the naturalistic fallacy.137 The ethicist David Oderberg has 
identified Finnis’ NNL contribution in Fundamentals of Ethics138 and ‘Scepticism, 
Self-refutation and the Good of Truth’139 as being the leading academic criticism 
of the fact-value distinction.140 This rejection is further supported in work by the 
ethicists Philippa Foot141 and Jean Porter.142   
In ‘The Basic Principles of Natural Law’ Finnis and Grisez made the claim that: 
‘[t]here can be no valid deduction of a normative conclusion without a normative 
principle, and thus … [the] first practical principles cannot be derived from 
metaphysical speculations.’143  
                                                          
133 D Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (first published 1739, L A Selby-Bigge ed, Oxford University 
Press, 1888) 469, and G. E. Moore, Principa Ethica (first published 1903, Cambridge University Press, 
1948), 46-56.  
134 Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (n2) 123. J Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government (first published 1698, P Laslett ed, 2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, 1967) 289. 
135 J Finnis & G Grisez, ‘The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph McInerny’ (1981) 26 Am. J. 
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136 George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 39) 49. 
137 E D Reed, Theology for International Law (Bloomsbury, 2013) 106. Here Reed is directly refuting the 
criticisms put forward in N Bamforth and D Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A 
Critique of New Natural Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 4.  
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139 J Finnis, ‘Scepticism, Self refutation and the Good of Truth’ in J Raz and P Hacker (eds), Law, Morality 
and Society: Essays in Honour of HLA Hart (Clarendon Press, 1977). 
140 D S Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-Consequentialist Approach (Blackwell, 2000) 9, 10. 
141 See P Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays In Moral Philosophy (University of California Press, 
1978) 110-131. 
142 See Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (n 2) 123-124. 
143 Finnis and Grisez, ‘The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph McInerny’ (n 106) 24. 
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This claim was made to avoid reductivism which, in their opinion, leads to the 
naturalistic fallacy.144 George is convinced that reductivism entails adopting the 
is/ought problem of deriving an ‘ought’ prescription from an ‘is’ proposition.’145 A 
relaxed stance is taken to this problem, which in and of itself is no longer a 
pressing issue in contemporary analytical jurisprudence.146 The use of the good 
here is indicative of the wider, problematic approach that George makes in his 
understanding of the good. A problem which has identified modification required 
in George’s thought. The centrality of practical reason to George’s NNL thought 
has again been shown here. To shed more light upon practical reasoning, the 
next section will turn to George’s approach towards the principle of ethical 
autonomy. 
Elevation of the principle of ethical autonomy 
The last section conveyed that George was influenced by Aquinas’ moral 
theology and that the good within practical reasoning is central to George’s use 
of Aquinas. It further noted  Aquinas’ teleological understanding of human actions 
i.e. that whatever is action is undertaken for some end or purpose, and his 
ultimate attribution of goodness to God. We saw briefly that, for Aquinas, the first 
principle of practical reason [FPPR] is inseparable from his belief that the 
meaning of goodness is found in God:   
Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the 
notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence 
this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and 
evil is to be avoided." (S.T. II-I, q.94, art.2, c)  
For Aquinas, the FPPR is rooted theologically in the nature of the concept of the 
good which leads to flourishing. Yet, Aquinas does not use the term ethical 
autonomy, nor does he discuss autonomy in modern, liberal terms. He states 
clearly, however, that the human person is capable of apprehending the good as 
something to be sought, thereby implying that the human person has moral 
agency:  
                                                          
144 Ibid. 
145 D J O’Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (Macmillan London, 1967) 32. 
146 Ibid. Further see McInerny, Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (n 67) 118. 
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Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a 
contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural 
inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and 
consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and 
objects of avoidance. (S.T. II-I, q.94, art.2, c) 
Hence NNL theorists have assumed that he operates with an understanding of 
moral agency comparable to modern notions of autonomy. Of interest for our 
purpose is how the new natural law theorists, and George in particular, explain, 
understand and appropriate Aquinas’ theologically-informed natural law 
reasoning in their jurisprudence. Schockenhoff recognises the tension between 
traditional theological teaching on natural law and modern, predominantly 
philosophically informed versions. He notes a critical boundary which 
distinguishes ‘an autonomous ethics of reason and a theonomous ethics of 
faith’.147 Moreover, he provides context for analysing George’s approach to 
ethical autonomy because he guides us helpfully in appreciating how natural law 
theorists have tended to present tensions between revelation and the autonomy 
of practical reason.148 So, for instance, he observes that A.J. Lisska ‘remains too 
bound to this basically neoscholastic type of interpretation, since he derives moral 
philosophy (as a logically secondary discipline) from metaphysics, thereby 
ultimately undermining the autonomy of practical rationality’.149 As is becoming 
apparent, both evidence an awareness of theological traditions of metaphysically-
rooted theological reasoning. Both speak to an audience, however, who might 
not be sympathetic to theologically-explicit modes of argumentation. Hence both 
venture ways of speaking that are cut loose from explicit linkages with theology. 
Both, as we shall see, assume that practical reason is capable and acting in ways 
that seek the basic goods. Schockenhoff’s representation of this theologically-
informed natural law reasoning is a helpful preparation for our reading of George. 
For our purposes, it is important to be clear that George understands ethical 
autonomy to be the ‘capacity to be author of one’s own life’.150 George is aware 
                                                          
147 Schockenhoff, Natural Law and Human Dignity (n 23) 3. For instance Aquinas states: ‘the 
practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation.’ Aquinas, ST, I Q 79 a.11. 
148 See his account of a range of views on this point, Schockenhoff, Natural Law and Human Dignity (n 
23) 137-140. 
149 Ibid 139. 
150 George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 39) 147. In this work George draws 
upon limited references in the Summa Theologiae in an attempt to substantiate his claim: see ST I-II, q. 
95, a. 1.; ST I-II q. 96, a. 2.; ST II-II, q. 10, a. 8. 
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of the potential anachronism at stake here but maintains a reliance upon ethically 
autonomous practical reasoning.151 The autonomous operation of practical 
reason is a feature in his development of ethical autonomy.152 George’s argument 
is that autonomous practical reasoning is authentically Thomist.153 George states: 
‘[I] allow for a measure of autonomous practical reasoning. This solution, I think, 
is the authentic Thomist one.’154 It is evident that there is a promotion of ethical 
autonomy and dependence upon the autonomous ethics of reason as he 
engages natural law jurisprudence.155  
Further support for this claim is given by Stephen Long who finds that George 
favours ethical autonomy in rationalist terms.156 This attempts to follow Aquinas, 
for whom practical reason is the ‘perfection of some activity other than 
thinking.’157 As such, ethical autonomy may be evident in the writings of George 
as he develops the moral theology of Aquinas and engages with autonomous 
practical reasoning.158 
Shockenhoff criticises this approach. He criticises NNL for attempting to ‘defend 
this approach justify[ing] it by appealing…to the historical example of Thomas 
Aquinas’ doctrine of nature law.’159 There is some merit in this criticism because 
there is very little direct reference to the original works by Aquinas when George 
attempts to explicate his understanding of moral agency present in Thomas’ 
natural law reasoning. 
On the other hand, establishing the elevation of ethical autonomy within moral 
reasoning is helpful in this chapter to determine George’s normative moral 
doctrine. O’Connor has identified that within Thomas’ ethics, actions are called 
human or moral inasmuch as they ‘proceed from the reason.’160 This is important 
                                                          
151 R P George, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (Doubleday Books, 2008) 132. 
152 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 64-66. 
153 Ibid 255.  
154 Ibid. 
155 See further ibid 37, 76; Biggar & Black (eds), The Revival of Natural Law: Philosophical, Theological 
and Ethical Responses to the Finnis-Grisez School (n 49) 67-68. 
156 S Long, ‘Natural Law or Autonomous Practical Reason: Problems for the New Natural Law Theory’ in J 
Goyette, M S Lutkovic and R S Myers (eds), St Thomas Aquinas & The Natural Law Tradition: 
Contemporary Perspectives (Catholic University of America Press, 2004) xix. 
157 McInerny, Ethica Thomistica: The Moral Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (n 18) 38-39. See Aquinas, ST 
Ia, q. 14, a. 16. 
158 See further George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 64-66. 
159 Schockenhoff, Natural Law and Human Dignity (n 23) 2. 
160 O’Connor (n 116) 32. See ST I-I 9.90 a.I ad 3. 
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for our analysis of George’s thought because it implies that disputes about morals 
are capable, in principle, of being decided by practical reasoning. This inference 
has developed as a method to engage the choosing agent within George’s 
monographs, notably In Defense of Natural Law and Making Men Moral161 and 
will be seen to be important when later applying the modification of George’s 
thought to religious equality law.  
George consistently maintains that the basic human goods, as intrinsic aspects 
of well-being and flourishing, create a distinct space for ethically autonomous 
moral decision making. Flourishing is instead enabled through actions 
undertaken by practical reason. The human goods create space for ethically 
autonomous practical reasoning. For George, this provides an ethical autonomy 
of the human person and the dignity of the rational being.162 This is intrinsically 
marked by two positions: first, a level of personal decision making; and second, 
the connection of the good with autonomy to enable such decision making, which 
can be used later in this thesis to analyse the right to religious liberty within 
equality law. Taken together, the combination of the FPPR with ethical autonomy 
provides George with a specific normative moral doctrine. It is one that is 
supplemented with an ethically autonomous responsibility. This is important 
because in chapter 1 it was also suggested that in George’s thought authority to 
enforce the natural law may be vested with the legislature as a check on law 
making power.163 George’s reliance upon scholastic legal reasoning and the 
natural law to reach pragmatic conclusions in line with the common good may 
well produce a justiciable form of natural law, which will be further developed in 
chapter 4.3. 
This section has shown that the autonomous nature of practical reason is an 
important feature in George’s development of ethical autonomy. It will now be 
argued that the basic good, in both an ethical and moral notion, depends upon a 
certain form of the good. The basic good of religion will be shown to be modified 
by George.  
                                                          
161 For instance: George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 39) 226; George, In 
Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 38. 
162 George, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (n 150) 132. 
163 R P George, The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford University Press, 1996) 329. 
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Inclusion of the basic good of religion within practical reasoning 
In this section I will show that George further differs from Aquinas in the approach 
to the basic good of religion. There is reason to believe that George diverges from 
the teaching of Aquinas concerning practical reason’s connection to the basic 
good of religion. The premise is that NNL attempts to construct a genuinely 
Thomistic account of natural law ‘without needing to advert to the question of 
God’s existence or nature or will’.164 As outlined in chapter 1, this is also the 
position of George. 
MacIntyre points out Aquinas’ view of religion and draws notice to the difference 
between NNL treatments of the good of religion. Aquinas, in MacIntyre’s view, 
suggests that religion is a moral virtue ‘being part of the cardinal virtue of justice 
concerned with what we owe to God in the way of honour, reverence and 
worship.’165 This is because obedience to the natural law requires the virtue of 
justice.166 Given that Aquinas’ view of religion was concerned with justice and the 
metaphysical, this involved, first, the ultimate end being the state of perfect 
happiness, and then, second, the contemplation of God, in which contemplation 
all of human nature finds its completion.167 It is a view of religion that posits a 
deity setting down obligations in order to achieve justice. 
George has given a high place to the good of religion within NNL, even though 
there is an uncertainty surrounding of the basic good of religion within his list of 
basic goods,168 although there is no such uncertainty in Finnis’ list.169 For 
instance, while there is clearly a basic good of religion listed in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, George does not list a basic good of religion within Body Self 
Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics170 but he does list a basic good of 
religion in the later - Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of 
Liberal Secularism.171 This shows the increased importance that George has 
attached to religion over time.  
                                                          
164 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 48-49. 
165 A MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality (n 2) 188.  
166 Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (n 14) S.T IIa-IIae, 79, 1.  
167 Ibid 262 Ia, 6, 1 - A MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality (n 2) 192. 
168 R P George & P Lee, Body Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 91. 
169 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 85-90. 
170 George & Lee, Body Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (n 169) 91. 
171 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 89) 119. 
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Within A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory172 Russell Hittinger critiques the 
place of religion within NNL. Hittinger proposes that it is necessary to distinguish 
between the good of religion and a religion, and in addition to offer criteria for 
assessing whether the latter ‘satisfies the nature of the general good of 
religion.’173 Within the context of the basic good of religion and religious liberty, 
Hittinger argues that it is unclear why one ought to choose the basic good of 
religion, much less promote or safeguard the basic good of religion.174 Any 
position taken on religion and religious liberty by the new natural lawyers is 
dependent on their Thomist interpretation. Hittinger notes that Aquinas 
distinguishes between religion and the good of belief in God. In Christian Moral 
Principles:175  
Grisez uses the Thomistic distinction to reinforce his own position that the 
basic goods, including religion, are incommensurable, and that there does 
not exist, prior to choice, a hierarchy amongst them. What he overlooks is 
the theoretical apparatus that Aquinas employs in order to justify the so 
called natural good of religion and in its place the natural law system.176  
Aquinas’ discussion of religion presupposes a philosophy of human nature – an 
account of the intellect and the will’s relation to objects and ends.177 This 
distinguishes Aquinas from Grisez. The argument runs that the virtue of religion 
is superior to the other natural virtues precisely because it governs man far more 
immediately, in particular, to his final end.178  
George’s approach to the basic good of religion 
George’s approach to the good of religion has been rejected by the legal idealist 
Mark Murphy who rejects George’s approach as it relates to practical reason. He 
discards George’s incommensurability thesis and instead argues that ‘what is 
needed to participate in one good requires participation in another good’.179 
Murphy’s logical suggestion is that, if participation in the religious good was 
threatened by pursuit of other goods, then those committed to religion would 
                                                          
172 Hittinger, Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (n 10). 
173 Ibid 90. 
174 Ibid 108. 
175 Grisez, Christian Moral Principles: The Way of the Lord Jesus. Vol 1 (n 52). 
176 R Hittinger, Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (n 10). 
177 For instance: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book Two: Creation (n 51) Chapter 48 [6] 146. 
178 Ibid 171. See Aquinas, ST I-II q. 1 a. 8. 
179 Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (n 129) 194. 
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‘abandon those other claims.’180 Much like George, Murphy’s conclusion is that 
practical reason provides a state of affairs similar to the function that constitutes 
human flourishing. Yet, Murphy finds there are reasons to doubt that practical 
reason affirms that all other basic goods are for the sake of religious good.181 The 
inference from this is that practical reason does not ‘provide an independent 
reason to think religion to be a superordinate good.’182 This is a surprising 
conclusion. The differentiating factor here is that Murphy, in his criticism of NNL, 
finds religion to be a superordinate good. I agree with his initial finding, which will 
be the subject of in-depth discussion in chapter 4 in which the modification of 
George’s thought is required to establish a better critical understanding towards 
the place of religious liberty within equality law. Nonetheless, Murphy’s later 
conclusion ignores the full incommensurability of the good of religion, which will 
also later be discussed in detail. 
In the analysis of George’s thought, what role does the common good play 
regarding religion and law? Chapter 1 presented George’s set of general moral 
principles that are: a) distinct from the basic practical principles and b) enable the 
basic moral principles to work.183 This successfully allows the contentious choice 
between human goods. As argued earlier in this chapter, Finnis’ labelling of these 
principles as ‘requirements of practical reasonableness’184 is vital to the process 
and performance of NNL deliberation and judgement in situations of morally 
significant choice. This is a choice that is not merely confined to the intellectual 
natural law theorist, instead to every rational agent.185 Hence George under his 
own methodology would achieve practical reasoning of reason, morality and law. 
I suggest that George presents here two substantial, differing claims. First, 
because George recognises that NNL clarifies ways to identify basic principles of 
practical reasoning and/or morality, he provides direction to guide the arms of the 
state: legislators, the executive and to an extent, judges, in their decision making 
processes.186 Secondly, it is evident that George recognises that other natural 
                                                          
180 Ibid 42. 
181 Ibid 197. 
182 Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (n 129) 191, 197. 
183 Basic moral principles that are derived from the first principle of morality. 
184 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 3. 
185 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 31) 105. 
186 This would be applicable to the British context. A good example of this is the English common law, 
which emerged historically as a sort of positive embodiment of the natural law, due to its creation not 
being dependant on an act of parliament. So Corwin concludes ‘the Common Law becomes higher law, 
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lawyers seek to guide legal interpretation, adjudication and reasoning on the 
basis of a necessary connection between morality and law.187 This is important 
because George has previously recognised the normative basis of adjudication 
required to divide different natural law interpretations of legal validity. Moving 
further than Aquinas, these must be separate issues – separate issues that by 
analysing George’s thought I claim divide his approach/NNL into a jurisprudential 
and ethical theory. This presents a normative basis for moral judgment built upon 
practical reason and provides a place for the basic good of religion, within the 
later analysis regarding religious freedom in equality law.188 
2.2 Conclusion 
From the above we can see George’s development of Thomistic natural law 
theory to provide application through the basic good of religion.189 The aim of this 
section was to demonstrate that Aquinas’ influence was fundamental190 in 
pertaining to all jurisprudential decisions taken by George regarding the good and 
practical reasoning. George’s development should be seen as dependent upon 
a logical interpretation of Aquinas’ inclinationist theory of practical reason.191 
George’s development of Aquinas’ natural law theory, however, may not 
adequately incorporate the essence of Aquinas’ writing. It is not right to say that 
Aquinas’ influence is ‘fundamental’ to all the relevant jurisprudential decisions 
taken by George. It has been argued that George’s interpretation of practical 
reason in the work of Aquinas departs from Aquinas’ position in several key 
respects, such as: the elevation of the principle of ethical autonomy; George’s 
development of the good/goods; and the modification of the first principle of 
practical reason which fails to adequately incorporate Aquinas’ understanding of 
the good.  
                                                          
without at all losing its quality as positive law.’ (George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 17) 175). Corwin 
suggests: ‘first, that Natural Law is entitled by its intrinsic excellence to prevail over any law which rests 
solely on human authority; second, that Natural Law may be appealed to by human beings against 
injustices sanctioned by human authority.’ (Ibid 174.) This is of course misguided direct derivation – NNL 
is at pains to suggest that law is not to be variegated nor idealised.  It will be shown in section 2.3 that 
the natural law provides an internal arbiter for a minimum standard of law, rather than any indirect 
prevailing form. 
187 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 31) v. 
188 Chapters 4 and 5 will argue this presents a place for the basic good of religion. 
189 George, Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality (n 1) 95. 
190 Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (n 3) 24. 
191 Murphy, Natural Law and Practical Rationality (n 129) 86. 
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In summary, George’s NNL approach is contingent upon, following Aquinas, the 
good in reason and morality and the relation of ethical autonomy to practical 
reason. However, NNL diverges significantly upon the basic good of religion, and 
wider presentation of goods, within practical reasoning. Therefore, through 
ethical autonomy, the good in reason and morality provides practical application. 
In particular, through the basic good of religion. I suggest that this provides a 
coherent way forward for natural law reasoning in the context of jurisprudence. 
This basis will be crucial in chapters 4 and 5 to critique religious equality law. 
Section 2.3 will further detail how George’s NNL approach to moral reasoning 
has moved beyond many of the particular claims made by Aquinas. 
 
2.3 Beyond Aquinas: Revelation and Reason – debate about the validity of 
laws  
 
In an effort to further critique George’s thought, this section will show how George 
moves beyond Aquinas, to debate the validity of laws in a deeper exploration of 
moral reasoning within NNL. It will be argued that the sources of George’s NNL 
approach to moral reasoning depend upon three main approaches: 1) revelation; 
2) value; and 3) reason. This section will conclude by considering George’s 
contribution to the concept of the ‘minimum standard’ of practical 
reasonableness. Central to this section is the question of whether NNL is a 
product of human reason or divine revelation?  
The sources of George’s approach to moral reasoning: divine revelation, 
moral realism or human reason?  
 
This subsection will begin to address the question of the sources of George’s 
approach to moral reasoning by suggesting that George attributes more weight 
to human reason than divine revelation when framing his discussion of NNL. 
Herein lies a point of tension with Aquinas for whom natural law reasoning is 
ultimately a theologically grounded mode of reasoning.192 It will be argued that, 
                                                          
192 Jean Porter, a leading theological commentator on Aquinas’s natural law reasoning, makes this point 
while drawing attention to differences between Aquinas and subsequent, modern theorists of natural 
law: ‘In the transition from the later Middle Ages to modernity, the tradition of the natural law was 
transformed from a theologically grounded interpretation of human morality into a philosophical 
framework for deriving, or at least testing and supplementing, determinate moral norms’. Porter, 
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© James Gould, 2018  115 
like Aquinas, the sources of George’s NNL approach to moral reason depend 
upon both revelation and reason. Unlike Aquinas, however, George downplays 
the significance of divine revelation in relation to human reason. He follows Finnis 
in this regard. At issue is the degree of tension in this regard between George 
and Finnis, and where George wants to place his own work in relation to Aquinas.  
Law, morality and reason – moral reasoning in George’s thought 
Mindful of the above, this section will discuss in more detail George’s combination of law, 
reason and morality. Briefly stated, George believes that, for Aquinas, the natural 
law is humankind’s God-given participation in the eternal law of God through 
reason and will: ‘The natural law is a participation in the eternal law because even 
that part of creation subject to the norms of the natural law ultimately depends 
upon divine intelligence and free choice’.193 George cites from Aquinas to this 
effect: ‘[The human being] has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a 
natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal 
law in the rational creature is called the natural law.’ 194 As such, the natural law 
is the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law.195 This is not the place to 
explicate Aquinas’ meaning. For our purposes, the point is simply that George is 
here concerned explicitly to align his approach with key tenets of Aquinas’ 
teaching. This has been noted by McInerny, for instance, who has observed that 
George is wanting to position himself close to the position of Thomas, who 
believed there was no real conflict between faith and reason.196 George seems 
explicitly to want to hold together both faith and reason. He thus interprets 
Aquinas to the effect that: ‘there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides 
philosophical science built up by human reason.’197 As such, we can see that 
George wants to position himself close to Aquinas in maintaining that the sources 
of a NNL approach to moral reason depend upon both revelation and reason. The 
                                                          
193 George, In Defence of Natural Law (n 7) 42. 
194 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 17) 161, 162 referencing Aquinas ST I-II q.91 a.2. This once 
again shows George’s reliance upon Aquinas. 
195 Aquinas, Summa Theologica (n 4) I – II q. 91. a. 2. 
196 McInerny, A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas: A Handbook for Peeping Thomists (n 150) 62. See 
Aquinas ST I q. 6. a. 1. This reading is distinguished from the two extreme attitudes identified in the 
nineteenth century by McInerny: rationalism (reason without faith) and fideism (faith without reason). 
Within George’s thought neither extreme is adopted. This chapter will establish that there is always an 
acceptance of both in the theory; however, the argument lies in the extent that one dictates the other - 
McInerny, A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas: A Handbook for Peeping Thomists (n 150) 26.  
197 Aquinas ST I q. 1. a. 1. See also Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles Book One: God (Trans 
A C Pegis, University of Notre Dame Press, 1975) Chapter 5 [5], 71: ‘the human reason cannot grasp fully 
the truths that are above it.’ 
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question lurking close below the surface, however, is whether, despite these 
protestations, George tends nonetheless to elevate the human reason above 
revelation. 
As will become apparent, the significance that George attaches to the sources of 
moral and practical reasoning may also be a misreading of Aquinas. It has been 
shown above that for Aquinas, the natural law is the rational creature’s 
participation in the eternal law198 and it connects beings in contemplation with 
God. Aquinas’ posing of natural law as a participation in the eternal law follows 
because: ‘[e]veryone desires perfect happiness, and everyone has as the true 
end of their nature, that for the sake of which they move toward all other goods 
in the way that they do, the goodness of God.’199 In addition, ‘the ultimate end of 
human beings is the state of perfect happiness, the contemplation of God in the 
beatific vision, in which contemplation all of human nature finds its completion.’200 
Aquinas’ thought follows that it is evident that a scholastic understanding of 
natural law participates in the eternal law and connects beings in contemplation 
with God.201 The natural law participates in the eternal law. This is distinctively 
different to the significance George’s approach provides to practical reasoning 
and religious faith which will be shown in the next paragraph. 
George’s discussion of faith differs in believing that law, morality and reason 
combine with both special and general revelation. Biblical scripture is a form of 
special revelation, whereas natural law is a form of general revelation. For 
George, ‘[i]f natural law is based upon “faith,” it is a faith in reason, and in the 
possibility of practical reason in particular.’202 Note here how George directs the 
object of faith toward reason rather than the substance of divine revelation. It is 
in this sense he moves beyond reliance upon revelation alone in his claims about 
legal moral reasoning – this is an important observation for the purpose of 
analysing George’s thought which will later be applied to religious equality law. 
George reads Aquinas as suggesting that a Judaeo-Christian God directs man in 
His own image and likeness, and more specifically, the capacity of reason. Faith 
                                                          
198 Aquinas, Summa Theologica (n 4) I – II q. 91. 
199 Aquinas, The Treatise on Law: Summa Theologica, I-II, qq. 90-97 (n 14) S.T. Ia, 6, 1. 
200 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality (n 2) 191-2 quoting Aquinas, Summa Theologica (n 4) I-
IIae, 3, 7.  
201 Ibid 191-192.  
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in God entails faith in reason and the capacity of human beings to exercise 
practical reason, that is, to engage with reference to the first principle of practical 
reason and the first principle of morality whereby one grasps the intelligible point 
of certain possible actions for ends (goods, values, purposes) which qua 
intelligible provide ‘reasons for choice and action’203 concerning law. Here we can 
see that George downplays the significance of divine revelation in relation to 
human reason and comes close to Finnis’ position as will be outlined below. 
Chapter 1 has shown that at the very base level, George’s system is a tripartite 
distinction between law, morality and reason, providing reason for action. 
Freedom, guided by practical reason, supplements a basis for George’s theory 
of human nature within naturalism. For George, the ‘natural order’ is normative 
precisely in as much as it provides moral norms for free human choice.204 For this 
reason George’s approach is very different to a reading of the natural law 
participating in the eternal law and connecting beings in contemplation with God 
as presented in the Summa Theologica.205 
Two different systems for human reasoning 
Now that George’s approach to moral reasoning has been shown, Finnis’ ‘natural 
reason’ approach will be presented to draw a contrast. As shown in chapter 1, 
Finnis’ interpretation of divine law/reason takes a particular reading of Aquinas 
and is drawn from a form of moral reasoning termed ‘natural reason’.206 For 
Finnis, as we have already seen above, rationalist argument resolves any conflict 
between divine and philosophical conclusions termed ‘natural reason’;  natural 
reason is understood as philosophical reasoning based on the ordinary 
experience of natural things, unaided by divine revelation.207 Finnis uses ‘natural 
reason’ to reconcile revelation and rationality in moral reasoning by ‘natural 
reason’ taking precedence over revelation. Hence, this is why Natural Law and 
                                                          
203 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 17) 65. 
204 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 40, 41. 
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Natural Rights provides a proselytising argument for the existence of a 
transcendent source similar to Aquinas’ ‘Five Ways’.208   
Two different systems have emerged: the first is George’s combination of law, 
reason and morality, and the second is Finnis’ ‘natural reason’. Both Finnis’ 
understanding of ‘natural reason’ and George’s combination of law, reason and 
morality can be seen as controversial. For instance, Lloyd Weinreb is aware of 
these tensions and discusses how philosophers of the law who have interests in 
natural law reasoning negotiate the relationship between divine law and human 
reason. This has led Weinreb to deny that such reason-dependent ends or 
purposes exist within legal idealism.209 Both approaches to moral reasoning 
further place a high reading of human nature – one that can be rejected on the 
Biblical basis of total depravity (Romans 3:23) in the formation of choice common 
to man in moral reasoning discourse.210 This is traditionally a Protestant Christian 
critique.211 It has been argued that neither George nor Finnis hold appeal to 
revelation in claims made about moral reasoning. Here George’s reading places 
excessive weight on moral choosing and Finnis likewise relies heavily upon the 
role of ‘natural reason’. This section has criticised George’s dependence on 
human reasoning. The next section will consider if a way forward can be provided 
by comparing Robert George’s method of reasoning to Ronald Dworkin’s 
conception of value as a form of moral reasoning. 
Value as a form of moral reasoning  
Central to this chapter is the use of practical reasoning. The previous subsection 
showed that practical reasoning encounters trouble concerning human nature. If 
practical reason works in the way outlined above to form conclusions based upon 
law, reason and morality, then could the concept of value be assessed objectively 
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to form an analogous basis for moral reasoning? If so, can this provide an account 
of morality that depends upon value and religion, drawing a comparison to 
George’s Roman Catholic account of morality, which is contingent upon the value 
of religion? It will be shown in this section first, that value, like practical reasoning, 
can be assessed as a form of moral reasoning. This will be shown to be potentially 
detrimental for religion. By locating the independence of value in the FPPR, it will 
secondly be shown that George’s value system provides a basis to engage, 
through practical application, conclusions reached in contemporary case law.  
Both Finnis and Dworkin believe that practical reasoning precedes legal 
choice.212 As such, they focus on the connection between law and morality. It is 
clear that within Dworkin’s posthumous publication Religion without God,213 
Dworkin here ‘publishing from beyond the grave’, has for the first time focused 
solely on the issues of Western religion and a Judaeo-Christian God.214 It will be 
shown that this is an important step. It is an important step as first, Dworkin’s 
previous work focussing upon the relationship between law and morality will be 
seen in the light of his latest and last addition and secondly, Dworkin’s theory has 
serious implications for organised religion,215 notably Christianity, in the search 
for an applied form of moral reasoning in George’s scholarship. 
The use of ‘value in Dworkin’s work 
In Religion without God,216 Dworkin claims that value is objective, independent of 
mind, and immanent in the world.217 This development, and concentration upon 
value, stems from Dworkin’s position outlined in Justice for Hedgehogs.218 This 
unusual title is a reference to Isaiah Berlin's distinction, drawing on an ancient 
Greek aphorism between those intellectuals who, like the fox, have many ideas, 
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and those who have ‘one big idea’.219 The fox knows many things, but the 
hedgehog knows one big thing. Dworkin is a hedgehog.220 The hedgehog is an 
anti-pluralist image of scepticism. Pluralism in this context was Berlin's idea that 
there are truths but they conflict. Dworkin's pedagogical, prescriptive contribution 
was to put human dignity at the centre of his moral system, entrenched in value, 
for judges and for others. This provides: ‘if we manage to lead a good life well,’ 
then and only then in rare circumstances ‘we make our lives tiny diamonds in the 
cosmic sands.’221 Here Dworkin arguably distinguishes the good from a value 
consensus, by placing value as the cornerstone of his approach. 
From looking at cases in their best moral light as outlined in Taking Rights 
Seriously,222 Dworkin’s view of morality in Justice for Hedgehogs223 is intrinsically 
connected to value,224 thus rejecting external scepticism because external 
scepticism is a form of scepticism that doubts value.225 External scepticism also 
doubts moral value scepticism.226 This is due to the introduction of human dignity 
into Dworkin’s adjudicative system and, following this, value. It can be identified 
here that for Dworkin everything accords to value.227 Of course, this is not new – 
many religious beliefs contain a structured system focused around a central 
concept, often a deity. For instance, in mainstream Western Christianity, belief in 
Christ dictates everything else within the religion. Therefore, through placing a 
particular focus upon moral philosophy and ethics, Dworkin is presenting an old 
concept in a new guise.  
To draw out value and moral reasoning between Dworkin and George in this 
section, it is clear that Dworkin further sets a central structure of value focused 
upon morality, by aiming for ‘a larger system of value in which our moral opinions 
figure.’228 For Dworkin, moral reasoning is a form of interpretive reasoning in a 
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larger system of value.229 Convictions about value keep moral reasoning in 
check.230 Dworkin adumbrates that ‘moral reasoning, as I said, means drawing 
on a nested series of convictions about value.’231 Indeed, Dworkin’s term value 
explicitly refers to a broad normative category that includes reasons.232 A 
connection concerning value and morality is established in Dworkin’s work. This 
thesis attempts to analyse the right to freedom of religion by pursuing a critique 
of George’s work. In our analysis it can be observed that religions are commonly 
built upon/around morality.233 It was seen in chapter 1 that when considering 
religion prudentia is engaged to reach conclusions based upon ‘the common 
good’,234 through practical reasoning in George’s natural law theory.235 George 
turns to consider morality in his ‘natural law theory, as applied to problems of 
today’.236 Practical reasoning arguably guides the common good in line with value 
to achieve human fulfilment. A central focus upon moral reasoning is evident in 
George’s work. Therefore, at the outset both Dworkin and George adopt systems 
reliant upon morality and ethical consideration. 
Dworkin has previously considered matters of natural law and morality.237 
However, interpretivism is Dworkin’s theory of law which involves judges 
interpreting political morality in the adjudicative process. This had often been 
termed the ‘third way’, because it does not flow into legal idealism or positivism.238 
The ‘third way’ is not natural law.239 Instead, the third way depends upon a 
normative approach to law, putting existing legal practice in its morally best light 
in adjudication.240 George does not identify with this ‘third way’. Law as integrity 
is the picture of adjudication that Dworkin seeks to defend. This provides a picture 
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of adjudication from which Dworkin ‘infers his theory of legality.’241 For our 
purpose to assess moral reasoning it is clear that Dworkin’s interpretive approach 
follows judges deciding hard cases by deciding the political principles behind 
legal rules.242  
Does this system of value rely upon a normative separation of law and morality? 
Dworkin’s recognition and explanation in Justice for Hedgehogs243 that the two 
system normative separation approach to law and morality within Taking Rights 
Seriously244 was ‘itself flawed’ provided an important standpoint.245 Dworkin 
acknowledged that neither the two interrelated processes of a) the separation 
between law and morality in Taking Rights Seriously246 nor b) the presentation of 
the law in terms of principles would explain adjudication.247 This is why in Justice 
for Hedgehogs he then proceeded to discuss how law and morality are not two 
separate systems, by using the example of a tree structure in which law is a 
branch of morality.248 This branch of morality needs to be distinguished from other 
branches in so far as a community has rights that can be enforced on official 
demand through adjudicative institutions. Here an analogy with family morality in 
which there is a distinct institutional morality can be drawn. This would be a 
special morality governing the use of coercive authority within the family. There 
may be moral reasons for deferring to the history of how that power has been 
exercised, even if we can conceive of a better conception of family morality. This 
would not make sense, however, for the institutional morality established within 
the family and so both forms of morality are included together.249 Here the 
connection between family and institutional morality show law to be a branch of 
morality, and I suggest this is in the wider consideration connecting value and 
morality. 
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Dworkin has allowed his interpretive account of morality250 to provide an account 
of religion based upon value.251 Religion is connected to value,252 with the 
‘religious attitude …[insisting] on the full independence of value.253 Why is this 
important for our purposes? The independence of value254 constituting part of 
religion255 which forms the basis of Justice for Hedgehogs256 and Religion Without 
God257 is an important jurisprudential development for religion as a concept. This 
will be shown to be detrimental to religious believers and therefore also to religion. 
As we turn to an applied form of moral reasoning, can Dworkin’s account of ‘value 
laden religion’ be initially used to interpret the widespread conviction that people 
have special rights of religious freedom?258 This provides a distinct difference 
between Dworkin and George. In contrast to George, Dworkin’s ‘religious 
atheism’ incorporates a place for religious experience, such as the different 
understandings of religion: sporting fanaticism, constitutional allegiance and the 
United States’ recognition of ‘secular humanism,’259 as discussed in Torcaso v 
Watkins.260 Dworkin suggests these are types of religion that flourish and do not 
recognise a deity; Buddhism is another example. Religion Without God 
elaborates upon this by defining religion as an interpretive concept.261 Dworkin 
very clearly believes that religion is an interpretive concept rather than a criterial 
concept.262 The benefit of doing so is that Dworkin does not have to rely upon the 
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same criteria to identify instances of the concept.263 Instead, it allows for 
clarification when there is not precise agreement about its meaning.264 It is 
suggested that this allows Dworkin to introduce his controversial definition for 
religion. As a result, Dworkin here changes the traditional criteria for Western 
religion by recognising no deity.  
Further, Dworkin attempts to separate God from religion by ‘separating questions 
of science from questions of value.’265 This also importantly invokes ‘religious 
wars’ between militant atheists and those of different faiths. For Dworkin, these 
religious wars are ‘more fundamentally about the meaning of human life and what 
living well means.’266 Therefore, Dworkin’s proposition at its premise is a 
theoretical exercise to ascertain value, which is a process to avoid religious 
conflict. Dworkin’s value thesis is a process to avoid religious conflict. Value is 
all-inclusive. Here Dworkin’s ‘third way’ is extended to a third way for religion, to 
ascertain value and religious conflict. This process is structured upon the 
independence of value precisely because of its all-inclusive nature. 
A fundamental right to religious freedom requires a rights basis.267 Interestingly, 
for Dworkin, like George, the question of the metaphysical is essentially 
connected to the question of value and human flourishing. This is a helpful 
observation when attempting to apply NNL thought to the right to freedom of 
religion. To define the religious attitude, Dworkin holds an acceptance of two 
central judgements about value: first, ‘life’s intrinsic meaning’, that is, human life 
having the objective meaning and everyone having an innate responsibility to live 
well and flourish (Eudaimonia); and secondly, ‘nature’s intrinsic beauty’. In other 
words, what we call ‘nature’ is not just a matter of fact but is itself something of 
intrinsic value and wonder.268 These two value judgements ‘declare inherent 
value in both dimensions of human life.’269 The value judgements provide 
paradigms of a fully religious attitude to life. It is suggested that it is a hypothesis 
that combines humanity and nature to secure ends. For Dworkin this is not an 
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attempt to explain the meaning of truth in a normative/factual context. Instead, 
the independence of value is in the applied human construct of religion. 
The Mutually Supportive Value Thesis 
The important question to consider when developing a form of Protestant270 moral 
reasoning within Dworkin’s ‘third way’ is how atheists and agnostics would have 
knowledge of the various values claimed? Dworkin’s thesis is dependent on the 
religious attitude ignoring forms of naturalism.271 Would Dworkin’s thesis exclude 
a traditional (scholastic) or contemporary (NNL) version of natural law? He rejects 
the self evidency of moral judgment in natural law on the basis of what I will term 
the ‘mutually supportive value’ thesis. This name arises because in the value 
system adopted, convictions about value are themselves mutually supportive. 
Value, for Dworkin, does not rely upon any preconceptions or further necessary 
substance. This builds upon an independence of value.272 Value is not necessary 
for practical reasoning and, therefore, is independent from flourishing as a form 
of moral reasoning. The connection is made clear. However, within Dworkin’s 
synthesis of value and the religious attitude, the attitude takes priority over the 
substance. This may be Dworkin’s error. I suggest this is where Dworkin begins 
to take an approach that is detrimental for religion. He does not find value in duty, 
obedience or fulfilment in Christ. Rather, he finds value in the human construct of 
religion. Religion and religious freedom without God is a benign, man-made 
concept. For instance, what would distinguish a religious meeting from a 
scheduled, arbitrary social club meeting? The worship of God is for Christians not 
just confined to the church meeting – instead the whole of life (Romans 12:1)273 
gives purposeful value to religion. This is in stark contrast to an isolated religious 
meeting. 
In Dworkin’s opinion, the religious attitude ‘accepts the full, independent reality of 
value.’274 Value is objective. There is a distinction drawn here in the ‘mutually 
supportive value thesis’ though between value and fact, which differ because 
convictions about value are emotional convictions and ‘convictions of value are 
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also complex, sui generis, emotional experiences.’275 From this value, realism 
must not be grounded in realism in a deity. For Dworkin, human life cannot have 
any kind of a meaning or value if ceteris paribus a benevolent God exists. The 
scientific part (creator God) of conventional religion cannot ground the value part 
(ethical responsibility).276 Here Dworkin’s idea is that a background value 
judgement is necessary to show why the scientific fact is relevant, without 
breaking Hume’s law.  
Crucially, Dworkin’s analysis is missing a defined, background judgement for 
value itself, which is so prevalent when assessing moral reasoning in George’s 
work. Applying this to religion, for instance Christianity (George’s religion), this 
would be analogous to the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Christ’s life 
and death do a posteriori make a difference to the truth of any religious values 
that a Christian would hold. For a Christian, the verification of the Cross and 
Resurrection are grounded upon the value of the Lordship of Christ (John 
14:6).277  
Further Dworkin’s distinction breaks down when considering the science/value 
distinction from a Christian position. From this position the value part identified 
by Dworkin would be presented under God’s common grace and communicated 
through the natural law. For instance, for George both the Resurrection and the 
Cross of Christ can be seen to fall within the science part of Christianity, and for 
this reason also within the value part. For this reason, George identifies religious 
freedom as flowing from a respect for belief in God which provides the right to 
ethical independence. Logically then, for atheists/agnostics wanting to accept 
ethical and moral responsibility, they do so through the common grace revealed 
from God and communicated in the natural law. This is a form of general 
revelation. In this position, there is no ultimate ground to accept this apart from a 
deity (the scientific part of religion). It is arguable that the intrinsic connection 
between God’s common grace and the grace demonstrated through Jesus 
Christ’s death on the cross fundamentally breaks down the science/value 
distinction offered by Dworkin. 
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Through the acknowledgement that religious believers may come to similar 
conclusions surrounding value judgement, however, Dworkin fails to 
acknowledge the primacy of these conclusions. It is arguable that Dworkin’s 
position as a non-believer leads to his failure to see the importance of these 
conclusions. It is this primacy and sincerity of belief that may lead religious 
believers to break Hume’s fact/value dichotomy through an assessment of both 
fact and value rooted in a logical analysis. 
Dworkin’s position, on initial inspection, can be compared to Finnis’ NNL view of 
religion. The common premise is that both adopt an independence of value, 
Dworkin in the human construct of religion and Finnis in the first principle. To start 
with Dworkin, as was noted above Dworkin believes that religion is connected to 
value.278 With the ‘religious attitude…[insisting] on the full independence of 
value’,279 it was suggested that this found the independence of value to be in the 
applied human construct of religion.280 The limitation of this premise is that, as 
has been shown above, Dworkin’s approach does not expressly invoke a deity281 
and so this lack of a deity (and lack of need for a deity)282 is likely to invite 
objection and rejection from many religious believers.283 Now turning to Finnis, 
he goes further than Dworkin: Finnis does devolve attention to the value 
judgement itself. Finnis’ independence of value is located in the FPPR.284 The 
primacy of the FPPR was maintained in chapter 1.285 In this theory of practical 
reason for both Finnis and George there is a place for ‘the value of what….we 
summarily and lamely call ‘religion’.286 Indeed, within Finnis’ conception of NNL, 
there is expressly a place for the Christian understanding of Resurrection.287 
Finnis holds that ‘God is an unrestricted, ‘absolute’ value.’288 This is an important 
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observation for analysing moral reasoning. Whereas Dworkin’s approach was 
criticised for rejecting the need for a deity, on the other hand, the limitation of this 
approach for Finnis is that, once again, Finnis expressly relies upon Roman 
Catholicism to support his jurisprudence. A Roman Catholic bias is a theme that 
runs through this thesis. As such, it is unsurprising that Roman Catholic religious 
value is again drawn upon. George, as earlier detailed in section 2.3, goes even 
further and applies his natural law theory to contemporary case law through the 
pragmatic combination of law, morality and reason.  
To conclude, Dworkin’s distinction is a dangerous form of value reasoning for 
religion, notably Christianity. How is Dworkin’s value basis dangerous for 
religion? Dworkin asserts that the value of religion can only be manifested in 
personal beliefs.289 But this approach does not satisfactorily protect personal 
beliefs. There are three reasons why Dworkin’s approach does not adequately 
protect personal beliefs. First, followed to its logical conclusion, the value of 
religion would effectively override the value of personal belief. Even if the value 
of religion is linked to personal beliefs, it has been suggested that this value of 
religion overrides faith because this value is in the human construct of religion. A 
central theme in this thesis is that freedom of individual conscience is not 
adequately protected. This observation is overarching and will be important in the 
analysis of the right to religious freedom in chapter 5. If this was reflected in the 
law, a practical consequence is that it may provide protection for the human 
construct of religion and little protection for individual believers. This would not be 
a position endorsed by Aquinas or George. A benign theoretical position for faiths, 
such as Christianity, should be resisted.290 Rather it will be argued that George’s 
value system and understanding of religion as a basic human good provides a 
basis for engaging with contemporary religious case law, particularly religious 
liberty case law involving the Equality Act 2010. Secondly, religion without God 
is an arbitrary, human concept – a false religion. This would ultimately be 
damaging and deleterious to the continued practice of the faith because religion 
that involves belief in a God draws value from that belief.291 It was shown above 
                                                          
289 Dworkin, Religion Without God (n 213) 17-19, 28. 
290 See George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 89) 119. 
291 For instance, in mainstream Western Christianity it was noted above that belief in Christ (as deity) 
dictates the focus and structure in the religion, such as teaching, organisation and worship. See P Edge, 
Religion and Law: An Introduction (Ashgate, 2006) 15; R Trigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion (Oxford 
University Press 2012) 18. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  129 
that personal beliefs may not be satisfactorily protected. Dworkin’s independence 
of value has been located in the human construct of religion. If individual faith is 
dependent upon the human construct of religion, then the impact here is to 
deprive the substance from personal belief. The crucial part of the individual’s 
faith is removed by the empty construct of religion. In short, the human construct 
of religion deprives a background judgment for value. And third, faith is dependent 
upon the connection between the religion and its believers. Adherents to the 
religion constitute the body of the religion.292 Connection between the religion and 
its believers is very important for any religion. If the believers became 
disconnected and reject any form of established religion, such as for the reasons 
given above (personal belief is overridden or it has its substance deprived), then 
this may lead to a rejection of any form of religious imposed reasoning and belief 
central to the faith. Such a different connection may damage religion. For 
instance, religion may suffer from ever further decrease in membership. The 
connections established between individual adherents and the religion may be 
broken. Religion without God lacks any value. 
‘Minimum standard of reasonableness’ approach to positivism/natural law 
The last section argued that value, like practical reasoning, can be assessed as 
a form of moral reasoning and this is detrimental for religion. A ‘third way’ has 
provided key debate in the contemporary discussion of moral reasoning within 
adjudication. In the previous section it has been shown that Dworkin’s third way 
is not a valid system of natural law. This notwithstanding, this section will show 
that a ‘minimum standard’ of reasonableness has been interpreted by some new 
natural lawyers as providing a ‘third way’. This ‘minimum standard’ will be shown 
to be a clear feature of practical reasoning. Within adjudication, what is the effect 
of any minimum standard imposed by practical reasoning in contested litigation? 
This will prove important when scrutinising the application of George’s NNL 
theory to established case law in chapters 4 and 5. 
A minimum standard has been traced by NNL to Aquinas. Finnis has noted that 
when speaking about the natural law tradition, Aquinas stated that far from 
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‘denying legal validity to iniquitous rules’293 natural law explicitly (by speaking of 
‘unjust laws’) accords to iniquitous rules legal validity. This in the sense that, first, 
these rules are accepted in the courts as guides to juridical decision; or, secondly, 
in the judgement of the speaker, they satisfy the criteria of validity laid down by 
constitutional or other legal rules.294 Even laws without a minimum content of 
reasonableness are legally valid. It is evident that this validity fills the thematic 
void left by downplaying moral iniquity. Jurisprudential questions concerning 
morality depend upon their legal defectiveness rather than their inadequacy in a 
moral sense. It realigns legal adherence as a process in which all adjudication 
and legislation is driven by process rather than the content. As such, it is not in 
dispute that the tradition holds a place for the role of reason and legal validity in 
adjudication. In support, even the weak-positivist H.L.A Hart conceded a place 
for a ‘minimum content of natural law’ in his positivist union of primary and 
secondary legal rules when referring to the conditions necessary for the existence 
of legal rules.295 
George’s conception of legal validity holds that legal positivism has been 
juxtaposed with natural law theory in such a way as to suggest that there is a 
central proposition in the affirmation or denial of the role of morality within law 
which places a theorist of law in one camp or the other. For instance Hittinger has 
identified that in the context of American law, any position that presents as an 
‘antipode to legal positivism’ is accredited to natural law.296 As Fuller remarked, 
‘natural law is the method men naturally follow when they are not consciously or 
unconsciously inhibited by a positivistic philosophy.’297 However, it is important to 
note that work by thinkers identified with both schools of thought renders this 
juxtaposition dubious at best. Although the proposition that ‘an unjust law is not 
(or seems not to be) a law’ (lex iniusta non est lex) has been the source of much 
misunderstanding and confusion, George believes that work by John Finnis, Neil 
MacCormick, and others make plain that what is being asserted by natural law 
theorists; namely, that the ‘moral obligatoriness which may attach to positive law 
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is conditional in nature.’298 George believes that this conditional nature need not 
be denied by the legal positivist.299 This is George’s ‘minimum standard of 
reasonableness’. A ‘minimum standard of reasonableness’ is supported by 
George’s further belief that the natural law theorist need not denigrate law’s 
positivity or the significance of this positivity for the study of law, or instead much 
less deny the relative autonomy of law as a social phenomenon and as an 
intellectual discipline. As such, this is held to be a central concept which will be 
important in the modification of George’s thought necessary to provide religious 
equality law with a telling critique. 
George has been criticised for using a ‘minimum standard of reasonableness’. 
This follows from George’s conditional nature of obligation viewpoint, which 
suggests that all the natural law theorist wants to do in affirming a connection 
between law and reason is to issue a reminder that adherence to some laws 
would constitute such a departure from reasonableness that there could not be 
adequate reason to obey them – the only law that merits our obedience is law 
that meets a certain minimum standard of reasonableness.300 George believes 
that legal validity depends upon law that contains a ‘certain minimum standard of 
reasonableness’.301 For Murphy, this forms the ‘moral reading’ of the natural law 
thesis.302 This reading is an important way George is distinguished from Finnis.303 
This ‘minimum standard of reasonableness’ has been interpreted by George as 
providing a ‘third way’ solution to the traditional natural law/legal positivism 
debate. This has found support, first, by Brian Bix and Philip Soper who have 
agreed with George in holding that this is the point that classical natural law views 
intended to emphasise.304 Secondly, MacCormick has praised the NNL thesis for 
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putting forward practical reason, from which the minimum standard of 
reasonableness derives, as something of fundamental importance.305 
George’s ‘third way’ approach is, however, questioned because in contemporary 
jurisprudential literature doubt surrounds whether anyone held the ‘Lex iniusta 
non est lex’ view. George has considered whether an unjust law should be 
considered a law, for the purposes of legal validity. George has correctly noted 
that this view is found in Aristotle and Cicero, as well as Augustine and 
Aquinas.306 Murphy has also suggested that it does seem to ‘have been pretty 
clearly affirmed by Blackstone.’307 In contrast to George, Murphy relies upon 
Norman Kretzmann’s assertion that ‘no occurrence of the sentence lex iniuista 
non est lex appears either in Aquinas or Augustine, whom Aquinas cites in 
introducing the idea into his discussion of law.’308 Murphy believes that George is 
particularly confident that Aquinas did not mean to assert ‘so stark a claim about 
the connection between law and practical reasonableness that the slogan 
suggests.’309 Indeed, for George, the notion of an ‘unjust law is not law’ carries 
self-contradiction and so should ‘not be considered an accurate statement of the 
natural law position.’310 This conflicts with the majority of the natural law tradition 
which downplays the moral criterion of legal validity through simplifying it merely 
as defective law. 
A similar position is adopted by Finnis, who holds that the scholastic natural 
lawyers were concerned with explaining the moral force (or validity) of law, and 
were not concerned about providing a conceptual account of legal validity. To 
quote Finnis: ‘the principles of natural law explain the obligatory force of positive 
laws, even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles’.311 For 
George, the fact that Aquinas was perfectly willing to talk about unjust laws shows 
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that the paradigmatic natural law position does not affirm the lex iniusta thesis.312 
By taking this view, it is clear that George further attempts to strengthen his 
position surrounding a minimum standard of reasonableness. 
A minimum standard of reasonableness does not expressly invoke a concept of 
legal validity. Murphy has commented that the core of this strong view can ‘remain 
without the paradoxical formulation.’313 In his opinion, all one needs to do is 
‘restate the position as the claim that no norm or social result (etc.) that is 
unreasonable can be law.’314 This modern misconception about legal validity 
goes further than George’s position. 
It was seen in chapter 1 that within NNL legal validity instead follows correct 
procedure, dependent upon reason, rather than normative obedience. This is 
because Finnis’ theory of practical reason does not deny the thesis of the 
separation of positive law from morality in the form often ascribed to legal 
positivists. In chapter 1 it was argued that, for Finnis, it logically follows that the 
classical doctrine does not hold to there being a simple and universal moral 
criterion for the validity of every law.315 Some natural lawyers may flatly deny the 
existence of an unjust law, but NNL differs here and Finnis has put it beyond 
denial that the ‘mainstream of the Natural Law tradition ... affirms the existence 
of such laws, while denying or downgrading their morally compelling quality and 
insisting on their essential defectiveness as law.’316 To elaborate, George 
believes that the teaching that ‘an unjust law is no longer legal but rather a 
corruption of law’317 is a teaching of Aquinas. George draws upon Finnis 
distinguishing that Aquinas’ teaching here is not a thesis about the validity of law 
in the technical sense.318 As established in chapter 1, validity follows the 
observance of correct procedure by persons having appropriate competence 
rather than the normative injustice which arises from obediently interpreting 
unjust statutes. This was identified as the ‘weak reading’ of the natural law theory 
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earlier in this thesis.319 Finnis believes the creation of defective instances of legal 
rights and duties weakens, and in George’s case negates, any moral case for 
obedience.320 This is the key to George’s ‘minimum standard’ of reasonableness, 
which will be important when reviewing religious equality law.   
From this basis of obedience, George has suggested that belief in natural law or 
other forms of legal idealism entails the proposition that law and morality are 
connected in such a way as to confer upon judges a measure of authority to 
enforce the requirements of the natural law, or alternatively, legally invalidate 
provisions of positive law they judge to be in conflict with these requirements. 
George notes that the truth of the proposition lex iniusta non est lex is a moral 
truth. This is a moral obligation created by authoritative legal enactment – by 
positive law – one conditional rather than absolute: our ‘prima facie obligation to 
obey the law admits of exceptions.’321 The implicit difficulty lies within the 
conditional nature, which involves moral obligation dependent upon enforcement 
under parliamentary sovereignty. Through this basis of applied Thomist moral 
reasoning, one that George would believe was endorsed by the Roman Catholic 
Church, is it acceptable that moral obligation focused on both legal obligation and 
legal validity is conditional and, thus, defensible?322  
We have seen that for George it is acceptable that moral obligation focused on 
both legal obligation and legal validity is conditional and thereby defensible.323 
The ability to defend moral obligation will be important when analysing religious 
equality law later in this thesis. This position raises two key points: first, this moral 
obligation to obey can be defeated by a natural right to disobey in order to avoid 
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or evade an injustice being committed; and secondly, the injustice of a law or a 
system of laws can destroy its power to bind those subject to it. Once again, for 
George this conditional nature is definitively the central core of lex iniusta non est 
lex. The conditional nature ensures that moral obligation is defensible. Although 
this may enforce obligations that exist under a moral formulation, a problem is 
that laws inter alia create prescriptive moral obligations - moral obligations which 
require adjudicative power to enforce and create binding precedent. 
George’s approach has predictably been criticised. The main problem with this 
position is, first, according to Bix, that George’s understanding effectively ‘makes 
the natural law thesis excruciatingly uninteresting.’324 It is not merely that the 
natural law theorists would have no basis to disagree with the legal positivists. 
Rather, a central natural law focus has been to emphasise that the rightness of 
compliance with the law depends on an evaluation of the law’s merits. This is the 
earlier identified ‘moral reading’ of the natural law thesis. If the moral reading was 
all there was to the natural law thesis, then the natural law theorist would ‘have 
almost no one to disagree with in the entire history of philosophy.’325 Second, 
Murphy claims that the moral reading transforms the thesis from a claim 
belonging to analytical jurisprudence into a claim belonging to moral philosophy. 
Rather than defining the conditions for law, the focus is transferred to the action 
one should take towards the law’s demands.326 Third, this position may be 
compatible with legal positivism. If legal positivism tells us what law is, and natural 
law tells us what constitutes good law, then natural law is an outdated positivist 
viewpoint. Natural law is instead necessary to draw the connection between 
positive laws and morality. This is a significant criticism of George’s thesis. 
However, the criticism remains largely unfounded because it is based upon solely 
one aspect of George’s NNL formulation and NNL is not exclusively founded to 
reconcile problems with legal positivism. In George’s In Defense of Natural 
Law,327 the ‘moral reading’ is vividly apparent. However, this moral reading is only 
to be seen as a smaller part of his work as a proponent of issues such as the 
                                                          
324 Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (n 209) 198, 199. The same criticism is made by 
Murphy: Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (n 122) 9. 
325 Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (n 209) 198-199. 
326 Murphy, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (n 122) 9. 
327 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 9). 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  136 
incommensurability thesis;328 the value of the common good as a rights basis;329 
and the application of practical reason in contested religious liberty law in order 
to later analyse religious liberty (all of which will be examined later in chapter 4.) 
From this position the ‘minimum standard of reasonableness’ plays a lesser role.  
2.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it has been demonstrated above that NNL moves beyond Aquinas 
in the debate about legal validity. It has been shown in this section, first, that 
Finnis’ reliance on ‘natural reason’ and George’s combination of law, reason and 
morality render metaphysical conclusions unnecessary in favour of a focus upon 
practical reason. Secondly, Dworkin’s third way, buttressed by the mutually 
supportive value thesis, provides a comparison to the minimum standard of 
reasonableness approach provided by George. George’s theory nevertheless 
may fail on its own terms because the principles on which it relies do not meet 
the test of objective validity. Instead, would it be appropriate to term this a theory 
of morality rather than a Thomist theory of natural law? To term this theory only 
one of morality is denied because George’s minimum standard of 
reasonableness adopts practical reason as the guiding principle and NNL regards 
practical reasonableness as the natural law.330 This circumscribes the traditional 
trappings of law and morality and provides an innovative theory of practical 
reason. This theory is derived from a contemporary dependence on practical 
reason to foster legal validity, through obligation, in contested adjudication. This 
innovative theory of practical reason will be analysed in the application of 
George’s NNL views to religious equality law in order to analyse religious liberty 
in the later chapters. To conclude, within the sources of George’s approach to 
moral reasoning, it has been shown that George does not solely hold appeal to 
revelation in his claims about moral reasoning. Instead, George, unlike Aquinas, 
depends upon moral and human reasoning based upon practical reason to 
support legal validity. 
 
2.4 Robert George’s challenge to Public Reason 
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The rejection of Rawlsian Political Liberalism 
The purpose of this section is to first further analyse George’s use of practical 
reason through his rebuttal of Rawlsian political liberalism. Secondly, it will 
develop George’s expansion, rather than rejection, of public reasoning by taking 
public reasonableness towards a religious consensus. The section will finally end 
with a ‘religious based reasoning’ approach combined with George’s concept of 
‘common human reasoning’ to further critique George’s approach to practical 
reason, in order to later provide a telling analysis surrounding the right to religious 
freedom within equality law. 
As such, this section will engage the two main approaches: George’s reasoning 
and a version of modern social contract reasoning, and it will engage the relevant 
literature that highlights this debate. George’s NNL position has often been 
contrasted with the modern social contract theory of John Rawls.331 For instance, 
a significant part of the work within practical reasoning, for George, has centred 
round the defence of practical reasoning from other conflicting, differing forms of 
reason, such as social contract reasoning. A central challenge to George’s use 
of moral reasoning, and so any later use of George’s thought to analyse religious 
liberty, can be seen in the liberal critique of practical reasoning provided by the 
presentation of ‘political liberalism’ and the subsequent Rawlsian conception of 
public reason.332 
These terms need to be explained in reference George’s understanding of 
Rawls’s liberal theory of political morality, which was first outlined by Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice333 and then modified in Political Liberalism.334 According to 
George, ‘political power may not be exercised on the basis of controversial 
judgments of what makes for, or detracts from, a valuable and morally worthy 
way of life.’335 This definition of public reason was outlined in an edited work 
                                                          
331 Porter has termed Rawls’ work in moral philosophy a social contractarian theory - Porter, Nature as 
Reason: A Thomistic Theory of Natural Law (n 2) 237. See also: Oderberg, Moral Theory: A Non-
Consequentialist Approach (n 140). Rawls’s famous ‘difference principle’ - every legitimate social 
arrangement should guarantee the greatest benefit for the least well off - is a good and admirable 
example of this modern social contractarianism - J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 
1971) 206-207. 
332 The concept of ‘public reasonableness’ was argued by John Rawls most famously in J Rawls, A Theory 
of Justice (n 423) 221 and J Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993) 7. 
333 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (n 423) 221. 
334 Rawls, Political Liberalism (n 423) 7; see also: J Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) 
64(3) University of Chicago Law Review 765. 
335 R P George (ed), Natural Law and Public Reason (Georgetown University Press, 2000) 1. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  138 
devoted to the same subject, namely Natural Law and Public Reason.336 For 
Rawls, political liberalism follows social contractarianism because the 
government should take a neutral stance between competing conceptions of the 
goods. Following from this, George believes that public reason was introduced in 
‘support of the political liberalism he [Rawls] espouses.’337 Finnis rather defines 
public reason based upon reciprocity – political questions that depend upon 
constitutional issues or issues of justice that will be settled only if by principles 
and ideals that can be reached that ‘all citizens may reasonably be expected to 
endorse.’338 This begins the way that NNL has modified political liberalism. It will 
be argued that George’s rebuttal of the concept of Rawlsian political liberalism 
has proven to be a central part of his jurisprudence.  
The identification of non-instrumental reasons for action in NNL leads George to 
directly reject Rawlsian political liberalism. In The Clash of Orthodoxies, George 
identifies the ‘political liberalism’ of Rawls and then proceeds to identify reasons 
for rejecting Rawls’s liberalism. It is suggested that George places particular 
emphasis on Rawls’s conception of ‘public reason(s)’; that is, reasons which may 
legitimately be introduced in political advocacy and acted upon legislatively. 
These reasons are termed as unreasonably ‘narrow and restrictive.’339 This is 
because the concept of public reason is a concept dictated by principles and 
ideals that are endorsed by all. In other words, it provides for a mainstream 
consensus, dictated by cultural trends: this is rule by the majority.  
In a contemporary, democratic society should there not be ideals formed by a 
majority consensus? This idea does, however, conflict with the natural law 
approach that is criticised in this thesis. George agrees that there may be correct 
answers. However, these may not be shared by the majority.340 If this is not the 
case, then public reason may restrict these correct answers from being realised. 
For instance, when critiquing public reason, George gives an example asserting 
that NNL theorists (and others) maintain that on certain fundamental moral and 
political issues there are uniquely ‘correct answers’. Public reason is rejected 
because NNL theorists can often give ‘correct answers’ supported by minority 
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opinion. For example, NNL theorists believe that approaching questions such as 
whether there is a human right against torture, embodied in Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1950, or being punished for one’s 
religious beliefs, provides a ‘uniquely correct answer which is available to every 
rational person.’341 The self-evidency and incommensurability of the basic goods, 
in conjunction with practical reason, are key to providing the correct answer in 
areas of moral application. As such, George views public reason as narrow and 
restrictive because it may prevent the correct answers from being reached. Is this 
not a call for minority opinion to dictate controversial moral issues? For instance, 
public reason has led to calls for mainstream consensus to make minority opinion 
far more readily available.342 If minority opinion was not accessible, then would 
public reason actively prevent George’s thought from being analysed in an 
equality law context? 
John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice343 contains a defence of substantive principles 
of liberal justice: the inviolability of certain basic liberties.344 One method to 
achieve this is ‘public reason’, as outlined above. For George, the concept of 
public reason presents the most contentious aspect of John Rawls’s account of 
political liberalism.345 It has been established that the Rawlsian version of public 
reason is particularly unreasonable because it demands that complicated factual 
questions and moral truth be excluded from public discourse; for instance, 
religious opinion being removed from public discourse.346 Public reason has long 
been seen as problematic for religious adherents.347 This concept would, of 
course, restrain the work and influence of natural law theorists.348 It was shown 
above that substantive legal positions are taken by NNL, which depend on 
contentious moral issues. These positions can be used to criticise public reason. 
One such position is the right to religious liberty, which may not be shared by a 
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majority consensus.349 If this were the case then NNL would view the basic liberty 
of religious liberty as not being protected. George’s views analysing the right to 
religious liberty find no place in this system. This criticism is further borne out by 
Porter, who notes that the problem with public reason is that ‘it leads all too readily 
from respect for rational agents as they ideally are to a disregard for the views of 
men and women as they actually are.’350 Public reason seeks to reach an 
idealised consensus which can ignore the opinions, experiences and realities of 
individuals. 
A challenge for natural lawyers 
In his critique of the Rawlsian social contract, George has suggested in Natural 
Law and Public Reason351 that proponents of natural law doctrines often go in 
two ways regarding public reason.352 First, if interpreted broadly without 
application, natural law theorists believe that natural law theory is to all intents 
and purposes the philosophy of public reason.353 Secondly, however, public 
reason can be interpreted in a narrower sense, rejecting reliance on 
‘comprehensive moral, philosophical and religious doctrines’.354 If this is the case, 
then natural law theorists reject the idea of public reason because public reason 
would seek to reject the expression of moral convictions in public discourse. It 
has been argued in this thesis that Roman Catholic teachings directly lead to 
natural law theorists expressing religious moral positions. The public rejection 
and suppression of religious expression is likely to have the impact of 
undermining support for religious institutions.355 It is clear that under this second 
reading a prohibitive form of reasoning is present. For many, therefore, public 
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reason is unreasonable because it discards important questions of the common 
good and justice, as revealed by human rationality and special revelation.356 
This dual reading creates a difficult position for George. George believes that, for 
instance, the theorist Stephen Macedo, using the Rawlsian social contract theory, 
attempts to establish a Catch 22 situation357 for natural law theorists: Macedo 
views that if natural lawyers do not put forward an intellectually sophisticated 
argument for their positions regarding moral issues and life, then they fail the 
requirement of reason. If, on the other hand, natural law theorists do provide 
powerful reasons for their positions, then they go beyond the limits of public 
justification, because their arguments become too complicated and 
controversial.358 This constraint is enabled by Macedo’s reliance on the 
conception of public reason.359 Macedo’s primary claim against natural law ideas 
is that they fail to meet the requirements of public justification; this follows from 
the ‘large gap between the first principles of natural law and actual moral 
norms.’360 George correctly identifies that contemporary NNL theorists would 
argue there is sometimes, although not exhaustively, a ‘large gap’ between the 
first principles of natural law and actual moral norms. As shown in 2.2 above, this 
derives from the mistaken belief that in the natural law theory of Aquinas there is 
a movement from the first principles of natural law to actual moral judgements 
and action in concrete cases because the first principles are known by 
everyone.361 As such, this is an instance where the concept of public reason 
causes problems when applying George’s theory of practical reason. It is not to 
be considered too large a problem. This is because it is hardly a Catch 22 
situation to require that an idea be both reasonable and coherent.362 In order to 
rebut public reason here it is perfectly acceptable to appeal to the coherent and 
admirable achievements secured by religion (in particular Christianity), for 
instance: the abolition of slavery and efforts to reduce poverty.363 It will be shown 
                                                          
356 Ibid 2. 
357 S Macedo, ‘Reply to Critics,’ (1995) 84 Georgetown Law Journal 329. 
358 George, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 430) 65. The self-evidency is crucial in limits of public 
justification for NNL. 
359 Ibid 65. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid 55. 
362 Bamforth and Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural Law (n 
137) 42. 
363 A Lister, Public Reason and Political Community (Bloomsbury, 2013) 6-7. 
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that George does not rely upon an approach like this to overcome the challenge 
from public reason. It will instead be argued that George’s approach creates 
further flaws in his jurisprudence. 
The challenge presented by public reason is further evident because Rawls thinks 
that doctrines like natural law should be excluded from public reason because of 
what Rawls calls the ‘burden[s] of judgment.’364 Rawls’s ‘burden of judgment’ 
provides significance for a democratic ideal of toleration, by impacting upon public 
reason’s ‘exercise of political power in a constitutional regime’365 to affirm 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines and provide division over contentious 
religious claims such as those made in natural law.366 The burdens of judgements 
are the sources, or causes, of disagreement between reasonable persons.  
In my view George has responded to this challenge. A later principle advocated 
by George and Finnis follows a broad tradition of natural law thinking that 
proposes its own principle of public reason. If this principle is coherent it allows a 
place for George’s contentious thought to analyse the right to religious freedom, 
despite the challenges posed by Rawls. This principle asserts that questions of 
fundamental law and basic matters of justice ought to be decided in accordance 
with natural law, natural right/s and/or natural justice367 because in the public 
political state appeals to natural law impact positively upon judgement.368 It is 
important to remember that George’s interpretation of Aquinas requires that 
something is good, right or just ‘by nature’ insofar as it is reasonable.369 Thus the 
good of the human being, and enforcement of morality, accords with practical 
reason. This common link between the good and human reason is indicative of 
natural law. McInerny notes, for example, that the other goods are not properly 
to be considered human goods unless pursued in accordance with reason: ‘goods 
come to be constituents of the human good insofar as they come under the sway 
of the distinctive mark of the human agent; reason.’370 George’s earlier 
established dependence on Thomist rationality distinguishes George’s 
                                                          
364 George, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 430) 110. 
365 Rawls, Political Liberalism (n 424) 54–58. 
366 Ibid 81. 
367 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 7) 202. 
368 George, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 430) 110. 
369 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 36. Originally discussed within: J Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (n 424) 54-58. 
370 R McInerny, ‘The Principles of Natural Law’ 25 Am. J. Juris. 14. 
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conception of public reason from that of Rawls and shows the centrality of this 
debate to George’s jurisprudence. As such, an important development in 
George’s use of practical reason is present. The next section will further develop 
George’s modification to public reason, which is an important factor when seeking 
to improve upon George’s thought. 
The expansive pluralist modification to public reasonableness 
From this basis of difference that I have established between George’s and 
Rawls’ social contractarianism, it will be shown that George accepts differing 
ideals and proposes an expansion to public reason. Natural law theorists may 
welcome this modification as establishing a level playing field of public policy 
truths that cover a wide spectrum of differing opinions and beliefs.371 To achieve 
this expansion, George believes that the point of public reasonableness is to 
accept differing ideas in life and this is to be achieved through a pluralistic form 
of public reason. As such, George rejects Rawls’ ‘reasonable pluralism’372 
because he believes that Rawls’ goal is to conversely limit the morally acceptable 
doctrine of political morality in circumstances of moral pluralism to the earlier 
identified political liberalism.373 Instead George’s modification lies in the belief 
that the point of public reasonableness is to accept the facts of public reasonable 
pluralism. This will involve discerning principles that can be assessed and 
accepted by individuals who are committed to differing ideals in life.374 This 
encourages diversity within society and expands public reason. However, while 
an admirable stance, arguably differing motives and goals within living require 
differing subjective goods. George’s expansion may fail for two reasons: first, it 
is arguable that the Rawlsian version adopts a closer mirror to Aristotle’s ideal of 
universal flourishing defeating the purpose of an expansive form; and, secondly, 
reasonable pluralism within society necessitates a form of majority or public 
consensus to decide upon and adopt basic forms of morality within moral 
paternalism – ultimately a form of political liberalism. 
                                                          
371 George, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 430) 70. 
372 Rawls, Political Liberalism (n 424) XX. A concept dependent upon majority consensus to decide 
political morality. 
373 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 17) 51. 
374 George, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 430) 26. See also G Newey, ‘John Rawls: Liberalism and the 
Limits of Tolerance’ in S P Young (ed), Reflections on Rawls: An Assessment of his Legacy (Ashgate, 2009) 
131. 
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I suggest that George’s modification contradicts postmodernist Rawlsianism 
through the emphasis of the ‘reason’ within public reason. ‘Postmodernist 
Rawlsianism’ nullifies the active role the public communication and activity of 
religion plays in the public discourse of a liberal democracy. It is nullified to the 
degree that religion is considered to be non-rational.375 The ‘public’ part of public 
reason furthers this process as religion is deemed to be a set of beliefs based on 
‘private revelation.’376 However, George rebuts this criticism: if religion is to be 
deemed rational then ‘the revelation to which it responds is in the most important 
aspect fully publicly accessible.’377 A Rawlsian approach would only reject 
differing ideals here, such as religious views. This defeats the ‘non-rational role’ 
of religion prescribed by Rawls in a public discourse. It flows from the expansion 
to public reason previously outlined and provides George’s moral reasoning 
expansion to pluralist public reasoning.  
Public reasoning oriented towards a religious consensus 
This chapter has argued that George does not reject totally the Rawlsian notion 
of public reason but instead develops a modified conception of public reason. 
This is evidenced by the fact that in the 2011 ‘Anscombe Memorial Lecture’ 
George publicly backtracked on his firm rejection of public reason. He admitted 
to having ‘some sympathy’ for the matters of basic justice and George conceded 
that appeals to religious authority and political advocacy ought to be based on 
public reason to ‘buttress, illuminate and motivate people to act for the sake of 
ends.’378 This would be the ‘broad conception’ outlined above. This surprising 
stance, however, depends upon a deft alteration of the Rawlsian conception. As 
part of the analysis of George’s approach, for George, I suggest that political 
claims can be put forward as a proposition under ‘common human reason’.379 
This is a form of reasoning drawn from George’s interpretation of practical 
                                                          
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid 67. 
377 Ibid. 
378 R P George, ‘Science, Philosophy, and Religion in the Embryo Debate’ (Anscombe Memorial Lecture 
2011, 21 October 2011) <http://www.bioethics.org.uk/page/resources/multimedia> accessed 1st August 
2012. Also see, R P George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 
89) 125.  
379 Epistemology requires jurisprudential inquiry, derived from the natural law, to form an 
understanding of revelation. George holds special revelation directs us as individuals and communities 
in upright living, in accord with the concept I have identified to be central to George’s political theory: 
‘common human reason.’ George, ‘Science, Philosophy, and Religion in the Embryo Debate’ (n 430). Also 
see, George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 89) 125. 
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reasoning within Aquinas. However, George’s modification of Thomas’s use of 
practical reason importantly involves a democratically informed opinion on which 
‘reasonable people of goodwill across the religious and political spectrums should 
agree on’,380 as exercised by state power. Although this is a form of social 
contract theory I argue that it is broader than public reason. 
This is because a process of ‘common human reason’ expressly includes a place 
for metaphysical reason, an integration of religion and also an appeal to the 
concept of a Judaeo-Christian God to reveal ‘some polities or some policy’ and 
provide conclusive reasons for action.381 For George, it is this God who wills the 
integral good of human beings and is attentive to a society’s public policy on 
morally significant questions and who does so at least in part for reasons 
accessible to individuals as rational creatures. This would include morally 
significant questions specified by various dimensions of the good, a process 
which is arrived at by human rationality. The key differentiating factor between 
George and Rawls here lies in the fact that, unlike public reasoning, common 
human reason includes contribution from both the minority and the majority382 to 
achieve justice and rights. 
Through this integration of the metaphysical and ‘common human reason’, I 
argue that George has presented a dual synthesis in relation to morally significant 
issues between broader reasons (apart from revelation) for policy positions. For 
George, the identification of these reasons by philosophical theological inquiry 
and analysis, supplemented sometimes by knowledge derived from the natural 
and/or social sciences, ‘is critical to an accurate understanding of the content of 
revelation in, say, the Bible or Jewish or Christian tradition.’383 Thus faith and 
reason are mutually supportive: ‘criticism of secular liberal views is not that they 
are contrary to faith; it is that they fail the test of reason.’384 Placing reason as an 
affront to militant secularism provides a nuanced tactical reversal of 
contemporary reasoning. 
                                                          
380 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 89) 125. 
381 George, ‘Science, Philosophy, and Religion in the Embryo Debate’ (n 430).  
382 K Greenawalt, ‘On Public Reason’ (1994) 69 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 669, 672. 
383 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies (n 17) 64. 
384 Ibid xiv. 
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Moreover, as has been shown in 2.2, George believes that reason can be 
identified and acted on independently of revelation from a Judaeo-Christian God: 
‘they typically believe, as I do, that the precise content of what God reveals on 
the subject cannot be known without the application of human intelligence, by 
way of philosophical and scientific inquiry, to the question.’385 This is helpful 
because philosophical inquiry is important for ascertaining rationality. On first 
glance, this approach would be similar to the Rawlsian reason led approach. 
George considers it reasonable to suggest that public policy ought to be based 
on public reason. Distinctively, however, this concept of public reason would be 
far wider than the limiting version of public reason espoused by Rawls. George 
asserts that: 
… Anyone who believes that God has revealed that the public policy of a 
certain polity must be settled in a certain way has … an absolute, 
indefeasible reason for supporting that way of whether there are any 
grounds apart from revelation for the policy.386  
For George, this is not because Christianity prima facie must accord with 
philosophical reasonableness, or because it is inherently logical. Rather, it 
represents a Roman Catholic understanding of ‘truth’ that should be in accord 
with the most substantively recognised form of epistemological reason. The 
particular use of reasoning here provides a key role in George’s theory and so 
will be helpful for the later applied analysis, in this thesis. It is one built on practical 
reason to accommodate each person and provide opportunity for the majority, 
without obscuring the minority. This gives a reasonable perspective to informed 
philosophical belief.387 The place given to reasoning by George here 
fundamentally changes the ground rules from which public reason operates.  
                                                          
385 Ibid 67. 
386 George, The Clash of Orthodoxies (n 14) 63, 64. 
387 George’s connection to philosophical belief is no longer to be viewed as legally obscure as it once 
was: following Maistry v BBC [2011] ET 1313142/2010, an Employment Tribunal considered that a 
journalist's belief in the "higher purpose" of public service broadcasting was a protected philosophical 
belief under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 because the philosophical 
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Religious reasoning 
From this position, public reason can be reconciled and modified within a legal 
theory that advances religion, including overtly theological natural law reasoning, 
rather than public reasoning always remaining secular. As such, Jonathan 
Chaplin argues for a new form of public reasoning, a version of public reasoning 
in the form of ‘religiously based reasoning,’388 which I will argue can be interpreted 
positively within George’s system to include a platform for religion in the public 
debate. Chaplin has cogently articulated for two essential foundations of liberal 
democracy: 1) ‘the principle of state neutrality towards religion; and 2) the 
principle that public reasoning must be secular.’389 Secular public reasoning, for 
Chaplin, is seen to be ‘invalid and illiberal.’390 Finnis’ list of basic goods expressly 
include a place for religion, as does George’s.391 In any public debate forwarded 
on behalf of NNL, religion is undoubtedly important. Once again, this invokes the 
earlier identified criticism that Roman Catholic bias is present when attempting to 
integrate religion within public debate. Nevertheless, a religious consensus 
formed by this position would provide a basis for reasoning to include religion in 
the public debate.  
This is not to suggest that a form of religiously based public reasoning is not 
already evident and manifestly present in many liberal democracies. Tertiary level 
education involving theology and ethics provides a good example, and here it 
actively contributes to the public debate. Instead, the point of this is that this 
presence does not pose any threat to the creation or stability of states.392 From 
this basis, public good may be evident in public reasoning. This is very similar to 
George’s approach, as will be seen in chapter 3, as one which draws upon the 
secular humanist scholars.393 Democratic reasoning provides a form of common 
                                                          
388 J Chaplin ‘Law, Religion and Public Reasoning’ OJL&R (2012) 1. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid. 
391 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 89) 119. 
392 Chaplin ‘Law, Religion and Public Reasoning’ (n 480). 
393 George’s approach would subtly reject any form of public reasoning in favour of ‘common human 
reason’. However, Chaplin emphasises that John Locke within A Letter Concerning Toleration was correct 
to insist that public good is the rule and measure of all law makers: ‘[n]either the right nor the art of 
ruling does necessarily carry along with it the certain knowledge of other things and least of all the true 
religion.’ (J Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (first published 1689, Merchant, 2011) 36, 39). This 
draws from a basic law making a distinct form of reasoning. This form of reasoning would be a specific 
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human reason in George’s method to engage the right to freedom of religion in 
equality case law, as will be shown in chapter 5.394  
If Chaplin’s religiously based reason could incorporate the specific good of 
religion, then this provides a potential link between the divide of Rawlsian public 
reason and Georgian practical ‘common human’ reasoning. A connection here is 
being drawn from religious reasoning. I suggest that George’s thought can be 
improved upon by further integrating religion by adopting this amalgamation of 
moral reasoning and including religion as a public good.395  
This connection is indicative of George’s wider approach to the challenge of 
public reason and subsequent rejection of political liberalism. George invokes a 
pluralist perspective within a liberal democracy, which necessitates the influence 
of many conflicting forms of morality to provide a sphere for ‘religious’ based 
public reason. By doing so, this section has identified that this efficiently provides 
a sly alteration to the public reasoning provided by Rawls. As a final observation, 
it is unsurprising that both Rawls and George seek to present the idea that public 
policy ought to be based on varying degrees of social contract reasoning based 
upon ‘public’ reasons. The fact that George feels it necessary to revert to a 
modified understanding of public reasonableness396 shows both the failure of 
George’s rationalist, pluralist approach and the success of Rawls in reaching a 
reasonable informed consensus, to the exclusion of dissenters. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This section has addressed challenges made by the Rawlsian social contract 
critique from political liberalism. It has been suggested that the challenge 
provided by Rawlsian public reasonableness is a central feature in George’s 
understanding surrounding practical reason. It was therefore surprisingly 
                                                          
the specifically political common good, is an intrinsically valuable object for the relevant state because it 
marks out the domain of the coercive jurisdiction of state government and law - J Finnis, ‘Reflections 
and Responses’ in J Keown and R P George (eds), Reason, Morality and Law: The Philosophy of John 
Finnis (Oxford University Press, 2013) 514. The jurisdiction of the state’s government and law is not 
defined by the all-inclusive common good, rather the jurisdiction is defined by the public good - ibid 511. 
But in contrast to Locke, and closer to George, for Aquinas this type of public good is ‘the things which 
everyone ought to believe and practise, such as matters of faith and divine worship, and other things of 
that sort.’ T Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles (first published 1270-1273, Aeterna, 2015) III c.80 nn. 14, 
15, 2559-2560. 
394 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 89) 125. 
395 This will be further discussed in chapter 5. 
396 George, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 430) 70. 
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identified that George sees much merit within public reasoning through his own 
‘common human reason’. This was argued to be integrated with George’s 
practical reasoning expansion to pluralist public reasoning397 joining with a 
religious consensus from ‘religiously based reasoning’.398 The approach that I 
suggest here expressly allows the integration of religion, and so permits the 
connection between public reason and religion (particularly religion as a public 
good). It is therefore shown that this expansive pluralist modification to public 
reasonableness is supplemented with a concept orientated towards a religious 
voice. The move towards a religious voice is enabled through this process. As 
such, reasoning no longer requires restraint to remain on the use of religious 
reasons.399 The idea of religion as a public good will form a central part of 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown the influence of practical reasoning with 
George’s NNL jurisprudence and that, for George, NNL holds practical 
reasonableness as the natural law.400 Section 2.2 showed that George’s 
understanding of practical reasoning departs from Thomist thought in several key 
respects. While the influence of Aquinas overall to NNL is seen to be vital, 
George’s literature departs from Thomist thought in the following ways. First, 
George’s movement from the ‘good’ to the basic goods. Second, the modification 
of the FPPR. Third, the elevation of the principle of ethical autonomy; and fourth, 
the inclusion of the basic good of religion within George’s understanding of 
practical reasoning. It was here argued this presents a basis for practical 
application within George’s NNL, for instance when critiquing religious equality 
law.  
Section 2.3 argued that the existing literature establishes that George moves 
beyond Aquinas in other ways. To convey this, four sources of George’s NNL 
approach to moral reasoning were considered: a) divine revelation; b) moral 
                                                          
397 Ibid. 
398 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 89) 125. 
399 J Donald Moon, John Rawls: Liberalism and the Challenges of Late Modernity (Rowman & Littlefield, 
2014) 54. 
400 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 30) 1. 
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realism; c) human rationality and d) Dworkin’s concept of value, which it was 
established can be assessed as a form of moral reasoning. Two conclusions were 
drawn: first, Finnis’ reliance upon ‘human reason’ and George’s combination of 
law, morality and human rationality exclude references to divine revelation within 
moral reasoning. Secondly, it was considered that George’s ‘minimum standard 
of reasonableness’ approach towards legal validity adopts practical reasoning as 
a guiding principle. This was shown to be preferable to Dworkin’s value ‘third way’ 
thesis.  
Finally, section 2.5 portrayed George’s rejection of Rawlsian political liberalism 
and modification of public reason through George’s understanding of practical 
‘common human reason[ing]’. It was argued public reason in the form of 
‘religiously based reasoning’ could be a more appropriate form of reasoning for 
George. 
The centrality of practical reason to George’s approach is shown here. This 
chapter has analysed the concept of practical reason which will be key to the 
critical application and reformulation of George’s NNL views to religious liberty 
law in chapters 4 and 5. It will be argued in chapters 4 and 5 that the difficulties 
outlined above do not prohibit the critique of George’s thought from successfully 
providing a way forward for natural law reasoning. Next chapter 3 will move from 
practical reasoning to consider the influence of the secular humanist tradition 
upon George. 
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Chapter 3 - Robert George as New Natural Lawyer: Source and 
Development of Legal Rights
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to convey Robert George’s narrowing of natural 
law jurisprudence towards a natural rights discourse. To achieve this aim, this 
chapter will analyse the influence on George of the modern, ‘Western’ secular 
humanist tradition and its move from theological conceptions of natural law to 
non-theological designations of natural rights.  
For present purposes, the term ‘secular humanist tradition’1 refers to both the 
distinct philosophical transformation of natural law reasoning into natural rights 
jurisprudence associated with Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Thomas Hobbes 
(1588-1679), Samuel Von Pufendorf (1632-1694) and John Locke (1632-1704). 
Other phrases have been used to describe this concept: Richard Tuck has termed 
this scholarship as part of the ‘modern humanist tradition/Renaissance 
lawyer(s)’;2 Quentin Skinner uses the label ‘rationalist’ tradition;3 and Sean Coyle 
refers to these theorists as members of the ‘natural liberty school’.4 Esther D. 
Reed has noted a characteristic of this tradition to be the ‘progressive reduction 
of natural law reasoning to an extremely narrow set of rights.’5 The purpose of 
this chapter is to trace the extent to which George stands in this tradition that 
secularizes natural rights talk. This chapter will analyse the direct references that 
George makes to the relevant theorists. It will also analyse and critique the clear 
influences and themes derived by George from the secular humanist tradition that 
informs his new natural law (NNL) thought. This will allow the later application of 
George’s thought to analyse the right to religious freedom (see chapters 4 and 
5). 
Section 3.2 will highlight the view that the secular humanist tradition has 
embraced the interplay between the Roman Jurists’ classifications of laws into 
natural rights jurisprudence.  
                                                          
1 The terms ‘secular humanist tradition’, ‘secular humanist scholars’ and ‘seventeenth century theorists’ 
will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
2 R Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge University Press, 1979) 13. 
3 Q Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Volume Two: The Age of Reformation 
(Cambridge University Press, 1978) 347. 
4 S Coyle, From Positivism to Idealism: A Study of the Moral Dimensions of Legality (Ashgate, 2007) 54. 
5 E D Reed, Theology for International Law (Bloomsbury, 2013) 136.  
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Section 3.3 will demonstrate the influence upon George of Hugo Grotius’ 
jurisprudence. First, this section will show that George was largely influenced by 
seventeenth century natural law philosophy, which following scholasticism, 
stressed natural rights and proposed a justification for a system of international 
law based around human nature.6 This is important because it will be shown that 
George’s NNL adopts Grotius’ views concerning human nature. Secondly, this 
will also establish the nexus point for George at which natural rights are linked to 
property rights. To establish George’s movement from natural rights 
jurisprudence, it will be demonstrated that, for George, Grotius provides the break 
between the scholastic understandings of natural law into a natural rights basis 
centred upon property. 
Turning to Thomas Hobbes in section 3.4, it will be shown that George’s 
understanding of the common good has been influenced by Hobbes, and further 
that Hobbes provides a basis for George’s move towards liberty as seen in the 
introduction of rights being asserted against the state. 
Section 3.5 will begin by showing a rationalist basis7 features in the basis of 
Pufendorfian thought – a basis which has been largely modified by George. For 
Pufendorf, removing a Judaeo-Christian God as the provider of natural law; 
subordinating the place of religion and providing more emphasis upon human 
rationality as the base of obligation, allowed natural law to become accessible 
through human nature. Following from this, it will be argued that George has been 
influenced by linking human nature and morality to modify the self-
preservationist/social contractarian thought taken by Hobbes and Pufendorf. 
Finally section 3.6 will demonstrate that George draws from Locke’s narrowing of 
natural law in natural rights themes in two ways: first, Locke’s property rights, 
leading to George presenting his own rights discourse while adopting the 
Lockean property right of liberty; and second, Locke’s combination of right reason 
and reflection, presents a moral process similar to that found in George’s 
conception of ‘public morality’. From this, George will be shown to draw a ‘goods 
based opposition’ towards certain state made law. This will feature prominently 
                                                          
6 Ibid 32, 33.  
7 Rationalism was determined in chapter 2 to be a concentration upon human reason which excludes 
divine influence – see R McInerny, A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas: A Handbook for Peeping 
Thomists (University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 26. 
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in the applied critique of George’s NNL views to analyse the right to freedom of 
religion in the Equality Act 2010 that will be described in chapters 4 and 5. As 
such, the sections in this chapter will show that George’s development of natural 
rights has been influenced by the secular humanist tradition. To show that 
George’s work can reflect the narrowing of natural law jurisprudence into a natural 
rights discourse following the secular humanist tradition; however, it will first be 
necessary to reflect upon a key understanding within that tradition: a tradition that 
has embraced the interplay between the Roman Jurists’ classifications of laws to 
narrow natural law themes into natural rights jurisprudence. The next section will 
identify this interplay. 
3.2 Natural rights jurisprudence: an interplay between the classifications 
of laws 
The influence derived by George from the jurisprudential development of the 
classification of laws draws from a long lineage: the concept of a universal and 
eternal law was adopted by two notable groups, the Roman Empire and the 
Christian Church, who then bequeathed this tradition to medieval Europe.8 The 
Roman jurists’ classified laws into different types9 and importantly from this 
Aquinas, and scholasticism, latterly adopted a division between the law of nations 
(jus gentium); the civil law (jus civile) and the natural law (jus naturale).10 These 
categories will be important in this chapter because according to this position, the 
law of all nations is derived from the first principles of natural law.11 It will also be 
shown that these concepts underpin natural rights scholarship and the interplay 
between these three related concepts directly contribute to the narrowing of 
natural law into natural rights jurisprudence in the work of the secular humanist 
scholars.  
These concepts are directly applicable to natural law because the direct interplay 
from the two key concepts of jus naturale (natural law) and jus gentium (law of 
                                                          
8 M Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 32. While the European Middle 
Ages are commonly referred to as the great age of natural law thought, it needs to be remembered that 
the idea was not, arguably, Christian in its inception. It was rather a legacy of the Stoic, Roman and 
Greek legal traditions. 
9 The jus natural, jus gentium and jus civile – M P Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism 
(Princeton University Press, 1994) 129. 
10 Reed (n 5) 103. 
11 Shaw (n 8) 32. 
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nations) allowed the natural law to be applied to human affairs and law,12 which 
is very important in the work of Robert George.  
Jus natural and jus gentium are distinct concepts, although they are often so 
interconnected that differences were frequently ignored. Stephen 
Neffdistinguishes the two concepts as follows: ‘Natural law [jus naturale] was the 
broader concept ... [T]he jus gentium was the human component, or sub-
category, of it.’13 The jus gentium, as an application of the broader natural law to 
human affairs, provided general norms of conduct. If one views the jus gentium 
as a prescriptive ethical system, a collection of laws common to all nations, then, 
according to Neff, it affects individuals in/of all walks of life and all aspects of 
human affairs, such as: contract, crime, etc.14 This presents a malleable system 
that could be applied to a wide range of human affairs in differing situations and 
internationalised contexts. George’s interrelated theory of morality and ethics 
shows this system.15 This is because George has sought to provide a NNL 
system that rationally guides and structures human choosing16 - a normalised 
application of laws common to all nations, that has narrowed into the NNL 
approach for George. 
As such, this interplay between the natural and human laws has impacted the 
understanding of contemporary natural law jurisprudence in the moral philosophy 
of George and will be shown later to feature in the Hobbesian liberty right. It will 
next be shown that this interplay directly contributes to the narrowing of natural 
law. 
                                                          
12 Latterly jus gentium was commonly known as the law of nations and the law of people. 
13 S Neff, ‘A Short History of International Law’ in M Evans (ed), International Law (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 32.  
14 Ibid. 
15 J Crowe, ‘Natural Law Beyond Finnis’ (2011) 2(2) Jurisprudence 293, 297. 
16 R P George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford University Press, 1994) 93. 
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Robert George’s significant influences – the development of natural rights 
jurisprudence within Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes and Locke  
3.3 Grotius 
The imposition of Grotian human nature upon George: the grounding of a 
natural law theory upon human nature leading to flourishing 
The section will show that, despite many traditions of natural law,17 George was 
largely influenced by seventeenth century natural law philosophy, which following 
scholasticism, stressed natural rights and proposed justification for a system of 
international law based around human nature.18 This is important because it will 
be shown that George’s NNL adopts Grotius’ views concerning human nature. It 
will also be shown that the interplay between the three classifications of law in 
the previous section contributed to a system of international law that narrowed 
the natural law jurisprudence in the work of the seventeenth century theorists. 
The secular humanist scholars, particularly Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, 
proposed a system of natural law that stressed natural rights, one which Sean 
Coyle has identified as shifting the emphasis ‘away from the idea of law as a 
collection of remedies to the idea of law as a system of interlocking rights.’19 
According to Coyle, these scholars approached the question of the basis and 
justification of a system of international law,20 drawn from the interrelation of 
Roman conceptions of law as outlined above. Michael Zuckert has further 
identified this to be particularly relevant for Grotius and has suggested that his 
entire presentation of law is shaped by the Roman jurists’ classification of law into 
the aforementioned three types: jus natural, jus gentium, and jus civile.21 
The secular humanist tradition’s derivation from the Roman conceptions of law is 
relevant for George because the development of contemporary legal theory and 
international law was dependant on the interrelated development of natural law 
                                                          
17 An incorrect assumption runs through natural law scholarship that there is only one tradition of 
natural law, rather than many. Reed has criticised this misinformed position of a single natural law 
tradition, which fails to recognise the significant differences between ‘natural right’; ‘natural rights’; 
‘natural right’ according with right reason and ‘natural law’ which draws uniformity to a universal law – 
Reed (n 6) 32, 33. This draws a distinction between natural law and natural rights. There is no one single 
natural law tradition. This chapter will dispel the incorrect notion and attempt to posit a clearer, more 
distinct understanding of the tradition NNL has drawn from and situate this to the correct natural rights 
discourse. 
18 Ibid 32, 33.  
19 S Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (Hart, 2014) 14.  
20 Ibid 21. 
21 Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (n 9) 129.  
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and natural rights jurisprudence.22 It is for this reason that this section will trace 
George’s use of the secular humanist scholars, who are in turn leading natural 
rights scholars, such as Hugo Grotius.23 
In Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory, Finnis argues that, for Grotius, what 
is right and wrong depended upon the nature of things and not a decree of God.24 
This followed the ‘etiamsi daremus’.25 As such, if natural law is valid even if there 
is no God, NNL draws from this the moral obligation: to do ‘right’ and avoid 
‘wrong’.26 Grotius’ basic thesis is that the binding obligation of the natural law also 
implies that nature is a sufficient condition for the natural law, which, in turn, leads 
to human flourishing. This is similar to George, who denies that NNL is a theory 
of natural law without nature.27 Within In Defense of Natural Law, George 
integrates the good of religion and divine obedience in his theory by suggesting 
that such is a reason for political action and an aspect of the common good of 
civil society.28 Religion is a basic reason for action to ascertain truth and establish 
peace with God. While the theory presupposes existence of a God, much like 
Grotius, George’s understanding of natural law is that it is not dependent, and 
would nonetheless exist, even if there were no God.29 George takes from Grotius 
his reliance upon nature. This reliance upon nature is central in determining 
obligation within George’s NNL approach, for our later purpose to deploy 
George’s thought to the right to religious liberty within the Equality Act 2010. 
For both George and also the secular humanist tradition, including Grotius, the 
law of nature was a law of human nature. Grotius successfully introduces 
establishing the natural law to allow for human collective flourishing.30 An element 
of human nature is also reflected in George’s intrinsically basic human goods. 
For George, ‘moral norms are … implicit in, and derivable from human nature’.31 
                                                          
22 Shaw (n 8) 53.  
23 Legal scholars of the nineteenth century conferred onto Grotius the retrospective title of ‘father of 
international law.’ Ibid 135. 
24 J Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory 
(Oxford University Press, 1998) 43, 44. 
25 H Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, [The Law of War and Peace] (F W Kelsey tr, 1625, 1912 edn, Lonang 
Institute, 2011) Prolegomena [11]. 
26 Finnis, Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought - Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (n 
24) 43, 44. 
27 R P George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (Oxford University Press, 1992) 33. 
28 R P George, In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford University Press, 1999) 108. 
29 As established in chapter 2.3 and 2.4. 
30 Grotius (n 25) Prolegema 8-9.  
31 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 28) 40. 
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Whereas for Grotius, according to Coyle, human nature is reflected more in 
collective social arrangements (including the law).32 This is because, as Coyle 
has elsewhere written, ‘Grotius had grounded the basic properties of human 
nature in natural rights so that law could “reflect” aspects of human social 
nature.’33 For Grotius, natural law is ‘a law that is natural in virtue of being a law 
of human nature.’34 In contrast to a social understanding of law, the new natural 
lawyers would be more focused upon intrinsic moral choice that resulted in 
external choice, as shown above, namely the basic human goods. This 
understanding of nature will be established in the next section. It is one that flows 
from a move from scholastic natural law to a subjective natural rights basis built 
upon reasoning and property rights. 
George’s movement from Grotius: the break between the scholastic 
understanding of natural law into a natural rights basis centred upon 
property 
Turning first to human rationality seen within practical reasoning, Grotius provides 
the basis from which the new natural lawyers draw the distinctive independence 
of the rationality driven natural law from a traditional conception of divine origin. 
For instance, Ernst Bloch has suggested that Grotius was the first to clearly 
separate human natural law as a creation of human reason from the theological 
context.35 This is why Grotius termed natural law an ‘intuitive judgement’ because 
things were made known from their own nature. Chapter 2, meanwhile, identified 
that George and Finnis both accept religious doctrine within NNL. The leading 
jurisprudence textbook editor Michael Freeman has identified that “like Grotius 
he (Finnis) believes that a theory of natural law does not have to stipulate God.”36 
This approach may have arisen following the secular humanist tradition. Reed 
has noted that, following Grotius, the development of natural law reasoning, such 
as that provided by secular humanist scholars, became detached from a Christian 
confession of the law of nature and once more became associated with secular 
rationalism.37 Following chapter 2, the influence of reason, in the form of practical 
reasoning, has been clearly established within NNL. This is why George within In 
                                                          
32 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence (n 19) 64. 
33 Coyle, From Positivism to Idealism (n 4) 74. 
34 H Grotius, Mare Liberum (RVD Magoffin tr, Oxford University Press, 1916) 5. 
35 E Bloch, Natural Law and Human Dignity (D Schmidt tr, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987) 
49.  
36 M D A Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (8th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2008) 132. 
37 Reed (n 5) 140. 
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Defense of Natural Law notes Grotius’ influence, and work upon reason, as a key 
contributor to the natural law tradition, a tradition that the revival of interest in 
practical reason has once again revived interest in.38  
Richard Tuck has observed that Grotius separated the law of reason from the 
imposition of divine duty and/or obligation.39 As seen above, Grotius believed the 
natural law brought with it analogous duties to divine duty. However, the 
knowledge derived from human nature inherently involved human rationality, 
providing a duty to follow the same imposed by scripture.40 George’s practical 
reasoning, as that which engages the basic human goods, and acts in line with 
special revelation, would reach a similar conclusion. In other words, George 
outlined in Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal 
Secularism: ‘moral truths … can also be grasped … by ethical reflection apart 
from revelation.’41 For George, therefore, it is possible for natural law reasoning 
to be distinct from revelation. 
George’s approach can be seen to draw from Grotius’ own method. This is 
because the latter followed the law of nature, then the law of nations, and finally 
the law of God.42 Arising from this separation, Grotius’ rule of nature now reverted 
to being founded exclusively upon reason. Zuckert has identified that Grotius 
revised the Roman jus naturale doctrine in the same direction as Roman Catholic 
scholastic natural lawyers. For both, a combination of human nature grounded in 
reason provided a basis to approach the rule of nature.43 Robert George here 
would partially agree with the rationale of Grotius. This is because NNL is based 
upon the self-evidency of goods realised through practical reasoning, rather than 
the dependence upon any form of deity. For George, in Conscience and its 
Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism, the ‘basic norms 
against murder and theft, are knowable even apart from God’s special 
revelation.’44 In The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis, 
George further states: ‘the natural law is … in principle accessible to human 
                                                          
38 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 29) 31. 
39 Tuck (n 2) 68. 
40 This would reject natural law identification with the Christian Decalogue and Sermon on the Mount. 
41 R P George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (Isi Books, 
2013) 83. 
42 Zuckert, Natural Rights and the New Republicanism (n 9) 104. 
43 K Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy: From Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996) 29. 
44 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 41) 83. 
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reason and not dependent on … divine revelation’.45 Accordingly, for George, 
following Grotius, the rule of nature is founded on the role of reason rather than 
faith.  
In Natural Law and Public Reason, George defines action in accordance with right 
reason as a ‘good summary’46 of his conception of natural law, one in which acting 
upon reasons provided by the basic goods of human nature is a law of practical 
reasonableness.47 Alternatively for Grotius, the law of nature was: ‘a dictate of 
right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity 
with rationalistic nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity.’48 
A direct comparison can thereby be established between the dictates of right 
reason in both Grotius and George. In the case of Grotius, within the secondary 
literature Buckle has shown that the dictates of right reason entails those 
principles that cannot be denied without doing violence to ourselves, and to the 
fundamental characteristic of sociableness in particular.49 This follows 
Aristotelian teaching, in that for the purposes of flourishing the nature of the good 
is essentially social in nature.50 Thus while George’s understanding of acting 
against right reason would contradict all the basic goods, Grotius is more 
concerned with the good of sociability in particular. This distinction will be 
unpacked further below. 
To show the narrowing of natural law into natural rights jurisprudence in the work 
of Grotius and the direct connection this has to George, the second issue of 
property rights will now be considered. Chapter 1 introduced a focus upon rights 
within George’s work. Whether this focus be George in his work referring to 
‘fundamental human right[s]’51 within Embryo: a Defense of Human Rights or that 
‘every human being is subject of rights’52 in Body-Self Dualism: Contemporary 
Ethics and Politics, which shows that a rights discourse underlies his 
jurisprudence. NNL has been linked to natural rights ever since the publication of 
                                                          
45 R P George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis (ISI Books, 2001) 169. 
46 R P George, Natural Law and Public Reason (Georgetown University Press, 2000) 42. 
47 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis (n 45) 161, 162. 
48 H Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (n 25) I.I.X.I. 
49 S Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Clarendon Press, 1991) 25. 
50 S Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 19) 28. 
51 R P George, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (Doubleday Books, 2008) 208. 
52 R P George and P Lee, Body Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 88. 
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Natural Law and Natural Rights.53 In order to analyse George’s thought for later 
application to the Equality Act 2010 in chapters 4 and 5, George will be shown to 
draw influence in a rights based approach.  
However, this rights based influence upon George can be more clearly seen in 
the conceptual development of ‘ius’. In contrasting a rationalist position with 
medieval scholasticism, Tuck has argued that from the fourteenth century it was 
possible to show that to have a right was to be the Lord or dominus of one’s 
relevant moral world, ‘to possess dominium that is to say property.’54 Tuck has 
suggested the ‘medieval lawyer always regarded dominium as ius [right], and 
hence was prepared to talk about property right.’55 Rights are therefore linked to 
property. For Grotius property law provided the basis for natural law.56 The law of 
nature for Grotius depended on dominium as ius. This was represented for 
Grotius in property rights which provide a basis for the natural law. Grotius 
distinguished ‘another meaning of ius’57 ‘by reference to the person … [as] a 
moral quality of the person enabling him to have or to do something justly’.58 As 
such, Coyle has observed that this may be the basis of the NNL argument that 
there is no intellectual breach between the natural law/natural rights tradition so 
that ‘everything that has been claimed about justice in discussion of the basic 
goods can be suitably expressed in the language of rights; the reference to law 
in natural law being “analogical’’’.59 If natural law and natural rights are so closely 
linked, may property rights provide the basis for George’s approach to natural 
law? 
Looking further at the secondary literature, in The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies 
on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law,60 Brian Tierney argued that 
through the rights development in Grotius ‘one can find natural rights and natural 
law existing side by side, both associated with traits of human nature that were 
                                                          
53 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980).  
54 Buckle (n 49) 3. 
55 R Tuck (n 2) 13. Tuck modifies this position slightly, in that for neither the Romans nor early medieval 
lawyers could liberty be ius (a right) - ibid 26. 
56 Ibid 8.  
57 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 19) 60. 
58 H Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis [The Law of War and Peace] (n 25) I.1.3.  
59 S Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 19) 60, quoting Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights (n 53) 210. 
60 B Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-
1625 (Wm. B Eerdmans Publishing, 1997). 
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taken to be implanted by God.’61 As such, Tierney suggests that for Grotius the 
concept of natural law was derivative from rights.62 This once again indicates a 
basis for George’s approach to natural law. 
To assess whether property rights provide the basis for George’s approach to 
natural law, Grotius once again plays an influential role. Grotius can be seen as 
contributing to the defining break between the Scholastic understandings of 
natural law into a natural rights basis, centred on the basis of property.63 This 
defining break occurred with the secular humanist tradition moving away from 
older medieval conceptions of natural law towards the enlightenment learning 
and the embrace of property rights.64 Here marks the transformation of natural 
law reasoning into natural rights jurisprudence.65  
The law of nature, seen as necessitating property rights, is vital to Grotius: 
property was at the heart and root of his political system, forming the foundation 
of the state.66 The fact that property, for Grotius, was connected with equality,67 
can be considered pivotal for modern comparisons with NNL. In other words, the 
equality garnered by property implied a system of coherent rights, providing a 
basis for NNL. 
Further support for a natural law basis and for George’s conception of rights as 
being linked to property rights stems from Grotius’ conception of self-ownership. 
Through self-ownership, rights were given and protected in the name of the good 
for Grotius.68 Coyle has claimed that Grotius’ recognition of the suum69 as a form 
of self-ownership provided individual property rights free from interference in the 
name of the common good.70 This is because the suum included a natural faculty 
                                                          
61 Ibid 319. 
62 Ibid. 
63 It will subsequently be argued that Hobbes and Pufendorf also contributed to this development. 
64 Tuck (n 2) 8. 
65 Coyle, From Positivism to Idealism: A Study of the Moral Dimensions of Legality (n 4) 52. As such, an 
important point for George’s jurisprudence is that Coyle believes Grotius provides a basis to ‘detach the 
juridical framework of rights and duties from the theological moorings of natural law’ - ibid. 
66 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 19) 60. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Buckle (n 49) 76. 
69 An Aristotelian concept, the suum is an internal domain of self-ownership, which through inward 
reflection reveals individuals interests and goals - Coyle, From Positivism to Idealism: A Study of the 
Moral Dimensions of Legality (n 4) 51. 
70 S Coyle and K Morrow, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: Property, Rights and 
Nature (Hart, 2004) 35; Coyle, From Positivism to Idealism: A Study of the Moral Dimensions of Legality 
(n 5) 51. 
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or power to ‘take and use things, especially those things needed for 
preservation’.71 The concepts Domain (suum ius) and the earlier considered 
‘dominium’ established protective property rights.72 George’s similar focus upon 
the common good is apparent.73 This is because secondary literature has 
established that for Grotius each person enjoys a foundation of ‘fundamental 
right’ in the suum as a template for human flourishing.74 This natural rights basis 
focused on the suum is at the outset very similar to George’s approach: in the 
name of the good, the basic goods present basic reasons for action as constituent 
aspects for flourishing75 – the highest form of the good. 
Grotius attempted to adapt Aristotle to the seventeenth century situation76 and for 
this reason is a rights thinker. However, Grotius moved beyond scholasticism, 
breaking with Aristotelian philosophy ‘which was effectively decisive for all later 
political philosophy’.77 This was because, as Coyle suggests, Grotius detached 
the juridical framework of justice and rights from broader ethical questions of 
virtue and excellence: ‘Questions of the good are therefore no longer central to 
law, but belong to that inner-dimension of the person, the suum, and the manner 
of its flourishing.’78 Coyle here identifies that Grotius re-introduced the Aristotelian 
suum, and connected this with the good and the highest good – human 
flourishing. This is because the Aristotelian ‘good life’, as that which is natural for 
man, can also be said to be good for him; it is what is required for flourishing.79  
At this point divergence occurs between George and Grotius over human ends. 
For Grotius the contents of rights arose from reflection on human nature. This 
reflection required flourishing for each individual and so ‘each person enjoys a 
foundation of ‘fundamental right’ in the suum.’80 In particular this is built upon the 
earlier identified characteristic or ‘good’ of sociableness,81 as that which is 
                                                          
71 Buckle (n 49) 76. 
72 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 19) 60. 
73 George and Lee, Body Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (n 52) 108. 
74 Coyle and Morrow, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: Property, Rights and Nature 
(n 70) 35. 
75 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 28) 229. 
76 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 20) xviii. 
77 Ibid xviii. 
78 Ibid 64. 
79 Ibid 28. 
80 Ibid 67. 
81 Buckle (n 49) 25. 
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essentially outward-facing and social in nature. Coyle argues that Grotius’ basic 
premise and the good of sociability gave rise to forms of political society.82 This 
good followed Aristotelian teaching to secure flourishing at a societal level.83 
George differs from Grotius in that his self-evident basic good - ‘friendship of 
personal community’84 - is both an external and, more importantly, an internal 
reason for action to promote flourishing. It is in this sense that George has re-
interpreted Grotian rights discourse. This development is here built upon Grotian 
property rights as a form self-ownership to secure flourishing, in the name of the 
good.85 
For George, this section has established the key point where natural rights are 
linked to property rights within his jurisprudence. The crucial role that Grotius 
played in the development of natural law to natural rights jurisprudence has been 
shown at the nexus where proprietary rights develop from the suum in the name 
of the good.  
3.4 Hobbes 
Introduction 
Grotius has influenced George’s approach to natural law and natural rights. 
Turning to Thomas Hobbes, another member of the secular humanist tradition, it 
will be shown that Hobbes has influenced George’s understanding of the common 
good. It will be seen that Hobbes also provides a basis for George’s move 
towards liberty, seen in the introduction of rights being asserted against the state. 
This will be important for the deployment of George’s thought in chapters 4 and 
5. 
Hobbes' focus on positive law followed Grotius' law of nations (voluntary law) of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.86 Stephen Neff has identified that 
Hobbes provided laws with a practical and utilitarian character – making new law, 
                                                          
82 Coyle, From Positivism to Idealism: A Study of the Moral Dimensions of Legality (n 4) 30 – see S 
Pufendorf, De Iure Naturae et Gentium (CH and WA Oldfather, tr, 1688 edn, Oxford University Press, 
1934) 1. 3. 8.  
83 Coyle, Modern Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (n 19) 28. 
84 George and Lee, Body Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics (n 52) 91. Natural Law and 
Natural Rights identified Finnis’ equivalent basic good to be: ‘friendship and community’ - Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (n 53) 85-90. 
85 A motif of self-ownership to secure flourishing will be developed further in this chapter. 
86 Neff (n 13) 29. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  165 
rather than simply determining the natural law.87 As we shall see this will be 
important for the discussion of law’s creation/validity in the work of Robert 
George.  
George’s understanding of the common good: the rejection of the 
Hobbesian classification of law into realist social contractarianism 
George’s approach to the FPPR and basic goods differ from Hobbes’ first 
conception of natural rights. For George, natural rights are enforced through the 
attainment of the basic human goods. For instance, George holds that ‘norms of 
natural law can provide the basis for a common understanding of human rights.’88 
George further states in The Clash of Orthodoxies that ‘rights are rooted in 
intelligible and basic human goods.’89 This establishes natural rights on the basis 
of basic goods. Hobbes’ basis for natural rights involves a conception of the pre-
political state as chaotic, even violent. The first foundation of natural right thereby 
follows that ‘each man protect his life and limbs as much as he can’.90 This is 
important for our discussion because Hobbes’ natural law,91 construed as a right 
to self-preservation,92 secured a lawful rights discourse to provide resistance.93 
This echoes with the preservationist nature of Grotius and provides a basis for 
Hobbes. Analogous to the thought of Grotius, Hobbes’ right of nature is also 
rooted in the suum insofar as it is a right to self-preservation.94 Once again this 
achieves an Aristotelian motif of flourishing. However, this is closer to a rights 
basis rather than a concentration on the goods. As such, an important factor for 
the later application of George’s thought to the Equality Act 2010 is that George 
extends natural rights to flourishing - ‘flourishing [as] the ultimate reason’95 over 
and above mere preservation. 
                                                          
87 Shaw (n 8) 36. 
88 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 41) 84. 
89 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis (n 45) 19. 
90 T Hobbes, On the Citizen (R Tuck and M Silverthorne eds, Cambridge University Press, 1998) 27. 
91 T Hobbes, Leviathan (C B Macpherson ed, Pelican, 1968) Ch. XIII – The natural law of self-preservation 
is pursuant upon Hobbes’ discussion of the laws of nature where men live in ‘that condition called 
Warre’ - ibid Ch. XIII, 62. 
92 Ibid Ch. XIV. 
93 Skinner (n 3) 178. 
94 Coyle and Morrow, The Philosophical Foundations of Environmental Law: Property, Rights and Nature 
(n 70) 29 quoting Hobbes, Leviathan (n 91) I.6.120. 
95 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 28) 264. 
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Another difference between George and Hobbes is that, for George the Church 
is ‘the principal institution bearer of the tradition of natural law theorizing in the 
modern world.’96 Whereas Hobbes’ views surrounding human nature, according 
to George, do not depend on the Christian Church.97 Shaw has argued that the 
Hobbesian social contract basis of sovereignty, developed through the 
introduction of the natural rights thesis, was conceived out of an individualistic 
assertion of political supremacy rather than Christian values.98 Sovereignty, for 
Hobbes, was aligned to the concept of natural right. Sovereignty was aligned by 
forms of authority, government and law, through social contractarianism, 
preserving the boundaries over individual rights. Natural law was thus employed 
to preserve the absoluteness of sovereignty,99 which brought about a natural 
rights basis.  
The basis of reciprocity and utilisation of the natural law within the Hobbesian 
social contract is, however, similar to the dependence upon Papal authority within 
the work of Robert George. Who would be the sovereign for George in this 
situation? Within the modern setting, a mode of obligation would here be owed to 
the state for both Hobbes and George. If the state adversely impacted Roman 
Catholicism, for instance negating religious liberty, the difference is that George 
may reject state jurisdiction and authority in favour of post-Vatican II Roman 
Catholic teaching.100 This is in line with the Roman Catholic bias that was 
identified earlier in the thesis. 
This importantly shows the development within natural law reasoning. This 
development is a demarcating line drawn from the division between church and 
state, from authority founded in state sovereignty to church teaching often in 
contradiction with state mandate, in a post-secular setting. A Hobbesian influence 
can be seen in George’s insistence of individual rights used against the state. For 
instance, to give a privileged position to religion, within Conscience and its 
Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism, George has drawn 
influence from Hobbes by insisting on natural rights held by the individual against 
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the state, in particular against ‘overreaching governments.’101 George’s 
inspiration can be seen in cases of civil action being taken by the individual 
against the state in the context of religious human rights violations. This is seen 
in, for example, the case of Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom.102 From 
this influence it may be argued that the individual should be protected against the 
state in cases of, for instance, indirect religious discrimination.103 As we will see 
in chapters 4 and 5, George’s approach can be applied to religious liberty conflicts 
between Christian believers and the enforcement of contentious laws; this will be 
further demonstrated in chapter 5.2. As such, this focus on the individual 
relationship with the state is an important development for George and one that 
will be important in the deployment of George’s thought to analyse the right to 
religious liberty. 
The theories of George and Hobbes diverge, however, when it comes to their 
approaches to the so-called 'state of nature'. For Hobbes’ hypothetical condition, 
the state of nature existed when ‘there were no common power able to restrain 
individuals, no law and no law enforcement’,104 something not considered by 
George. By contrast, when considering human nature, George’s anti-
consequentialist NNL approach is not imposed upon a lawless state but rather 
upon a 21st century system of law – one governed by statutory law – and so his 
method furthers moral deliberation that leads to flourishing. As highlighted in The 
Clash of Orthodoxies, for George, ‘moral norms govern free choices by excluding 
possible actions that are incompatible with such a will’.105 George therefore 
discusses ethical choice rather than focussing upon the human condition. For 
Hobbes, if restraint were removed (i.e., there was no law), to prevent invasion of 
personal property, individuals should do whatever was necessary to avoid 
entering into this dark, repressive state of nature.106 Hobbes thus opts for a 
hypothetical situation to improve the human condition while George focuses on 
the refinement of and explanation of ethical choice.  
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A further difference between the two theorists is George’s rejection of the realist 
social contract theory of Hobbes. As discussed earlier, George uses Hobbes’ 
theory to highlight the notion that political orders are often never really supported 
by a shared and justified morality.107 Labelling Hobbes a ‘realist’, George 
suggests that the only way to give moral words a common meaning, and to 
establish common standard of just and unjust, would be for all to defer to the 
sovereign a will that is authorised to set the terms of political and social co-
operation.108 Coyle has observed that it was from this understanding that Hobbes 
based his theory of equality.109 George views that in this realist situation there is 
no possibility of shared moral standards as apart from the law made by the 
sovereign ‘citizens are not allowed to criticize the law based on moral 
standards.’110 Therefore George’s conclusion is that it is impossible on Hobbes’ 
view to say that law is unjust, for ‘the law is the only public morality that we can 
have.’111 Under this reading, morality is dictated by the law. George believes that 
laws shape morality – Brown v Topeka Board of Education.112 For this reason the 
Hobbesian social contract theory is untenable as it does not accommodate, as 
seen in chapter 2, the ‘minimum content of reasonableness’ thesis. As such, 
George disagrees with the Hobbesian presentation of equality regarding having 
no shared moral standards. Here George places limits on the possibility of 
sovereign authority and the Hobbesian embrace of morality within nature. 
For George law is a public morality, rather than vesting power to govern morality 
in the sovereign. We need law to protect the boundaries over our natural rights. 
Making Men Moral113 is based upon the central belief that natural law can 
inherently contribute to making man moral: for George, although laws cannot 
make humans moral ‘in any direct or immediate way’,114 the natural law can 
legitimately contribute to the legal enforcement of morality.115 It is for this reason 
that the narrow Hobbesian social contract theory is rejected.  
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George’s conception of public morality is founded upon, and finds expression in, 
the human good and revealed truth. This differs from Hobbes in that George does 
not base public morality upon the two defining standards of the current age: 
equality and liberty.116 To this extent, George can be termed counter-cultural in 
that his distinctive stance rejects equality and liberty as individual class 
preferences and interests.117 Instead, in Natural Law and Public Reason, George 
suggests political arrangements should be based on an objective account of the 
highest human good or from religious or philosophical truth.118 This is not to be 
found in the Hobbesian social contract theory. George proposes a public morality 
with a variety of different religious and philosophical commitments and, a 
‘reasonable consensus on certain shared matters of urgent concern’.119 This is 
preferred to the state of nature. Despite George’s claim to objectivity, this position 
is necessarily contingent upon cultural circumstance and popular concern. Two 
problems arise: a) how does a political moralistic arrangement account for a 
multicultural, pluralistic account of religion and b) in a system of basic, 
incommensurable goods what can be termed the highest human good? Both 
these questions form the subject of discussion in chapters 4 and 5, when using 
George’s thought to analyse religious freedom in the Equality Act 2010. 
George’s interpretation of Hobbesian reliance upon reason, nature and 
self-preservation 
George’s interpretation of the key concepts of reason, nature and self-
preservation within Hobbes’ work will now be considered to see if this has 
influenced George’s natural law understanding. It was earlier shown that George 
has adopted facets of natural rights teaching from the secular humanist tradition’s 
development of natural rights discourse.120 Reed has suggested that the 
theoretical construct of the ‘state of nature’ was Hobbes’ ‘starting point for natural 
law teaching.’121 This introduction provides an exercise that draws comparison 
with practical reasoning: for Hobbes ‘right’ was connected to liberty and 
demonstrated through reason. From this state of nature, ‘right’ was defined as 
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‘the liberty that each man has of using his natural faculties in accordance with 
right reason,’ from which it follows that, right can be exercised for self-
preservation. The right of nature, commonly called the jus naturale was the liberty 
each person has for self-preservation.122 From this, Reed suggests, right can be 
connected to liberty, performed through reason.123 Hobbes’ natural law of self-
preservation,124 construed as a right to self-preservation,125 is connected to, but 
distinct from, liberty.126 
In the work of Hobbes, the state of nature fundamentally underpins the basis that 
liberty is built on right(s). For Hobbes, rights were intrinsically linked to liberty, of 
which the law played a crucial constraining part. This is because of Hobbes’ 
distinction between the right of nature (liberty) and law of nature 
(obligation/determination).127  
Hobbes’ idea that the state of nature was home to the law of nature/jus natural128 
has been largely rejected by George. This is because, if right leads to an 
understanding of the concept of liberty,129 the natural law is seen to both enable 
value liberties and, through the legal enforcement of morality, restrict certain 
libertarian positions.130 That said, do the use of reason and liberty within 
Hobbesian thought find any overt parallels to George’s method of reasoning? 
I have suggested that George differs from Hobbes in his adoption of the good as 
the basis of rights reasoning. This is opposed to Hobbes, for whom liberty based 
upon self-preservation is the key. Why is this the case? There is a significant shift 
between the Hobbesian understanding of natural right from that of the 
scholastics,131 such as Aquinas. As was shown in chapter 2, Aquinas considered 
natural law to be a function of reason, focused on the common good.132 Hobbes 
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rejected the Scholastic understanding of reason focused on the good and instead 
advocated liberty based upon autonomy and self-preservation. For Hobbes, 
unlike Aquinas, natural law was no longer dependent upon the common good, or 
the Eternal Law. Instead, liberty provided the individual with a greater source of 
autonomy and self-preservation.133 Within this system, however, there was still a 
place for natural reason - an inviolable observation arising from the condition of 
human nature and laws divine.134 It is clear that while this would refute George’s 
approach to the good,135 the approach to reason may need more investigation to 
discern the level of disagreement. 
Despite the assumption that George rejects an approach of rationality based on 
self-preservation, in contrast, this line of thought has influenced George. George 
believes that because of the influence of Thomas Hobbes, the view that human 
nature is ultimately constituted on emotional desires is prominent in the 
intellectual life of modern culture. Though this basis is ultimately refuted because 
as a conservative Roman Catholic, George accepts the Roman Catholic Church’s 
view of human good and nature, in that natural goods give reasons for action, 
rather than liberty based upon self-preservation.136 Yet, the dual presentation of 
rationality driven by desires and revelation has found modern application in NNL. 
Even George admits that ‘there are aspects of human nature that are relevant to 
practical thinking and can indeed be known prior to practical reasoning.’137 
Reason, in the form of practical reason, and revelation in the form of Papal 
teaching has been modified and further developed to become a large factor in 
George’s work.138 
On this basis, George within Making Men Moral has criticised the position of 
Hobbes, who, in line with his theoretical successor David Hume, believed that 
‘the Thoughts are to the desires as Scouts and Spies to range abroad, and find 
the way to things desired’.139 This view is that desires are prior to and determine 
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our thoughts. Instead George has suggested the intrinsic human goods and basic 
reason for action can be sought as ends in themselves. This prevents practical 
reason being merely dictated by reason/emotions, a ‘mere instrument in the 
service of desire, which would prevent rationally motivated choice guided by 
practical intellect.’140 Practical reason is dictated by the good.141 As has been 
shown, the basic goods engage the practical reason, and provide reasons for 
action ‘precisely insofar as they are constitutive aspects of human flourishing.’142 
This is a conclusion Hobbes could never reach based on the necessity of self-
preservation in the state of nature. For such self-preservation is intrinsically self-
centred towards mere protection rather than the selfless, flourishing nature of the 
good.   
This section has identified the influence drawn by George from Hobbes. It will 
next be argued that a modified concept of reason, as shown in chapter 2, is 
evident in a natural rights basis adopted against the state and plays a significant 
role in the work of Robert George for the deployment of George’s thought in 
chapters 4 and 5. Following chapter 2 it will here be argued that practical reason 
has a large part to play in this process.  
Public reason morality: George’s modification of the Hobbesian ‘state of 
nature’ position arising from liberty 
Within George’s theory is modern application of Thomas Hobbes’ approach to 
reason to be found? How do both George and Hobbes approach limits to 
governing authority? For Hobbes, we have seen that the right of nature was 
contrasted with the law of nature (lex naturalis). Hobbes stated this was a rule 
found out by reason towards self-preservation in the state of nature.143 It would 
be reasonable in the state of nature to transfer power to gain protection by 
authority. This is because the transfer of these rights constituted individual 
obligation being transferred to the recipient authority. Hence, the transferee to 
whom these rights/powers would be transferred was the sovereign.144 It is from 
this position that Hobbes’ escape from the state of nature required handing over 
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all rights and powers to the sovereign145 in the earlier identified social contract 
basis of sovereignty.146 This natural law theory of the state has an emphasis upon 
the original liberty and freedom of the people abrogating their sovereignty to the 
state. As such, in Hobbes’ natural law theory of the state it can be identified that 
the state was primarily responsible for the enforcement of liberty.  
This is very different from the position developed by George who recognises a 
more nuanced, limited role for government. For George, the natural law acts as 
a guiding limit upon authority. In The Clash of Orthodoxies, George asserts that 
the natural law ‘does not dictate an answer to the question of its own 
enforcement.’147 For George, the ‘natural law itself requires that some-one (or 
some group of persons or some institution) exercise authority in political 
communities’.148 As such, the authority to enforce the natural law may be vested 
exclusively or primarily with the legislature. Moreover, a significant measure of 
such authority may be granted to the judiciary, via the natural law, as a check on 
legislative power.149 George recognises the authority of law to restrain authority 
based upon law’s inherent nature for the good. For instance, in the context of the 
American government’s approach to abortion following Roe v Wade,150 George 
suggests that the ‘failure of the American democracy to fulfil their responsibilities 
has created what is truly a crisis’.151 Consequently, for the purposes of the larger 
thesis in chapters 4 and 5, George provides a wider limit to the scope of the 
natural law to constrain government than Hobbes.152 
In response to Hobbes’ state of nature, George proposes a public morality with a 
variety of different religious and philosophical commitments. With a ‘reasonable 
consensus on certain shared matters of urgent concern’, this morality is preferred 
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to the state of nature.153 As shown in chapter 2.5, George rejects the Rawlsian 
concept of ‘public reason’ in favour of his modified social contractarian ‘common 
human reason’,154 to provide a wider that consensus accommodates religious 
belief. 
George’s public morality is employed here to refute the ‘Hobbesian invitation to 
abandon our moral aspirations in favour scepticism, will, and power.’155 On 
George’s own terms it would here be better to use the expanded practice of 
practical reasoning for a ‘common human morality’, instead of the Hobbesian 
state of nature, in order to prevent untamed executive power.  
George has further modified Hobbes’ understanding of liberty. This 
understanding of liberty arose from Hobbes’ contractarian movement from the 
law of nature. Hobbes used the words Lex Civilis, and Jus Civile, which for 
Hobbes were law and right civil accordingly. These are promiscuously used for 
the same thing: for Hobbes, right is liberty, namely that liberty which the civil law 
leaves us.156 But for Hobbes:  
Civil Law is an Obligation: and takes from us the Liberty which the Law of 
Nature gave us. Nature gave a Right to every man to secure himself by 
his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour … but the Civill 
Law takes away the Liberty, in all cases where the protection of the Law 
may be safely stayd for. Insomuch as Lex and Jus, are as different as 
obligation and liberty.157 
Here Hobbes shifted his definition of liberty as something that arises from the law 
of nature to a primary right of nature. Self-preservation is the primary right of 
nature - an innovative right that leads to liberty.158 
George has interpreted Hobbes’ innovate right to self-preservation by, as noted 
earlier, rejecting social contractarianism. However, he does endorse liberty 
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arising from the nature of the human good within natural law.159 As can be seen 
in Hobbes’ Leviathan,160 further developments are imposed upon the right of 
liberty when contracting in a civil society. Here in the development of ‘ius’, the 
terms lex and jus, can also be seen: ‘[f]or right is that liberty which law leaveth 
us; and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge one another’s 
liberty.’161 George’s presupposition towards liberty may draw from Hobbes 
intrinsically linking rights to liberty, of which the law played a crucial constraining 
part. Liberty and right arise here, for Hobbes, from nature. From this, George 
recognises that liberty can be protected via laws ‘as a common good, and thus 
as an aspect of the common good’.162 This is also another instance where the 
interplay between the three related legal concepts identified by the Roman jurists 
(here jus civile/jus natural) directly contributes to the narrowing of natural law into 
natural rights jurisprudence in the work of the secular humanist scholars. 
For George, points of inheritance have been shown from Hobbes. In De Cive, 
Hobbes categorised the first foundation of natural rights as one of self-
preservation.163 This concept is the overriding contribution of Hobbesian thought. 
This concept has certainly been used by George and Finnis – one of the 
incommensurable basic goods is ‘Life’ and the attaching right to protect life. This 
right, codified as Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
following the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, has a definite natural 
rights basis.164 For instance, George has regarded human rights as natural 
laws.165 George here explicitly draws from a ‘tradition of natural law thinking about 
morality, justice and human rights’.166 These are human rights as a modern 
version of the natural law theory, the doctrines of which can be traced back to 
Judaeo-Christian sources of European culture.167 This is a movement from divine 
law to natural law, via the secular humanist tradition eventually being presented 
in a rights discourse as human rights. 
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So it is argued that Hobbes' first foundation of natural right as self-preservation is 
analogous to George's incommensurable basic good of life. George has inherited 
this self-preservationist regard for life as a basic good from the secular humanist 
tradition. In a similar vein, Hobbes proclaimed in a way that can be now 
contrasted to a Hohfeldian approach, the absolute priority of rights to duties:168 
‘the doctrine of civil society as if for the preservation of peace and of government 
of manking there were nothing else necessary ... [This] is yet certainly false and 
an error.’169 
Zuckert highlights this important distinction that Hobbes introduced between 
natural law and natural rights: ‘Natural law is not natural moral duty; natural right, 
on the other hand, is permissive – a liberty.’170 As Hobbes said, ‘right consists in 
the fact that we have the free use of something, but law is that which either 
commands or forbids some action.’171 Could natural rights discourse be 
responsible for introducing liberty into NNL? George’s high regard for religious 
liberty will be outlined in chapter 4. However, here it can be stated that the 
presentation of human rights established and evolved from a natural rights basis, 
helps provide a basis in rights related discourse for religious rights. Here the jus 
natural acts as the liberty prescribed to preserve life, with individuals guided by 
reason.172  
Yet Hobbes viewed natural right as a pure liberty, a faculty, power or liberty, with 
no subsequent correlative duty attaching to it.173 The jus natural acts here as the 
liberty prescribed to preserve life, with individuals using their natural faculties 
guided by reason.174 This further shows how for both George and Hobbes law 
prescribes the boundaries for natural rights. This brings us back to the notion of 
self-preservation and George’s subsequent development via the basic good of 
life. This can be considered in two ways: first, if one reads Hobbes as treating 
natural right as a pure liberty, Hobbes’ reading is potentially wider, and offers a 
broader scope for decision making than that offered by the conception of basic 
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goods provided by George. To meet this reading by Hobbes, liberty would form 
a basic reason for action. 
Secondly, however, if one reads a natural right to liberty purely as a right to life, 
then this would not match George’s conception for basic human goods. Because 
the goods are incommensurable and internally variegated, the restricted space 
provided here for liberty would not be analogous to the liberty Hobbes prescribed. 
A reading of the former position is preferable because Hobbes’ libertarian basis 
may involve aspects touching upon other basic goods, not just the good of life, 
and George’s incommensurability cannot accommodate this. Instead George’s 
modification of the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ arising from liberty involves the 
basic good approach encompassing natural rights and reducing liberty into a 
basic reason for action.175  
In conclusion, for the deployment of George’s thought in chapters 4 and 5, much 
of George’s reliance upon natural rights has been drawn from Hobbes. First, 
through influencing George’s understanding of the common good and second, 
providing a basis for an embrace of reason focused on both self-preservation and 
a move toward liberty – liberty reduced into a basic reason for action in alignment 
with the basic goods. In these ways George has been subtly influenced by 
Hobbes. More overt influence can be seen in George’s movement from Hobbes 
to provide individual, natural rights protection against the state. However, 
George’s rejection of sovereignty/social contractarianism and George’s concept 
of public reason morality diverge from Hobbes. Next this chapter will turn to 
Pufendorf who, like Hobbes, provided a rationalist basis that has influenced 
Robert George. 
3.5 Pufendorf 
Application of the law of nature: the influence of Pufendorf’s rationality in 
NNL 
This section will begin by showing that George has been influenced, by 
Pufendorf, towards creating case law solutions through applying his NNL thought. 
It will be shown in this section that this influence stems from Pufendorf’s approach 
to the law of nature. Next, this section will show that a rationalist basis features 
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in the basis of Pufendorfian thought. This basis has, however, been largely 
modified by George.  
Pufendorf is influential because he moved further from the other natural rights 
theorists by providing a law of nations that was concerned with making new law, 
rather than simply determining the natural law. For instance, On the Law of 
Nature and Nations176 was Pufendorf’s attempt to identify international law 
completely with the law of nature. As earlier identified, this arose from the direct 
interplay between the key concepts of jus naturale (natural law) and jus gentium 
(law of nations), which allowed the natural law to be applied to the human 
condition. It is in this sense that George has been influenced to apply the natural 
law to creative case law solutions.  
The previous section detailed George’s rejection of Hobbesian social contract 
theory. For Pufendorf a state’s highest obligation was its natural law ‘duty to itself’: 
natural rights being powers to fulfil the duty of the natural law.177 It is in this sense 
that the social contractarian duty of self-preservation arose.178 Yet Pufendorf’s 
‘state of nature’ was effectively a state of war, a selfish, inward looking notion.179 
George once again takes this duty further, and has externalised this idea as a 
natural rights defence against the state.180 
This natural rights basis has so far in this chapter been shown as a defining 
characteristic within the secular humanist tradition. George’s natural rights basis 
can be drawn from Pufendorf’s belief that the divine will was accessible no longer 
merely by the natural law’s participation in the eternal law. Instead, the natural 
law became accessible through human nature: ‘natural theology’ as reasoning to 
the divine from the nature of the world.181 A form of Protestant Aristotelianism, 
similar to scholastic Aristotelianism, was the source of this view that rejected the 
possibility that men could have any rational knowledge of God’s nature on the 
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basis of which they could draw moral lessons for themselves.182 It is expressed, 
for example, as a denial that we can know that the natural law ‘participates’ in 
God’s eternal law.183 On this reading, Pufendorf sought to reconcile the normative 
character of natural law with a view of nature by deriving morality’s binding force 
from the divine will. This was an ambitious compromise.184  
Pufendorf here follows Grotius in that the above position draws natural law and 
natural rights away from a divine source. Knud Haakonssen has argued that in 
Germany Pufendorf was a Lutheran reaction to Grotius.185 In other words, his 
adherence to a secularist position distinguished Pufendorf from scholasticism 
which led to the precepts of the natural law being ‘accessible via examination of 
the nature and disposition of human kind’.186 
This rationalist basis has overtly influenced Robert George. Pufendorf achieved 
a secularist transition by first removing a Judaeo-Christian God as the provider 
of natural law and, second, providing more emphasis upon human rationality 
through human nature. By doing so, this removed any point of external moral 
reference which transcended the legislative obligations of human nature.187 This 
depended upon a reliable, consistent form of human nature to suggest a 
rationalist basis in which contents of the natural law would be susceptible to 
discovery through human reason rather than revelation.188 With the natural order 
providing moral norms for free human choice, in this sense knowledge of the 
human nature is key to George’s moral philosophy189 which will be later deployed 
to resolve tensions facing religious liberty in the application of the Equality Act 
2010.    
In The Clash of Orthodoxies, George has drawn upon Pufendorf to present 
human nature as a law of practical rationality.190 Accordingly, George's reliance 
upon human nature derives from Pufendorf's transition from divine influence as 
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the base of obligation in the natural law, towards rationality as the base of 
obligation.  
George and Pufendorf both further embrace human nature to generate a similar 
understanding about morality. Within De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Pufendorf’s 
remarks on the nature of law paints laws as moral entities.191 Both George and 
Pufendorf maintain a position that human nature creates morals. In that Pufendorf 
with his ‘science of morals’192 approach, like Grotius, draws a distinction between 
the clarity of moral concepts and the complex circumstances to which they must 
be applied. This is similar to Grotius’ own understanding of moral uncertainty and 
so likewise Pufendorf maintains that human nature creates morals. From this 
Nigel Simmonds believes that Pufendorf’s writings represent a shift towards the 
idea of morality as a distinct and autonomous outlook on the world in line with 
human nature.193  
For Pufendorf, all acts were morally indifferent before the imposition of a divine 
law: ‘[t]hat reason should be able to discover any morality in the actions of a man 
without reference to a law, is as impossible as for a man born blind to judge 
between colours.’194 Laws, for Pufendorf, as moral entities, had a material 
element: the most important set of just laws (the natural law) being the will of a 
superior.195 Unlike positive laws, their formal element lay only in the will of the 
divine superior. For this reason, unlike positive law, natural law had a ‘necessary 
agreement ... with its subjects.’196 As such, mirroring Hobbesian teaching, 
Pufendorf believed morality was constituted by the individual choosing to 
surrender rights to society in order to fulfil self-interests.197 This is one of the 
defining features of the secular humanist tradition; an agreement that has been 
reformulated in the relationship of law and obligation within George’s work. 
Obligation transferred to the recipient authority as part of the social contractarian 
basis.  
George has been influenced by this autonomous nature for fulfilment; however, 
as detailed, he rejects to any great extent the surrender of rights for preservation. 
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For Pufendorf and George human nature created morals. This has shown the 
influence and application George has drawn from Pufendorf’s approach towards 
rationality and human nature. The next section will trace George’s movement 
from Pufendorf’s rational nature towards the basic goods. 
Rights, religion and society: George’s movement from the rational nature 
of Pufendorf’s theory to the basic good of religion 
This section will show three key ways George’s NNL approach has been 
influenced by Pufendorf’s take on natural rights. First, Pufendorf’s account of 
human rationality arising from right reason has influenced George’s own 
formulation of right reason. Second, Pufendorf’s understanding of property rights 
as an aspect of a) human social life and therefore b) natural rights jurisprudence, 
will be shown to influence George’s own understanding of natural law and natural 
rights. Third, George’s conception of the basic goods is influenced by Pufendorf’s 
understanding of the interaction between society and religion.  
First, human rationality is central to both Pufendorf’s approach and George’s NNL 
work. Chapter 2 detailed George’s approach to moral reasoning. It also detailed 
the central role played by practical reasoning within NNL. Following in the 
scholastic tradition, and seen as a defining feature within the secular humanist 
tradition, human reasoning is central to Pufendorf’s understanding of the natural 
law. Pufendorf stated in De Officio that ‘the law can be investigated by the light 
of reason ... the common and important provisions of the natural law are so plain 
and clear that they at once find assent, and grow up in our minds.’198 Human 
rationality enables natural law to be a dictate of right reason. For Pufendorf ‘[t]he 
law of nature does not require divine revelation to become known or effective in 
human affairs.’199 Rather, it ‘can be discovered and understood from the mental 
endowment peculiar to man, and a consideration of human nature in general.’200 
This consideration of human nature involved an assessment of reason and so, in 
his rejection of innate ideas, natural law could be investigated by the ‘light of 
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reason’. Therefore human reason is central to an understanding of the natural 
law – rationality enables natural law to be a dictate of right reason. 
Within the secondary literature Brian Tierney supports this conclusion. He argues 
that Pufendorf, following the medieval scholastics, believed that right reason 
reflected revealed truth, and provided the basis for natural law and natural 
rights.201 Thus highlighting again one of the most important inferences of reason 
in the natural rights development, reason, as previously established, is crucial in 
the development of the natural law and natural rights basis employed by Robert 
George.202 As such, it will be important when critiquing George’s approach to 
religion and US religious liberty law in chapter 4.3 and 4.4. NNL has also further 
followed this tradition. It considers practical reasonableness to be a theory of 
‘natural law’ through the first principles identifying the basic human goods as 
ultimate reasons.203 This ‘light of reason’ should be considered analogous to 
practical reasoning. 
Further influence regarding moral reasoning within George’s theory can be seen 
in Pufendorf’s political theory. Central to this was the understanding that natural 
law could be deduced from the rational social nature of humanity.204 It was shown 
in the previous section that Pufendorf understood a detached, autonomous view 
of morality to achieve this. Pufendorf drew a distinction between the way there 
was a created moral world containing certain permanent features, namely those 
of basic human nature and a theistic creation of the physical world in a way that 
follows laws discoverable by human sciences: ‘[e]veryman, so far as in him lies, 
should cultivate and preserve towards others a sociable attitude, which is 
peaceful and agreeable at all times to the nature and end of thee human race.’205 
This led to the understanding of a divine act creating human nature and so 
allowed a detached application of human morals.  
In my view, George adheres to this process. He argues that ‘many moral truths, 
including some that are revealed, can also be grasped by ethical reflection apart 
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from revelation.’206 It was shown in chapter 2, and earlier in this chapter, that 
George’s Roman Catholic ethical theory expressly includes, though is not 
dependent upon, a place for revelation to supplement philosophical conclusions 
based upon the practical reasoning.207 In this sense, for both George and 
Pufendorf, morals can be accounted for as a human construct without lapsing 
into scepticism/relativism.208 This approach to morality will be shown later in this 
chapter to be a large influence in George’s view of rationality. 
In contrast it was earlier shown that Grotius took a modified separatist view on 
the ultimate foundation for the law of nature. Though Pufendorf drew significantly 
on the work of Grotius, unlike Grotius, for Pufendorf the law of nature was not 
independent of the divine will. This is because although it is true that natural law 
can be correctly described as a ‘dictate of right reason’ this does not mean that it 
can have a ‘degree of validity; if God is left out of [the] account.’209 Human reason 
alone cannot impose obligation.210 Pufendorf’s modification was to base the 
obligation to obey the natural law on both the ‘formal and material elements of 
the divine will.’211 Now that this section has analysed Pufendorf’s approach to 
human rationality the next will turn to property rights. 
Secondly, this subsection will consider the ways Pufendorf’s understanding of 
property rights have influenced George’s own understanding of natural law and 
natural rights. Within rights discourse literature, Buckle has written that 
Pufendorf’s account of property ‘can be called natural.’212 Buckle has further 
identified Pufendorf’s requirement for natural law to be a dictate of right (or 
‘sound’) reason. This involves the provisions of natural law being discovered by 
a more exacting and reflective process of rational enquiry – such as reflection 
upon property rights.213 This is important as these natural property rights214 are 
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natural in that they are ‘either necessary to peaceful social existence, or possess 
a rational utility to that end.’215  
To draw comparison with the rational reflection upon the basic human goods, 
property rights are natural and arise in human social life and dictate 
preservation.216 In Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of 
Liberal Secularism, George noted that ‘these [basic] goods … are the subjects of 
the very first principles of practical reason that control all rational thinking with a 
view to acting’.217 Like Grotius, Pufendorf regarded natural law as ‘welded’ to 
human development.218 This shows an important modification in natural rights 
thought from human nature, one which incorporates social nature and 
governance,219 like an old common law rule being amended to incorporate new 
statutory law. 
Thirdly, it will now be considered whether George’s basic human goods 
conception is influenced by Pufendorf’s understanding of the interaction between 
society and religion. From his theory of the state,220 Pufendorf’s control of religion 
rested with civil society. He believed that ‘historically those states have fared best 
that have entirely subordinated religion to the ends of the state.’221 This was 
because Pufendorf regarded all disputes over religion as presenting a potential 
danger to public safety.222 This is a controversial position. As noted, for George, 
the realisation of the good of religion is pivotal to human flourishing. It is agent 
dependent rather than state controlled and, as was discussed earlier, George 
thinks that rights arising from religion can be enforced to derive independence 
from the state. This position has been furthered by the concept of the basic good 
of religion within George’s work. For the individual agent the religious good is 
important because ‘the flourishing of a man’s spiritual life is integral to his all-
round well-being and fulfilment’.223 Pufendorf’s approach is to be contrasted with 
George's understanding of the religious good that rests with the human agent 
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rather than society. George’s approach to NNL rejects the Pufendorfian place for 
religion. As such, no direct or indirect influence can be found here. The privileged 
place given to religion by George will form discussion in chapters 4 and 5 when 
considering what George might think about religious liberty cases taken under 
the provisions of the Equality Act 2010.  
George has again narrowed natural law themes into natural rights jurisprudence 
following Pufendorf. This is because it has been shown that, for Pufendorf, in 
removing a Judaeo-Christian God as the provider of natural law; subordinating 
the place of religion; and providing more emphasis upon human rationality as the 
base of obligation, this led to natural law becoming accessible through human 
nature. Following from this, George has been influenced by linking human nature 
and morality. However, George provides a higher place for religion and further 
rejects the surrender of rights for self-preservation. This use of natural rights will 
now be seen in light of John Locke. 
3.6 John Locke 
Introduction 
This section will show that George has drawn upon John Locke, the final secular 
humanist scholar to be discussed in this chapter. Specifically it will detail that 
George has drawn inspiration from John Locke’s development of the Protestant 
natural rights discourse: George has been impacted by Locke’s narrowing of 
natural law in natural rights themes. It will demonstrate this in two ways: first, 
through Locke presenting property rights, this being influential in the common law 
development of a social contract theory focused upon human flourishing, and 
second, Locke’s combination of right reason and reflection presenting a moral 
process similar to that found in George’s NNL. 
George’s basic good method: deriving human sociability from human 
nature can be seen as an escape from the state of nature 
It has been shown that George modifies the self-preservationist/social 
contractarian thought of Hobbes and Pufendorf. The latter’s natural rights 
jurisprudence was clearly a precursor to John Locke’s work in the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding.224 In George’s interpretation of the 17th 
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century condition Locke is a leading figure. Once again, Locke followed the trend 
within the secular humanist tradition, by identifying in the Second Treatise of 
Government225 that the fundamental law of nature is to preserve humanity in 
others as well as in oneself, through this basis ‘natural rights are powers to fulfil 
the fundamental duty of natural law.’226  
Coyle has observed that through the focus upon humanity by the secular 
humanist scholars, property rights emerged from the focus upon humankind’s 
relationship with the natural world.227 This basis, and influence upon George, has 
already been discussed earlier in the chapter; however, Locke explored property 
in terms of its theological origins and the role in human social life.228 From this 
position Locke’s four notions of property rights – life, health, liberty and the state 
– provided an approach to human social life from a basis of human nature. 
Property rights enabled Locke, like Grotius, to approach human sociability from 
human nature.229 
For George, moving from the natural rights discourse brought about by the 
secular humanist tradition and focusing upon contemporary liberty provides that 
‘where it [religion] flourishes and is healthy, [it] is among the key institutions of 
civil society providing a buffer between the individual and the state.’230 This basis 
derives from the basic human goods. Here it may be shown that George’s basic 
human goods: life, knowledge, play, religion, aesthetic experience, practical 
reasonableness and sociability, arguably encompass all of Locke’s property 
rights, with the exception of the state. The reason for this lies in George’s rejection 
and modification of the seventeenth century social contract theory. In Making Men 
Moral, George notes that Locke presented a familiar theory of the social 
contract.231 Locke used a language of rights interchangeably with the language 
of property: by human nature beings exist in a ‘state of nature’ based upon 
equality and liberty.232 Locke’s conception of natural law provided a contractual 
agreement with the government to escape the state of nature: ‘[t]he State of 
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Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one’.233 This method 
of escape, based upon the social contract theory, has led George to view Locke 
as the ‘par excellence’ natural law thinker.234 
George ultimately regards Aquinas as being the classic pre-modern natural law 
thinker but here holds Locke in high regard.235 Why does George hold Locke in 
such high regard in The Clash of Orthodoxies? The reason lies in Locke’s natural 
law basis providing a bulwark against the oppression of the state. It has earlier 
been shown that in specific circumstances George would use the natural law 
against the state’s legal enforcement.236 Locke’s escape from the ‘state of nature’ 
arising through liberty has led to this conclusion by George. Here George 
enlarges the good to encompass the natural rights discourse, via the work of the 
secular humanists, to provide a ‘good based opposition’.237 George believes that 
the good encompasses the (natural) right to provide this ‘good based 
opposition’.238 Importantly for analysing the right to freedom of religion in chapters 
4 and 5, George employs a basic good method to a) escape a contemporary 
‘state of nature’ and b) provide opposition towards the enforcement of laws 
restricting liberty imposed by the government. 
However, a warning is provided by Zuckert who identifies natural rights, in their 
Lockean version, to be theoretically different from Thomistic natural law and they 
are further different from ‘those versions of natural rights theory that quasi-
Thomists such as Finnis are promoting.’239 As such, Zuckert identifies that 
Locke’s natural rights differs to those of NNL because of their embrace of nature. 
This fails to appreciate the basic nature of the good and, as identified in this 
chapter, the level of influence drawn from secular humanist tradition’s move 
towards human nature. 
                                                          
233 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (first published 1698, P Laslett ed, 2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press, 1967) 289.  
234 George, The Clash of the Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis (n 45) 163. 
235 Ibid 162, 163. 
236 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 28) 229. 
237 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 41) 114.  
238 This concept will be further developed in chapter 4 and 5. 
239 Zuckert, ‘Do natural rights derive from natural law?’ (n 170) 730. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  188 
The response to the seventeenth century situation: Robert’s George’s 
application of right-reason towards Locke’s modified rationalist basis  
From Locke’s position of self-preservation, human knowledge discerned the 
natural law through right reason.240 George will in this chapter be shown to draw 
further influence from this understanding of human reason. Locke identified that 
the law of nature and the law of reason are combined,241 indeed ‘the Law of 
Nature … is the Law of Reason.’242 Coyle and Morrow have, however, disagreed 
and identified Locke’s denial of the Hobbesian belief that the natural law could be 
‘simultaneously binding upon human beings and traced back, as a while, to the 
principle of self-preservation.’243 Is there general agreement that the source of 
human knowledge is the base of reasoning? 
This approach to reason can instead be narrowed in focus here, as it has been 
observed Locke avoided speaking of natural law as a dictate of right reason. Alan 
Watson has identified that the process should more aptly be understood as the 
requirements of natural law being worked out in the process of reasoning.244 This 
is a matter of word play: both right reason and reasoning apply law to human 
nature. Both of these processes may have influenced George presenting human 
nature as a law of practical rationality.245 This is because human nature is 
contingent within the approach. Human nature was earlier identified as key to 
Robert George’s moral philosophy.246   
George can be seen to draw further influence from Locke’s modified rationalist 
basis. Roger Trigg has insightfully noted this modified rationalist basis, which, for 
Locke, held that ‘reason was not intrinsically opposed to religion but was itself 
founded on it.’247 As such, Locke argued knowledge of the natural law arose partly 
from revealed truth (special revelation), and partly from natural law itself (general 
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revelation).248 This allowed independent justifications for self-preservation based 
upon reason: ‘whether we consider natural Reason, which tells us … Or 
Revelation, which gives us an account.’249 This has contributed to the position 
outlined by George earlier in section 3.3, one which allows a place for revelation 
to supplement philosophical conclusions based upon the practical reasoning.250 
In my opinion George takes a very specific approach to this Lockean 
methodology. He draws upon a passage in which Locke wrote: ‘[A person] is a 
thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection’.251 George has termed 
this approach ‘Lockean Dualism’.252 Writing in Embryo: A Defense of Human Life, 
George believes this approach to be close to the view given by NNL. This is 
because Locke’s modified rationalist argument accessed the divine through 
unassisted human reason.253  
However, George believes ‘Lockean Dualism’ requires reason and reflection to 
be ‘actively possessed’. It separates entities from their bodies, which come to 
exist ‘when an entity more or less immediately capable of reason and reflection 
begins to exist.’254 This is a refinement of Lockean theory, focused upon the 
embryonic stage of development.255 Locke’s view of body-mind dualism involving 
the person as the subject here provides an analogous interpretation to the 
approach adopted by George. 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding256 further ensures that natural 
law is part of the divine law. Hence, the dualistic approach. Buckle has identified 
this to be through use of our natural rational faculties. From the combination of 
the law of nature and law of reason, Locke’s method provides a source of 
knowledge of the human condition which is distinct from, but in accord with, divine 
revelation.257 NNL also depends on the divine will but uses natural rational 
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faculties to engage basic goods. Yet rather than innate, these basic goods are 
self-evident. It is in this sense that while NNL could be considered similar to 
‘Lockean dualism’, the approach differs. 
This self-evident approach is teased out by Weinreb in George’s Natural Law 
Theory: Contemporary Essays.258 Weinreb has written that natural law is self-
evident to the reasonable person.259 Arguably, this is the process by which Locke 
referred to natural law to support his natural rights argument – a Judaeo-Christian 
Creator’s telos self-evidently being the law of his creation: ‘Reason…is that 
law’.260 If correct, this line of thought about natural law can be also be found in 
George’s thought – George is applying Locke’s natural rights conclusions by 
appealing to the self-evidency of right reason. Chapter 5 will show the fruits of 
these conclusions through critical treatment of George’s NNL views towards case 
law application, in order to analyse religious freedom related to the Equality Act 
2010. The next subsection will show how George achieves natural rights 
conclusion through embracing the Lockean property right of liberty.  
George’s understanding of public morality invokes Lockean sociability  
In addition to George’s identification of ‘Lockean dualism’, in George’s edited 
volume, Natural Law and Public Reason, Stephen Macedo views Locke as 
providing a base of ‘civil interests’ which depict religious and other fundamental 
differences which provide ‘an adequate base for ‘social unity’.261 
In response to Locke’s civil interests, George has provided a further conception 
of morality. This follows George’s understanding that morals concern our day to 
day life, while ethics provide a theoretical reflection on morals.262 It was earlier 
identified in this chapter that George adopts a concept of public morality to reject 
the Hobbesian state of nature.263 For George, law, by shaping morality prescribes 
a public morality, this is a public morality “based on certain civil interests.”264 
These civil interests are those reasonable people share and certain principles of 
                                                          
258 George, Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (n 27).  
259 Ibid 33. 
260 Locke, Two Treatises of Government (n 233) bk. 2, sect. 6, 311.  
261 S Macedo, ‘Are Slavery and abortion hard cases?’ in George, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 46) 
19-20. 
262 P E Devine, Natural Law Ethics (Greenwood Press, 2000, USA) 1. 
263 George, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 46) 20. 
264 Ibid 27. 
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liberty and equality that reasonable people are prepared to affirm.265 George 
proposes a public morality based upon reasonable liberty.   
This is because George’s conception of morality equally invokes a sense of 
sociability concerning daily existence and embraces one of Locke’s property 
rights – namely liberty. Jeremy Waldron has highlighted the concept of liberty 
within Locke’s famous passage in the Two Treatises of Government: ‘That all 
Men by Nature are Equal … which was the Equality I there spoke of … being that 
equal Right that every Man hath, to his natural freedom’266 and so Waldron 
suggests that Locke’s doctrine of natural rights conferred liberty as a property 
right.267 Following in his rejection of the Hobbesian understanding of liberty, 
George’s public morality also rejects Lockean liberty as a personal class 
preference and interest.268 However, George here differs in his approach to 
Locke: George’s conception of public morality invokes Lockean sociability and 
right reason which leads to George embracing the Lockean property right of 
liberty in the human condition.  
In summary, George has further refined his conception of NNL through drawing 
upon Locke. This has been achieved in two ways. First, through drawing upon 
Lockean property rights to provide a rights discourse grounded in a ‘good based 
opposition’. This has led to an escape from the state of nature and provided 
resistance against the state. Second, George’s conception of public morality 
invokes Lockean sociability which has led to George embracing the Lockean 
property right of liberty. 
3.7 Conclusion 
George’s natural rights development has been influenced by the secular 
humanist tradition. George draws upon the secular humanist tradition – a tradition 
that has embraced the interplay between the Roman Jurists’ classifications of 
laws so as to narrow natural law themes into natural rights jurisprudence.  
In this chapter it was shown that George’s work reflects the narrowing of natural 
law jurisprudence into a natural rights discourse by, first, embracing Grotius’ 
                                                          
265 Ibid. 
266 Locke, Two Treatises of Government (n 233) II, sect. 54. 322. 
267 J Waldron (ed), Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Routledge, 
1987) 53. See Locke, Two Treatises of Government (n 233) II, sect. 95. 348. 
268 George and Wolfe, Natural Law and Public Reason (n 46) 20. 
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methodology surrounding human nature to link natural rights into property rights. 
This invoked Grotius’ views concerning human nature.  
Second, it is from Hobbes that George has derived a basis for an embrace of 
reason focused on both self-preservation and a move toward liberty – liberty 
reduced into a basic reason for action in alignment with the basic goods. This 
also detailed George’s movement from Hobbes to provide individual, natural 
rights protection against the state. This will be important for chapter 5’s applied 
critique surrounding religious equality law. George was shown, however, to reject 
Hobbesian social contract theory. 
Thirdly, it was highlighted that George has drawn influence by accessing the 
natural law via human nature and the human condition. Here George follows 
Pufendorf. Through Pufendorf removing a Judaeo-Christian God as the provider 
of natural law and further providing more emphasis upon human rationality as the 
base of obligation, this has contributed to the modified rationalist basis adopted 
within NNL. 
Finally George was shown to draw upon the Lockean property right of liberty to 
provide a ‘goods based opposition’ in further opposition towards certain state 
made law. George’s ‘opposition’ will find fruition when applied to analysing the 
right to religious freedom in religious equality law in chapters 4 and 5. 
A motif of fundamental rights to secure liberty has repeated throughout this 
chapter. This chapter has shown the influence and comparisons George has 
drawn from the secular humanist scholars to move from natural law to natural 
rights. From this basis, chapter 4 will critique George’s approach to religious 
equality law by engaging with a concept which will be termed ‘legal liberty’. This 
concept will be introduced and shown within George’s work to display the 
American Constitution as a paradigm for the discourse of natural rights built upon 
reason.  
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Chapter 4 – Robert George’s Approach to Religious Discrimination and 
Equality Law 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will consider Robert George’s approach to equality law, his 
understanding of and contribution towards both the basic good of religion and 
religious liberty discrimination case law. It will show that, for him, law is the 
medium in which it is possible to talk about the good and, more specifically, about 
religion not only as a basic human good but also a public good in the sense that 
the good is prior to the right and rights within equality law. As such, it will 
demonstrate George’s approach to discrimination and equality law. I analyse 
George’s new natural law (NNL) thought and this will be shown to engage the 
public good of religion in order to provide a more effective approach towards 
discrimination law. 
In this thesis I refer to ‘religious equality law’ when speaking about the sense of 
equality in relation to the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010). This is a branch of the 
larger concept of equality. The concept of equality itself is a very welcome 
concept and other derivations such as gender equality are racial equality are 
especially welcome. The critique in this thesis will only focus upon equality as it 
relates to religion. Religious equality law is law attempting to protect all people 
equally, regardless of religion or belief. Religious equality law governs the legal 
recourse that can be taken by individuals attempting to both assert and protect 
religious belief. Religious equality law will the term that I use in the remainder of 
this thesis and is a term that is only applicable to the religious liberty law that will 
be analysed, this is why the term religious equality law is used when talking about 
the EqA 2010 and related cases. Integral to this critique is the EqA 2010. The aim 
of the EqA 2010 can be identified to ‘achieve the harmonisation, simplification 
and modernisation of equality law.’1 
An example of this harmonisation in the EqA 2010, is that religion or belief sits 
alongside eight other ‘protected characteristics’.2 An important consideration in 
this thesis is whether such harmonisation aims and attempts to change the 
                                                          
1 B Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Hart, 2011) 173. 
2 The protected characteristics are listed in the Equality Act 2010 s.4: ‘age; disability; gender 
reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; 
sexual orientation.’ 
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standing of religion or belief by modernising religious equality law and putting it 
on a similar footing (or even below) the other protected characteristics.   
Bob Hepple has termed the only type of equality to be considered by the EqA 
2010 as status equality.3 This is the association between one or more of a limited 
number of characteristics and the treatment afforded to the individuals to which 
they belong – here being the protected characteristics. This is noteworthy for two 
reasons: first, because there are concerns that religion or belief is different from 
the other characteristics and thus ought to be protected differently. Secondly, 
within the EqA 2010, the characterisation of the protected characteristics has 
caused confusion in that, unlike the duty to advance equality in respect of sexual 
orientation, the inclusion of religion encourages, according to Lord Lester, 
‘division, not cohesion.’4 Why does the inclusion of religion cause such concern 
and division? Throughout this chapter religious equality law will be shown to be 
engaged through George’s work and approach to religion. This chapter will 
examine the conflict caused by religious equality law and suggests a way out of 
the division through critiquing George’s theory, which will be analysed within both 
an American and English context.  
First, section 4.2 will begin to show George’s approach towards religious equality 
law. It will do this by discussing the public sector equality duty. Section 4.2 will 
also turn to the requirement of ‘due regard’ within this public sector equality duty. 
In this section it will be argued that any discussion of NNL is now dictated under 
the banner of equality and enforced by a ‘due regard’ public sector duty. This 
section will also consider whether a focus upon the concept of human dignity, 
rather than equality, is a better method to use to talk about the good of religion. 
The concept of liberty will further be used to show some of the current tensions 
within religious equality law. It will be argued that George views liberty in the form 
of religious liberty as intrinsically linked with the public good of religion. This 
section will also show why, in part, the analysis and application of George’s 
thought showing religion as a public good is a more effective approach towards 
religious equality law.  
                                                          
3 Hepple (n 1) 17. 
4 Ibid 135. 
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Second, George’s views on the US Constitution will be conveyed in 4.3 through 
analysing George’s writing and litigation in American Courts. The way George 
applies his thought to American religious liberty case law will be assessed. This 
will expose and critique the weaknesses in his theory. Section 4.3 will further 
show that George holds the US Constitution as a paradigm for a natural rights 
discourse. This provides authority to enforce the natural law and to protect the 
natural rights held by the legislature or judiciary. 
Next section 4.4 will demonstrate George’s approach to discrimination law by 
considering the juxtaposition in his work between the three constitutive aspects 
of religious liberty: first, the basic/public good of religion; secondly, the connection 
between human flourishing and religion; and thirdly, the role of common human 
reason in the good of religion. This last constitutive aspect (the role of common 
human reason) will produce a ‘reasonableness test’. Through combining this test 
with a ‘responsibilities discourse’, which will also be outlined in this chapter, it will 
demonstrate George’s unique approach to religious liberty adjudication. This will 
detail the tensions within NNL. This will be further applied in the fifth chapter. 
Throughout all these sections, in order to demonstrate understanding and 
application of George’s approach, there will be a critical application of George’s 
NNL views to substantive religious discrimination law. This will be achieved 
through considering statutory and case law. Turning first to statutory law, an 
examination of statute (predominantly the EqA 2010) which replaced the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003,5 will be considered 
throughout the chapter. This will begin to show what George might think about 
the religious liberty cases taken under the provisions of the EqA 2010. Turning 
next to the case law: first, section 4.3 will focus on the American case law that 
George has frequently dealt with at length in constitutional matters, ethics and 
religious communication – (Romer v Evans (1996) US 620; Griswold v 
Connecticut 381 U.S 479 (1965)); and second, it will focus on the leading case 
                                                          
5 The Equality Act 2010 is not, of course, the only source of equality (for instance, Article 157 of the 
Lisbon Treaty and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights) but for the purposes of this 
thesis the EqA 2010 provides a contentious case law base. 
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within equality/religious liberty law – (Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom6 
and conjoined cases).  
So in order to analyse George’s basic good approach to religious equality law in 
section 4.2, I will critique George’s approach towards the public sector equality 
duty; evaluate the requirement to have ‘due regard’ to the public sector equality 
duty; consider the concept of dignity towards the wider understanding of equality; 
and criticise George’s views concerning the concept of liberty within equality law. 
Section 4.3 will display analysis and application of George’s approach to 
American religious liberty case law, and finally section 4.4 will construct the 
‘natural rights and the common good’ approach that George applies to American 
and European constitutional case law to highlight the tensions within applied 
NNL. This will determine whether a unique approach can be brought out from a 
reconstruction of both George’s NNL case law analysis and George’s 
jurisprudence in the application of the EqA 2010. 
4.2 Equality and Discrimination on grounds of religion and belief: a basic 
good approach to religion 
Introduction 
Both substantive equality law and academic approaches towards equality law are 
problematic as applied to religion or belief. Religion or belief is the most fertile 
protected characteristic, with the most relevant claims being taken under this 
ground in English anti-discrimination law claims.7 It will be shown in the 
subsection ‘Public Sector Equality Duty’ that this difficulty for religious equality 
law arises because equality law now applies to different conceptions of the good 
under a different approach to religion. This discussion will also ask whether 
equality law’s struggle to incorporate the public good of religion leads to a 
hierarchy emerging in the balancing of protected characteristics within the EqA 
2010.  
                                                          
6 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 
36516/10). This case will form the subject of critical analysis in chapter 5 and it was introduced in 
chapter 1. 
7 M Gibson, ‘The God ‘Dilution’? Religion, Discrimination and the case for Reasonable Accommodation’ 
(2013) 72(3) CLJ 578, 590. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  199 
This section will turn next to the requirement of ‘due regard’ within the public 
sector equality duty. In this subsection it will be shown that any discussion of NNL 
is now dictated under the concept of equality and enforced by the said duty. 
Following this, the subsection ‘Dignity within Equality’ will consider whether a 
focus upon the concept of human dignity, rather than equality, is a better method 
to talk about the good of religion. For the purposes of the central thesis, it will be 
argued that human dignity is a branch within the wider tree of equality that exists 
in the goods based approach to protected characteristics. This is because human 
dignity allows individual flourishing by exercising religious conscience in 
accordance with a NNL approach. This subsection will also show why my 
modified natural law critique, portraying religion not only as a basic good but also 
as a public good, is a more effective approach towards religious equality law. 
Finally, the subsection entitled ‘Liberty within Equality’ will show that George 
views liberty in the form of religious liberty as intrinsically linked with the public 
good of religion, and also that through the lens of liberty, law is the medium in 
which it is possible to talk about the good. 
Public Sector Equality Duty 
This section will demonstrate and analyse George’s approach to discrimination 
and equality law as it relates to religion. Law, and equality law in particular, 
following the passage of the EqA 2010, is becoming increasingly important in the 
‘public life of developed liberal democracies such as the United Kingdom’.8 Within 
this public life, equality and diversity are becoming the dominant jurisprudential 
concepts9 of public discourse.10 That said, there are numerous problems with the 
concept of ‘equality’ impacting religious liberty, both in relation to substantive 
religious equality law and with the public sector equality duty.  
For instance, Rivers has suggested that one problem with the concept of equality 
is that it reverses a traditional understanding of law within a democratic state by 
‘justifying new restrictions on the civil liberties of individuals and groups who 
                                                          
8 J Rivers, ‘Good News for Law?’ (2014) 19(5) KLICE Ethics in Brief 1. Sandberg has termed the Equality 
Act 2010 to be one of the ‘most important statutes’ in domestic law - R Sandberg, Law and Religion 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 128.  
9 T Etherton, ‘Religion, the Rule of Law and Discrimination’ (2014) 16 (3) Ecc. L.J. 265, 269. 
10 As a leading concept, Roger Trigg has interestingly noted that equality originated as a Biblical teaching 
– R Trigg ‘Religion in the Public Forum’ (2011) 13(3) Ecc. L.J. 274, 276. 
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adopt a different ethical foundation.’11 This is the inherent nature of the public 
sector equality duty.12 Statutory duties brought about by ss.149-157 of the EqA 
201013 provide for a respected, individualised authenticity. This is prescriptive to 
the extent that it narrows the options and opportunities of difference. As such, the 
duty imposed by equality law is a negative one.14 In other words, the duty has a 
negative impact, and an opportunity to prescribe preferred conceptions of 
equality is enabled. This theme will be developed throughout this chapter. 
George’s views on equality and human worth stem from the conclusion that the 
‘good is prior to the right, and, indeed, to rights.’15 This is what I will term the 
‘goods-rights synthesis’. The right to religious liberty is preceded and legitimised 
by the basic good of religion. The ‘goods-rights synthesis’ will be the focus of this 
section and also s4.4 where this approach will be criticised. The connection 
between religion and religious liberty is legitimised for George by two factors: first, 
the fact that the concept of human dignity includes religious freedom: ‘to respect 
people, to respect their dignity, is to, among other things, honour their rights, 
including the right to religious freedom’.16 Secondly, it follows for George that, 
‘human rights, (including the right to religious liberty) are shaped, and given 
content, by the human goods they protect.’17 Here the right to religious freedom 
is seen to be a branch of morality dependent on the good. George further 
elaborates upon this conclusion: 
Because faith of any type, including religious faith, cannot be authentic – 
it cannot be faith – unless it is free, respect for the person (that is, respect 
for his or her dignity as a free and rational creature) requires respect for 
his or her religious liberty.’18 
                                                          
11 Rivers, ‘Good News for Law?’ (n 8) 2. 
12 A public sector equality duty is imposed upon public sector authorities to ‘reduce the inequalities of 
outcome which result from socio-economic disadvantage’ – s.1(1) of the EqA 2010. Further the statutory 
duties to advance equality in ss. 149-157 include the protected characteristics (s.149(1)(a)-(c); s.149(7)) 
and focus upon both ‘public authorities’ (s.149(1)) and individuals who exercise ‘public functions’ 
(s.149(2)) . 
13 The public sector equality duty has been identified as one of the prime ways in which the EqA 2010 
aims to buttress the law to support progress on equality. See S Fredman, ‘The Public Sector Equality 
Duty’ (2011) 40(4) ILJ 405. 
14 J Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (2012) 1 Ox. J Law Religion 2, 386. 
15 R P George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (Isi Books, 
2013) 117. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid 119. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  201 
Accordingly, any right to religious liberty is governed by equality19 and the good 
of religion,20 and so the connection between religion and religious liberty is further 
strengthened. The ‘goods-rights synthesis’ will be used to assess other 
viewpoints towards equality impacting religion throughout this section, in order to 
provide a critique of George’s thought regarding freedom of religion. 
The good of religion has been applied to equality by Rivers who understands 
juridification as the breaking down of the familiar distinction between, inter alia, 
law and ethics in public discourse.21 This distinction is dependent upon the public 
promotion of equality and diversity, for instance, via the public sector equality 
duty. Rivers’ approach is close to my analysis of George’s thought because 
Rivers sees equality as a framework no longer for the pursuit of private ends 
(rights) or as a tool to achieve democratically agreed public good (liberties). 
Instead, for Rivers, the law ‘becomes the medium in which we talk about the 
good’.22 This approach is used by Rivers to criticise the jurisprudential impact 
made by equality law. George does not explicitly state that law is a medium in 
which it is possible to talk about the good of religion. However, as the preceding 
chapters have shown, work here can build on Rivers’ approach because analysis 
indicates that NNL is focused upon the good and there is sense in the suggestion 
that law is the medium for such. This chapter will then seek to provide a basis for 
viewing both substantive equality law and also academic approaches towards 
equality law as problematic for conceptions of equality when applied to religion 
and belief. This is because it will be shown that religious equality law now applies 
to different conceptions of the common good.  
Would George be satisfied by the approach taken to prevent discrimination within 
the EqA 2010? This section will argue that equality law now applies to different 
conceptions of the good, whereas George adopts a different approach. Under the 
analysis of George’s NNL thought, practical reason highlights that religious 
freedom and/or freedom from religious discrimination should be treated as a right 
supported by the state. The methodological basis under the EqA 2010 arguably 
does not go far enough, as it does not explicitly mention a form of positive 
                                                          
19 This will be developed in section 4.4. 
20 Later in this subsection it will be shown that the good preceding the right to religion provides for a 
public good of religion.  
21 Rivers, ‘Good News for Law?’ (n 8) 1. 
22 Ibid 2. 
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discrimination for religious believers (e.g. conscientious objection). As such, 
s.149(3) of the EqA 2010 could go further to promote a form of ‘justified 
proportionate inequality’.23  
However, O’Cinneide and Liu have argued that the EqA 2010 is designed to give 
effect to the ‘principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and respect for 
human dignity’24 guarded by the state. Prima facie these broad principles in the 
EqA 2010 may appeal to George’s NNL approach. This is because religious 
liberty, based upon the good of religion, also depends upon action taken by the 
state but it is shown that this may not go far enough to enable, for instance, 
positive discrimination for religious liberty. 
For George, there is a ‘distinct’ basic human good of religion.25 This is George’s 
basis to prevent discrimination. It follows that religion is a legitimate concern for 
the common good of political society.26 The basic human good of religion is to be 
held as a superior good because it is ‘uniquely architectonic in shaping one’s 
pursuit of and participation in all the basic human goods.’27 For this reason, 
George’s understanding of the basic good of religion will be termed a ‘public 
good’.28 This terminology is used because the good of religion is constituted by 
‘a good whose pursuit is an indispensable feature of the comprehensive 
flourishing of a human being’.29 The definition for flourishing, and human 
flourishing, will be explained and analysed in section 4.4 ‘Religious liberty leading 
to human flourishing’. In this section, however, it becomes apparent that the 
public good of religion is enabled by the good preceding the right to religion. The 
‘goods-rights synthesis’ is here integrated, providing a basis for law to be the 
medium under which it is possible to talk about the good of religion as, in 
particular, a public good. 
                                                          
23 This will be the subject of discussion in the subsection: ‘Public Sector Equality Duty ‘Due Regard’ in 
Equality Law’. 
24 C O’Cinneide & K Liu, ‘Defining the limits of Discrimination law in the United Kingdom: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Tension’ (2015) 15(1-2) IJDL 80, 95. 
25 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 119. 
26 R P George, ‘Law, Liberty and Morality in some Recent Natural Law Theories’ (DPhil Thesis, University 
of Oxford 1986) 219, 373-374. George suggests that the basic good of religion ‘is a reason for political 
action and an aspect of the common good of civil society.’ R P George, In Defense of Natural Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1999) 132. 
27 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 119. 
28 This concept will further be developed in s4.4 and chapter 5. 
29 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 119. 
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As shown in chapter 3, the basic human good of religion is important because 
‘the flourishing of a man’s spiritual life is integral to his all-round well-being and 
fulfilment’.30 This is significant because, first, it demands a higher position as a 
public good to enable pursuit of the other goods. Second, a public good of religion 
ensures that religion takes a higher position in criticism of the law, a ‘new natural 
law’ to critique positive law that would seek to restrain liberty. Given this 
presentation of the good of religion the EqA 2010 presents a conflicting view of 
religion to that taken by George. This is because equality and discrimination law 
on grounds of religion or belief, within a state that seeks to promote equality and 
diversity, presents a public discourse at risk of minimising the good at the 
expense of religious liberty. Later in this subsection and in the final subsection of 
s4.4  this claim will be established and it will be shown whether the ‘public sector’ 
enforcement of equality can be criticised by my analysis of George’s thought.  
 The public sector equality duty and religion 
Does the public sector equality duty work for religion and belief? If we were to 
apply George’s understanding of a NNL approach to religious equality law, does 
the public sector equality duty enforce and implement an understanding of 
religion as a public good? I will discuss whether the protected characteristics 
allow for George’s understanding. Under s.149(7) of the EqA 2010 religion or 
belief is only one of the protected characteristics. Indeed Rivers has observed 
that it is already the case, and is likely to continue, that equality arguments tend 
to win over human rights arguments because the legal obligations in equality 
arguments are much more precise.31 It leads to claimants being unable to 
effectively rely upon Articles 9 and 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950 (ECHR). The precise scope of this will be seen in chapter 5. This 
unsatisfactory solution has led Hepple to argue that through equality legislation 
the harmonisation of equality law within the area of religion and belief has 
progressed too far.32 Religious equality law may be seen to be dominant over 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (n 14) 399. It is ironic that equality legislation that has been 
termed by Hepple as a method to ‘change organisational policy and behaviour, so as to remove what is 
loosely described as ‘institutionalised’ status equality’, because Hepple’s definition may in fact be 
actually contributing to a categorised enforcement resulting in inequality - B Hepple, ‘Enforcing Equality 
Law: two steps forward and two steps backwards for reflective regulation’ (2011) 40(4) ILJ 315.  
32 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 1) 177. 
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matters involving religion and belief. These points made by Rivers and Hepple 
indicate that the public sector equality duty is not beneficial for religion. 
A further problem for religious freedom within the EqA 2010 is that it does not 
introduce a notion of anti-discrimination arising from religion or belief. In other 
words, with religion or belief sitting alongside the eight other ‘protected 
characteristics’ in s.4 of the EqA 2010, this prescriptive approach fails to 
distinguish religion as an objective characteristic. Sedley LJ held in Eweida v 
British Airways Plc that while all of the other protected characteristics ‘apart from 
religion or belief are objective characteristics of individuals; religion and belief 
alone are matters of choice.’33 Sedley LJ here distinguishes religion as an 
internal, higher level of good within the basic goods, a matter of choice. This may 
be necessarily incorrect because arguably gender re-assignment34 and 
marriage/civil-partnership are all matters of choice. Moreover, in R (RJM) v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,35 Lord Neuberger stated that: ‘I do not 
accept that the fact that a condition has been adopted by choice is of much, if 
any, significance.’36 Here, Lord Neuberger describes religion (and even the 
protected characteristic of sex) to possibly be matters of choice within equality 
law. This shows the current confusion surrounding the protected characteristics 
within this area of law. 
Hierarchy and the public sector equality duty 
Hepple has also noted the failure of the EqA 2010 to introduce a notion of 
‘discrimination arising from religion and belief’ and has called this a missed 
opportunity because it avoids the need to make ‘hair-splitting distinctions 
between direct and indirect discrimination.’37 The EqA 2010’s failure to introduce 
                                                          
33 Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80 [40] 48. Vickers has also suggested that age is also a 
characteristic which is different from the others in the EqA 2010. This is to be doubted because 
following the distinction of choice, apart from the fact some lie about their age, age is not a 
characteristic that can be categorised by choice - L Vickers, ‘The Expanded Public Sector Duty: Age, 
Religion and Sexual Orientation’ 2011 11 IJDL 43, 48.  
34 Sandberg has termed the comments of Sedley LJ to be ‘somewhat of a simplification’ because he 
draws upon Vickers (L Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ 
(2010) 12 Ecc. L.J. 280, 302) who suggests that given the availability of gender reassignment procedures, 
it is arguable that gender can be chosen - Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 8) 102. 
35 R (RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] UKHL 63. 
36 Ibid [47]. 
37 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 1) 43. For instance see Lady Hale’s categorisation in 
Bull and another v Hall and another [2013] UKSC 73 [33]. 
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a notion of anti-discrimination specifically targeted to a separate notion of 
religious belief, as opposed to one of the many protected characteristics, may 
explain why laws protecting religious liberty seem to be at odds with the good of 
religion. This creates a problem when attempting to integrate the public good of 
religion into equality law, for the purposes of resolving the tensions facing religion 
within equality law. Timothy Macklem has also questioned whether, as the EqA 
2010 is designed to combat discrimination in terms of a principle of equality, then 
why does this not involve other ‘innumerable distinctions’38 and if inequality is 
objectionable, why do we treat it ‘as objectionable only when it affects certain 
people in certain dimensions of their existence?’39 The current failure to integrate 
discrimination arising from religion and belief in part explains the problems 
experienced within a balancing of protected characteristics, from which a 
hierarchy may seem to emerge and equality law may seem to struggle to 
incorporate or have regard for the good of religion. This seems to present a 
problem when applying George’s thought, in particular his high regard for religion, 
towards religious equality law. 
The idea of a hierarchy of protected characteristics may be the reason why laws 
protecting religious liberty seem to be at odds with the good of religion. Rivers 
argues that any hierarchy may be ‘legitimised’40 by the public sector duty to 
promote equality.41 This may conflict with George’s natural law theory because 
George’s basic human goods are incommensurable and not hierarchical.  
Lucy Vickers has noted the inevitability of a ‘hierarchy of protection’ being created 
in the implementation of the EqA 2010, with religion and belief being treated 
differently from equality on other grounds.42 Logically, this would result in two 
contrasting possibilities: 1) a danger of levelling down of protection for the other 
                                                          
38 T Macklem, Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 203. For 
instance, marriage and civil partnership. 
39 Ibid 204. 
40 J Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14(3) Ecc. L.J. 371, 383. 
41  For a conflicting account of hierarchies within equality law see L Peroni, ‘Deconstructing ‘Legal’ 
Religion in Strasbourg’ (2014) 3(2) Ox. J Law Religion 235, 257.  
42 L Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion 
and belief’ (2011) 31 LS 135, 158. The ECJ has been keen to discourage this – Chacon Navas v Eurest 
Colectividades SA (2006) C-13/05 [40], and instead attempt to reinforce the idea of a common 
understanding of equality with “common standards to be introduced across the different equality 
grounds.” L Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 34) 301. 
Chapters 4 and 5 continue analysing religion in relation to religious equality law. 
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grounds; or 2) the creation of a hierarchy of protection as between grounds of 
discrimination.43 This highlights a failure by the public sector equality duty to 
clearly define the relations between the protected characteristics. 
This has led to Pitt cogently arguing against the inclusion of religion and belief as 
a protected characteristic. For Pitt, the inherent problem is that inclusion 
‘confuses a freedom guaranteed by human rights law with the need to protect 
individuals from less favourable treatment because of their membership of a 
group likely to suffer disadvantage in the labour market.’44 This argument is 
misconceived. Article 9(1) and 9(2) of the ECHR seeks to prevent individuals from 
exactly this form of discriminatory, ‘less favourable’ treatment and quite rightly so 
in both the job market and wider society. Such treatment is exactly why religion 
and belief need be treated as a protected characteristic. It is also exactly why 
applying George’s critique has utility, for instance, in order to protect religious 
liberty as a public good. 
Fears of a hierarchy within religious equality law can be contrasted with the 
assessment made by Munby LJ in R (Eunice Johns and Owen Johns) v Derby 
City Council and Equality and Human Rights Commission.45 According to Munby: 
‘[t]he starting point of the common law is thus respect for an individual’s religious 
principles coupled with an essentially neutral view of religious beliefs and 
benevolent tolerance of cultural and religious diversity.’46  
While this sounds fairly neutral, thereby countering notions of a hierarchy, this 
case also sets the sign for what I term a ‘characteristic bias’ which favours certain 
characteristics at the expense of others, as is later distinguished in the judgment: 
‘[t]he laws and usages of the realm do not include Christianity, in whatever 
form.’47 A further example of this bias is the attitude shown by Sedley LJ, who 
stated in Eweida v British Airways: ‘I expressed my unease that a sectarian 
                                                          
43 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 34) 301.  
44 G Pitt, ‘Keeping the Faith: Trends and Tensions in Religion or Belief Discrimination’ (2011) 40 ILR 4, 
384, 403. 
45 R (Eunice Johns and Owen Johns) v Derby City Council and Equality and Human Rights Commission 
[2011] EWHC 375 [41]. 
46 Ibid [41]. See also J Munby, ‘Law, Morality and Religion in the Family Courts’ (2014) 16 Ecc. L.J. 131, 
137. 
47 R (Eunice Johns and Owen Johns) v Derby City Council and Equality and Human Rights Commission 
[2011] EWHC 375 [39]. 
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agenda appeared to underlie the claim.’48 In his opinion, this led to the claim 
‘be[ing] framed and pursued on the footing that BA was indirectly discriminating 
not simply against the claimant but against all Christians in its uniformed 
workforce.’49 The converse could, of course, be true: a sectarian agenda could 
be enforced by those of an atheist persuasion in the workforce, leading to a claim 
of discrimination being brought forward. This could lead to a prescribed 
conception of equality being enforced against Christian individuals. In this case, 
as was introduced in chapter 1, Ms Eweida advanced a claim of discrimination 
on the basis of a breach of her right to manifest her religion contrary to Article 9 
of the Convention. On the balance of probabilities, it is far more likely that in the 
case Ms Eweida was the discriminatee rather than the discriminator. Indeed this 
was the Strasbourg court’s conclusion. It was found on behalf of Ms Eweida that 
domestic law had failed to give adequate protection to her rights under Article 9, 
in that she was denied protection for her sincere desire to manifest her faith by 
wearing a cross. As such, there was found to be failure by the UK government ‘to 
put in place legislation adequate to enable those in the position of the applicant 
to protect their rights.’50 In other words, domestic equality law did not strike the 
correct balance between the protection of the right to manifest her religion and 
the rights of others.51 Religious equality law failed to protect Ms Eweida’s right to 
manifest her religion and belief. This dismisses any idea of a hierarchy with 
religion and belief placed at the higher end, or indeed anywhere near the top. If 
anything, religion and belief is denigrated below other characteristics.  
This ‘Public Sector Equality Duty’ subsection has presented the current failure to 
integrate discrimination arising from religion and belief as problematic for 
conceptions of equality applied to religion and belief. This is because religious 
equality law now applies to different conceptions of the common good. It was 
discussed whether the balancing of protected characteristics has led to the 
emergence of a hierarchy. Although this hierarchy was denied, religious equality 
                                                          
48 Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80 [25] (Sedley LJ). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [66]. 
51 Ibid [114]. 
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law may still seem to struggle to incorporate the good of religion.52 This provides 
opportunity for a natural law critique of freedom of religion within equality law. 
The next subsection will turn to the understanding of ‘due regard’ within the public 
sector equality duty. It will do so to consider whether, in a society where equality 
is becoming a dominant jurisprudential concept of public discourse, a temptation 
exists to prescribe preferred conceptions of equality towards the detriment of the 
public good of religion. It will be considered whether this prevents law from being 
the medium in which it is possible to talk about the good.  
Public Sector Equality Duty ‘due regard’ in equality law 
As noted above, the public sector equality duty, brought about by s.149 of the 
EqA 2010, imposes a negative duty upon equality law.53 This duty may restrict 
the civil liberties of people with a different ethical foundation, particularly those 
with a concern for religion and belief. In this subsection it will be argued that any 
discussion of NNL is now dictated under the concept and scheme of equality. 
This form of equality law impacting religion will be enforced in society by a ‘due 
regard’ public sector duty. Within the critique of religious equality law, this focus 
upon and understanding of ‘due regard’ within the public sector equality duty will 
consider whether preferred conceptions of equality are being prescribed towards 
the detriment of the public good of religion. It will also be considered whether this 
prevents law from being the medium in which it is possible to talk about the public 
good of religion. 
Because there is a negative prescribed duty associated with equality law, active 
steps may not be taken to achieve equality. Sandra Fredman has noted that the 
substantive conception of equality advanced by the public sector equality duty is 
prescriptively worded to ‘have due regard’,54 but not to take steps to achieve 
equality. This public sector equality duty is an admirable stance that requires 
public bodies to have due regard to the need to eradicate discrimination, including 
indirect discrimination. It is also extended by the proactive duty to have due 
regard to the need to ‘advance’ equality of opportunity (s.149(1)(a-c) EqA 
                                                          
52 This ‘hierarchy fear’ will be discussed at length in the continued critique of equality in chapter 5. 
53 Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (n 14) 386. 
54 Fredman, ‘The Public Sector Equality Duty’ (n 13) 405.  
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2010).55 However, Burton has criticised the equality duty for ‘merely 
harmonis[ing] and marginally extend[ing] previous duties.’56 On the other hand, 
Hepple has disagreed, noting that the duty marks a transition from the focus not 
to discriminate to positive duties to advance equality57 through structural 
change.58 The theoretical impact of this extension finds expression in s.149(3) of 
the EqA 2010, which provides that equality of opportunity involves having due 
regard to the following: minimising disadvantages based upon protected 
characteristics;59 meeting the needs of those who share a relevant protected 
characteristic;60 and encouraging participation.61 This pragmatically advances 
equality but does not actively achieve equality. 
The equality duty has now adopted a practical focus to empower proactive duties 
to promote equality. This will impact any application of George’s NNL views to 
religious equality law in order to analyse religious freedom because the promotion 
of equality is more apparent. Sandra Fredman has observed a subtle shift away 
from claims being initiated by individual victims and a move towards proactive 
models ‘plac[ing] responsibility on public bodies, employers and others who are 
in a position to bring about change.’62 A proactive, empowering switch has 
occurred enabling others to bring claims on behalf of the individual. This proactive 
duty focusing upon the good has been criticised by Rivers for placing an 
‘unavoidable’ temptation to place one’s preferred conception of equality under the 
radar of rational justification. In other words, equality becomes ‘a mask for a 
substantive conception of the good which informs the distinctions and values at 
play.’63 Equality law becomes a tool to incorporate personal values within society. 
Further, this danger is particularly the case for equality on grounds of religion and 
belief.64 Rivers has elsewhere written that the drive towards equality is not only a 
denial of reality but represents an illiberal attempt to define people’s faith for them, 
                                                          
55 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 1) 135.  
56 B Burton, ‘Neoliberalism and the Equality Act 2010: A Missed Opportunity for Gender Justice’ (2014) 
43(2) ILJ 122, 134. 
57 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 1) 1. 
58 S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) 279. 
59 Equality Act 2010 s.149(3)(a). 
60 Equality Act 2010 s.149(3)(b). 
61 Equality Act 2010 s.149(3)(c). 
62 Fredman ‘The Public Sector Equality Duty’ (n 13) 408. 
63 Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (n 14) 396. 
64 Ibid 398. 
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rather than allowing freedom of conscience.65 This treats equality as a universal, 
univocal ‘good’ prone to abuse as a negative and prescriptive ideal/duty that can 
be manipulated. It can be manipulated as law governs notions of the good. This 
understanding of equality attracts criticism from George’s NNL approach which 
has been shown arguably to be wary of any approach to equality on the grounds 
of religion and belief that acts as a mask to govern conceptions of the good.  
Public sector equality duty ‘due regard’ for religion 
Prescribed conceptions of equality may prevent George’s public good of religion. 
For instance, the need to ‘have due regard’66 has been criticised for its potential 
impact upon religion. Rivers, for example, has identified the public sector equality 
duty, and more generally equality law, to be a form of manipulation when viewed 
through this process of having ‘due regard’. The process of having ‘due regard’ 
is one that Rivers fears will make public authorities deliver prescribed conceptions 
of equality, and one which requires public authorities in a liberal-democratic state 
to pretend, even if they do not believe, that equality on grounds of religion or belief 
should be promoted equally within public discourse.67 Public authorities should 
not be forming a view on such matters as they ‘should be particularly cautious in 
their implementation of such duties where they touch on matters of legitimate 
public debate.’68 Caution is welcomed. However, the difficulty in the suggestion 
made by Rivers is that the problem lies in the implementation of such procedures, 
not the individual authorities themselves – it is quite correct that public authorities 
should consider and impact matters of public debate.  
Rivers has argued that the root of the problem with expansive, contestable, 
conceptions of equality is that the new positive duty for equality requires having 
regard to how a policy or decision might impact a group defined by reference to 
their protected characteristic.69 The tendency is to reinforce patterns of 
understanding/norms/belief by rooting them in ‘supposedly personal 
characteristics, beyond rational challenge’.70 Such a temptation ‘is fundamentally 
                                                          
65 R McCrea, ‘Book Review: J Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and 
Secularism (Oxford University Press, 2010)’ (2011) 74(4) MLR 631, 632. The concept of conscience will 
be introduced, and separate analysis will be given to the concept, in chapter 5. 
66 As outlined above.  
67 Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (n 14) 401. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid 398. 
70 Ibid. 
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illiberal in ethos and tendency.’71 This may prescribe preferred conceptions of 
equality impacting religious freedom under the banner of equality. In essence, 
equality law is prescribing normative behaviour and belief rather than a NNL 
approach which adopts a plurality of goods. Chapter 5 will further develop how 
these prescribed conceptions of equality can be seen as detrimental to the public 
good of religion within Eweida.72 
It is arguable, however, that prescribing views upon equality was exactly the 
intention behind the equality provisions. Hepple, one of the key influences behind 
the EqA 2010,73 has noted in Equality: The New Legal Framework that equality 
law ‘is important because it seeks to use law as a means of changing entrenched 
attitudes, behaviour and institutions in order to secure the fundamental human 
right to equality.’74 Finnis supports this by noting that the indirect strategy of anti-
discrimination law and its ‘capacious notions of equality have changed the law 
and social policy of millennia in a very few decades’.75 It is telling that, even at 
the outset, the EqA 2010 was intended to be persuasive in its impact.  
On the other hand, the promotion of equality, and with it the attempts to generate 
dialogue between grounds on the basis of religion, may ‘lead to greater focus on 
religion in public life, leading to enhanced sensitivity to religious difference.’76 
While this is possible, the practical outworkings of equality legislation make it 
unlikely. For instance, within Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom,77 the 
claimants Ms Ladele and Mr McFarlane both found that equality legislation led to 
the justification of discriminatory acts on the basis of the identification of a 
legitimate aim and a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim 
and discriminatory effect within the state’s margin of appreciation.78 This 
legitimate aim positively ignored their religious difference (Christian belief) in 
                                                          
71 Ibid. 
72 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
73 A member of the Commission for Racial Equality and drafter of the Equality Act 2010. 
74 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 1) vii. 
75 J Finnis, ‘Equality and Differences’ (2011) 56 Am. J. Juris 17, 42. 
76 Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion and 
belief’ (n 42) 145. 
77 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). This case was introduced in chapter 1. 
78 J Rivers, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 409, 422 – see s.149(1) of the EqA 
2010. 
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favour of a conception of proportionality favouring rights relating to sexual 
orientation.79 Eweida illustrates that having ‘due regard’ does not lead to a greater 
focus upon religion. Rather, it conflicts with the NNL public good of religion. 
Gibson has also identified that UK jurisprudence concerning religious 
discrimination in the workplace has shown that the ‘courts often marginalise 
religion in the face of other legitimate aims’.80 This highlights the tensions 
between laws protecting religious freedom and those prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation.81 It should be remembered that, although the 
right not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation often trumps the 
concurrent rights within religion and belief, the public sector equality duty protects 
discrimination on grounds of religion in conjunction with grounds of sexual 
orientation.82 Arguably this should present a level playing field at the outset.83 The 
principles arising from Eweida will be considered at length in chapter 5 in the 
continued critique of George’s thought towards equality law as it related to 
religious freedom. 
It has been shown that George also views religion and belief as different to the 
other goods (as a public good) and so the public sector equality duty should 
arguably have ‘due regard’ towards this. Sandberg further supports this position 
by recognising that religion or belief, built upon an individual’s autonomy,84 is 
different to the other protected characteristics within the EqA 2010 and ‘ought to 
be protected differently.’85 This draws from Lord Nicholls’ comments in R v 
                                                          
79 It has further been argued that in any areas where proportionality should be applied in the court’s 
assessment (for example, in Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357) the court 
failed to conduct the balancing exercise between the claims in the council’s policy (delivering the service 
in a way which would not discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation) and the claims of Miss Ladele 
to respect for her religious views (avoiding discrimination against employees on the grounds of religion). 
See McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880 [14] (Laws LJ) and Eweida and Others v The 
United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [72]. 
80 Gibson (n 7) 616. 
81 R Sandberg, ‘The right to discriminate’ (2011) Ecc. L.J. 157. 
82 Ibid 172; Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 8) 111. Following these calls for level protection, Westen has 
pointed out that the concept of equality can be used both by advocates for the protection of sexual 
orientation and by advocates in favour of religion and belief: ‘every moral and legal argument can be 
framed in the form of an argument for equality’ – Westen, ‘The Empty Idea of Equality’ (1982) 95 Harv. 
L. Rev. 527, 594–596. 
83 For instance Lord Dyson has held that between sexual orientation and religion or belief: ‘Neither is 
intrinsically more important than the other. Neither in principle trumps the other’ - Black & Anor v 
Wilkinson [2013] EWCA Civ 820 [35]. 
84 The definition for the concept of autonomy will be given in chapter 5.4.  
85 Sandberg, ‘The right to discriminate’ (n 81) 170-171. See P W Edge, Religion and Law: An Introduction 
(Ashgate, 2006) 7. 
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Secretary of State for Education and Employment and Others, ex parte 
Williamson: ‘[f]reedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual.’86 
Sandberg distinguishes religion or belief on the basis that this need for the 
protection of subjective belief is not true of the other protected characteristics.87 
Religion or belief is arguably different and requires treatment different to the other 
goods within the EqA 2010.  
Does the protection of religion and belief as a public good88 hold general 
importance?89 In other words, why is religion and belief protected against 
negative impacts and why should the public sector equality duty recognise 
religion and belief as different? Vickers has offered multiple reasons for this. For 
instance, Vickers identifies that given an element of choice, religion and belief 
signifies identity and self-autonomy and so should be given a large degree of 
respect by the legal system.90 This leads to religion being termed a ‘fundamental 
choice’ because it is ‘clearly closely related to an individual’s concept of identity 
and self-respect, and the cost to the individual of renouncing religious affiliation 
should not be underestimated.’91 This is connected to a further reason identified 
by Vickers: religion is understood as a key aspect of personality and autonomy, 
based upon choice about the good.92  
Taken together, the public sector equality duty could be viewed here as protecting 
autonomy through allowing individuals within society to choose the good of 
religion. For George’s NNL, chapter 3 has identified that human nature complies 
                                                          
86 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and Others, ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 
[22]. 
87 Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 8) 102. 
 
89 Vickers has noted that there is a surprisingly united front in extending discrimination protection to 
religion and belief: while Christians fear legal decisions are marginalising the religious in legal decisions; 
the National Secular Society are also concerned about opt outs to the EqA 2010 by religious 
organisations - Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty 
and religion and belief’ (n 42) 142. 
90 Ibid 138. Vickers’ first reason is that many religious adherents stay in the religious groups into which 
they were born – this identifies a lack of mobility and lack of choice in the adoption of religion - ibid. See 
further P Edge, ‘Religious rights and choice under the European Convention on Human Rights’ [2000] 3 
Web JCLI. The theme of ‘identity’ was argued by counsel for Ms Ladele in the ECtHR hearing for Eweida. 
The argument followed that the protected characteristic of religion ‘constituted a core aspect of an 
individual’s identity.’ Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [71]. 
91 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 34) 302. 
92 Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion and 
belief’ (n 42) 138. 
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with societal governance,93 with a proportionality assessment being the measure 
of its justice,94 to suggest that society should provide space to allow individuals 
to pursue goods. Consequently, the public sector equality duty provides a sense 
of human autonomy in equality law and is focused upon the good, rather than the 
flourishing conception of goods. This requires a different approach towards the 
public sector equality duty.  
Public sector equality duty viewed in line with difference 
The public sector equality duty could also be viewed in line with ‘difference’. The 
methodology taken by Macklem, in Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination, 
views ‘equality … to be compatible with the recognition of difference … provided 
that the difference to be recognised exists in respect of other that in which equality 
is sought.’95 For Macklem, to pursue a policy of equality is, for instance, to remedy 
sex discrimination whenever the prevailing misconceptions of what it means to 
be a woman describes women as different from men, when in fact they are not.96 
This draws criticism from a natural law critique. Macklem’s description of 
difference within equality may attract Rivers’ earlier criticism, which is that it 
transposes the good to ‘substantive conceptions’97 of the good by widening 
equality to match subjective preferences. Macklem fails to engage or provide a 
platform for goods to engage and find the NNL understanding of virtue in 
differentiation. I suggest that it provides an inward understanding of the good: 
because difference is suppressed, the public good of religion would be held to 
conform to stereotypical understandings by Macklem. As a result, therefore, 
Macklem’s description of difference unfortunately does not identify the required 
distinctions and contemporary values necessary in order to reflect a twenty-first 
century post-modernist society.   
Rivers does not think that the public sector equality duty can be viewed in line 
with difference. Rather than the public sector equality duty being in line with 
difference, ‘equality requires the suppression of difference’98 and ‘this public 
suppression of difference has been a high measure of pluralism in the public 
                                                          
93 See N Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
94 Rivers, ‘Good News for Law?’ (n 7) 3.  
95 Macklem, Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination (n 38) 4. 
96 Ibid 19. 
97 Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (n 14) 396. 
98 J Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 341. 
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domain.’99 This is a conception of neutrality100 which reflects the ‘value of 
individual equality’. It is one rooted in a belief in the moral sameness of 
individuals.101 Such an approach to neutrality can, Rivers argues, lead to a 
‘suppression of difference’ as ‘the State, or the public [domain] more generally is 
taken as a place in which [religious] difference may be avoided or subdued’.102 
This may prevent any basis for using George’s thought to reach a good/public 
good basis for equality, as instead a public domain that seeks to recognise the 
value of incommensurable goods may be preferred by George. 
The approach to equality differs from my reading of George’s approach. We have 
already seen that George thinks that the public domain should recognise the 
value of the basic human goods. George’s views on equality law draw from his 
views upon value, which in turn is drawn from views relating to embryo ethics. To 
explain, George’s traditionalist view is that all human beings are intrinsically 
valuable, from ‘the point they come into being’.103 George follows the Roman 
Catholic view that the human embryo is a ‘human person worthy of full moral 
respect’.104 As such, the mere existence of the embryo provides value and this 
provides a basis to value human beings and ascribe inherent worth to individuals 
based upon individualism. George’s approach to value in the public domain is not 
transferred by the protected characteristics but from inherent worth, drawn from 
his religious convictions. This is in contrast to a view prescribed by Laws LJ in 
McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited,105 which does not favour inherent worth or 
individualism: Laws LJ would hold those who regard equality law to be protected 
on religious grounds as holding ‘divisive, capricious and arbitrary [beliefs],’106 
                                                          
99 Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (n 14) 397. Vickers has further criticised a position of equality 
based upon ‘formal or symmetrical equality’, this is in a way similar to Macklem’s minimal difference 
approach because it focuses upon consistent treatment of individuals. Vickers has criticised this for two 
reasons: first, difficulty arises when determining whether like cases are alike and second that equally 
bad treatment can be pursued in the name of equality, leading to a substandard equal outcome - 
Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion and 
belief’ (n 42) 147. 
 
101 McCrea, ‘Book Review: J Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and 
Secularism (Oxford University Press, 2010)’ (n 65) 631, 636; Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (n 98) 
340. 
102 Ibid 631, 636-7.  
103 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 174. 
104 R P George & C O Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (Doubleday Books, 2008) 4.  
105 McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880 [22] (Laws LJ). 
106 Ibid [22] (Laws LJ). Sandberg draws upon this case to suggest that a notion of religious equality now 
underlies the discourse concerning law and religion - Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 8) 202, 205. 
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because their individualism marks them as ‘different’. Lord Justice Laws’ position 
has also been rejected by Ernest Lim. He draws comparisons with NNL by 
arguing that claimants should adopt ‘public justifications’ to provide a stronger 
reason for the courts to take into account religious exceptions in a Protestant107 
proportionality analysis.108 This may provide a stronger basis to assert religious 
value and reject the definition given by Laws LJ in McFarlane v Relate Avon 
Limited.109 
It has further been shown that George’s approach towards value in the public 
sector equality duty is not transferred by the protected characteristics but from 
inherent worth. George shows the value of the individual good by drawing an 
analogy between abortion and religious liberty. Because George believes human 
life begins at conception, debate over abortion, like religious liberty, depends on 
the concept of value being ascribed to human beings at the beginning of life.110 
This once again raises the issue about George’s views being drawn from an 
apparent Roman Catholic bias. George believes that human beings have dignity 
and rights by virtue of their humanity interconnected with the basic goods. For 
instance, the good of human life itself.111 George’s approach is analogous to a 
rights based approach towards religious liberty – rights are conferred by dignity 
and value by virtue of their humanity.112 It will be argued later in this section that 
the dignity and value deriving from rights take their own value from the public 
good of religion.  
In summary, this subsection has outlined how the public good of religion, and any 
discussion of NNL, is now being dictated under the banner of equality and 
enforced by a ‘due regard’ public sector equality duty. This section has 
considered how there is a temptation to prescribe preferred conceptions of 
equality towards the detriment of the public good of religion. Eweida has 
demonstrated that having ‘due regard’ does not lead to a greater focus upon 
religion. In contrast, this approach conflicts with the NNL public good of religion, 
                                                          
107 L Peroni, ‘Deconstructing ‘Legal’ Religion in Strasbourg’ (n 41) 249-250. Once again ‘Protestant' is 
used to refer to the central problems of jurisprudence for the present day - S Coyle, Modern 
Jurisprudence: A Philosophical Guide (Hart, 2014) 50. 
108 E Lim, ‘Religious Exemptions in England’ (2014) 3(3) Ox. J Law Religion 440, 449. 
109 McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880 [22] (Laws LJ). 
110 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 166. 
111 George & Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense of Human Life (n 104) 103. 
112 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 167. 
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which limits the potential of the law as the medium in which it is possible to talk 
about the good of religion, for the purposes of analysing religious freedom within 
the EqA 2010. 
The next part of this section will go on to consider and critique George’s 
understanding of the concept of human dignity within equality law. 
Dignity within equality 
This part will consider whether a focus upon human dignity, rather than equality, 
is a better method to talk about the good. In particular whether a focus on human 
dignity presents religion as not only a basic good but also as a public good. 
George’s connection between NNL and human dignity will be established. It will 
be argued that human dignity is a branch within the wider tree of equality that 
exists in the goods-based approach to protected characteristics. Human dignity 
will be shown to allow individual flourishing by the exercising of religious 
conscience. It will also be shown why the modification of George’s thought 
displaying religion as a public good is a more effective approach towards equality 
law.  
This section will help determine whether for George law is the medium in which 
it is possible to talk about the good. To do so, it will consider and critique George’s 
approach to religious equality law. Equality law is becoming a favoured concept 
in public discourse. However, like all concepts, there will be a range of 
philosophical ideas underpinning the particular concept. For instance, integral to 
equality law is the concept of human dignity. The concept of human dignity as 
self-respect and individual authenticity was identified by Ronald Dworkin in 
Justice For Hedgehogs.113 A focus upon human dignity within equality law draws 
connections with NNL. This is because a narrative based upon dignity and social 
inclusion would, to an extent, as stated in the Equality Review 2007, enable the 
public sector to create an ‘equal society [which] protects and promotes equality, 
real freedom and substantive opportunity to live in the ways people value and 
would choose, so that everyone can flourish.’114 This is an interesting position, 
                                                          
113 R Dworkin, Justice For Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) 203-204. 
114 Vickers, ‘The Expanded Public Sector Duty: Age, Religion and Sexual Orientation’ (n 33) 54. See 
Equalities Review Panel, ‘Fairness and Freedom: the Final Report on the Equalities Review’ (Equal Rights 
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one which draws upon an understanding of dignity actioned by freedom of 
conscience and one that results in the enhanced good of the individual through 
flourishing.  For George, this connection can be emphasised because NNL is 
connected to human dignity and as such enables individuals to act upon 
conscience and flourish.115 
In considering George’s NNL approach towards religious equality law, dignity as 
a basis for equality law has certain similarities. It has been suggested that the 
concept of dignity ‘inherently encompasses the concept of equality, as humans 
are equal in their humanity and moral worth.’116 Such a controversial 
understanding of dignity adopts an inclusive methodology drawing comparisons 
towards NNL. 
The idea of dignity as a basis for equality law, though, has strength. For instance, 
it allows a broader approach to equality as focusing on autonomy and dignity 
rather than mere parity of treatment,117 or equality based upon outcomes 
determined by worth. This reasoning is interesting because Vickers argues that 
a concept of accommodation of difference, based upon dignity, is preferable to a 
traditional, formal equality approach based upon parity of treatment.118  
This idea of dignity as a basis for equality law, depends upon an understanding 
of the role of formal equality. At the foundation of formal equality law there is a 
problem arising from human difference.119 At its most basic level, formal equality 
ensures that ‘likes be treated alike and differences proportionately to the 
difference.’120 In other words, human persons are equal in dignity with the same 
worth, while at the same time, possessing value in their own uniqueness.121 In 
contrast, Gibson has considered whether religion or belief interests should 
                                                          
Trust, 27 February 2007) <http://www.equalrightstrust.org/content/fairness-and-freedom-final-report-
equalities-review> accessed 25th August 2015. 
115 R P George, ‘Natural Law, God and Human Dignity’ in R P George and G Duke (eds), Cambridge 
Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
116 Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion 
and belief’ (n 42) 148. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid 148-149. 
119 See Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (n 14) 386. 
120 Ibid; Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (n 98) 340. Fredman has identified this Aristotelian 
principle (that likes should be treated as like) to form the basis of modern ideas about equality - 
Fredman, Discrimination Law (n 58) 8. This emphasises the importance of formal equality.  
121 Rivers, ‘Promoting Religious Equality’ (n 14) 386. See N Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs 
(Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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sometimes be treated differently from other interests precisely because religion 
or belief is different (substantive equality).122 The benefit of substantive equality 
is that it is designed to enforce equality and reduce discrimination by providing 
exceptions to a blanket application of neutral laws. Substantive equality would 
not focus on the individual cause alone (as formal equality would do) but attempts 
to change society as a whole to reduce discrimination. For Gibson, human dignity 
has a basis in substantive equality law.123 Such a basis provides a level of 
protection for religion and belief. Formal equality (a form of human dignity), in 
other words, protects individuals, while substantive equality (a form of 
accommodation) protects at the group level. Taken together, it may be better to 
view dignity (formal equality) as a limb of the wider equality duty, or the role of 
the individual in the public sector. If this is the case, then formal equality, within 
the wider equality duty, provides a place for human dignity.  
Dignity as a basis for equality law is also supported in case law. Baroness Hale, 
in Archibald v Fife County Council,124 emphasised the need to interpret the 
provisions of equality law by reference to the need to uphold human dignity 
through combating stereotypes and promoting individuality.125 As shown earlier 
in this chapter, George’s view on human worth stems from the notion that the 
‘good is prior to the right, and, indeed, to rights.’126 As I once again apply George’s 
thought to provide a greater justification for religious liberty, the ‘goods-rights 
synthesis’ necessitates and promotes the good of the individual and human 
dignity secures this individuality. As such, a goods based approach could lead to 
human dignity becoming part of the wider equality duty. 
There are, however, problems with this approach. First, it is ‘not necessarily 
virtuous … equal treatment can lead to equally bad treatment.’127 Secondly, 
particularly in relation to direct discrimination, there is a focus on the need of an 
equal treatment model for a comparator, which is not always available.128 
                                                          
122 Gibson, ‘The God ‘Dilution’? Religion, Discrimination and the case for Reasonable Accommodation’ (n 
7) 584.  
123 For Gibson this is human dignity incorporated via reasonable accommodation. Reasonable 
accommodation will be discussed at length in chapter 5. 
124 Archibald v Fife County Council [2004] UKHL 32. 
125 Ibid [59].  
126 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 117. 
127 M Connolly, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) 5. 
128 A good example of this is women seeking to show pregnancy discrimination - ibid 6. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  220 
Macklem’s approach is relevant here – the best form of criticism to formal equality 
is the claimant absent the features resulting from the allegedly discriminatory 
treatment.129 In cases of religion, however, individuals will often be seeking 
different rather than equal treatment.130  
It has also been argued by Fredman that these limitations of formal equality have 
led to its abandonment and has instead led to a single focus upon human dignity 
as the core of a concept of equality.131 As such, it is argued that neither 
substantive nor formal equality on their own provide a satisfactory model. Instead, 
human dignity (encompassing both formal and substantive equality) provides 
more opportunity for human flourishing within the natural law critique. Human 
dignity may contribute to individual dignity recognised in concepts of self-worth 
and self-actualisation, which I suggest is an autonomous public sector duty 
enabling individuals to exercise their religious conscience in action and 
flourishing in line with George’s NNL thought. If this were the case, then once 
more human dignity within equality legislation would draw connections with a 
goods based approach. 
Dignity within equality law – social inclusion 
Problems with formal and substantive equality have, however, also led to Vickers’ 
most recent analysis of equality: equality of social inclusion.132 This method 
equates disadvantage with a lack of equality and seeks to address this. Equality 
of social inclusion aims for an overt concept of equality, which seeks to address 
disadvantage, rather than a concept based on dignity, recognition or difference. 
This is an inclusive basis that provides a platform for equal measure. Does 
equality of social inclusion reflect George’s approach to equality and 
discrimination law? Or does it provide a better method to understand equality? 
Fredman has identified this vision of equality based on the need to allow all 
groups an equal set of alternatives, from which they can pursue their own version 
of the good life.133 As a result of Fredman’s vision, equality of social inclusion is 
                                                          
129 Macklem, Beyond Comparison: Sex and Discrimination (n 38) 4. 
130 Connolly, Discrimination Law (n 127) 6. 
131 Fredman, Discrimination Law (n 58) 19. 
132 Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion 
and belief’ (n 42) 153. 
133 S Fredman, ‘Positive duties and socio-economic disadvantage: bringing disadvantage onto the 
equality agenda’ [2010] EHRLR 290.  
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more developed than purely being disadvantaged based. Such an understanding 
of equality overcomes the problems in disadvantage and dignity based 
approaches by enabling the ‘voices of different groups to be heard as public 
authorities plan service provision’, while at the same time this would not show 
that the public authority values one group over another.134 This ‘consensus’ 
based approach echoes a Rawlsian public reasoning approach, as that in which 
the majority set down a plurality of options.135  
Does the above approach exclude George’s ‘goods-rights synthesis’? Vickers 
believes that through addressing disadvantage to redistribute the aims of equality 
law, social inclusion is seen to be advantageous, a ‘third way’, allowing for the 
other possibilities of equality: dignity136 and disadvantage137 (social 
advantage).138 Therefore Vickers’ analysis aims at reducing any problems 
associated with the public sector equality duty: public authorities would be able 
to ‘recognise the importance of full participation in society for out-groups, 
including where those groups are defined by religion, age or sexual 
orientation.’139 This has both attractions and limitations. Unfortunately, Vickers’ 
approach fails to engage, or address, proportionality problems within human 
rights discourse – groups/individuals are commonly excluded and further 
disadvantage is often justified to pursue a legitimate aim.140 As such, it would not 
prima facie help to resolve equality law tensions. However, turning to George’s 
approach to religious equality law, social inclusion does reflect an aspect of 
George’s approach: the inclusive nature of the goods within George’s NNL141 – 
placing the good of sociability prior to any legal right. This follows from chapter 3, 
where it was identified that George broadens the good to encompass the natural 
rights discourse, via the work of the secular humanists, to provide a ‘good based 
                                                          
134 Vickers, ‘The Expanded Public Sector Duty: Age, Religion and Sexual Orientation’ (n 33) 54. 
135 J Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993) xviii. 
136 Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion 
and belief’ (n 42) 148. Vickers views that equality as dignity allows for accommodation of difference, 
because it focuses on the autonomy and dignity of individuals, rather than same treatment. This 
distinguishes equality as dignity to be preferable to difference, though still below social inclusion - 
Vickers, ‘The Expanded Public Sector Duty: Age, Religion and Sexual Orientation’ (n 33) 50-51. 
137 Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion 
and belief’ (n 42) 154. 
138 Ibid 151. 
139 Vickers, ‘The Expanded Public Sector Duty: Age, Religion and Sexual Orientation’ (n 33) 56. 
140 For instance, Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80. 
141 T Shah, ‘The Anthropological Basis of Human Freedom’ in M Franck and T Shah (eds), Religious 
Freedom: Why Now? Defending an Embattled Human Right (The Witherspoon Institute, 2011) 221 
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opposition’.142 As a result, social inclusion does engage the good of sociability 
within the goods-rights syntheses. 
In contrast to George’s treatment of law as a public good, Vickers accepts that a 
focus on social inclusion within equality may not necessarily be compatible with 
religion viewed as a public good. She has opined that, an equality duty model 
based on dignity does not result in an automatic protected mantle for religion.143 
Vickers has identified, though, that equality set upon remedying disadvantage 
could be positive for religion as ‘it does not provide value to the characteristics 
that are protected.’144 In contrast, George’s ‘goods-rights synthesis’ does draw 
value because any natural rights derive from value located in the basic goods. 
This gives value to the natural rights underlying the ‘goods-rights synthesis’.  
The ‘goods-rights synthesis’ is also important to discussion involving religious 
equality law because value of the individual good was explained earlier in relation 
to George drawing an analogy between abortion and religious liberty.145 It is about 
the nature of human dignity and the equality of human beings. This value of the 
good is once again applicable because dignity, as a form of value, is inherent 
within the good of protected human characteristics for George. The ‘goods-rights 
synthesis’ engages religious liberty: rights conferred by dignity and value by virtue 
of their humanity146 in any conception of equality.   
This is where any comparison between George and Vickers ends. As outlined, 
an equality duty model based on dignity for Vickers ‘is likely to lead to the 
realisation of many of the concerns so far expressed’.147 In addition, Vickers 
identifies that many religious groups are not themselves supportive of equality, 
such as those based on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or disability.148 If 
protection is only provided based upon a group/characteristics outlook to others, 
then this quid pro quo approach to protection (particularly for religion) would 
prevent any serious comparisons with George’s thought in order to critique 
                                                          
142 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 114. 
143 Vickers, ‘The Expanded Public Sector Duty: Age, Religion and Sexual Orientation’ (n 33) 50-51. 
144 Ibid. 
145 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 166. 
146 Ibid 167. 
147 Vickers, ‘Promoting equality or fostering resentment? The public sector equality duty and religion 
and belief’ (n 42) 157. 
148 Vickers, ‘The Expanded Public Sector Duty: Age, Religion and Sexual Orientation’ (n 33) 46. 
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equality law impacting religious liberty. In the end, Vickers’ respect for an equality 
duty model based on dignity is not compatible with George’s view of religion as a 
public good. 
For our purposes, how does this impact George’s reformulated approach to 
equality law? Vickers holds that under her method, religion would ‘not [be] 
endorsed and public authorities would not have to ensure even treatment of every 
religious group.’149 The problem with social inclusion is that different equality 
grounds are ‘not always reliable proxies for disadvantage’150 and what would be 
disadvantageous would also be very contentious. As has been shown, equality 
grounds do not match the good of religion. It is submitted instead that, following 
George’s views, value (human dignity) is still inherent within the good of each 
individual characteristic. In this sense law is a medium to talk about the good. 
Human dignity is a branch of the wider tree of equality that exists in the goods 
based approach to protected characteristics. 
To conclude, this subsection has shown that formal equality law and Vickers’ 
various approaches to human dignity fail to engage the good of religion in a way 
that identifies with the flourishing of the individual. George’s connection between 
NNL and human dignity resolves this conflict. Human dignity has been shown to 
allow individuals to exercise their religious conscience in action and flourishing in 
accordance with a NNL methodology. There is no need to focus upon human 
dignity as opposed to equality in relation to the good of religion. The dichotomy 
between human dignity and equality is a false one. Instead, human dignity is 
inherent within the basic human goods and thus is a branch within the wider tree 
of equality that exists in the goods based approach to protected characteristics. 
Such a connection helps establish that for George law provides a medium in 
which it is possible to talk about the good of religion, and so it shows that applying 
George’s thought to religious equality law is a valid exercise. 
                                                          
149 Ibid 52-53. 
150 Ibid 53. This is a position endorsed by Hepple, yet conversely Hepple believes that this is because law 
is related only to one element in the many causes of disadvantage, mainly discrimination. Hence the 
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Liberty within equality 
This discussion will now move to survey an alternative approach to equality, 
which is the concept of liberty. This will be done in an effort to further understand 
George’s thought and analyse his approach to discrimination and equality law. 
The concept of liberty will be used to show some of the current tensions within 
equality law impacting religion and belief. 
Is this ‘liberty’ position one that George may endorse? Rights and liberties arise 
for George because there are basic human goods that constitute flourishing. 
From this position, ‘[t]he full defense of any particular liberty, including the 
freedom of religion, requires the identification and defense of those human 
goods’.151 Hence religious freedom is intrinsically linked to the basic goods. 
Liberty is linked to the goods. Liberty within the public square, and public square 
limits of freedom, owe much to the secular vision presented by Isaiah Berlin.152 
Berlin presented two conceptions of freedom: negative and positive liberty. 
Western society promotes negative liberty as manifested in the idea that ‘religion 
should be a purely private matter in which the state should not intervene, but 
which should not therefore, attempt to be too public’.153 In contrast, George 
believes that consent to religion should be given to people within the populous. 
This provides the opportunity for people to flourish. George believes liberty, and 
religious liberty in particular, is necessary for individuals to flourish and thrive in 
accordance with the nature of law.  
George’s preference towards liberty is contrasted to the modified libertarian 
position adopted by Robert Wintemute. Considering the philosophical basis for 
equality law, Wintemute considers that a ‘liberty approach’ should be preferred to 
equality.154 This is because freedom of religion receives protection under Article 
9 of the ECHR (subject to the limitations in Article 9(2)) and so Article 9 actively 
promotes religious liberty as a right.155 Given this, Wintemute believes that a 
‘liberty approach’ has been the ‘traditional starting point when seeking protection 
                                                          
151 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 110. 
152 B Ryan, ‘Good News for the Public Square’ (Theos, 30 May 2014) 
<http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/comment/2014/05/30/good-news-for-the-public-square> accessed 
6th June 2014. 
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values – I Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1969). 
154 R Wintemute, ‘Accommodating Religious Beliefs: Harm, Clothing or Symbols, and Refusals to Serve 
Others’ (2014) 77(2) MLR 223, 226. 
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for individual and collective religious freedom.’156 This collective approach is to 
be preferred because, unlike an ‘equality approach’, it requires no express 
comparison with the treatment of other religions. It has already been shown that 
George would go further and suggest that, as a public good, the good of religion 
should not be compared with other goods or rights. Should equality and liberty be 
contrasted in this way? 
For Dworkin liberty is a crucial ingredient within a concept of equality.157 
Contrastingly, however, a Thomist understanding of the good could be said to 
require legal rules to maximise the degree of legal freedom that each person 
enjoys, while at the same time placing restrictions on that freedom/civil liberties 
‘in the name of equality.’158 Wintemute disagrees with this amalgamation, and 
notes that while a ‘liberty approach’ is preferred it has rarely succeeded. 
Therefore, this very limited success is good reason to consider an approach 
based upon the concept of equality which is better to ‘accommodate religious 
beliefs in a diverse society’.159 This undermines Wintemute’s earlier justification 
that sought to emphasise collective religious freedom. He fails in his conviction 
to follow no express comparison in order to establish the good of liberty for 
individual conscience objections. As such, the lack of success establishing the 
good of liberty instead suggests that the public good of religion is preferable. 
Liberty within equality: the protected characteristics 
Two different approaches have considered liberty over equality. d that the ‘goods-
rights synthesis’ justifies the public good of religion. This is enabled by the good 
preceding the right to religion. For George, equality and discrimination law, on 
grounds of religion or belief, presents a public discourse at the risk of minimising 
the good at the expense of religious liberty, in a state that seeks to publicly 
promote equality and diversity. One reason that liberty may be preferred to 
equality law is that the law views individual choice within the protected 
characteristics of the EqA 2010 problematically. 
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This problem surrounding choice is brought out in the context of the Court of 
Appeal decision, Ladele v London Borough of Islington.160 This case was detailed 
and analysed in chapter 1. Vickers has considered two positions when reviewing 
the indirect discrimination claim brought by Ms Ladele: first, upholding the finding 
of no indirect discrimination, she considers organisations should be secular and 
so should not accommodate religious views.161 Does this disregard individual 
choice reflected in sincerely held religious beliefs? On the other hand, it can be 
said that the public sector should ‘reflect its community and so accommodate 
both sexual orientation and religion and belief.’162 As such, this may, theoretically, 
have resulted in a claim of indirect discrimination succeeding. Vickers cites 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice163 to argue that 'justice as fairness’164 requires equal 
participation in the state. For example, if the public sector should be inclusive 
regarding sexual orientation, should it also be inclusive in terms of religion and 
belief?165 Moreover, following George’s ‘goods-rights synthesis’, could the good 
precede the right in cases like Ladele, and require equal participation in both the 
situation of service provision and freedom of conscience?166 Here, the law views 
individual choice as problematic within equality law. In contrast, the critique 
brought about by a public good of religion would ensure that liberty is preferable 
to equality law because it can cut both ways and deliver a wider variety of scope 
in decisions involving choice. 
Liberty within equality can, however, be criticised through the categorisation of 
basic goods within the EqA 2010. As noted earlier, with religion or belief sitting 
alongside the eight other ‘protected characteristics’ in s.4 of the EqA 2010, Sedley 
LJ held in Eweida v British Airways PLC that, while all of the other protected 
characteristics ‘apart from religion or belief are objective characteristics of 
individuals, religion and belief alone are matters of choice.’167 With claims made 
by some religions that sexual orientation is a matter of choice, does this explain 
                                                          
160 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357. As outlined in chapter 1, this case was 
later considered in the conjoined hearing, seminal to this thesis: Eweida and Others v The United 
Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10). 
161 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 34) 292. 
162 Ibid. 
163 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) 196. 
164 This is Rawls’ famous conception of justice that comprises two principles: the first principle (liberty) 
and the second principle (equality) within a liberal, egalitarian society - ibid. 
165 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 34) 280. 
166 This issue will be discussed at greater length in chapter 5. 
167 Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80 [40], [48]. 
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why case law conflict has arisen between the protected characteristics of religion 
or belief and sexual orientation? Two points can be drawn from this. First, this 
distinguishes religion as an internal, higher level of characteristic – a public good. 
Second, this also goes some way to highlighting that the protected characteristics 
do not cover other distinctions of choice. The EqA 2010 does not provide for the 
liberty of the other protected characteristics. 
Further criticism is brought out by Sedley LJ’s distinction failing to treat religion 
as an internal point of view: the contrasting characteristics identified by Sedley 
LJ in Eweida168 may adopt an ‘external viewpoint, rather than a cognitively 
internal viewpoint.’169 As a consequence, liberty may be further restricted by 
judges failing to understand religion from an internal viewpoint. This would be 
detrimental to both the religion and any manifestation of belief. 
In summary, liberty, in the form of religious liberty, is intrinsically linked with the 
public good of religion. Through the lens of liberty, law is the medium in which it 
is possible to talk about the good. My critique of George suggests that this is a 
method to present legal rights in line with the common good – within the protected 
characteristics, religious liberty would be promoted as a common good in the 
analysis of George’s thought towards religious equality law. 
Conclusion 
 
This section has begun to show George’s approach towards equality law. Law 
has been seen to be the medium in which we talk about the good, and this good, 
a public good of religion, is one now dictated under the banner of equality law 
and enforced by a ‘due regard’ public sector duty. This ‘public sector equality 
duty’ highlights the failure to integrate discrimination arising from religion and 
belief as problematic for conceptions of equality applied to religion and belief. The 
measure of the ‘goods-rights synthesis’ was introduced. It was also denied that 
the balancing of protected characteristics leads to a hierarchy emerging. 
However, it was suggested equality law may seem to struggle to incorporate the 
good of religion.   
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draws inspiration from Hart’s external/internal influence debate. See H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press, 1994).  
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  228 
Eweida170 was introduced as showing that having ‘due regard’ does not lead to a 
greater focus upon religion. Rather, it may partly conflict with the NNL public good 
of religion. 
In an effort to further criticise George’s NNL and analyse his approach to religious 
equality law, the concept of human dignity was considered to allow individuals to 
exercise their religious conscience in action and flourishing in accordance with 
NNL thought. This is because human dignity is a branch within the wider tree of 
equality that exists in the goods based approach to protected characteristics.  
It was further argued that liberty, in the form of religious liberty, is intrinsically 
linked with the public good of religion. The lens of liberty has helped display that 
for George law is the medium in which it is possible to talk about the good of 
religion.  
4.3 Griswold v Connecticut, Romer v Evans - Robert George on American 
case law and religious liberty 
Introduction 
Now that we have seen how George approaches equality law surrounding religion 
and belief, this section will consider how he applies NNL to religious liberty case 
law within his own jurisdiction, the United States. This will allow a theoretical 
critique to be transferred between jurisdictions, in order to use George’s thought 
to analyse religious freedom within equality law. For George, the American 
Constitution is a paradigm for natural rights built upon reason. It will be shown 
that this provides authority to enforce the natural law and protect natural rights 
and, as such, provides protection as a check on legislative power.171  
To see how the theoretical critique can be transferred, George has argued that 
any healthy society rests on three pillars, which combine both political and legal 
theory. One of which is a fair and effective system of law and government.172 
Religion underlies and supports each of these pillars. The pillar relevant to this 
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section is the third tenet: a fair and effective system of law and government.173 
One of the ways in which a fair and effective system is enabled is through 
religious freedom secured through George’s NNL process. In ‘Natural Law, the 
Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review’,174 George once 
again addresses constitutional matters, ethics and public communication through 
an engagement with the following cases: Romer v Evans175 and Griswold v 
Connecticut.176 The interpretation employed by George in this article is a novel, 
innovative, NNL approach, which provides theoretical answers to conflicting 
decisions in America religious liberty case law. 
To arrive at a position securing religious freedom, in chapters 2 and 3 of the 
thesis, the claim was made that the natural law, via the work of the secular 
humanist tradition (Hobbes, Grotius etc.), brought about a natural rights basis. In 
section 4.2, this basis was applied to substantive English and European religious 
liberty and discrimination law through a consideration of the relevant provisions 
and case law arising from the EqA 2010. From this basis, the project to analyse 
George’s NNL critique to European religious discrimination and religious liberty 
case law will be continued from chapter 4 into chapter 5.  
Natural law due process in American case law 
This section will analyse the process by which Robert George applies NNL theory 
to American religious liberty case law. Focusing on the US Supreme Court case 
of Griswold v Connecticut,177 I will argue that George, in ‘Natural Law, the 
Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review’,178 maintains a 
dialectic approach to verify whether the American Constitution incorporates 
natural law in such a way as to make it a source of ‘judicially enforceable, albeit 
unwritten, constitutional rights and other guarantees.'179 George’s position holds 
that the American Constitution embodies the American founding fathers’ belief in 
natural law and natural rights. To focus this debate, George highlights two 
interconnected factors: first, the exchange between the majority and dissenting 
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Justices in the 1965 American Supreme Court case of Griswold v Connecticut.180 
Secondly, George highlights the work of Edward S. Corwin, a constitutional law 
scholar, to elaborate upon American constitutional law through natural law 
analysis.  
By drawing upon Griswold181 and Corwin’s thought, I argue that the analysis of 
George’s work here provides a thesis articulating that under the American 
Constitution, the legislatures, not the courts, have the primary authority to give 
effect to natural law and to protect natural rights. This analysis provides a starting 
point for how the natural law process can be applied in George’s thought. 
In Griswold,182 the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated a Connecticut 
anti-contraception law on the ground that it violated a common,183 fundamental 
right of marital privacy, a right that, according to George, was not explicitly 
mentioned in the Constitution. The right was instead found in the ‘penumbras, 
formed by emanations,’ of specific ‘guarantees in the Bill of Rights.’184  
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black accused the majority of indulging in the 
‘natural law due process philosophy’ of judging.185 For Black J that natural law 
jurisprudence within Griswold186 was in principle illegitimate.187 George correctly 
identifies Black J as ‘unmasking’ what he judged to be an implicit revival by the 
majority of the ‘natural law doctrine.’188 It is also clear that Black’s highlighting of 
the ‘natural law’ basis in the Griswold decision establishes an error in the lead 
judgement given by Justice Douglas.189  
The focus upon ‘penumbras, formed by emanations’190 and Justice Black’s 
dissenting opinion are helpful in identifying a judicial ‘natural law due process’ 
approach to adjudication. It is also helpful in identifying the application of 
George’s thought to American religious liberty case law, for the purposes of 
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deriving a critique that can be applied towards analysing the right to religious 
freedom within equality law. As such, George has identified that Black and 
Douglas were appointed to the Supreme Court in an attempt to appoint jurists 
who could be relied upon to ‘oppose the judicial philosophy that had impeded the 
progressive legislative agenda’191 since at least 1905. This judicial philosophy 
was apparent in cases such as Lochner v New York192 and Adair v United 
States.193 The important point in analysing George’s thought regarding 
adjudication is that this apparent judicial philosophy was natural law. 
The emergence of natural law jurisprudence in American case law sheds light on 
George’s approach to natural rights jurisprudence. In Griswold,194 it is important 
to note that by the justices refusing to rule on the morality of contraception, 
George believes they were unwilling to declare that anti-contraception laws 
violated the Constitution – they were unwilling to declare a violation of natural 
rights.195 A comparison can be drawn to the UK Supreme Court’s criticism in the 
‘assisted dying’ case of R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v Ministry 
of Justice,196 which was directed towards another arm of the executive - 
Parliament. This criticism was for, first, Parliament’s failure to debate upon Lord 
Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill and, second, Parliament’s failure to direct whether 
an Act of Parliament is incompatible with a right under the ECHR.197 Once again, 
this appears to be a failure to rule upon legal boundaries prescribing morality. 
This failure to engage with the legal boundaries prescribing morality, drawing 
further on Griswold,198 suggests that American courts appear to adopt a muddled 
approach to the natural law due process. It is clear that judges rarely explicitly 
refer to the natural law due process. Despite this, George has noted that the 
dissenting judges in Griswold did identify that natural law was to be ‘superior to 
the statutory law to which judges may appeal in striking down a statute even 
where the constitutional text provides no warrant for doing so’.199 Consequently, 
this shows the right to marital privacy being declared through the idea of natural 
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law as a check upon executive power. George is correct to identify that natural 
law jurisprudence by any other name here remains natural law jurisprudence. 
Nevertheless, the identification of such a jurisprudence is helpful in establishing 
a natural law critique. This analysis goes some way towards establishing a 
‘natural law due process’.  
George’s approach to constitutional religious liberty 
This ‘natural law due process’ is instructive in considering George’s views on 
constitutional religious liberty. It is helpful when analysing George’s thought within 
his own jurisdiction. His views can be summarised in a position termed ‘legal 
liberty’,200 which was first coined in his DPhil thesis.201 ‘Legal liberty’, for George, 
is ‘the freedom to do as one pleases so far as the law is concerned, [this] can be 
understood as the absence of legal coercion.’202 Although this concept will 
receive full consideration in section 4.4 below, for the purposes of this discussion, 
however, was Black’s condemnation of the natural law here a rejection of legal 
liberty? George uses Griswold203 to question why, if the framers of the 
Constitution were firm, fervent believers in natural law and natural rights, did they 
not find in favour of the following proposition: that the institutions of government 
are justified, precisely because natural rights are protected by civil authority? If 
so, George questions how Black J could condemn a jurisprudence of natural 
rights - would this lead to the conclusion that natural rights should not be 
protected as civil freedoms? 
George has argued that ‘the fabric and theory of our [American] Constitution 
embodies our founders' belief in natural law and natural rights.’204 This assists in 
beginning to connect the American Constitution towards a paradigm natural rights 
basis. In contrast, it also evident that he wants to conclude that the judges 
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution should not interpret and enforce 
principles of natural law or natural rights: 
I do not draw from this [conception of the Constitution as embodying our 
founders' belief in natural law and natural rights] the conclusion that judges 
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have broad authority to go beyond the text, structure, logic, and original 
understanding of the Constitution to invalidate legislation that, in the 
opinion of judges, is contrary to natural justice.205 
Does this present a contradiction, in that following Griswold judges reading the 
American Constitution cannot enforce the natural rights paradigm upon which it 
is based? An analysis of George’s thought here suggests that the natural law in 
itself confers no authority on judges to go beyond the textual understanding of 
the Constitution to enforce principles of natural justice. Instead, judges possess 
such authority, not as a matter of natural law, but rather as a power conferred 
upon them by the Constitution. This presents a limit upon natural law justiciability. 
George contends that ‘natural law itself does not settle the question of whether it 
falls ultimately to the legislature or the judiciary in any particular polity to insure 
that the positive law conforms to natural law and respects natural rights.’206 
Rather, this draws a compromise. He argues not only that the Constitution 
embodies natural law or natural rights but also that judges have no authority to 
enforce natural law or natural rights against legislative encroachment. Further 
questions arise from this: is it possible to believe that the Constitution does 
embody a paradigm natural law and/or natural rights discourse, and still agree 
with Black J’s criticism against the enforcement of natural law protecting religious 
liberty? However is this not contradictory and can George really have it both 
ways? 
In ‘The Natural Law Process Due Philosophy’207 George clarifies these seemingly 
contradictory comments on the Griswold case.208 He argues that the courts 
should enforce neither ‘liberal political judgements nor conservative ones in the 
absence of a warrant rooted in the text, structure, logic, or original understanding 
of the Constitution.’209 For any natural law due process, the Constitution should 
incorporate/evidence this process. By doing so, this provides a structured 
process dependent upon the American Constitution. 
From a position of ‘legal liberty’ George outlines his belief that the American 
Constitution leaves the matter of natural law ‘to the deliberation and judgement 
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of democratically constituted and accountable legislatures at the state or national 
level.’210 This is because it was part of the strategy of the Constitution’s framers 
‘for giving effect to the principles of natural law and protecting natural rights.’211 
Here I identify George’s method for applying the NNL theory to religious liberty 
law and it is also how the Constitution presents a model for future rights 
integration as a paradigm natural rights discourse. This natural law and natural 
rights process will be critically analysed against George’s approach to religious 
liberty in section 4.4 and will be further considered under the lead case of 
Eweida212 in chapter 5. 
Synthesis between constitutional law and the natural law 
This thesis aims to critically analyse George’s thought towards the EqA 2010. To 
see his analysis of American law, we can critique the synthesis George draws 
between American constitutional law and natural law. To do so, George draws 
upon the 1949 lecture given by the American constitutional law scholar, Edward 
S. Corwin. George draws upon this to synthesise the American Constitution with 
natural law. This synthesis explains how the natural law due process is integrated 
with the American Constitution and how George takes a deferential position 
towards American constitutional law.  
It is clear that Corwin takes a similar approach to George by providing a natural 
law due process within American constitutional law. This is by showing that the 
legal tradition that shaped the understanding of the framers of the American 
Constitution was informed by the natural law,213 with American constitutional law 
in debt to its natural law genesis.214 Adopting a similar position to George’s earlier 
outlined ‘minimum standard of reasonableness,’215 Corwin argues that the 
positive law of the constitution is still ‘natural law under the skin.’216 The question 
becomes whether this provides a minimum standard within adjudication? 
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George’s rebuttal of Corwin’s argument is that ‘common law judges [are] law 
making authorities’.217 I suggest that this identifies with George’s thought that if a 
rule is needed, then judges must exercise choice and judgement.218 For George’s 
approach to American constitutional law adjudication, however, this does not 
mean that the rule selected by an American judge enjoys a status as law ‘simply 
by virtue of its reasonableness.’219 Its status as law depends entirely on the 
judge’s authority as an appointed member of the judiciary to make the choice 
among competing possible rules.220 I claim that this reformulates George’s 
method: a judge’s will and choice are her or his own. This is crucial, even though 
the obligation is to choose, the legislator’s (and the legislature’s) obligation, no 
less than the judges’, is ‘precisely to make the choice as reasonably as 
possible.’221 As such, the natural law due process provides discretion built upon 
human reasonableness. NNL reasoning is confined to adjudication, not validity.  
George is clear that ‘unjust choices are in principle unreasonable’.222 Practical 
reason will guide the choices in order to promote flourishing. The constitutive 
power of humanly posited law to create moral obligations depends on the 
reasonableness of the law, as interpreted through the guide of practical reason 
in adjudication. This section has argued that this is not merely dependent on the 
jurisdictional authority of the person or institution with the authority to make law. 
For George, writing ‘valid law is an act of both reason and will.’223 This provides 
application within the American legal system for a synthesis between the natural 
law and practical reason; a broad synthesis between reasonableness and 
rationality.   
George also applies Corwin’s analysis to vindicate the ‘natural law’ jurisprudence 
that Justice Black opposed in Griswold.224 It is arguable that he uses Corwin’s 
reasoning to achieve a case law basis for NNL critique. In The Authority of Law,225 
George maintains that natural law does not settle the question of whether it falls 
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ultimately to the legislature or the judiciary to ensure that the positive law 
conforms to natural law and respects natural rights.226 It is suggested that natural 
law does not dictate an answer to its own enforcement.227 As a result, George 
believes that authority to enforce the natural law ‘may be vested primarily, or even 
exclusively, with the legislature’228 as a check on law making power.  
This mirrors the Grisez School’s reliance on Aquinas: activities of the courts – 
such as judicial review – rely upon careful and subtle choice among morally 
acceptable options. For instance, in an enlarged array of goods, George relies 
upon Aquinas’ process of ‘determinatio’ and distinguishes this from matters that 
can be resolved by a process ‘akin to deduction from the natural law itself.’229 An 
example can be seen by George arguing that judicial review itself emerged in a 
US context as part of the strategy to ensure governmental conformity with natural 
law and to protect natural rights.230 This is a synthesis between constitutional law 
and natural law. I suggest this provides a justiciable form of natural law adapted 
to a modern context. It is one that is applicable across jurisdictions. For instance, 
it can be applied towards equality law arising from the EqA 2010. 
In summary, it has been shown that the earlier identified paradigm discourse is 
built upon judicial reasonableness. It has also been shown that natural law plays 
a large part in George’s approach to the American Constitution, which allows a 
critique of the synthesis George draws between American constitutional law and 
natural law. This is important to draw a trans-jurisdictional critique that can 
analyse the right to religious freedom within the EqA 2010. 
Conclusion 
To summarise, through critiquing George’s thought within his own legal 
jurisdiction, it has been shown that George views the status of the US Constitution 
as embodying the American founding fathers’ belief in natural law and natural 
rights. It moves towards practical application because this is combined with 
authority to enforce the natural law and to preserve natural rights being protected 
by the legislature, not the courts, as a check on legislative power through 
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processes such as judicial review. This provides a paradigm for a natural rights 
discourse. It will be considered in chapter 5, through the application of George’s 
thought towards analysing the right to religion to the EqA 2010, whether 
analogously the UK government protects natural law and natural rights through 
equality law.  
A conclusion can be drawn here: by giving effect to these principles George gives 
a limited role to constitutional government - a role that includes supporting 
religion.231 As a result, natural lawyers derive fundamental rights for religious 
liberty.232 With the American Constitution viewed as a paradigm for a natural 
rights discourse, this rights discourse is further guided by reason, which in itself 
is dependent upon the Grisez School’s interpretation of Aquinas’ preference of 
natural reason over divine revelation (as seen in chapter 2). The applied concept 
of ‘reasonableness’ provides direction for application to achieve ‘legal liberty’. 
This will be a key concept used to critique equality law surrounding freedom of 
religion. The next section will consider this amalgamation between the common 
good and human rationality in the context of religious liberty. 
4.4 The tensions within new natural law: a natural rights and common 
good approach to religious liberty case law 
Introduction 
Moving from the previous discussion, which conveyed the American Constitution 
as a paradigm for the NNL discourse of natural rights, section 4.4 will show how 
George addresses identified tensions within equality law233 by further analysing 
George’s thought. It will look to George’s understanding of religion/religious 
liberty and critique what I suggest are the three constitutive aspects of George’s 
methodology: a common/basic good approach, human rationality, and human 
flourishing. 
A motif of fundamental rights to secure liberty has been repeated throughout 
chapters 2 and 3. This section will further argue and emphasise that George’s 
jurisprudence presents fundamental rights for religious liberty. The arguments 
that George uses when defending religious liberties are importantly built upon 
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these fundamental rights. To elaborate, for Finnis, the first amendment of the 
American Constitution and the ECHR both intrinsically associate religious liberty 
with freedom of conscience.234 This rights basis, grounded in a basic good 
approach, allows religious judgements to be made. 
Chapters 2 and 4.2 have already considered a basic NNL approach to religious 
liberty. To repeat, when new natural lawyers consider religious liberty, their 
consideration of religion depends partly upon the value given to the subject by 
society. It was earlier shown that Finnis rejects this. Indeed, for him, religion is a 
basic human good and thus does deserve dignity and value – it is more than ‘just 
one among the deep passions and commitments that move people’.235 It was 
shown above that George views the American Constitution as holding a high 
place for religion. On the other hand, another approach could be to deny religion 
and religious liberty any moral or constitutional status distinct from other ‘deep 
commitments.’236 This is similar to the multiple protected characteristics approach 
adopted within the EqA 2010. It will be argued that preference is not given to the 
characteristic of religion within English law. However, this will be distinguished 
from the elevated position given to religion within the basic goods. This section 
will attempt to analyse the reason why, and the process how, new natural lawyers 
have regard for this ‘good’ and why this requires more protection. This discussion 
is crucial in applying George’s thought to analyse religion within the EqA 2010, to 
solve the problems facing freedom of religion. 
In George’s discussion about moral paternalism, liberty was held in chapter 2 to 
be close to elements of the basic goods, in so far as it served the good of what 
he terms ‘choice’.237 This element of ‘choice’ is essential to George’s discussion 
of ‘legal liberty’, which was introduced in section 4.3.238 For George, ‘legal liberty’ 
is ‘the freedom to do as one pleases so far as the law is concerned, [and] can be 
understood as the absence of legal coercion.’239 The good of ‘choice’ leads to 
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legal liberty being considered ‘an important human good.’240 I suggest that this is 
a controversial position because the basic good of liberty does not appear within 
the ethical theory of Grisez or Finnis. The reason that George believes that it 
does not appear is because goodness of liberty is instrumental rather than 
intrinsic, and so neither Finnis nor Grisez classify it as a basic good.241 The 
problem is that this depends on a strict understanding of liberty within law. This 
is an instance where George’s development of NNL thought raises difficulties.  
This section will consider the question as to whether positive legal restrictions on 
religion and the good of religion constitute a breach of ‘legal liberty’. It is relevant 
because positive law, be it case law precedent or statutory legislation, that 
restricts religious freedom would restrict legal liberty as a factor which might 
impede action.242 Positive law itself can provide an impediment towards religious 
liberty.243 As such, George’s conclusion is thus duty based. He imagines that 
‘[t]hose in authority in the political community, therefore have the moral duty to 
respect the good of personal self-constitution in legal [sic] for the common good 
of those in their care.’244 This is a moral duty of care towards the community not 
to infringe legal liberty. It is a moral duty because limitations of legal liberty that 
are unfair are, first, immoral245 and, second, only legitimately limited by the 
legislator in certain circumstances.246 
I argue that George’s deliberation upon the restriction of religious liberty and legal 
liberty depends upon his views regarding the good of religion. In Making Men 
Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality,247 he deliberates on the good of religion. 
Because George refers to his area of expertise as being normative jurisprudence 
and political theory,248 this makes it easier to see the connections George makes 
with regard to political and legal theory when talking about religion.249  
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It was briefly mentioned in section 4.3 that George understands that the health of 
any society rests on three pillars which combine both political and legal theory. 
These are: 1) individual respect for the human person and their dignity; 2) the 
institution of society/family; and 3) fair and effective system of law and 
government.250 Importantly, George believes that religion underlies and supports 
each of these pillars, and so the third pillar enables the first pillar - respecting 
legal personhood (for human personhood and dignity). This is enabled through 
religious freedom, which has set down guidelines for the third pillar. The third 
pillar (a fair and effective system of law and government) in turn draws 
dependence from an inherent ‘worth/value’ in the person (pillar 1). This is a very 
unoriginal idea, for instance the idea of worth and value is identified by 
Wolterstorff as deriving from religion.251 
The pillar structure is helpful in understanding George’s tripartite approach 
towards religion: first, religion is a basic good; secondly, religion is dependent 
upon human rationality; and thirdly, religion is an irreducible aspect of human 
flourishing. There is a clear structure identified here to analyse George’s 
approach to religion. The next section will consider each aspect of George’s 
approach to religion separately in order to formulate a critique towards equality 
law impacting freedom of religion. 
Common good application present in religious liberty case law 
I will now analyse the application of religion as a basic good within George’s 
approach. George relies upon Timothy Shaw’s contribution, The Anthropological 
Basis of Human Freedom,252 where religion is presented as a basic good, even 
for those that do not ascribe to a religion.253 This gives a plural, expansive 
definition to religion, which is essential to the universal application of George’s 
jurisprudence. This is how George deliberates upon restriction towards religious 
freedom. It is an inclusive method because overtly secular institutions can rule 
upon religion. Even atheists participate in the good of religion, under George’s 
approach, by considering meaning, value and truth.254 Rather than this 
condescending approach, it would be better to term the whole of humanity clearly 
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engaging with the good of religion, by all engaging with meaning, value and truth. 
A position such as this would be a far more inclusive position. The former 
approach regarding religion is still dependent upon George’s interpretation of the 
basic good of religion. However, a question arises out of this: are problems 
encountered by this basic good approach when transferring this directly to 
religious liberty? 
One key factor for a basic good approach to religious liberty lies in George’s 
observation that state action which infringes individual moral rights can only 
damage the common good. Any negative action by the government in relation to 
religious liberty could only serve to damage the common good. This assumes a 
breach of human rights, such as a breach of Article 9 of the ECHR. For George, 
a breach of human rights overrides any gain and it is held that the 
‘incommensurability of goods means that the non-aggregative common good 
simply cannot be advanced by governmental action which infringes people’s 
moral rights.’255 This is because where ‘there are undefeated reasons for 
government to act to support, and encourage religion, as there often will be, such 
action is for the common good’.256 I argue that this suggests any governmental 
action in relation to religious liberty which would infringe religious rights could only 
serve to damage the common good by further infringing moral rights which are 
constitutive aspects of basic human goods. In effect this ties religion to the 
common good. 
This leads us to the concept I have termed the ‘goods-rights synthesis’ which was 
mentioned above. According to George, ‘the good is prior to the right and 
rights.’257 He believes that to respect religious liberty is to respect rights. Religious 
liberty depends upon a certain form of good that both impacts rights discourse, 
and more precisely human rights application. George draws from the Aristotelian 
notion that thinking agents are rational individuals. For this reason, flourishing 
can take place by guarding individual health and wellbeing; for instance, through 
intellectual flourishing by receiving an education. I argue that the ‘goods-rights 
synthesis’ engages all three aspects constituting religious liberty (basic 
goods/rationality/flourishing). This follows from the analysis of George’s thought 
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that if goods are regarded as intrinsically valuable, then practical reasoning will 
dictate that flourishing depends on our intellectual well-being, or our physical well-
being.258 Because the good is prior to the rights ‘it gives shape, content to our 
rights.’259 It matters to the identification and defence of rights what the basic good 
is that is being protected. An example given by George is the foundational right 
to life. This could easily be transferred to religious liberty. For George, it matters 
to the identification and defence of the right to religious freedom that religious 
liberty is no mere instrumentality but is an intrinsic aspect to the good of human 
persons, an integral dimension of overall flourishing: 
If we believe, as I believe, that right is violated … it is because we believe 
[religious liberty] has more than merely instrumental value, it has intrinsic 
or basic value, it is a constitutive dimension of our flourishing as human 
beings. And similarly it matters to the identification and defence of religious 
liberty that religion is yet another irreducible action of well-being and 
fulfilment: a basic human good.260 
In criticism, George is clear in his identification of religion as a basic human good 
– the basic human good of religion. Although clarity may be lost through the 
‘goods-rights synthesis’, as George identifies that rights enable religion; and 
religion, and religious liberty, enables flourishing. I argue this is a controversial 
projection of religion in that, as shown in earlier chapters, new natural lawyers 
differ on their understanding of the good and the subjective nature of the goods 
would be denied as being instrumental to intrinsic human flourishing.   
For George, the ‘goods-rights synthesis’ is a rejection of Rawlsian public 
reason,261 and also contemporary rights discourse. This gives a certain content 
and context to the ‘goods-rights synthesis’ model. It has been suggested that 
society is so obsessed with rights talk and contemporary rights discourse that we 
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are no longer possible to talk about goods, well-being and human dignity.262 
George would not, however, agree with this. For him a plethora of people see the 
implications in public life. Have we gone too far in our language of rights? George 
would respond ‘yes’, for two reasons: 1) some issues simply are not addressed if 
the only language of discourse is rights; and 2) the focus on rights omits 
responsibilities, such as ‘I want such and such – therefore, I have a right to such 
and such.’ Here accountability is disregarded in favour of personal gain for the 
individual. It is arguable that this is a non sequitur movement from rights based 
on desires to responsibilities based on rights.  
George wishes to suggest that human rights, including rights to religious liberty, 
are:  
… among the moral principles that demand respect from all of us, including 
governments and international authorities, which are morally bound not only 
bound because they possess authority, not only to respect human rights but 
also to respect them. To respect people and to respect their dignity is to 
honour these rights. This is what it means for governments to respect their 
citizens. Including the right to respect religious freedom.263 
Here it is clearly identified that ‘moral principles’ – basic human goods, 
independent of human rights – deserve respect within George’s thought. To 
achieve respect, governments must display dignity in terms of both citizens and 
their religious liberty. This is a difficult argument. Chapter 5 will display how in 
reality the government has argued to restrict religious liberty.264 George sees a 
necessity for discussion of goods in public life as part of public mandate – a way 
to defend a right in human goods/human needs/aspects of human well-being and 
fulfilment that religious liberty is to protect. 
I claim that George’s observation that human rights (including rights to religious 
liberty) are being shaped and given content by ‘the human goods they protect’265 
further justifies the ‘goods-rights synthesis.’ As introduced above, it is in this 
sense that the ‘goods-right synthesis’ holds that the good is prior to the right, and 
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even to the rights. Rights are not mere abstractions, they are connected because 
they protect human goods. George believes that rights, like other moral 
principles, are intelligible as rational action guiding principles because they are 
specifications of practical reason that direct human choosing to ‘what is humanly 
fulfilling or enriching … and away from what is contrary to our wellbeing as the 
kind of creatures we are i.e., human beings.’266 This shows the prior application 
of George’s NNL theory to any rights discourse establishing religious liberty, and 
to any human rights application engaging freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion within Article 9 of the ECHR. This is because both are dictated in content 
by the underlying goods-rights basis. 
If religious liberty is dictated in content by the ‘goods-rights synthesis’, then does 
this present religion as a superior good? Chapter 2 considered the frequently 
offered suggestion that religion is subordinate to the other basic goods267 or 
whether religion can be termed a ‘superordinate good.’268 George’s NNL 
approach follows a practical requirement to form subjective prioritisation of the 
basic goods,269 particularly when acting upon the good. George believes that 
religious freedom is central and has priority among the basic civil liberties.270 As 
was established, this is why religion can be termed a ‘public good’.271 
NNL regard for the public good of religion 
Following this approach to the good of religion, it was identified in chapter 2 that 
the legal idealist Mark Murphy rejected George’s incommensurable approach to 
the good of religion, terming George’s work a moral natural law thesis by 
suggesting that George has transformed his thesis from a claim belonging to 
analytical jurisprudence into a claim belonging to moral philosophy.272 This is 
because Murphy doubted practical reason affirms that other basic goods for the 
sake of religious good.273 He further criticised George’s rejection of the basic 
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goods hierarchy,274 drawing into doubt where practical reason dictates that 
religion is a superior good. Murphy’s approach was earlier rejected in this thesis 
because he suggested George may prioritise religion above the other basic 
goods, which George does not do and does not need to do. George does not 
view religion as a ‘superordinate good’.275 George’s very clear anti-
consequentialist presentation of religion as an incommensurable basic human 
good highlights this.276 It was maintained in chapter 1 that basic human goods 
are taken to be irreducible and therefore incommensurable, and so the basic 
human goods provide ultimate reasons for actions.277 This is precisely as far as 
they are intrinsic aspects of human flourishing in line with the common good. As 
such, this understanding surrounding incommensurability of the basic goods 
plays a key role in George’s thought. The incommensurability of the basic goods 
clarifies George’s thought surrounding religion (and the other goods).Therefore, 
despite Murphy’s doubts concerning religion, George’s view of religion as a 
public/superior good can still apply to the common good.  
It was earlier shown that basic human goods deserve respect within George’s 
NNL thought. This, in turn, ensures respect for both citizens and religious liberty 
by the state. The possibility for, first, religion as a basic human good and, second, 
religion as the subject of a primary reason for action, such as deducing norms 
from the intrinsic requirement of love of neighbour as self,278 or for instance the 
Pauline ‘Golden Rule’,279 flows from a ‘premise that an intrinsic aspect of one’s 
neighbour and one’s own good is the basic good of life, and the premise that no 
more than in one’s willing of ends may one choose means which are contrary to 
a basic human good.’280 Applying this reason to religious liberty, the modificaition 
of George’s thought would endorse a norm including a private person’s choosing 
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to engage with religion,281 through the premise that an aspect of one’s own good 
would be the basic good of religion, and the premise that none may be prohibited 
from engaging a choice in line with a basic human good, such as religion, which 
would establish human flourishing. This highlights the prominent role of scriptural 
interpretation, mixed with case law analysis, that can be critically analysed within 
George’s thought when defending religious liberties. I argue it provides a reason 
to respect religious liberty based upon the high regard held for the good of religion 
as both the subject of a primary reason for action and a public good. 
A different treatment for religious liberty 
As a public good that merits respect, religion is treated differently. For instance, 
following R (Begum) v Headteacher & Governors of Denbigh High School,282 
Finnis has observed that the House of Lords here held that the right to be free 
from coercion in one’s religious beliefs and acts is a right that is ‘good not only 
against the state and its government and laws, but also against all other 
individuals and social groups.’283 Within this decision it was considered that the 
right to religious freedom should be secured differently, having a wider remit.284  
Finnis also interprets the ECtHR decision in Sahin v Turkey,285 and gives 
particular attention to the assertion that state governments, laws and other public 
institutions are entitled to exclude and forbid the sartorial exercise of religious 
liberty. This is in order to preserve public order including the religious liberty of 
others. For Finnis, the Lords’ decision implicitly ‘accepts the premise that one 
religion may and should be treated – understood and dealt with – differently from 
others.’286 Through Finnis’ interpretation it follows that one religion may and 
should be treated differently from others, and this discloses an inbuilt bias. 
Throughout this thesis a recurring theme has been to suggest that this inbuilt bias 
is also present within George’s work. The NNL disposition to Roman Catholicism 
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accords with Finnis’ interpretation of the Begum287 decision. Presumably from this 
basis, the one religion which should be treated differently would be Christianity, 
and narrowing even further this denomination would be Roman Catholic 
Christianity.288 This case highlights the approach taken by NNL to treat religious 
liberty differently. However, this also reveals problems. For instance, do claims 
to public order override national laws, which are designed to protect liberty?289 I 
suggest that Finnis’ interpretation, however, is construed too narrowly in favour 
of his Roman Catholic bias, and it further re-emphasises that NNL is a conduit for 
the public communication of Roman Catholic ethics.  
To secure this wider protection for religious liberty, George grounds respect for 
liberty, in all public manifestations, in the dignity and good of the individual. How 
does George reach this basis? In his keynote address, ‘Religious Freedom: Why 
Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’,290 George draws upon the example 
of Martin Luther King Jr.’s libertarian actions in the civil rights movement, namely 
his knowledge that such acts may lead to imprisonment.291 How could King act in 
disobedience to the law when he advocated obedience to the law? For George, 
following Martin Luther King Jr’s libertarian approach invokes a conception of 
equality similar to that submitted by Vickers, considered above.292 Religious 
freedom removes disadvantage through a basis of individual human dignity, 
dependent upon autonomy rather than difference.293 Religious liberty requires 
autonomy within a sphere defined as internal to the religion.294 George’s social 
inclusion grounds respect for legal liberty in human dignity (Vickers’ third way) 
and good (basic good approach) towards the individual.  
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This protection for religious freedom and dignity of the person is not limitless. 
George’s approach concedes that there are limits to freedom that must be 
respected for the sake of the good of religion and the dignity of the human person. 
These limits extend to ordering one’s life ‘in line with one’s best judgments as to 
where spiritual truth lies and what it requires. Gross evil, even injustice can be 
committed by sincere people for the sake of religion.’295 The presumption in 
favour of respecting liberty, especially for the state, to preserve human good and 
the dignity of the human person as free and rational individuals, I argue is a broad 
one. Nevertheless, unjust or morally wrong acts should not be tolerated in the 
name of religious freedom.  
George’s limit to freedom is: morally wrong acts are not to be tolerated by public 
consensus in the name of religious freedom. George here is very clear – the 
recourse is through the courts, not through anarchy - through adjudication, rather 
than anarchy. This presents a problem. How do we go about resolving religious 
liberty conflicts while maintaining dignity? Here, George initially fails to provide a 
solution. 
Therefore, it has been shown above that George’s NNL approach is that religion 
should be protected. This is because for George religion is a human good unique 
in the shaping of one’s pursuit of, and participation in, all the basic goods. In the 
words of George: ‘One participates in this good the moment one enters the 
pursuit of ordering one’s life in one’s very best judgements in conscience, of the 
truth of religious matters … and relates this to the more than merely human 
sources of meaning and value.’296 
As Vickers has observed, equality of religion ensures dignity of the individual.297 
Religious investigation was set out by George in Making Men Moral298 as ‘part of 
the human good of religion, as goods whose pursuit is an indispensable future of 
the integral flourishing of human kind.’299 As a result, protecting the good of 
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religion protects flourishing for the individual.300 This provides a potential 
resolution for religious liberty conflicts to preserve dignity for the individual. 
The analysis of George’s thought indicates that the good of religion leads to 
flourishing. Religious liberty requires specific protection within case law to protect 
the good that leads to human flourishing. This provides a basis for social inclusion 
as a form of justiciable equality that grounds respect for legal liberty in human 
dignity. Once again, this highlights the tripartite benefit of human goods, human 
rationality and human flourishing in religious engagement. My analysis 
suggesting that there are three constitutive aspects in George’s approach to 
religious liberty is further substantiated. The aspect of flourishing within George’s 
thought will now be considered. 
Religious liberty leading to human flourishing 
Within George’s three constitutive aspects approach, in this section I now turn to 
the concept of human flourishing. The intention is to show why and how, for 
George, there are connections between religious liberty and human flourishing. 
A critique will be provided to further analyse George’s NNL approach to religious 
liberty and prepare for the application towards religious equality law in chapter 5.  
To respect a person’s well-being, or more simply to respect a person, for George, 
demands respect for her or his flourishing as a religious person in line with their 
best judgment, to ‘make judgements that link us with real opportunities of 
flourishing.’301 For George, this requires respect for ‘liberty in the religious quest; 
the quest to understand religious truth and order one’s life in line with it.’302 This 
presents flourishing as an extension of liberty – religious legal liberty. It has been 
established in this thesis that religious liberty is essential to human flourishing.303 
Therefore, I argue religious liberty is essential to George’s NNL approach. It 
enables flourishing within George’s NNL process. For George, it will now be 
shown that religion forms both a) a public good and b) a method of fulfilment. To 
respect religious liberty is to respect human flourishing. 
To understand how, for George, flourishing and religion are linked it is helpful to 
look at how George responds to the Papal encyclical entitled the Declaration of 
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the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions (Nostra Aetate),304 which 
provides a religious centred approach: the further away one gets from the good 
of religion and ‘the fullness of religious life, the less fulfilment is available.’305 To 
put this positively: for George, in the central case viewpoint, freedom of religion 
represents the efforts to bring ourselves ‘into a relationship of friendship with 
transcendent sources of meaning and value’.306 
 This provides a wide spectrum for protection and George posits from this a 
requirement that civil authority respect and nurture conditions and circumstances 
in which people can engage in religion.307 Flourishing engages religion when one 
considers meaning, value and truth, ‘living with honesty and integrity in line with 
… best judgements about ultimate reality.’308 Coercing belief is a violation of 
human dignity and legal liberty. The violation of liberty is ‘worse than futile’.309 For 
George, ‘it not only does no good, it does harm.’310 I suggest this turns the 
principle of religious liberty defended by George, into a non-intrusive, libertarian 
form of freedom – an accommodating form of freedom. However, such libertarian 
freedom in flourishing relies upon the maximisation of choice based upon the 
pursuit of the basic goods. Choice founded upon human rationality, via practical 
reasoning, was shown in chapter 2. This will be shown to be important within 
George’s approach when defending religious freedom. 
I suggest that there is confusion is to be found in the concept of choice 
surrounding modern society’s approach to liberty. Here we can define different 
uses attached to the concept of ‘choice’ in this thesis. As George has suggested, 
the good to now be found is the good of freedom (religious liberty). Choice in the 
Natural Law tradition, however, is part of practical reason.311 Therefore the use 
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of choice here is not arbitrary. David Bentley Hart suggests that in contemporary 
society there is now no other absolute value to be found apart from choice.312 
This is essentially existentialism as choice and is hugely subjective. The cultural 
presupposition is that we are all now essentially consumers, shown through 
choice in rights. We now have the rights to exactly the same goods, rights and 
service from anyone who is providing them. This leads to an inevitable clash 
resulting in litigation between protected characteristics and is borne out by the 
proliferation of religious liberty case law.313 For example in Eweida,314 religious 
freedoms were categorised as choices by the employees.315 This freedom was 
balanced against the deprivation of services.316  
As we have identified that the concept of choice is not used arbitrarily in the 
Natural Law tradition, this can be contrasted with the way that the maximisation 
of this choice leads to confusion in the concept of religious liberty in contemporary 
society. The criticism given to ‘choice’ in this section is limited. It only relates to 
the meaning of choice, regarding the approach given to religious liberty in 
contemporary society. This is shown through value within religious freedom, 
which can be seen as the exercising of choice. Building on the point made above 
about clashes between protected characteristics in litigation, this understanding 
of choice was detrimental in Eweida317 in the exercising of religious conscience 
by employees wishing to restrict service in line with conscience. Their choice here 
was prohibited. As such, this leads to tensions within religious liberty. By here 
considering the impact upon religious liberty, the difference between choice in 
contemporary society and that taken by George is apparent. The action of ‘choice’ 
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impacting religious liberty is arbitrary in society, whereas rationality (in order to 
make any decisions) as part of practical reasoning is more defined in the Natural 
Law tradition. Rationality, seen as choice, will be the subject of discussion in the 
next subsection. Here in further analysing George’s approach to religious liberty 
it will be shown that George fails in his understanding of human rationality to give 
a satisfactory basis for religious freedom. 
The role of common human reason in the good of religion 
The last subsection identified the tension caused by an incorrect focus upon 
human reason within human flourishing. This subsection will look to the third 
aspect of religious liberty, which is human rationality/reason. Religious reasoning 
plays a central part in George’s approach to religion. Human reason also has an 
expansive role in the distinctive good of religion within George’s theory. Human 
reason has a central part to play in any applied NNL conclusion in which religion 
provides a reason for political action. It will be argued in this section that English 
law requires a new higher standard to protect the good of religion. 
George’s NNL conception of religious reasoning has a higher regard for the 
individual as a rational choosing agent than the current equality law. This is 
because, for George, reason’s role is not exclusive to individual reasoning but 
very prominent in both individual and governmental judgments. I argue this 
expands George’s analysis because, as was shown in chapter 2, his concept 
provides not only capacity for case law analysis, but also capacities for practical 
reason and moral judgment. 
Practical reasoning is also used by George to distinguish religious freedom as a 
fundamental right. This is an approach to religion in line with the definition 
provided by Lord Toulson in R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages:318 
… a spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group of adherents, 
which claims to explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship 
with the infinite, and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives 
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in conformity with the spiritual understanding associated with the belief 
system.319 
I argue that George here follows the ‘belief’320 aspect within the definition.321 
Freedom of belief entails respect for the human person, which derives from a 
rational approach to human dignity. Thus under George’s NNL account, religious 
freedom is a fundamental right. George defends a conception of religious liberty 
as a basic human good.322 Choice concerning religion is seen as part of the 
practical reasoning process. Reason holds that respect for the person requires 
respect for this fundamental right. This, for George, allows people to make 
decisions about religion in line with their conscience. When people lose their 
religious freedom, George suggests they lose more than their freedom to be 
religious – he suggests that they lose their rights to act in line with conscience 
and so lose their ‘freedom to be human.’323 They lose the ability to pursue the 
basic human goods – integral human fulfilment is prevented. The problem with 
this approach is that human rationality is aligned to choice. It arguably does not 
reflect the other arbitrary use of choice shown in a consumerist approach to 
religion in contemporary society. As such, it does not address, once more, 
Bentley Hart’s criticism posed for religious liberty that was outlined in the previous 
subsection. Namely that what is now considered to be the ultimate good is the 
good of freedom (including religious liberty); yet there is now no other absolute 
value to be found apart from choice.324 This subjective existentialism as choice 
leads to the pursuit and maximisation of materialist goods. The result is that the 
materialist provision of services would extend far wider, beyond any religious 
liberty exception identified in Eweida.325 George’s method to reach religious 
freedom may, therefore, produce a tension because it does not meet or provide 
a solution to the contemporary understanding about the way religious equality 
                                                          
319 Ibid [57] (Lord Toulson). 
320 Ibid [57] (Lord Toulson). 
321 The meaning of religion in R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, 
Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77 will be considered at length in chapter 5. The definition is limited 
to the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 - A Hudson, Equity and Trusts (9th edn, Routledge, 2016) 
999. 
322 George, In Defense of Natural Law (n 26) 5. 
323 George, ‘Keynote Address: Religious Freedom: Why Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’ (n 
260). 
324 Bentley Hart, Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies (n 312). 
325 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). This was introduced in chapter 1 and will be further developed in chapter 5. 
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law interacts with a consumerist approach to religion (in particular the tensions 
arising from service provision).  
This provides an opportunity to further analyse George’s approach to religion 
because to support this contested position for religion, George relies upon the 
Roman Catholic teachings Dignitatis Humanae (Declaration on Religious 
Freedom, 1965)326 and, as earlier noted, Nostra Aetate.327 Is George simply, and 
predictably, following the teaching of his Church? Is this another example of the 
Roman Catholic bias established in chapter 1? Is George revising historical 
Thomism in a way that would accommodate the Second Vatican Council and so 
preserve traditional Catholic and Thomist moral teaching?328 I suggest these 
criticisms are valid because George notes that, in Dignitatis Humanae, the 
Roman Catholic Church provides a natural law argument for religious liberty and 
has ‘a commitment to such reasoning.’329 This is distinguished from Rawls’s 
‘common human reason.’330 George’s preferred, modified approach which was 
first identified in chapter 2.5 will be discussed at length later in this section. At the 
outset, however, George argues that his NNL approach may be able to defend 
religious freedom, although this is rather in a rational affirmation of the human 
value of religion as embodied and made available to people through many 
traditions of faith via practical reasoning, in line with the teaching of the Roman 
Catholic Church. The benefit is that this moral reasoning method enables many 
traditions of faith to participate in the good of religion. This is an inclusive 
approach, even if it is one prescribed initially by an exclusive, institutionalised 
religion. Later in this section it will be shown that this dual commitment provides 
the necessary critique to engage case law that recognises the plurality of faiths, 
                                                          
326 Pope Paul VI, ‘Declaration on Religious Freedom, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, On the Right of the Person 
and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious’ (Holy See, 7 December 1965) 
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html> accessed 8th May 2012. 
327 Pope Paul VI, ‘Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, NOSTRA AETATE’ 
(n 305). 
328 N Bamforth and D Richards, Patriarchal Religion, Sexuality, and Gender: A Critique of New Natural 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 167. 
329 Ibid. A process, outlined in chapter 2, that involves both practical reasoning and Scriptural reference - 
Pope Paul VI, ‘Declaration on Religious Freedom, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, On the Right of the Person and 
of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious’ (n 327). 
330 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 121. 
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and a wide spectrum of morality, as defined in R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages.331 
George’s understanding of political morality protects the 
flourishing of the rational agent 
For George, what is true of personal morality is true of political morality.332 This 
is important because it highlights that George’s understanding of political morality 
encompasses a wide spectrum of positions and allows his NNL thought to engage 
with such positions. It is helpful for the wider thesis because it may allow George’s 
thought to engage with equality law regarding religious liberty. For instance, both 
forms of morality (personal and political) can be in line with flourishing. This also 
connects two pillars333 present in George’s idealised society: the individual 
person (pillar one – private) is connected with a system of law and government 
(pillar three – public). The problem here is that religious freedom is held to be part 
of political morality rather than public morality. George writes that governmental 
respect for individual freedom and the autonomy of governmental spheres of 
authority is a requirement of political morality.334 This is because law and 
government fundamentally exist to protect human persons and their well-being. I 
claim that George here fails to acknowledge a liberal sense of autonomy 
(transferring responsibility to the people) and also confers a high expectation 
upon government. George attempts to rebut this criticism, through his belief that 
‘human conviction to limited government is the fruit of moral conviction.’335 
Nevertheless, this critique has utility. Government’s role should be subsidiary. 
Yet the role of equality law is anything but subsidiary; instead, the government 
through legislation is arguably prescribing conceptions of morality.336  
This can be seen in the remedy available under the public sector equality duty. 
For instance, the implementation of the earlier introduced public sector equality 
duty by the EqA 2010 has set down statutory duties. Since there is no private 
                                                          
331 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
[2013] UKSC 77 [Lord Wilson]. 
332 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 115-116. 
333 Ibid 4. 
334 Ibid 91-92. 
335 Ibid 93. 
336 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 1) vii. See earlier criticism of equality law in section 
4.2. 
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sector duty to advance equality within the EqA 2010,337 Hepple has identified that 
the public sector equality duty does not give rise to any enforceable private law 
rights; rather, it is only enforceable by way of judicial review within the UK.338 This 
limits the equality duty to a duty that is only enforceable against public bodies as 
a public law action. As such, Hepple observes that the majority of proceedings 
so far have been brought by non-governmental organisations or individuals.339 
Because there is no cause of action in private law, it is not possible for an 
individual to claim damages for breach of statutory duty. Instead, the only legal 
remedy available is an application for judicial review on the basis that an authority 
had failed to perform its duty.340 Notably, public bodies have a larger general 
impact upon society at large (when compared with private bodies). As a 
consequence, in critique, applying George’s thought to the public sector equality 
duty would lead to the conclusion that equality is being enforced by government 
against public bodies in an effort to impact a wider consensus – a conception of 
political morality directed to society at large. 
This political morality should, George contends, result in the governmental 
enforcement of common welfare – one that promotes human flourishing. This 
position further puts a high level of expectation upon the government because it 
ought to take account of the religious life of citizens, since the function of 
government should be to make provision for the common welfare.341 Arguably the 
common welfare should provide opportunities of flourishing, one of which, 
according to George, can be achieved through the good of religion.342 I argue that 
this is an idealised notion that fails to take account of necessary and appropriate 
limits imposed upon the right to religious freedom. For instance, by the Supreme 
Court limiting protection to recognised forms of religion,343 and regulating 
religious education.344 As such, George’s approach does not successfully impose 
limits upon the right to religious freedom. 
                                                          
337 Ibid 179. 
338 Ibid 140. 
339 Ibid 142. 
340 Ibid. 
341 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 16. 
342 Ibid 14. 
343 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
[2013] UKSC 77 [54-55] (Lord Toulson). 
344 See R (on the application of Begum (by her Litigation Friend Sherwas Rahman)) v The Head teacher 
and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15. 
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As a result of this flaw and because of the problems inherent within equality 
regarding religion, this chapter argues that  English law needs a higher standard 
in law. Such a standard will include a respect for the good (and basic goods) to 
prevent religious institutions from being forced to act against their will. At the 
outset this standard will be one of a ‘very heavy burden’345 upon legal authority 
to disregard a broad presumption in favour of religious liberty and impose the 
least intrusive/restrictive means in limiting principles for religious institutions not 
to be compelled to act against their will.346  
George’s approach is analogous to the second condition for a free society 
suggested by Laws LJ in McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited.347 He considers, 
although hastily rejects, that the law may protect a particular moral position taken 
by Christianity not because of its ‘religious imprimatur, but on the footing that in 
reason its merits commend themselves. So it is with core provisions of the 
criminal law, the prohibition of violence and dishonesty.’348 In a free society, 
Christian morals should be protected because human rationality and practical 
reasoning supports their logical consistency.  
George terms this a rational philosophical argument because George’s limiting 
principles for religious institutions not to be compelled to act against their will is 
the standard in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993. It is apparent that 
George is here merely attaching his view to a statute in which the view finds 
support. By doing so, this reduces the persuasive impact of George’s argument. 
Yet, whether this standard should be applied by the courts or by the legislature, 
the standard relied on by George should be a high one: 
… the highest interest/standard known to our law and the least 
intrusive/least restrictive means, so if this government regards this as 
important, they better be able to show it is supremely important and there is 
another important way of doing it that doesn’t impinge negatively on the 
liberty of the person they are imposing on.349  
                                                          
345 George, ‘Keynote Address: Religious Freedom: Why Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’ (n 
260). 
346 This latter part is the legal test found in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993. 
347 McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880. 
348 Ibid [21] (Laws LJ). 
349 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 15) 13. 
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George here proposes a potential solution for state restriction in an American 
context. Can this also apply to UK case law or does the UK already demonstrate 
a high standard? Do legal restrictions on religious liberty constitute a breach of 
‘legal liberty’? For George, a justified, political authority must meet a ‘very heavy 
burden,’ to restrict liberty.350 Is this standard really robust enough to prevent 
political authority from disregarding a broad presumption in favour of religious 
liberty? This concept is one that needs elaboration. Although George’s broad, 
sweeping principle may be idyllic in content, in practice imposing an arbitrary 
standard may not prove to be this simple. 
George’s approach has again provoked criticism. McIlroy has argued that, with 
religious liberty being seen as ‘optional’ by the courts, the maximisation of this 
choice in the form of equality leads to methodological confusion in the good of 
religious liberty.351 Once again, this consumerist approach to religion in 
contemporary society does not reflect George’s approach to religion, which as 
we have seen, is linked to the exercise of practical reason in the Natural Law 
tradition. 
Moving from dignity: responsibility, common human 
reasonableness or human rationality? 
As I continue to critique George’s approach to religious liberty, the challenges 
presented above require deeper exploration. As discussed earlier, value within 
religious freedom in contemporary society can be seen as exercising choice, and 
this is to the detriment of restricting services on matters of religious conscience.352 
It was also outlined above that religious equality law is causing religious liberty to 
be an optional consideration. In his defence of religious liberty, Rivers has 
presented a different approach to George.353 Following from the Kantian 
enlightenment (here postmodernism value/dignity is the capacity to be one’s own 
creator), Rivers has identified human dignity once again to be most clearly 
                                                          
350 George, ‘Keynote Address: Religious Freedom: Why Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’ (n 
260). 
351 D Mcllroy, A Biblical View of Law and Justice (Paternoster, 2004). 
352 Bentley Hart, Atheist Delusions: The Christian Revolution and Its Fashionable Enemies (n 313). 
Chapter 5 will detail the approach of the courts against this position: for instance Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 
73. 
353 J Rivers, ‘Human Rights and Human Dignity: Unmasking the Trojan Horse’ (Faith in the Future: biblical 
thinking for public life conference, 13 September 2013) 
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expressed in Justice For Hedgehogs,354 where Dworkin identified two principles 
securing ethical responsibility: 1) a principle of self-respect; and 2) human 
dignity.355 The ethical concept of human dignity is constructed from these two 
principles taken together. A clear example is given but the example given is 
purposefully not a very robust concept of human dignity. This is because, for 
example, Rivers attempts to defend religious liberty by suggesting this ethical 
constructivism is dangerous for religious belief because if dignity requires self-
respect and authenticity, then what makes an act morally wrongful is if it attacks 
or insults the dignity of others.356 From this basis any rights discourse, such as 
that relating to human rights, entails the ‘relatively discrete components on which 
the dignity of human beings can be attacked’.357 This concept of human dignity is 
fragile because it is dictated by ethical constructivism based upon human choice 
in a contemporary society. 
To summarise, a concept of human dignity is becoming a Trojan horse, appearing 
like the universal foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, when its 
actual function is for the insinuation of a postmodern worldview.358 It provides no 
set currency for nature or flourishing because truth is juxtaposed with relativism, 
to provide authenticity dependent upon individual choice in situations presented 
by modern life. For instance, through analysing the right to religious freedom one 
consequence is that in a human rights conflict, the choice in freedom of sexual 
orientation is arguably given greater rights than choice in freedom of religion in 
contemporary society.359  
Rivers has built on this by presenting a ‘Christian conception of human dignity.’360 
This requires the expression of religious conscience in human dignity via a 
theistic understanding. The problem, identified by Rivers, is that this would seem 
to relegate the non-religious to ‘second class citizens’.361  
The flaw in Rivers’ argument is the failure to observe that an independent theistic 
conception would invoke rights, notwithstanding any (lack of) belief. For example, 
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Christmas traditions are observed within Western Society by the majority of 
people. Large parts of this majority have little regard for the underlying 
Christian/Pagan influence. However, s.1(1) of the Banking and Financial 
Dealings Act 1971 provides a prima facie option to take bank holidays for the 
majority of the population,362 not relegating any to ‘second-class’ citizens. The 
bank holiday is not excluded from those who choose not to participate in the 
annual Christmas celebrations. As such, a better way to ground religion and the 
good of religion against conflicting rights discourse, may be through looking to 
the responsibilities discourse.363  
This ‘responsibilities approach’ is an understanding built not on rules, nor rights, 
but upon responsibilities.364 A responsibilities discourse draws links with the 
discussion about rights that is present throughout this section. For instance, a 
‘responsibilities approach’ to religious liberty would meet the test that is set down 
for legal restriction. As briefly mentioned earlier in this section, to overcome the 
powerful and broad presumption in favour of religious liberty, political authority 
must meet a ‘very heavy burden.’365 The applied critique in chapter 5 will outline 
the ways this limit has been breached in equality law areas. 
I argue that a responsibility approach is shown to be better. However, George 
does not adopt such. Rather, he lays down a test that can be transferred to 
English case law. George relies upon the courts or to the legislature to ‘decide 
when exceptions to general neutral laws should be granted for the sake of 
religious freedom, or to determine in other words when presumption in favour of 
religious freedom has been overcome by the substantive matter of what religious 
freedom demands’.366 I earlier suggested that this proposes a high standard in 
exercising the levers of governmental power, whether in the US or elsewhere, 
which standard, according to George: ‘reasonable people of good will across the 
                                                          
362 This provision is subject to individual employment contracts. 
363 This would provide obligation, with responsibility being a key aspect of any obligation. 
364 1 Corinthians 10: 32-33 - Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Collins, 2002). 
365 George, ‘Keynote Address: Religious Freedom: Why Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’ (n 
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religions and political spectrum should agree, precisely because it is a matter 
capable of being settled by our common human reason.’367 
This sets down a ‘reasonableness test’ guided by common human reason to 
balance religious exceptions and so provide protection for religious freedom. 
George’s Roman Catholic ‘reasonableness test’ approach to the natural law 
argument for religious liberty368 was earlier distinguished from Rawls’s ‘common 
human reason’.369 It was earlier distinguished on the basis that a pluralist 
approach to moral reasoning enables many traditions of faith to participate in the 
good of religion. 
This is important because, following Rawlsian political liberalism, would 
reasonable people of good will across the religious and political spectrum agree 
with current English religious liberty case law? From the unsettled case law and 
media commentary already generated, we can answer this negatively. There is 
also a problem here with the NNL concept of reasoning – practical reason 
contains elements of public reasoning.370 For George, publically communicating 
ethics appeals to a facet of Rawlsian public reason, that of common human 
reason, as a part of public reason that appeals to the lowest common 
denominator. George has written that ‘choice and action here enables [NNL] to 
overcome to [sic] inadequacies of Kantianism, while retaining the fundamental 
(and plausible) Kantian commitment to the inviolable dignity of the human 
person.’371 George here presents a further weakness in his theory by forwarding 
a post-Rawlsian form of NNL reasoning based upon choice and human dignity.372 
It has been shown in chapter 2 that Rawlsian public reason silences natural law. 
Rawls allows beliefs to influence policy only if they belong to the overlapping 
consensus, or beliefs that would be accepted in the original position behind the 
veil of ignorance.373 An unintended consequence of this reasoning may lead to 
                                                          
367 Ibid. See also George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 
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those with religious convictions being prevented from fully expressing their 
opinion or standing for their rights. This would be contrary to public reason’s 
judicial application: Dworkin has observed that, in a hard case, judges may 
appeal to religious convictions or philosophical writings.374 Dworkin has noted 
that a number of American judges have in fact appealed to the philosophical 
writings of John Rawls.375 Rawls’ public reason requires judges searching for a 
justification of the law’s structure to avoid controversial religious, moral or 
philosophical doctrines. As such, this demonstrates the undesirability of Rawlsian 
public reasoning to achieve a fair and open critique of equality law. The same 
result would not apply to George’s reasoning. George’s ‘reasonableness test’ 
engages the good of religion in public debate. This is why it may provide a better 
approach to solve tensions within the EqA 2010. 
Conclusion 
It has been shown above that George has other foundations to his religious liberty 
law critique, rather than just presenting religion as a basic good. Preference is 
not given to the characteristic of religion within English law and this could be 
better protected. My analysis indicates that George’s juxtaposition between the 
three constitutive aspects of religion – the elevated position given to religion 
within the basic goods; human flourishing; and rationality – taken together 
produce a ‘reasonableness test’.376 This is similar to many other tests for the 
‘reasonable person’ in both private and public law, and so overcomes legal 
restrictions that breach ‘legal liberty’ and provides more protection. However, the 
reliance upon Rawlsian reason and conception of human dignity within a rights 
discourse leads ultimately to a responsibilities approach being preferred.  
4.5 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has provided original analysis by considering Robert George’s 
approach to equality law, and his understanding of, and contribution to, the basic 
                                                          
64 Univ Chicago L Rev 765); however, Lim here fails to identify that practical and public reasonableness 
focus on different, irreconcilable ends - E Lim, ‘Religious Exemptions in England’ (n 108) 449. 
374 R Dworkin, ‘Rawls and the Law’ (2004) 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1387, 1396. 
375 For example: Uhl v Thoroughbred Teach. and Telecomms., Inc., 309 F .3d 978, 985 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(referring to Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’ from A Theory Of Justice); Goetz v Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 39 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (quoting A Theory of Justice). 
376 This is most connected to the ‘Wednesbury Unreasonableness’ Judicial Review Test - Council of Civil 
Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1983] UKHL 6 [140] (Lord Diplock).  
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good of religion and religious liberty discrimination case law, and has shown that, 
for him, law is the medium in which we can talk about the good. This chapter has 
also shown that the modification of George’s thought engages the public good of 
religion in order to advocate a more effective approach towards equality law. 
Section 4.2 argued that any discussion of NNL is now dictated under the banner 
of equality and enforced by a ‘due regard’ public sector duty. Section 4.3 further 
that George holds the American Constitution as a paradigm for natural rights 
discourse. This provides authority to enforce the natural law and to protect the 
natural rights held by the legislature or judiciary. 
Section 4.4 analysed George’s approach to religious equality law by considering 
the juxtaposition in his work between the three constitutive aspects of religious 
liberty. The role of common human reason was shown here to produce a 
‘reasonableness test’. Through combining this test with the ‘responsibilities 
discourse’, chapter 4 has demonstrated George’s unique approach to religious 
liberty adjudication. This unique approach will be further reconstructed and 
applied in the fifth chapter in an attempt to resolve the problems facing freedom 
of religion within equality law. 
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Chapter 5 – Possible Application of Robert George’s Approach to 
Religious Equality Law 
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5.1 Introduction 
My central argument is that the analysis of George’s thought provides a viable 
justification for the greater protection of religious freedom in English law. Chapter 
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4 analysed the core components of George’s approach to discrimination and 
religious equality law. In this chapter I review English case law and legislation to 
show how the modification of George’s thought can relieve some of the difficulties 
found within current religious equality law. 
In 5.1 more discussion will be given to religion to lay groundwork for the later 
application of George’s thought, with both a focus upon the meaning of religion 
in English law and also with a brief overview of the key legislation. This will lead 
to the substantive work in the remainder of the chapter. The steps taken in this 
chapter are then as follows. First, in 5.2, I will engage with George’s 
understanding of the concept of human flourishing and proportionality analysis. I 
will use this to view natural rights as protection forcing the state to engage in a 
more serious examination of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950 (ECHR). Building on the protection offered to the right to manifest 
religion in the workplace in Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom,1 I will 
argue that this protection is necessary to protect the good of religion that leads to 
human flourishing. Second, in 5.3 I will argue that George’s conception of ‘legal 
liberty’ secures freedom from equality laws which restrict religious liberty and 
shows how the freedom to change jobs is insufficient to secure freedom of 
religion. Third, in 5.4, I will argue that applying George’s thought enables us to 
develop a different understanding of reasonable accommodation that protects 
religion as a public good. Finally, in 5.5, I develop the concept of public good 
further and draw on George’s discussion of religious conscience to argue for 
enhanced protection for freedom of religious conscience. 
The analysis in this thesis so far has shown that George’s views surrounding 
equality and conscience have centred upon religion, in particular the promotion 
of religious liberty. This chapter will show that in an area where religious liberty 
often loses out in a balancing of rights, interests and protected characteristics, a 
superior way to view religion will be via my critique of George’s thought in which 
religion is presented as a public good. This development was started in chapter 
4 and so in this chapter a modification of George’s thought will be drawn from the 
analysis and application of his work. The claim is that this will have implications 
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for the protection of religious freedom – it will strengthen the protection accorded 
to religion and belief. 
This chapter will contribute to the overall argument by explaining that the English 
courts have regularly undervalued religion and generated an inappropriately 
narrow understanding of liberty. This is why more protection for religious freedom 
is necessary. This point will be developed by reference to the Supreme Court’s 
recent definition of religion for the purposes of the Places of Worship Registration 
Act 1855, the extent of protection offered to religious persons in the workplace 
under the Equality Act 2010, the scope of lawful conscientious objection under 
section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967, and the debate concerning the introduction of 
reasonable accommodation. 
To do this, it is first necessary in this section to consider the meaning of religion 
within English law and to provide a brief overview of key legislation and case law.  
The right to manifest religion - the meaning of religion 
Legislation and case law surrounding religious freedom may be seen to be 
difficult because of the way that the meaning of religion is conveyed in law. Edge 
criticises the way that the law provides for religious freedom by doubting the legal 
system’s approach to defining religion.2 This is because he believes statements 
about metaphysical reality impacting on manifestation (and so religious freedom) 
are not adequately analysed. As such, this indicates that there are problems with 
manifestation of belief and freedom of religion. As quoted in the previous chapter, 
Lord Toulson’s most recent definition of religion given in R (Hodkin) v Registrar 
General of Births, Deaths and Marriages is: 
… a spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group of adherents, 
which claims to explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship 
with the infinite, and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives 
in conformity with the spiritual understanding associated with the belief 
system.3 
                                                          
2 P Edge, Religion and Law: An Introduction (Ashgate, 2006) 32. 
3 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
[2013] UKSC 77 [57] (Lord Toulson). 
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Lord Toulson accepted in R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages that, ‘[t]here has never been a universal legal definition of religion in 
English law’.4 The courts have struggled providing a definition and a specific 
meaning for religion. For our purposes Lord Toulson took a very bold and 
controversial step by offering the understanding of religion given above. This 
understanding limited religion to, first, ‘a spiritual or non-secular belief system’ 
and second, ‘explain[ing] mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with 
the infinite’ for the purposes of registering Scientology premises as a place of 
worship under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855.5 
There are two benefits with this approach. First, it rejects the narrow ruling in R v 
Registrar-General ex Parte Segerdal.6 Religion no longer requires belief in some 
sort of supreme being.7 The theistic test set down in R v Registrar-General ex 
Parte Segerdal8 was always too narrow. The danger is that the requirement for 
belief in a supreme being can exclude certain religions. For instance, Buddhism 
is, and should be, considered a religion regardless of that test.9 This approach 
broadens the scope, and continues the pattern found in both the Charities Act 
2006 and Charities Act 2011, which states that religion includes those which 
involve belief in more than one god or none.10 Second, this meaning given for 
religion does not judge the relative worth of one religion as compared to 
another.11 It does not prescribe the merits of one particular religion. For instance, 
the reference to a ‘group of adherents’ does not discriminate against a large 
                                                          
4 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] 
UKSC 77 [34] (Lord Toulson). 
5 This would then allow an application for the premises to the licensed for marriage under the Marriage 
Act 1949. 
6 R v Registrar-General ex Parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697.  
7 J Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 162. 
8 R v Registrar-General ex Parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697, 707 per Lord Denning MR: ‘it must be 
reverence to a deity…Religious worship means reverence or veneration of God or of a Supreme Being’. 
The theistic test was followed by Dillon J in Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565. 
9 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions (n 7) 162. For discussion surrounding the inclusion of Jainism, 
Taoism, and Theosophy in the definition of religion, see R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v 
Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77 [51]. 
10 Charities Act 2006 s.2(3)(a). See now s.3(2)(a) of the Charities Act 2011. 
11 K O’Halloran, Religion, Charity and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 59-60; S Panesar, 
Exploring Equity and Trusts (Pearson, 2010) 687. See Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav. 14; Nelan v 
Downes (1917) 23 CLR 546; Neville Estates Ltd v Madden [1962] Ch. 832; Varsani v Jesani [1999] Ch. 219, 
235. 
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number or a small number of adherents to the religion.12 In a multi-faith, 
contemporary society this is welcome.13  
The definition provided by Lord Toulson upon first impression complies with my 
analysis of George’s position. In this thesis I have detailed George’s definition for 
religion, as part of the wider application of George’s views to analyse the right to 
religious freedom in equality law. Lord Toulson’s understanding of religion 
accords with George’s, for instance, because as was noted in chapter 4.4, 
concerning the ‘belief’ aspect within the definition, George acknowledges that 
freedom of religious belief allows people to make decisions about religion in line 
with their conscience.14 One is able to live their life in tandem with what their belief 
system encourages them to follow. 
On the other hand, I suggest that there are problems with this definition. Lord 
Toulson recognises the limits provided by his own definition and suggests that 
his comments in R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
are, ‘intended to be a description and not a definitive formula’.15 The qualification 
offered by the Supreme Court shows the uncertainty present in this approach. 
This is mirrored in the legislative provisions surrounding the definition for a 
religion, which provides little guidance as to whether a system of belief constitutes 
a religion.16 
Perhaps this lack of guidance is, however, by intention. Lord Toulson did consider 
the challenges facing the courts and commission over analysing particular “fine 
theological or liturgical niceties as to how precisely [adherents] see and express 
their relationship with the infinite”,17 which may lead to these issues not being 
                                                          
12 J Chevalier-Watts ‘Charity Law, The Advancement of Religion and Public Benefit – Will the United 
Kingdom be the answer to New Zealand’s Prayers’ (2016) 47 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 385, 398; J 
Glister and J Lee, Hanbury and Martin: Modern Equity (20th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) 388. 
13 This development is a logical progression following the older rule that no distinction was to be drawn 
between Christian denominations - Dunne v Byrne [1912] AC 407. 
14 R P George, In Defense of Natural Law (Oxford University Press, 1999) 5. Analysis in chapter 4 
identified George’s tripartite definition for religion: religion as a basic good; religion dependent upon 
human rationality; and religion as an irreducible aspect of human flourishing. 
15 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
[2013] UKSC 77 [57] (Lord Toulson). The definition is limited to the Places of Worship Registration Act 
1855 and therefore is not authority for the law of charities - A Hudson, Equity and Trusts (9th edn, 
Routledge, 2016) 999. 
16 Glister and Lee (n 12) 369. For instance, section 3 of the Charities Act 2011. 
17 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
[2013] UKSC 77 [63] (Lord Toulson). 
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justiciable.18 This matches concerns that have been raised surrounding control 
being placed over religion by the law.19 That being said, it is arguable that the 
Supreme Court is exactly the right sort of arena for these issues to be discussed. 
The justices of the Supreme Court provide independent legal judgment20 and are 
frequently to be found engaging with matters of law and religion.21  
This definition also conflicts with the analysis concerning George’s tripartite 
approach to religion that was introduced in chapter 4.4; a definition that was 
provided to analyse the right to religious freedom. This is because religion is not 
seen as an irreducible aspect of human flourishing. The connection between 
religious liberty and human flourishing was a key observation made in analysing 
George’s approach to religious liberty law. The protection required for religious 
liberty will be shown later in this chapter to be necessary to support the good of 
religion that leads to human flourishing. 
I depart from the Supreme Court’s approach because there is nothing explicit, 
however, in Lord Toulson’s definition that specifically highlights or acknowledges 
the protection required by religious liberty, in order to protect the good that leads 
to human flourishing. By recognising a plurality of faiths and a wide spectrum of 
morality in R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
reference is made to a ‘group of adherents’. There is no explanation given here 
surrounding religious freedom, rather, the focus is more instructive in ‘teach[ing] 
its adherents how to live their lives’. It is suggested that this lack of focus upon 
religious liberty in R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
leads to greater attention being paid to the ethical definition given by Dillon J in 
the earlier Re South Place Ethical Society: ‘ethics are concerned with man’s 
relations with man’.22 The focus is switched from worship of a deity as an aspect 
of religious liberty to a solely human focus. This approach conflicts with Dillon J’s 
favoured approach in which religion was clearly concerned with man’s 
                                                          
18 O’Halloran (n 11) 181. 
19 See R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 98; J Rivers, ‘The Secularisation 
of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14(3) Ecc. L.J. 371, 398. 
20 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
21 Bull and another v Hall and another [2013] UKSC 73 [45]; R (on the application of Hodkin and another) 
v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] UKSC 77; Shergill v Khaira [2014] UKSC 33; 
Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68. 
22 Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565, 1571. For more discussion see P W Edge, 
‘Determining Religion in English Courts’ (2012) 1(2) Ox. J Law Religion 402. 
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relationship with God.23 By moving from a clear focus providing religious liberty 
being connected to a deity, this different focus may lead to a reduced, unclear 
role for religious freedom and so conflict with the account provided by George. 
A further problem for the meaning of religion is that Lord Toulson’s comments 
may be considered vague and amorphous. References are made to ‘man’s place 
in the universe’ and ‘the infinite’ and both have broad theological leanings. We 
have also seen that teaching a ‘group of adherents’ how to live has ethical 
teaching connotations. The lack of specificity given in R (Hodkin) v Registrar 
General of Births, Deaths and Marriages may prove problematic for different 
religions. Prior to the Charities Act 2006, charities law had ‘separated religion off 
from other forms of belief by reference to the existence of belief in a god or 
gods.’24 If there is, as above, no need for there to be reference to a god/gods, 
how is a religion to be distinguished from other competing belief systems?25 It is 
identified that a code of living in accordance with belief in a group context is one 
possible factor.26 This has merit because it accords with the finding that 
Scientology is a religion27 and further may accommodate other recognised belief 
systems such as paganism.28 As such, although the understanding of religion in 
R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages29 is to be 
considered vague and without explicit reference to religious freedom, there may 
be one specific benefit: by recognising Scientology under the Places of Worship 
Registration Act 1855, there is an implicit tendency towards religious freedom by 
allowing a wider consideration. An implicit outworking is that greater religious 
freedom may be achieved by promoting groups that are generally considered to 
be religions outside outdated meanings given for religion. It is arguable that 
Paganism and Scientology should find favour in the understanding of religion, or 
at least the meaning should be open to such bodies for consideration. Through 
the modification of George’s thought required to analyse religious freedom, 
                                                          
23 Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565, 1571. 
24 Hudson, Equity and Trusts (n 15) 996. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid 997-998. 
27 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
[2013] UKSC 77. 
28 For an argument that Paganism should fall within the meaning of religion see - A Iwobi, ‘Out with the 
old, in with the new: religion, charitable status and the Charities Act’ (2009) 29(4) Legal Studies 620, 
629. 
29 R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
[2013] UKSC 77. 
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religious liberty was identified in chapter 4 as a public good.30 So by finding 
Scientology to be a religion the law therefore has followed suit by promoting 
religious liberty for Scientology in this manner. 
The reference to ‘infinite’ in R (Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages also displays the problems that the courts experience in evaluating an 
inherently spiritual, transcendent order. George takes a more pro-active stand for 
religion – George adopts a protective position for religion. It will be argued later 
in this chapter that George adopts a legal test31 to provide protection for religious 
individuals from the state. Further, it was identified in chapter 3 that George has 
drawn influence from Hobbes by insisting on natural rights held against the state, 
in particular providing protection against ‘overreaching governments.’32  
This protective position for religion is reflected in the view proffered by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), whereby a person’s views ‘attain a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance’;33 this actively 
prevents the State assessing the expression or legitimacy of these religious 
beliefs and the question of what is required by a religious or other belief is now to 
be tested subjectively.34 I argue that when analysing George’s thought this 
protective position for religion instead provides a readily enforceable position for 
religious freedom under equality law and the exercise of religious liberty in the 
workplace as a natural right,35 as courts and tribunals must engage in a more 
serious examination of Article 9 in interpreting employment legislation.36 Arguably 
this is a move which can only benefit the exercise of religious liberty. This is 
because it accords more with NNL by fulfilling requests for a return to ‘freedom 
of religion or belief for all’.37 This is to be welcomed because in effect a breach of 
                                                          
30 R P George, ‘Keynote Address: Religious Freedom: Why Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’ 
(Berkeley Centre for Religion, Peace and World Affairs; Georgetown University, 1 March 2012) 
<http://vimeo.com/38096383> accessed 8th May 2012. 
31 Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993. 
32 R P George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (Isi Books, 
2013) 114. 
33 Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ (2013) 42 ILJ 4, 403. This reflects the earlier judgment in Campbell and 
Cosans v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293. 
34 Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ (n 33) 403. The test set down in Eweida is now: a ‘sufficiently close and 
direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief’ – Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom 
(2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [82]. 
35 This would here be the natural right to freedom identified in: H L A Hart, ‘Are there any natural 
rights?’ (1955) 64 Philosophical Review 175-91, 175. 
36 Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ (n 33) 403. 
37 M Evans, ‘Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belief: Agendas for Change’ (2012) 1(1) Ox J. Law Religion 
5, 13. 
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Article 9 rights is a form of religious discrimination. It is a form of discrimination 
which can also been seen acting as a form of cultural discrimination.38 The 
importance of this is shown in the protection set out within Article 9: in the 
structure of Article 9 only the manifestation of religion or belief may be subject to 
the limitations set out in Art 9(2), general freedom of religions are absolute rights 
not subject to any limitations.39 
The Equality Act 2010 – religion or belief 
I now begin to look at the legislation impacting religion, legislation which will be 
important when applying George’s thought to analyse the protection for religious 
freedom. It has been argued that the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010) is ‘not the end 
of the struggle for equality, but it is a new beginning.’40 This Act provides an 
important opportunity to stop discrimination that demeans individuals. It will be 
argued in this section that, although the intentions behind the EqA 201041 in 
relation to religion and belief were admirable,42 the enforcements of these 
intentions in case law, such as Eweida,43 are less so. This will be shown to be 
the case especially in a ‘democratic society’,44 which has forced a significant shift 
from ‘non-discrimination to anti-discrimination’45 in the legislation and case law 
focus outlined above. For instance, the English appellate courts have 
encountered great difficulty in addressing questions of religious discrimination 
particularly in the context of equality law. The implementation of the Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, since replaced by the Equality Act 
2010, has made it impossible for courts to avoid this issue,46 because religion or 
belief is listed as a ‘protected characteristic’ under s.4 of the EqA 2010.  
                                                          
38 Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) 73. 
39 J Dingemans, ‘The need for a principled approach to religious freedoms’ (2012) 12(3) Ecc. L.J. 2012 
371, 371-372. 
40 B Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (Hart, 2011) 186. 
41 Lord Bingham identified the idea of equality before the law as a ‘cornerstone of our society’ - T 
Bingham, The Rule of Law (Allen Lane, 2010) 55. 
42 For instance, removing disadvantage and increasing ethnic minority participation in public life.  
43 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). This is not to say many of the provisions within the Equality Act 2010 are not valuable. 
The majority are very beneficial and welcome. This chapter critiques solely the provisions with the EqA 
2010 concerning religion or belief. 
44 Bayatyan v Armenia (2011) 54 EHRR 467 [494] – here the ECtHR stressed the importance of Article 9 
rights in a democratic society. 
45 R Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13(2) Ecc. L.J. 157, 159.  
46 Pitt, ‘Keeping the Faith: Trends and Tensions in Religion or Belief Discrimination’ (n 14) 384. 
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In chapter 4.2 it was noted that equality legislation has led to excessive 
integration of equality law in the area of religion and belief.47 Chapter 4 highlighted 
problems with the way that, for instance, the public sector equality duty interacts 
with religion. As such, the EqA 2010 has caused concerns about the way equality 
law has been connected to religion and belief. Religious equality law now 
dominates matters involving religion and belief.48  
As a consequence there is now a ‘growing tension’ between Article 9 rights and 
the anti-discrimination provisions of the EqA 2010,49 with equality law now 
starting to take over from the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) as the greater cause 
of increased litigation – such disputes are more frequently being framed in terms 
of anti-discrimination and not in liberty claims.50 If equality law is increasingly 
being used, with an impact that is driving religion out of public discourse, then 
this may prevent employees with religious convictions from litigating to protect 
their rights. This difficulty for religious equality law is a difficulty found in the 
workplace. The protection offered to the right to manifest religion in the workplace 
will now be considered in light of George’s thought. 
5.2 Human flourishing and the right to manifest religion in the workplace 
This section will display how a modified version of George’s thought supports the 
right to religious freedom. In particular it will focus upon the right to manifest 
religion in the workplace. The first step here is to consider the reasons why 
manifestation of religion in the workplace is problematic. Second, it will be 
considered whether the right to manifest religion shown in Eweida51 is necessary 
to protect human flourishing. This will require engagement with concepts drawn 
from George’s work, in particular human flourishing. Thirdly, the right to manifest 
religion in the workplace will be considered in line with a legal process that can 
both protect and limit manifestations of religious belief: proportionality analysis. 
As such, this section will particularly consider the (lack of) proportionality analysis 
                                                          
47 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 40) 177. 
48 For instance, it was suggested in chapter 4.2 that religious equality law prevents claimants being able 
to effectively rely upon Articles 9 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR). 
49 M Hill, ‘Religious Symbolism and Conscientious Objection in the Workplace: An Evaluation of 
Strasbourg’s Judgment in Eweida and others v United Kingdom’ (2013) 15(2) Ecc. L.J. 191, 2013. 
50 Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (n 19) 382. 
51 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
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in Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan.52 Finally, this section will turn back 
to the proportionality tensions identified in Eweida53 to apply George’s thought 
and assess the right surrounding manifestation of belief. By taking these steps 
this section will show that the right to manifest religion in the workplace is 
necessary to protect the good of religion that leads to human flourishing. This will 
argue that the analysis of George’s thought is helpful in analysing the right to 
religious freedom. 
The manifestation of religion in the workplace has proven to be very problematic. 
Does case law recognise that employees have a right to manifest religion in their 
workplace? In Eweida54 the ECtHR found that Ms Eweida, as an employee, had 
a right to manifest her religion in the workplace: domestic law55 did not strike the 
right balance between the protection of Ms Eweida’s right to manifest her religion 
and the rights of others.56 Further Ms Ladele’s and Mr McFarlane’s (conjoined 
applicants) religious beliefs were the direct motivation for their objection to carry 
out certain duties; this was held to be sufficient to engage Article 9 of the ECHR 
                                                          
52 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68. 
53 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
54 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). This case was explored (and introduced) in detail in chapter 1 because of its centrality to 
the thesis. A short re-introduction is that Ms Eweida, a British Airways employee, was successful in her 
claim of discrimination against her employer who breached her right to manifest religion in the 
workplace by wearing a cross. This was held to be contrary to Article 9 of the ECHR. The ECtHR held that 
by denying Ms Eweida her right to wear a cross, domestic law did not strike the right balance between 
the protection of Ms Eweida’s right to manifest her religious and the rights of others - Eweida and 
Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) 
[79]. The ECtHR determined that the domestic courts had given too much weight to BA’s wish to protect 
its corporate image - Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [112]-[114]. It was decided that domestic law did not therefore 
protect Ms Eweida’s right to freedom of religion and so this case promotes the protection for religion 
offered by Article 9 - Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [66]. 
55 In contrast, the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the same case held that Article 9 of the ECHR was 
inapplicable since the restriction on wearing a cross visibly at work did not constitute an interference 
with the manifestation of belief - Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80 [22] (Sedley LJ). Here 
Sedley LJ believed he was following the ECtHR decision in Kalac v Turkey (1997) 27 EHRR 522, s.27, 
which stated: ‘Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or a belief. 
Moreover, in exercising his freedom to manifest his religion, an individual may need to take his specific 
situation into account’. Sedley LJ’s interpretation was deemed by the ECtHR in Eweida to place too little 
weight on the legitimacy of Ms Eweida’s manifested religious belief - Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] 
EWCA Civ 80 [94].  
56 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [79]. The courts here held Ms Eweida’s desire to manifest her religious belief was of 
value to an individual – ibid [94] [Partly dissenting judgment]. This highlights the affirmation of Article 9 
and the place of religion.  
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in Eweida.57 Donald considers this an important step as overall Article 9 is 
becoming ‘insufficiently and erratically protected in the courts’.58 Ms Eweida’s 
manifestation of religious belief being protected under Article 9 is considered to 
be important by Donald. This is to the extent that ‘almost every case brought with 
reference to the religion clauses of the European Convention has failed in the 
British domestic courts’.59 It will be argued in this section that the intentions of 
Parliament implementing the religious liberty protections in the EqA 2010 were 
admirable. These were intentions such as removing disadvantage and increasing 
participation in public life; however, it will be shown that the enforcement of these 
intentions in case law and under the application of George’s thought are less so 
in a democratic society. As such, following these admirable intentions it has been 
argued that it is easy to accept that equality is a ‘good thing’ without stopping to 
question what supports such a belief and what factors drive intentions to 
implement religious equality law.60 
The right to manifest religion is necessary to protect human flourishing 
Before it can be shown that employees have any rights to engage equality law 
under our critical application of George’s thought, it is necessary to establish a 
connection between the critique of George’s NNL and equality law. Hepple has 
defined an ‘equal society’ as one which ‘protects and promotes equal, real 
freedom and substantive opportunity to live in the ways people value and would 
choose, so that everyone can flourish.’61 For Hepple, much like within NNL, 
equality within society is connected to flourishing.  
It will now be established by engaging George’s thought, whether the right to 
manifest religion secured in Eweida62 is necessary to protect human flourishing. 
This requires engagement with the concept of flourishing. Flourishing, and in 
                                                          
57 Ibid [103, 108] (Fourth Section). 
58 A Donald, ‘Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights: Grounds for 
optimism’ (2013) 2(1) OJLR 50, 51. 
59 Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (n 11) 380; Rivers, The Law of Organized 
Religions (n 7) 320. 
60 Trigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion (Oxford University Press, 2012) 2. 
61 Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 40) 12 – here citing The Equalities Review Panel, 
‘Fairness and Freedom: the Final Report on the Equalities Review’ (Equal Rights Trust, 27 February 2007) 
<http://www.equalrightstrust.org/content/fairness-and-freedom-final-report-equalities-review> 
accessed 25th August 2015.  
62 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [79]. 
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particular human flourishing is very important for George.63 In chapter 4.4, 
analysis highlighted the definition for human flourishing.64 I will elaborate upon 
this concept here. Human flourishing was earlier considered to be important 
because it is linked to the attainment of religious freedom.65 The good of religion 
requires religious freedom66 and in establishing the connection between religious 
freedom and human flourishing, George writes that ‘[r]eligion is a basic human 
good, an intrinsic and irreducible aspect of the well-being and flourishing of 
human persons’.67 For George, it is clear that to attain and secure religious 
freedom requires the protection of the right to religious liberty, in order to achieve 
human flourishing.68 
It has been shown above that the protection required by religious liberty 
(highlighted by manifestation of belief being protected) is necessary in order to 
protect the good that leads to human flourishing. This is an important observation 
for religious freedom. As this thesis argues that religious liberty currently conflicts 
with religious equality law, this connection between religious liberty and human 
flourishing allows the possible application of the analysis of George’s thought to 
equality legislation and associated case law.  
Turning to the relevant case law, Hill believes that the judgment in Eweida69 
formed an ‘uncompromising reaffirmation of the importance of the Art. 9 right to 
freedom of religion and belief’.70 Indeed, there is consensus in the literature that 
Eweida establishes a right under Article 9 for employees to manifest their religion 
in the workplace.71 Does this manifestation of religion in the workplace also 
                                                          
63 Chapter 1 outlined that George grounds his conception of human flourishing on the Aristotelian 
notion of eudaimonia. 
64 Human flourishing was argued to be a constitutive aspect for George’s definition of religion. 
65 In chapter 4.4 I analysed George’s approach to the Declaration of the Relation of the Church to Non-
Christian Religions (Nostra Aetate) which directly links religious liberty to human fulfilment - Pope Paul 
VI, ‘Declaration on the Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, NOSTRA AETATE’ (Holy See, 28 
October 1965) <http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html> accessed 8th May 2012. 
66 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 32) 119. 
67 R P George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford University Press, 1994) 221. 
68 R P George, ‘Keynote Address: Religious Freedom: Why Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’ 
(Berkeley Centre for Religion, Peace and World Affairs; Georgetown University, 1 March 2012) 
<http://vimeo.com/38096383> accessed 8th May 2012. See also George, Conscience and its Enemies: 
Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 32) 75. 
69 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). This case was introduced at length in chapter 1. 
70 M Hill, ‘Religion at Work’ (2013) 163 NLJ 89, 90. 
71 For example: McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 13) 211; M Pearson, ‘Article 9 at 
a Crossroads: Interference Before and After Eweida’ (2013) HRLR 1, 22; Hill, ‘Religious Symbolism and 
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include views upon ethical and moral questions? For instance, does this include 
George’s view that the natural law is inherent in making moral conclusions?72 The 
fourth section of the ECtHR has stated that because religious beliefs prescribe 
views upon moral questions, this leads to these views generated being termed a 
‘manifestation of ... religion and belief’.73 This further supports the manifestation 
of religion because it prescribes the contentious duty for the state to protect and 
secure these rights under Article 9.74 It also arguably provides guidance for 
member states when applying the limitations for indirect discrimination provided 
for in Article 9(2), as ‘manifestations of religious belief’ will only be limited subject 
to the proportionality balancing exercise undertaken by the courts under Article 
9(2).  
Manifestation and proportionality analysis 
The right to manifest religion in the workplace will now be considered in line with 
a legal process that can both protect and limit manifestation of religion and belief: 
proportionality analysis. Given that the concept of proportionality has a long 
history75 and can mean different things in different contexts, it is important to 
identify the proportionality analysis being criticised in this thesis. Proportionality 
provides a method for justifying interference with a Convention right that is 
permitted by the courts.76 Neil Addison puts it well: ‘[i]n essence, proportionality 
means a balance between what is the alleged discriminatory effect and the 
importance of the aim pursued.’77 This is a balancing act which requires analysis 
                                                          
Conscientious Objection in the Workplace: An Evaluation of Strasbourg’s Judgment in Eweida and others 
v United Kingdom’ (n 10) 193. 
72 See George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 67). For instance, a moral 
position within law: a philosophical belief in the BBC was held to gain protection under equality law 
within Maistry v BBC [2011] ET 1313142/2010. 
73 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [108] (Fourth Section majority judgment). 
74 Sir James Munby has considered that Article 9 of the ECHR requires the courts to ‘pay every respect to 
the individual’s….religious principles.’ J Munby, ‘Law, Morality and Religion in the Family Courts’ (2014) 
Ecc. L.J. 131, 137. For this reason Article 9 protects both ‘religion’ and ‘belief’. 
75 For instance in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700, Lord Reed fascinatingly traces 
proportionality reasoning to German constitutional law, Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle - Bank Mellat v 
HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700 [68] (Lord Reed). 
76 This concept of proportionality was most clearly set out by Mummery LJ in R (Elias) v Secretary of 
State for Defence [2006] 1 WLR 3213 [165]; see also Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700 
[20] (Lord Sumption). 
77 N Addison, Religious Discrimination and Hatred Law (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 71.  
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by the court.78 It is a balancing act that seeks to avoid unnecessary limitations of 
rights by taking, for instance, religious interests into consideration.79 
Proportionality has been shown throughout this thesis to be at the centre of 
religious freedom tensions. Indeed, proportionality is held to be inherent within 
the whole of the Convention.80 The scope of proportionality is therefore broad and 
powerful. Evidently this scope would include Article 9 and 14 rights. Hence this is 
why manifestation of religion is subject to proportionality analysis. This can be 
seen in Eweida because, as introduced in chapter 1, the ECtHR weighed ‘the 
proportionality of the measures taken by a company in respect of its employee.’81 
They considered whether the imposition of a dress code (prohibiting 
manifestation of religion) was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim (a company brand and image). As was detailed in chapter 1, it was by this 
process that the ECtHR decided that Ms Eweida’s Article 9 rights had been 
infringed.82 It was by this process that the protection offered to the right to 
manifest religion in the workplace was secured for Ms Eweida. 
This protection for the manifestation of religion and belief secured by 
proportionality analysis would be a move endorsed by Robert George. The 
protection given to manifestation of religion and belief in the workplace is 
necessary to support and guard the good that leads to human flourishing. This is 
an important observation that I have taken from George’s thought in order to 
critique religious freedom and show protection for the good of religion. Chapter 
4.4 analysed George’s tripartite approach to religion, and George is very clear 
that everyone should enjoy the right to manifest their religious belief and should 
not suffer discrimination when doing so.83 The protection for the manifestation of 
religion is important because it prevents the English courts from ‘assum[ing] that 
they know enough about Christianity to be able to determine what does and does 
                                                          
78 See further: E Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart, 1999); Y Arai-
Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in Jurisprudence 
(Intersentia, 2002) 14-16, 190-205; T Harbo, The Function of Proportionality Analysis in European Law 
(Brill Nijhoff, 2015) 63-99; F Urbina, A Critique of Proportionality and Balancing (Cambridge University 
Press, 2017) 4-12. 
79 L Vickers, ‘Twin approaches to secularism: organized religion and society’ (2012) 32(1) OJLS 197, 209. 
80 Sporrong and Lonroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35 [69]. 
81 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [94]. 
82 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [79]. 
83 R P George, The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion and Morality in Crisis (ISI Books, 2001) 6. 
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not count as a necessary manifestation of such a belief.’84 The courts have 
seemingly come close to this position, for instance in McFarlane v Relate Avon 
Ltd85 Underhill J was prepared to accept that an objection to a manifestation of 
religious belief might effectively be an objection to the belief itself, if the context 
showed no other reason for the employer’s action.86  
As we have now seen that the right to manifest religion in the workplace was 
secured by proportionality analysis in Eweida, this section will now turn to 
consider the lack of proportionality analysis in the important later decision in 
Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan before I then identify the preferred 
proportionality test.87 A further restriction and interpretation imposed upon 
manifestation of religious belief (in particular religious conscience) can be seen 
in Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan.88 
Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan – manifestation of religion and 
proportionality analysis 
The Supreme Court considered freedom of religious conscience in Greater 
Glasgow Health Board v Doogan.89 It is an example of a missed opportunity to 
consider the right to manifest religion in the workplace. This case highlights an 
instance where equality law interacts with freedom of conscience. Miss Doogan 
and Mrs Wood were both practising Roman Catholics. Both worked at South 
General Hospital in Glasgow as Labour Ward Co-ordinators, and they objected 
to having any involvement in the process of abortion. Although this case 
originated in Scotland, the relevant legislation is the same in Scotland as in 
England and Wales.90 This makes the judgment important as an indication of the 
scope of the Abortion Act 1967 and the Equality Act 2010 in England as well. 
Section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 was in issue in this case because the Supreme 
Court considered the right to conscientious objection to abortion. Section 4(1) of 
the Abortion Act 1967 states:  
                                                          
84 McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 212. See R (Williamson and Others) v 
Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15 [23]. 
85 McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] IRLR 196 [18]-[19] (Underhill J). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68. 
90 Section 217 of the Equality Act 2010. 
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‘(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no person shall be under any duty, 
whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate 
in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection: 
Provided that in any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious 
objection shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it.’ 
The “conscience clause” in s.4(1) of the Abortion Act 1967 was identified as the 
key in determining the scope of the right of conscientious objection,91 and in 
particular the phrase ‘to participate in’, which protects an individual from 
participating in an abortion. As such, the key question was one of pure statutory 
construction.92 
Lady Hale’s analysis followed Lord Diplock’s judgment in Royal College of 
Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security93 in 
deciding that the Abortion Act 1967 authorised the whole course of treatment 
bringing about the abortion.94 Lady Hale agreed with Lord Diplock that the clear 
policy brought about by the wording in the Abortion Act 1967 was to, ‘broaden 
the grounds upon which an abortion might lawfully be obtained and to ensure that 
abortion was carried out with all proper skill and in hygienic conditions.’95 The key 
point for impact on freedom of religious conscience and religious equality law is 
that Lady Hale’s statutory construction then built upon this by adopting a narrow 
meaning in relation to what is meant by to participate in the course of treatment, 
for the purposes of the conscience clause under section 4 of the Abortion Act 
1967.96 This was because in drafting the conscience clause it was unlikely that, 
‘Parliament had in mind the host of ancillary, administrative and managerial 
tasks’.97 Here Lady Hale ascribed a narrow meaning for the purposes of 
conscientious objection. For instance, it was held that participation ‘means taking 
part in a “hands-on” capacity.’98 Lady Hale interpreted the intention of Parliament 
                                                          
91 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [10]-[11] (Lady Hale). 
92 Ibid [11] (Lady Hale). 
93 Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 
800. 
94 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [33] (Lady Hale). See Royal College of Nursing 
of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800 [828A] (Lord Diplock). 
95 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [27] (Lady Hale). See Royal College of Nursing 
of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800 [827D] (Lord Diplock). 
96 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [37-38] (Lady Hale). 
97 Ibid [38] (Lady Hale). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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in a way that excluded ancillary, administrative and supervisory tasks in the 
course of treatment in question.  
By holding this narrow meaning, these arguments then led to the statutory 
interpretation being applied to a number of hypothetical scenarios. Here Lady 
Hale practically applied the Abortion Act 1967 to the context of particular roles 
and situations faced in the workplace by midwives.99 For instance, Lady Hale 
applied the conscience clause to the job description of the Labour Ward Co-
ordinator,100 in order to decide whether the particular examples satisfied her 
Ladyship’s interpretation of the statutory wording. This found the conscience 
clause to be narrower in scope than that put forward by the midwives. The whole 
course of treatment included work activity not included in the narrow conscience 
clause.101 As such, the nurses’ complete job description was not covered by the 
conscience clause; the nurses were required to perform services that infringed 
their religious conscience but which were not covered by the statutory conscience 
clause. 
Religious freedom in relation to equality law was raised in the judgment.102 In 
deciding that the case concerned solely statutory construction, Lady Hale 
considered (and dismissed) important arguments that involve religious freedom 
and equality law. These were labelled by Lady Hale as ‘Two distractions’.103 Lady 
Hale considered that any argument made under the Equality Act 2010 should be 
made under a different forum. Doogan was held to resolve issues involving 
statutory interpretation; Doogan was not the correct setting to resolve matters of 
indirect discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. Lady Hale came to this 
conclusion for two reasons: first, Lady Hale considered whether the employer 
should adopt ‘reasonable adjustments’ in the job in order to cater for the nurses’ 
religious beliefs.104 Reasonable accommodation to cater for the religious beliefs 
of the employees was held to depend upon ‘issues of practicability which are 
                                                          
99 Ibid [39] (Lady Hale). 
100 A Henderson, ‘Conscientious objection to abortion: Catholic Midwives lose in the Supreme Court’ (UK 
Human Rights Blog, 28 December 2014) <https://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2014/12/28/conscientious-
objection-to-abortion-catholic-midwives-lose-in-supreme-court/> accessed 18th September 2017. 
101 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [39]-[40] (Lady Hale). See further B Hale, 
‘Secular Judges and Christian Law’ (2015) 17(2) Ecc. L.J. 170, 177. 
102 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [24] (Lady Hale). 
103 Ibid [22] (Lady Hale). 
104 Ibid [24] (Lady Hale). 
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much better suited to resolution in the employment tribunal proceedings’.105 
Therefore the issue of reasonable accommodation was considered to be better 
suited to resolution in the proceedings that the respondent had also brought in 
the employment tribunal. In writing extra-judicially Baroness Hale has identified 
that the issue whether employers could reasonably be expected to make 
reasonable adjustments to accommodate the midwives’ belief is considered a 
separate question.106 The concept of reasonable accommodation will be 
analysed at length in chapter 5.4. 
The second argument alluded to by the Supreme Court questioned whether there 
was a need to apply a proportionality test to decide about limiting manifestation 
of belief following Eweida and Others v United Kingdom.107 This is key because 
although we have seen above that the case was not explicitly analysed in these 
terms, the fact that Lady Hale cites Eweida and suggests ‘[r]efusing for religious 
reasons to perform some of the duties of the job is likely…to be held to be a 
manifestation of a religious belief’108 this frames the rest of the debate. The 
manifestation of belief was here considered to be the nurses’ conscious objection 
to performing services directly connected to abortions,109 and this invoked 
mention about indirect discrimination under the Equality Act 2010.110 A judgment 
surrounding the issue of discrimination under equality law was not given. Lady 
Hale considered this to involve ‘difficult questions’111 because such questions 
would involve proportionality analysis under Article 9(2) of the ECHR, and so 
question whether restrictions placed upon the manifestation by the employers 
was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.112 This was held not to 
be helpful because the answers would not assist in the preferred approach 
(statutory analysis) adopted by Lady Hale in this case.113 The answers would not 
necessarily point to ‘either a wide or a narrow reading of section 4 of the 1967 
                                                          
105 Ibid [24] (Lady Hale). 
106 Hale, ‘Secular Judges and Christian Law’ (n 101) 177. 
107 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
108 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [23] (Lady Hale). 
109 Ibid [23] (Lady Hale). See further, J Kentridge, ‘Case Comment: Greater Glasgow Health Board v 
Doogan & Anor [2014] UKSC 68’ (UK Supreme Court Blog, 20 January 2015) <http://ukscblog.com/case-
comment-greater-glasgow-health-board-v-doogan-anor-2014-uksc-68/> accessed 15th September 2017. 
110 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [23]-[24] (Lady Hale). 
111 Ibid [23] (Lady Hale). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Kentridge, ‘Case Comment: Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan & Anor [2014] UKSC 68’ (n 109). 
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Act.’114 For this reason the answers were deemed ‘context specific’.115 Instead, 
Lady Hale found it helpful to set a clear limit set down from the employer to the 
employee and instead, as we have seen, clearly adopted the ‘ordinary principles 
of statutory construction.’116 This was because this would ‘set a limit to what an 
employer may lawfully require of his employees.’117 I suggest that in this respect 
the judgment was admirable because taking this approach helpfully provides 
clear guidance involving conscience exemptions to both hospitals and midwives. 
As a result of the case there are clearer guidelines given for the scope of 
conscientious objection under the Abortion Act 1967. 
By considering manifestation of religion in Doogan, we can see that Baroness 
Hale rejected balancing the need to provide abortion services with midwives’ 
religious conscience. It is nevertheless clear throughout this thesis that balancing 
the interests of society with those of religious individuals, involves weighing (and 
potentially restricting) religious rights.  
For instance in Doogan, the Supreme Court considered that refusal to perform 
abortion services for religious reasons was likely to be held to be a manifestation 
of religious belief,118 and for the reasons given above rejected the need to employ 
the proportionality analysis to question whether the restriction of a religious right 
was a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim to provide hospital 
services in accordance with Article 9(2).119 The need for a clear limit providing 
guidance for conscientious objection, in the provision of abortion services, was 
met.  
On the other hand, I suggest that the statutory construction approach by the 
Supreme Court (providing guidance) potentially decides the question in an 
illogical manner. Just because arguably a valid legal test does not help the 
preferred mode of legal analysis, this does not mean that this test should be 
abandoned. The proportionality analysis was a perfectly valid option open to the 
Supreme Court here. A preferable approach is that when the Supreme Court is 
invited to interpret a rule affecting a fundamental right, they should do so against 
                                                          
114 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [23] (Lady Hale). 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid [24] (Lady Hale). 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid [23] (Lady Hale). 
119 Kentridge, ‘Case Comment: Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan & Anor [2014] UKSC 68’ (n 109). 
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the background of the underlying balance of principles. In other words, to interpret 
s.4(1) of the Abortion Act 1967 properly requires the court to consider what 
limitations of freedom of conscience are justified. The underlying balance of 
principles was the same and equally relevant both in the statutory interpretation 
rule and any other question of indirect discrimination. As such, following the use 
of the proportionality analysis in Eweida,120 proportionality under Article 9(2) of 
the ECHR was highly relevant and would have addressed the issue of 
manifestation of belief surrounding individual conscience here. Richard Ekins, for 
instance, has termed it ‘extraordinary’ that the Supreme Court did not reflect on 
Article 9 of the ECHR.121  
The Supreme Court should not dispense with a valid legal option merely because 
an easier option (in the form of statutory interpretation/construction) presents 
itself. It is arguable that if the Supreme Court had considered what limitations of 
freedom of conscience are justified, then the decision may have been more 
favourable to the nurses’ religious rights. There was a missed opportunity to 
invoke the proportionality analysis under Article 9(2) of the ECHR and so a 
corresponding opportunity to (potentially) allow for more protection to be given to 
the protection of manifestation of religious belief in the workplace. Here this was 
freedom of religious conscience.  
Alastair Henderson argues that the ruling in Doogan makes clear that the law 
requires employers to respect the conscience of their employees, to the extent 
that they do not need to directly participate in abortion.122 He identifies that this is 
a narrow victory for religious freedom – it is one that recognises a limited respect 
for freedom of religious conscience. Such a level of respect is welcome in 
hospitals. As Henderson points out this is also for the sake of women undergoing 
an abortion procedure, because presumably they would rather not be treated by 
someone who strongly disagrees with what is happening.123 The problem with the 
decision in Doogan, however, is that in this case there were two opportunities for 
protecting religious belief and both were missed: neither the manifestation of the 
                                                          
120 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom [2013] (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [83]-[84], [100]-[101], [104]-[106].  
121 R Ekins, ‘Abortion, Conscience and Interpretation - Case Comment: Greater Glasgow Health Board v 
Doogan [2014] UKSC 68’ (2016) 132 LQR 6, 11.  
122 Henderson, ‘Conscientious objection to abortion: Catholic Midwives lose in the Supreme Court’ (n 
100). 
123 Ibid. 
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midwives’ religious beliefs, nor the reasonable accommodation of these beliefs 
were secured. This suggests that rather than respecting conscience, Doogan was 
a missed opportunity and therefore continues to limit conscience. The Supreme 
Court instead ‘undercut the provision that Parliament made to protect 
conscience.’124 This will require the modification of George’s thought to provide 
an express position for freedom of religious conscience later in this thesis. 
The failure here to protect manifestation of religious conscience highlights a 
limitation placed upon religious liberty. Legal liberty is not guaranteed for those 
willing to defend their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
following Doogan. This is surprising because following Eweida it may have been 
reasonable to assume that domestic courts would be more willing to protect 
religious conscience. This has not been the case. Miss Doogan and Miss Wood 
did not see their manifestation of their religious belief being protected. As such, 
this shows a limitation upon the public good of religion when exercised by the 
individual. The promotion of religion as a public good is needed to extend 
protection for matters of individual freedom of religious conscience. 
It has now been shown that there was a lack of proportionality analysis when 
deciding about limiting manifestation of religion and belief in Doogan. As such, 
now that proportionality analysis impacting the manifestation of religious belief 
has been highlighted, it is now appropriate to identify the proportionality test that 
is preferred.  
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 
To assess the issue surrounding manifestation of religion and belief we need to 
turn back to the original proportionality tensions125 identified within Eweida.126 
Here the restrictions imposed upon Mr McFarlane, Ms Ladele and Ms Chaplin 
arose out of the fact that their employers were attempting to justify workplace 
duties and obligations (McFarlane and Ladele) and workplace attire (Chaplin and 
Eweida) as requirements to pursue a legitimate aim. This raises the question 
whether a religious believer can be required to do something contrary to their 
                                                          
124 R Ekins, ‘Abortion, Conscience and Interpretation - Case Comment: Greater Glasgow Health Board v 
Doogan [2014] UKSC 68’ (n 121).  
125 Sandberg, ‘The right to discriminate’ (n 45) 157. 
126 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). This was explored in chapter 1.3: ‘The applicants within Eweida and Others v The United 
Kingdom.’ 
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faith. If so does this limit their right to actively manifest their religion? It was 
identified in chapter 4 that to overcome the powerful and broad presumption in 
favour of religious liberty, political authority must meet a ‘very heavy burden’127 
when providing a justification. Here a practical, broad limit is imposed. George 
notes that a legal test, for example in the United States under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act 1993,128 is one way of capturing the presumption and 
the burden to justify a prohibition that bears negatively on religious freedom: ‘a 
neutral law of general applicability must be supported by a compelling state 
interest and represent the least restrictive or intrusive means of protecting or 
serving that interest.’129 This is a proportionality test highlighted by George and 
as part of the application of George’s thought to analyse religious freedom it can 
helpfully be transferred to English case law. 
This differs from existing conceptions of proportionality. The ‘least restrictive or 
intrusive means of protecting or serving that interest’ wording in the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act 1993, is a very high legal standard of review to 
impose.130 Next the ‘compelling state interest’ requirement of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act 1993 can also be considered harder for political 
authority to meet than the equivalent standard in English law.131 The proposed 
proportionality test is a stricter one. It is arguable that this proposed 
proportionality test may provide more protection for religion. For instance, this 
preferred approach could be used to impose a heavy burden upon restriction of 
religious liberty – such as the restrictions to religious liberty taken by the state in 
Eweida. It is a proportionality test that focuses upon causing minimal 
disruption,132 this is because it does not give wide discretion through the 
                                                          
127 R P George, ‘Keynote Address: Religious Freedom: Why Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’ 
(Berkeley Centre for Religion, Peace and World Affairs; Georgetown University, 1 March 2012) 
<http://vimeo.com/38096383> accessed 8th May 2012. 
128 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 is a United States federal law aimed at preventing laws 
that substantially burden a person’s free exercise of their religion. By requiring that government will not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, and holding federal government to be responsible for accepting additional obligations to 
protect religious exercise then religious liberty is prima facie provided with protection. 
129 George, ‘Keynote Address: Religious Freedom: Why Not? Defending an Embattled Human Right’ (n 
30) [Emphasis added]. 
130 It is higher than ‘whether a less intrusive measure could have been used’ - Bank Mellat v HM 
Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700 [20] (Lord Sumption). 
131 See: ‘(i) whether its objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right’ 
- Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700 [20] (Lord Sumption). 
132 For instance, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 includes the prohibitive terms: ‘the least 
restrictive or intrusive means’. 
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‘justification’ and ‘legitimate aims’ given to the courts, for instance, under Article 
9(2) of the ECHR. 
A proportionality test is necessary in order to secure religious freedom under 
English law. George’s proportionality test reflects the difficulty that law 
encounters when dealing with religious belief. English law has already perceived 
religious beliefs restrictively, that is as prima facie ‘chosen’ beliefs.133 Lucy 
Vickers has observed it also to be important that ‘courts do not overstep their 
competence in ruling on matters of faith and doctrine’.134 This is because it seems 
that courts are more ready to restrictively determine both what is and what is not 
core with regard to Christianity than with other faiths, while also giving a ‘cautious 
and formalistic approach to the task of interpreting and applying anti-
discrimination law’.135 For instance, this was the case in Williams v Secretary of 
State for Education and Employment136 where ‘some of the judges were prepared 
to determine what was and what was not required of Christianity, rather than 
considering the religious views of the particular claimants before them.’137  
This contrasts with Lord Hope who famously began his dissenting judgment in R 
(E) v Governing Body of JFS by stating ‘it has long been understood that it is not 
the business of the courts to intervene in matters of religion’.138 Evidently through 
the imposition of the EqA 2010 there is a certain level of intervention, one which 
has led Vickers to comment that the courts are ‘stepping beyond their usual 
boundaries in determining religious issues, with particular reference to comments 
by the courts on issues such whether [sic] particular beliefs are ‘core beliefs’’.139 
This intervention can also be seen through ‘belief’ being interpreted broadly140 
and expansively141 as a positive legal right for the purposes of the EqA 2010 – a 
process that has led to the courts moving from ‘non-discrimination’ towards an 
                                                          
133 E Lim, ‘Religious Exemptions in England’ (2014) 3(3) Ox J. Law Religion 440, 446. See, for instance, 
Eweida v British Airways PLC [2010] EWCA Civ 80 [40] (Sedley LJ). 
134 L Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (2010) 12 Ecc. L.J. 280, 
295. 
135 C O’Cinneide & K Liu, ‘Defining the limits of Discrimination Law in the United Kingdom: Principle and 
Pragmatism in Tension’ (2015) 15(1-2) IJDL 80, 89. 
136 Williams v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2002] EWCA Civ 1926 [76] (Buxton LJ). 
137 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 134) 295. 
138 R (E) v Governing Body of JFS [2010] IRLR 136 (SC). 
139 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 134) 280. 
140 M Pearson, ‘Offensive Expression and the Workplace’ (2014) 43(4) ILJ 429, 440. See: Grainger Plc v 
Nicholson [2010] 2 All ER 253 (EAT); Maistry v BBC (2011) ET/1313142/2010. 
141 Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 19) 83. 
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‘anti-discrimination’ approach.142 This intervention has been argued to be from 
passive toleration to the active promotion of religious freedom as positive legal 
rights.143  
A proportionality test is necessary to secure religious freedom because Eweida144 
has shown that for manifestation of belief, adjudication surrounding manifestation 
of belief in the workplace has been difficult. To resolve any fears that the courts 
are restrictively determining core beliefs differently for Christians as compared to 
other groups of religious believers, Ernest Lim has argued that the courts could 
adopt a different approach in the context of indirect discrimination claims.145 For 
instance, instead of analysing the source and content of belief that should be 
accorded (a qualitative approach) he suggests that the court could instead 
analyse whether the belief is subscribed to by many believers (a quantitative 
approach).146 There are however problems with this suggestion. This is because 
although this approach would be helpful if the number of persons holding a 
particular belief was viewed as a proportion within any religious group - i.e. 
examining what proportion of Christians hold a particular belief may be helpful in 
identifying whether it is a core belief - sincerity of belief is conceptually 
distinguishable from the number of people who subscribe to a belief. Therefore 
adjudication surrounding core beliefs shows that there are further difficulties to 
be found with manifestation of belief and that the preferred proportionality test 
identified above is necessary to secure religious freedom. 
This section has shown that following Eweida147 employees do have the right to 
manifest religion in the workplace. This manifestation was seen to be contingent 
upon the connection I have drawn from religious liberty and the concept of human 
flourishing in George’s work. The protection given to manifest religion in the 
workplace was shown to be necessary to support and guard the good that leads 
to human flourishing. From engagement with the concept of human flourishing 
and a preferred quasi-proportionality test following the Religious Freedom 
                                                          
142 Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (n 45) 157. 
143 Ibid 159; R Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 19) 81, 192. It is submitted a similar process has followed 
for the other protected characteristics. 
144 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
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Restoration Act 1993, the analysis conducted here into George’s thought 
provides a response to any attempt by the state to restrict religious liberty. Anti-
discrimination law, however, has further proven problematic for equality in 
relation to religion and belief – the evaluation of Article 9 presents problems 
surrounding justiciability. This was shown by suggestions that courts have been 
terming certain manifestations as fundamental beliefs. This has infringed 
religious freedom and resulted in the law moving from ‘non-discrimination’ to ‘anti-
discrimination’. The next section will consider whether equality law and George’s 
‘legal liberty’ concept protects employees manifesting their belief against 
pressure to seek employment elsewhere.  
5.3 Legal liberty and the insufficiency of changing jobs to protectfreedom 
of religion  
Chapters 3 and 4 detailed Robert George’s understanding of liberty as a basic 
reason for action within his theory. This section will consider this basis and use 
the modification of George’s thought to address the issue whether freedom to 
change jobs is enough to guarantee religious liberty and so continue the critique 
surrounding the right to religious freedom in equality law. To do so this section 
will engage with the concept of choice. George’s thought will be shown to be 
helpful when analysing this concept. This section will continue to analyse the right 
to freedom of religion by, first, my analysis of an opposition provided towards laws 
restricting religious liberty, via ‘legal liberty’. This section will also, secondly, 
engage with the concept of conscience when considering religious liberty 
restrictions, in particular freedom of religious conscience. By engaging with 
George’s conception of ‘legal liberty’ I will arrive at a position showing how 
freedom to change jobs is insufficient to secure freedom of religion. This issue 
surrounding the freedom to change jobs has arisen from case law because 
liberty, in the form of religious liberty, has encountered difficulty in litigation 
involving Article 9 of the ECHR. For instance, in R (Begum) v Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School,148 Lord Bingham dealing with the question of 
interference with the claimant’s rights under Article 9, stated:  
The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an 
interference with the right to manifest religious belief in practice or 
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observance where a person has voluntarily accepted an employment or 
role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and there 
are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her 
religion without undue hardship or inconvenience.149 
This gives rise to the inference that faced with a conflict between religious 
freedom and another protected characteristic, if the possibility of changing jobs 
is available, this guarantees freedom of religion – a ‘specific situation rule’.150 By 
changing jobs, this prevents conflict by allowing the religious believer to carry on 
in their practice/belief without interfering with another’s rights.151 Gwyneth Pitt has 
argued against this ‘highly restrictive approach’ on the basis that in reality 
employees are rarely in the position to be ‘choosy’ about which jobs they will 
accept and on which terms.152 This highlights the imbalance of power this position 
has enforced. 
This position (the option for the employee to gain employment elsewhere) was 
argued by the UK Government in Eweida.153 The government sought to define 
religion here by the ability of the employees to seek employment elsewhere – a 
‘get another job’154 approach – an approach argued not to impose requirements 
upon individuals incompatible with their religious beliefs. Freedom of religion is 
one of the central tenets of liberalism and as this chapter considers the 
implications of George’s work for religious liberty, was this a restraint upon an 
employee’s religious liberty? The courts have acknowledged the ‘moral 
imperative’ for employers not to discriminate155 but should employers be 
analogously prevented from requiring their employees to find alternative work?  
                                                          
149 Ibid [23]–[24] (Lord Bingham).  
150 Pearson, ‘Article 9 at a Crossroads: Interference Before and After Eweida’ (n 71) 10. Adhar terms this 
a ‘take-it-or-leave-it stance’ - R Adhar, ‘Solemnisation of Same-sex Marriage and Religious Freedom’ 
(2014) 16 Ecc. L.J. 283, 295. 
151 Ahmad v United Kingdom 4 EHRR 126. 
152 Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ (n 33) 401. Pearson has found that for most employment is an 
‘economic necessity’ - M Pearson, ‘Article 9 at a Crossroads: Interference Before and After Eweida’ (n 
30) 11. 
153 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [79] (Majority judgment). 
154 R McCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ (2014) 77(2) MLR 277, 
279. 
155 X v Mid Sussex Citizens Advice Bureau [2012] UKSC 59 1. 
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This has provoked much opinion and criticism. David McIlroy has termed this 
position on alternative employment ‘unjustified and dangerous’.156 The ‘specific 
situation rule’ is held to be dangerous because, as Sandberg believes, this 
approach has confined religion to the ‘private sphere’.157 Religious freedom is 
removed from the public sphere and this practical outcome is a negative one for 
religious freedom.158 A further problem is that enforcing resignation to prevent 
interference with rights would make employment a ‘rights-free zone’.159 As 
individuals are prevented from manifesting their Article 9 rights, instead they are 
faced with finding other employment and so as I continue to analyse the right to 
religious freedom this can be identified as a restriction upon religious liberty.  
In the discussion of liberty in chapter 3 it was shown that George has applied 
John Locke’s natural rights conclusions by appealing to the self-evidency of right 
reason and sociability to reach religious liberty conclusions, through embracing 
the Lockean property right of liberty. Chapter 4 argued the American Constitution 
acts as a paradigm for the discourse of natural rights. In the continued analysis 
applying George’s thought towards religious equality law, this section and also 
the wider chapter argues George’s NNL can impact upon contemporary 
adjudication through the natural law acting as a guiding limit upon authority – a 
check on legislative power.160 
To remind ourselves of how this follows in my analysis of George’s NNL theory: 
chapter 3 argued George’s modification of the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ arises 
from embracing Locke’s natural property right to liberty. It was argued that this 
enlarges the good to encompass the right/rights. Good effectively precedes right 
and rights.161 This led in chapter 4 to the ‘goods-rights synthesis’. This transforms 
liberty, and respect for religious liberty, into a basic reason for action. Liberty is 
reduced to a ‘distinct’ basic human good of religion.162 This is to be held as a 
superior good because it is a good ‘that is uniquely architectonic in shaping one’s 
                                                          
156 McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 212. 
157 Sandberg, Law and Religion (n 19) 98. 
158 See T J Gunn, ‘Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
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pursuit of and participation in all the basic human goods.’163 As seen in chapter 
3, I argued that Locke’s escape from the ‘state of nature’ has led to George’s 
good-based opposition towards enforcement of laws restricting liberty by the 
government. For George, it follows that liberty is essentially a human good; a 
human good which would oppose a restriction on religious freedom and present 
a basic good based opposition to the enforcement of law restricting religious 
liberty.164  
Legal liberty enables freedom from religious equality laws that restrict 
religious liberty 
This good of liberty (‘legal liberty’) that was introduced in chapter 4.3, is 
established through the reasoning process employed by George. For George, it 
is argued that human reason highlights that religious freedom should be treated 
as a fundamental human right to liberty. This fundamental human right is 
supported by the state in rejection of the Hobbesian ‘state of nature.’ This is not 
mere reason revealed by religion, as identified in chapter 2, nor practical 
reasoning as has been modified by George to present NNL. Instead, through 
opting for a pluralistic approach to religious liberty, George provides discernment 
on the good through Rawlsian ‘common human reason.’165 From this position, 
identified in chapter 4, George believes that religious pluralism can incorporate, 
into the basic understanding of the human right to religious liberty, principles and 
arguments available to all men and women by virtue of Rawlsian ‘common human 
reason.’166 For George, democratic reason dictates laws on religious freedom. 
This is because religious freedom demands ‘something on which reasonable 
people of goodwill across the religious and political spectrums should agree on’167 
by those who exercise state power. Logically then, this must be a matter capable 
of being settled by our ‘common human reason.’ Hence ‘common human reason’ 
requires agreement to decide whether courts or legislators should decide whether 
exemptions to general, natural laws should be granted for the sake of religious 
freedom. ‘Legal liberty’ offers a balance to dictate laws concerning religion 
                                                          
163 Ibid. 
164 This is a conclusion supported by Trigg, who further connects any restriction of the good to a 
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through ‘common human reason’. This is one of the ways in which George’s 
thought, with his view of religion as a basic human good, can be used to critique 
religious liberty cases taken under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010. 
George does not specify a solution here; rather, George presents a method. I 
argue that George’s conception of ‘legal liberty’ here enables freedom from 
religious equality laws that restrict religious liberty. 
George’s approach to ‘legal liberty’ can also help us here to analyse the concept 
of choice. The concept of choice was introduced in chapter 4.4. Here choice was 
considered in relation to religion. It was argued that there is arbitrary use of the 
concept of choice, which is shown in a consumerist approach to religion in 
contemporary society. This was held to be different from the use of choice in the 
exercise of practical reason. The concept of choice can be further defined here. 
For instance, an individual expresses freedom when making a choice. It is in this 
sense (freedom) that choice can mirror the arbitrary meaning given in 
contemporary society: as a way of expressing freedom. The concept of choice 
may, however, be considered problematic, particularly as the concept of choice 
relates to religious freedom. This is because often when one makes a choice, this 
choice is often taken from a list. For instance, all actions motivated by religion 
beliefs may be seen as matters of choice, however, in reality a religion typically 
makes demands of its adherents and so obligations imposed upon them limit the 
choices that can be made.168 As such, this limits whether choice can really be 
seen as a way of expressing freedom.169 The combination between the concept 
of choice and the concept of conscience (freedom of religious conscience) is also 
important here. The way that the concept of choice interacts with the concept of 
conscience will be considered a little later in this chapter. 
Applying the analysis of George’s thought to current case law within English law, 
the majority judgment in Eweida170 identified that any approach to restrict 
religious liberty via the ‘get another job approach’ was unjustified because ‘no 
equivalent principle exists in relation to any of the other fundamental freedoms’171 
set out in the ECHR. This ‘belated recognition’172 is the correct reading as the 
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logical conclusion of such a restrictive measure would be to create no-go areas 
in the jobs market for those who have particular religious beliefs,173 ignoring the 
basic right to religious freedom.174 It is also the correct reading because it rejects 
the assumption that underlies the specific situation rule that individuals have 
chosen their religion and must therefore take responsibility for it.175 The Fourth 
Section imposed a proportionality assessment: 
Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the 
Court considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction of 
freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility 
of changing job would negate any interference with the right, the better 
approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when 
considering whether or not the restriction was appropriate.176  
This is to be welcomed as a significant development in the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion;177 a progression towards asserting once more the 
court’s role to safeguard the religious rights of citizens of member states;178 and 
it undermines the reasoning in R (Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of 
Denbigh High School179 by providing an avenue to find interference with 
manifestations of religion and belief rather than showing the ‘specific situation 
rule’ to apply. I argue that this removes a restriction upon ‘legal liberty’. The 
rejection of the ‘specific situation rule’ can be seen to follow a good-based 
opposition against rules (such as the ‘specific situation rule’) that restrict religious 
liberty. As such, the rejection of the ‘specific situation rule’ is endorsed by my 
modification of George’s thought because it allows religion freedom (and freedom 
of religious conscience) to be dictated by ‘common human reason’, rather than 
allowing a restrictive position to continue – one that restricted religious liberty. By 
                                                          
173 McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 212. 
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rejecting the ‘specific situation rule’ the decision in Eweida180 clearly supports 
religious freedom. 
The concept of conscience brought about by the ‘specific situation rule’ 
I have argued that the rejection of the ‘specific situation rule’ is an important 
development for freedom of conscience. The second part of this section will 
engage with the concept of conscience in the context of analysing the right to 
religious liberty against restrictions such as the ‘specific situation rule’. The 
meaning and definition given to conscience in this thesis will now be considered. 
Conscience is an elusive and intangible concept. Indeed, discussion of the 
concept of conscience in philosophy has become quite rare.181 Perhaps this is 
why when George talks about conscience in Conscience and its Enemies, 
George specifically refers to freedom of religious conscience.182 Despite there 
being many different theories about what conscience is,183 I identify that the 
concept of conscience is here explicitly connected with religion. A religious 
conception of conscience is frequently engaged in contemporary human rights 
discourse. For instance, George’s reference matches with the combined 
understanding of conscience and religion set down in Article 9 of the ECHR: 
‘Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion.’ This right is shown to be 
important throughout this thesis because acting against religious conscience is 
prima facie discriminatory, falling within the ambit of Articles 9 and 14 of the 
ECHR. 
This consideration is helpful for us when modifying George’s thought in order to 
analyse the right to religious liberty against restrictions such as the ‘specific 
situation rule’. George creates a problem by only considering conscience in 
relation to religion. This approach creates problems for here assessing a full, 
developed understanding surrounding the concept of conscience. George’s 
position on conscience can be criticised for two reasons. First, George’s 
approach can be criticised because it portrays a ‘limiting individualistic 
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tendency’.184 The ‘limiting individualistic tendency’ in this complaint comes about 
by regarding freedom of conscience as primarily a matter of religious liberty and 
vice versa.185 The concept of conscience is here limited to the individual 
exercising religion in the state and so does not consider the role of the wider 
religious body. It does not consider collective religious freedom. The role played 
by collective religious conscience is ignored in favour of the individual. Second, 
George’s position does not further explicitly accept the fact that, of course, non-
religious people have developed consciences.186 George’s reference to freedom 
of religious conscience ignores the fact that conscience is not only a religious 
concept.187 Although the ‘specific situation rule’ only applied to religious 
conscience it was earlier noted that conscience is an elusive concept – 
conscience is not only confined to religion. The two problems that are detailed 
here further develop George’s understanding of conscience and help to justify the 
modification of George’s thought that is applied in this chapter. 
George’s understanding of conscience is also not very different from an objective 
sense of conscience. An ‘objectively constituted conscience’188 was recognised 
by the Roman Catholic priest Cardinal Newman as acknowledging that Roman 
Catholics receive religious teaching which is placed upon their brains, which then 
impacts their attitudes and holds them to account throughout life.189 George relies 
upon Cardinal Newman’s work to present an account of freedom, in particular 
freedom of religious conscience. George reads the foundation for freedom of 
conscience in a concern for human flourishing: ‘he [Cardinal Newman] locates 
the foundation of honourable freedoms in a concern for human excellence and 
human flourishing.’190 It is clear that when talking about conscience George draws 
upon this place for conscience given by Cardinal Newman to provide that 
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‘conscience is…a stern monitor.’191 Therefore, conscience is a guiding force,192 
like a pair of braces straightening an individual’s teeth. This is contrasted with a 
subjective autonomous notion of conscience which is termed ‘conscience as 
“self-will” [which] is a matter of feeling or emotion’.193 
George expressly recognises that outside, external influences can impact on the 
conscience. Religious obligation can therefore particularly impact on the 
conscience, such as the earlier identified Roman Catholic influence. This is 
because conscience is ‘a right to do what one judges oneself to be under an 
obligation to do, whether one welcomes the obligation or must overcome strong 
aversion to fulfil it.’194 It is why individuals compelled by their religious teaching 
may be forced to carry out duties or follow mandated teachings even if they do 
not want to follow them.195 Religious liberty can involve demands put upon 
followers that may require them to abstain from or follow certain action, 
sometimes even against their own will. This allows for outside, wider influence. 
George’s position here can be compared with the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud. 
By analysing conscience Hudson suggests that there is an objective 
psychological sense of conscience.196 This flows from a mixture of objective ideas 
implanted into the mind.197 Such an understanding of conscience as an 
objectively formed phenomenon derives from Freud’s work in psychoanalysis. 
Freud sets out the relationship between the super-ego and conscience in The 
Question of Lay Analysis: ‘[y]ou will already have guessed that that the super-
ego is the vehicle of the phenomenon that we call conscience.’198 Building upon 
the interrelation between the id/ego/super-ego,199 his psychoanalysis of the mind 
led to Freud coming to detail the creation of conscience as a psychological 
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phenomenon.200 This draws comparisons with the understanding surrounding 
freedom of religious conscience provided by George. 
This is because it has been shown that for both, the conscience is a guiding force 
that provides a controlling influence upon the individual. For both, outside 
messages control the conscious mind. It does not depend upon whether this 
direction is subjectively welcomed by the individual. George’s account of 
conscience therefore measures up to the account of conscience provided by 
Freud.201 This will be considered important for analysing the right to religious 
freedom in equality law. This section has shown that the ‘specific situation rule’ 
placed a restriction upon religious conscience. This chapter will show that 
religious freedom requires freedom of conscience in order to protect matters of 
conscience from invasion by the state. 
The approach given for conscience, which leads to the rejection of the ‘specific 
situation rule’, also helps us to criticise the concept of choice used in this thesis. 
It was earlier established that choice may be used as an arbitrary way of 
expressing freedom (freedom in choice). This was criticised because, often in 
religion, choice is made from a list – a list of choices attached to the religion that 
bind the believer.202 In contrast the objective account203 provided above for the 
concept of conscience, ‘is something which comes to you unbidden and which 
nags at you. You have no conscious control over the things which do or do not 
bother your conscience.’204 This distinctly differs from understanding choice as a 
concept which constrains freedom. It is because within the limits of the messages 
that have been inserted into an individual’s psyche,205 then conscience strikes in 
a more open field. There is not such a constraining limit upon individual freedom. 
With no conscious control over the conscience for the individual,206 then 
conscience as an objectively formed phenomenon can be seen to be helpful for 
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later in this chapter when assessing limits that have been placed upon freedom 
of religious conscience.  
Therefore this section has argued that a) the majority judgment in Eweida207 
reached the correct decision by identifying that any approach to restrict religious 
liberty via the ‘get another job approach’ was unjustified - instead applying a 
proportionality assessment208 and b) by engaging with the concepts of choice and 
freedom of religious conscience to analyse George’s thought, then my analysis 
indicates ‘legal liberty’ offers a balance to conflicting rights discourse. This 
balance dictates laws on religious freedom through ‘common human reason’ and 
shows that freedom to change jobs is never enough to guarantee religious liberty. 
The next section will consider a solution to restricting religious liberty in the form 
of the concept of reasonable accommodation. 
5.4 The concept of reasonable accommodation 
This section will engage with the important concept of reasonable 
accommodation. To enable engagement with the concept of reasonable 
accommodation it will also be necessary to consider the concept of autonomy. 
For this section, it was identified in chapter 1 that one of the key issues for direct 
and indirect discrimination in relation to religion or belief is the particular 
protection this characteristic receives. The issue is whether law confers less 
protection upon religion or belief compared with other protected characteristics, 
or alternatively, does protection ensure one belief is favoured over another?209 
This had divided opinion. Pitt has previously argued that the effect of the Court of 
Appeal decision in Eweida v British Airways210 is ‘effectively to introduce a 
hierarchy of protection in relation to different beliefs.’211 As such, it has been 
suggested that the law offers ‘very little, if any, accommodation’ for the views of 
religious individuals.212 Others have disagreed, for instance Lady Hale has 
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previously incorrectly identified that a concept of reasonable accommodation can 
be found in English discrimination law.213 There are also calls for recognising that 
a concept of reasonable accommodation for religion and belief can be simply 
integrated into religious liberty law.214 The ECtHR decision in Eweida,215 which 
was explored in detail in chapter 1, has provided space once more for discussion 
upon the concept of reasonable accommodation. This section will argue that the 
concept of reasonable accommodation can be used to engage the ‘goods-rights 
synthesis’ within George’s work. I will then go on to argue that my analysis of 
George’s thought debates using reasonable accommodation to present and 
protect religion as a public good. 
This concept of reasonable accommodation is already a live issue within English 
law for two reasons: first, the duty to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ already 
exists in relation to disability under s.20 of the EqA 2010 and so it is argued why 
an analogous right is not available for religion or belief?216 Disability is a protected 
characteristic alongside religion or belief under s.149(7) of the EqA 2010 and so 
why do they not both receive the same treatment? Secondly, a duty of reasonable 
accommodation already connects with the framework of anti-discrimination law – 
reasonable accommodation is used in this thesis as a species of anti-
discrimination law.217 The concept of reasonable accommodation is therefore 
identified as a further method to prevent discrimination.  
                                                          
213 Bull and another v Hall and another [2013] UKSC 73 [45] (Lady Hale). Lady Hale is here relying on the 
incorrect position asserted by Erica Howard, see E Howard, ‘Reasonable Accommodation of Religion and 
other discrimination grounds in EU Law’ (2013) 38 EL Rev 360. In Bull, Hale posits the legitimate aim in 
the incorrect order: she enquires whether ‘the limitation on the right of Mr and Mrs Bull to manifest 
their religion was a proportionate means of achieving a limited aim. The legitimate aim was the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of Mr Preddy and Mr Hall.’ Rather, the correct aim was the 
protection of the religious rights Mr and Mrs Bull held and whether this could be done at less cost 
towards protecting rights conferred by sexual orientation to Mr Preddy and Mr Hall. Trigg has helpfully 
identified this to be a clash between a right to equal treatment and not to be discriminated against, and 
a right to religious freedom - Trigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion (n 18) 94. 
214 See Islington v Ladele [2008] UKEAT 0453_08_1912 [116-117] (Elias J); Hepple, Equality: The New 
Legal Framework (n 40) 39. 
215 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
216 It should be noted that, by this same token, disability remains the only protected characteristic in 
respect of which reasonable accommodation currently operates - A Lawson, ‘Disability and Employment 
in the Equality Act 2010: Opportunities seized, lost and generated’ (2011) 40 ILJ 4 359, 369. 
217 M Gibson, ‘The God ‘Dilution’? Religion, Discrimination and the case for Reasonable Accommodation’ 
(2013) 72(3) CLJ 578, 591. 
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Following Eweida218 some commentators were disappointed by the lack of 
discussion surrounding the issue of reasonable accommodation in the majority 
judgment,219 other commentators were more favourable towards the dissenting 
judgment’s approach,220 and still more were more negative towards this 
dissent.221 Through engaging with the work of Hepple,222 McIlroy223 and Pitt224 
(and most frequently George), it will be shown that reasonable accommodation 
may not ensure freedom of religion as a public good (or religion as a public good) 
to ensure flourishing of believers. This section will show that in the context of 
religious equality law, despite different understandings of reasonable 
accommodation, the modified NNL conception that is drawn from the analysis of 
George’s thought is to be favoured. This is one founded upon the public good of 
religion. 
Although it has been noted that reasonable accommodation was not mentioned 
in the majority judgment, the dissenting judgment in Eweida,225 in favour of Ms 
Ladele, argued that the right not to be forced to act against one’s conscience was 
not subject to the limitations that cover manifestation of belief in Article 9.226 
Judges Vučinić and de Gaetano suggested that once a case of conscientious 
objection is established, the state has an affirmative duty to require it to be 
accommodated.227 The state has a duty to accommodate conscience.228 McCrea 
                                                          
218 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
219 McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 213. 
220 Hill, ‘Religion at Work’ (n 70) 89, 90. 
221 McCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ (n 154) 277. 
222 For instance: Hepple, Equality: The New Legal Framework (n 40); B Hepple, ‘Enforcing Equality Law: 
two steps forward and two steps backwards for reflective regulation’ (2011) 40 (4) ILJ 315. 
223 For instance, see McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 210; D Mcllroy, A 
Biblical View of Law and Justice (Paternoster, 2004). 
224 For instance: Pitt, ‘Keeping the Faith: Trends and Tensions in Religion or Belief Discrimination’ (n 46) 
384; Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ (n 33) 398. 
225 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) Partly dissenting judgment. 
226 Ibid.  
227 Ibid [2] (Partly dissenting judgment). 
228 This already occurs within other jurisdictions. The court within Eweida noted that in the United 
States, when a statutory claim is made, the employer must have either offered ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ for the religious practice or prove that allowing those religious practices would have 
imposed ‘undue hardship on the employer’ - Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) 
(Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [48]. See Ansonia Board of Education v 
Philbrook 47 US 60 (1986); United States v Board of Education for School District of Philadelphia 911 F.2d 
882, 886 (2rd Cir. 1990); Webb v City of Philadelphia 562 F.2d 256 (3rd Cir. 2009). Canadian employers 
are also expected to ‘adjust workplace regulations that have a disproportionate impact on certain 
religious minorities’ to achieve reasonable accommodation - Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom 
(2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [49]. In Multani v Commission 
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has opposed this approach on the basis that ‘people can change’.229 Here 
McCrea’s observation depends upon, for instance, Ms Ladele becoming a 
Christian only after she took her job (presumably the inference being here that 
the employer could not accommodate an employee’s changing conscience). This 
fails because reasonable accommodation depends upon change – a mutual 
accommodation by employer and employee. Further any mandatory requirement 
in assessing manifestations to religious belief cannot, as was suggested in 
Eweida,230 be an objective approach. Rather the third parties/interveners within 
Eweida231 argued that any ‘mandatory requirement’ was too high and overly 
simplistic. If this mandatory requirement was compared with my modification of 
George’s thought, it would not allow a basic good approach to take into account 
the subjective convictions of the individual when measuring conscience.232  
In contrast, within the majority opinion, despite the matter being raised by a 
number of interveners, calling for both ‘reasonable accommodation/mutuality of 
respect’233 and evidence provided to the court of a ‘substantial corpus of foreign 
jurisprudence’ favouring reasonable accommodation of conscientious 
objection,234 there was no evaluation of the concept in the judgment. McIlroy has 
reflected on this judgment and termed this approach the ‘most unsatisfactory part 
of the decision.’235 This is because he has observed that reasonable 
accommodation ensures that one of the major justifications for laws against 
discrimination is upheld: employers are able to draw from the widest pool of talent 
available because no one who has the relevant experience/skills/qualification is 
                                                          
Scolaire Marguerite-Gourgeoys (2006) 1 SCR 256, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a Sikh student’s 
right to wear a kirpan to school. The court did not undertake a theological analysis of the centrality of 
kirpans to the Sikh faith. Instead, the court considered that the claimant ‘need[ed] only show that his 
person and subjective belief in the religious significance of the kirpan [was] sincere.’ In Eweida and 
Chaplin, by contrast, the court did effectively engage in a theological analysis to determine the centrality 
of the cross to Christian faith rather than attempting to accommodate individual religious conscience. 
229 McCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ (n 154) 286. 
230 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [76]. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid. 
233 The interveners argued a proportionality and justification interference with Article 9 should 
incorporate some ‘compromise between competing rights…in a democratic and pluralistic society’ 
within the context for a significant margin of appreciation, which would hold ‘so long as an individual’s 
religious practices did not detrimentally affect service provision or unduly affect an employer; those 
religious practices should be permitted and protected at work.’ Ibid [78]. 
234 Hill, ‘Religion at Work’ (n 70) 89, 90. 
235 McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 213. 
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excluded.236 Reasonable accommodation ensures employers consider the duties 
of the employee and give consideration to any conscientious objection based 
upon part of the job role. As a result, this prevents the marginalisation of 
minorities. 
Reasonable Accommodation: does this concept provide or deprive 
choice? 
The concept of autonomy will also be considered in this section. George’s 
definition for autonomy will be given in order to further analyse and critique his 
thought. George’s definition is the ‘capacity to be author of one’s own life’.237 This 
places individual autonomy in relation to individuality and freedom. For example, 
it is arguable that religious freedom requires autonomy.238 Therefore restrictions 
upon individual autonomy, via discrimination in the workplace,239 may clearly 
hinder religious liberty. The concept of autonomy can, however, be distinguished 
from the earlier identified concept of conscience. The concept of autonomy is not 
here a guiding force that requires an individual to act in a certain way in, for 
example, an employment context. 
In an employment context, discrimination in employment also deprives individuals 
of choice. Julian Rivers has noted that it is becoming clear that employers who 
fail even to consider whether they could accommodate a religious employee 
commit a wrong.240 This connects the concept of reasonable accommodation with 
the concept of choice that was considered in section 5.3. Reasonable 
accommodation is here offered as a consideration for employers in relation to 
their employees. Accommodation is part of this concept because it forms part of 
the consideration to be taken by employers. Yet, I suggest that mere 
consideration noted by Rivers does not go far enough – this does not confer 
religious liberty on employees – it may only add another procedural requirement 
for employers. Jeremy Waldron has written that the right to religious freedom 
logically requires the protection of the right to religious liberty, via 
                                                          
236 Ibid. 
237 George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 67) 147. 
238 Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (n 19) 373. 
239 Such as the earlier considered ‘specific situation rule’. 
240 Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (n 19) 383. 
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accommodation, to produce flourishing.241 This is the process within NNL and in 
chapter 4.4 analysis indicated that George’s thought follows this process.  
Some theorists have argued that reasonable accommodation should involve 
equality. Robert Wintemute, for instance, has argued an understanding of 
equality law involving ‘accommodation’242 requires an aspect of equal treatment. 
Moreover, accommodating religious beliefs in a diverse society is better viewed 
as a matter of ‘equality’.243 Wintemute here sees that equal treatment 
accommodates religious beliefs and so allows such belief to flourish. This 
approach, however, goes further than is necessary. Equal treatment may require 
a higher level of protection than that sought by the recent calls for reasonable 
accommodation. This is because although reasonable accommodation requires 
a level of protection, it is a lower level of protection built upon permitting religious 
expression in the workplace.244 
Hatzis may further assist in the application of George’s thought to religious 
equality law. This is because he has identified values underlying the principle of 
equal treatment to be: human dignity and autonomy.245 Hatzis here takes a 
different position when integrating reasonable accommodation with equality. For 
Hatzis, autonomy requires people to be allowed to shape their lives by making 
choices among a range of valuable options - a series of choices by the 
individual.246 The concept of autonomy therefore requires reasonable 
accommodation - one cannot live an autonomous life if one is denied the options 
to choose between.247 This draws connections with the earlier definition given for 
autonomy – an individual is given the freedom to separately make decisions.248 
A religious believer is allowed to follow their religious convictions. While an 
individual has the capacity to be the author of their own life, under this approach 
                                                          
241 J Waldron (ed), Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Routledge, 
1987) 157. 
242 Wintemute proposes his own form of accommodation, and this can be seen to be close to reasonable 
accommodation because it seeks a ‘right to accommodation of a particular manifestation of an 
individual’s religious beliefs’ - R Wintemute, ‘Accommodating Religious Beliefs: Harm, Clothing or 
Symbols, and Refusals to Serve Others’ (2014) 77(2) MLR 223, 224. 
243 Ibid 226. 
244 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [78]. 
245 N Hatzis, ’Personal Religious Beliefs in the Workplace: How not to define Indirect Discrimination’ 
(2011) 74(2) MLR 287, 293. 
246 Ibid. 
247 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1985) Ch. 14. 
248 George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (n 67) 191. 
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reasonable accommodation secures the autonomy for religious believers in the 
workplace. As such, an employee is neither separated from their religion/religious 
community or their employment. I suggest that reasonable accommodation would 
therefore acknowledge employee’s individual religious choices and so reduce risk 
of alienation by the law.249 
Individual choice within equality law also highlights a problem with reasonable 
accommodation applied to religion. We have seen that reasonable 
accommodation already exists in relation to disability under s.20 of the EqA 2010. 
Vickers has suggested a legislative model based upon the ‘reasonable 
adjustments’ duty under disability discrimination law should also apply to religion 
and belief.250 The difference in terminology here between reasonable 
adjustments and reasonable accommodation within disability instead highlights 
problems in transferring reasonable accommodation to the protected 
characteristic of religion or belief. The issue is the concept of choice: it is hard to 
imagine one would choose a disability. However, freedom of religion should 
expressly allow a person to choose their religion. This leads to a further problem 
arising from the concept of choice in that it was earlier established that the 
concept of choice can follow the arbitrary meaning given in contemporary society: 
as a way of expressing freedom.251 This exposes a tension because the concept 
of choice suggests an ordered range of ‘free’ choices, whereas belief suggests 
an open-texture free from prescriptive guidelines. When engaging religious 
freedom this therefore causes a tension in transferring reasonable 
accommodation to the protected characteristic of religion or belief. For these 
reasons it is here argued that no direct comparison or transfer of legislation 
between these areas (disability and religion) can be made. 
Discrimination clearly also deprives employees of choice, by depriving individuals 
of valuable options which relate to a fundamental aspect of one’s life – this is 
because work is ‘not merely a way of earning one’s living but also an important 
aspect of self-fulfilment.’252 Hatzis has identified that in religious discrimination 
this means the discriminator undermines the discriminatee’s ability to exercise 
                                                          
249 Gibson (n 217) 616. 
250 L Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Hart, 2008) 129, 130. 
251 In the last section the way the concept of choice relates to religious freedom was considered 
problematic because of the limits imposed upon adherents by their religion. 
252 Hatzis, ’Personal Religious Beliefs in the Workplace: How not to define Indirect Discrimination’ (n 
245) 293. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  307 
their autonomy by making choices which relate to the freedom of religion overly 
burdensome to pursue.253 This relates back to the earlier definition given for the 
concept of choice in section 5.3 – as a potential way of expressing freedom. If 
this freedom is not secured under autonomy then self-fulfilment is denied Once 
again the concept of choice is problematic in discussion involving religious 
freedom. This provides another argument against reasonable accommodation. If 
through any discrimination autonomy is prevented, legal liberty cannot be 
pursued; reasonable accommodation cannot arise. This is, therefore, an 
argument against religious discrimination – discrimination in and of itself would 
prevent any form of autonomous accommodation arising in the first place. 
Does reasonable accommodation secure flourishing within NNL? 
Does accommodating equality fit with George’s goods based approach and 
secure flourishing? Equality in Britain is based upon lifestyle and habits. One 
person’s lifestyle and habits may differ from another’s. For instance, I may like to 
swim every morning, you may prefer to swim every evening. Reasonable 
accommodation can solve the problem of difference in discrimination law based 
upon equality. Chapter 4.2 highlighted that differentiation is wrong when it 
demeans (Hellman).254 Chapter 4 argued that people’s lifestyles and habits are 
not the same on the face of it. However, they share a ‘common good’ and I have 
argued that George’s ‘legal liberty’ offers a balance to conflicting rights claimed 
by individuals.  
Further, although people may differ regarding lifestyle and habits, Biblical 
teaching about ‘common origin’ in Acts 17,255 indicates that though people are 
not all the same, all share a ‘common origin’ not restricted to faith, ethnicity or 
ideology.256 This helps to explain current understandings of equality that underpin 
the concept of religious equality law. In chapter 4 it was noted that equality is a 
very welcome concept (in particular gender and racial equality). It was stated in 
chapter 4 that the critique in this thesis only applies to equality law impacting 
religion or belief under section 4 of the EqA 2010. This focus distinguishes the 
                                                          
253 Ibid. 
254 See D Hellman, When is Discrimination Wrong (Harvard University Press, 2008). 
255 ‘And he made from one man every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having 
determined allotted periods and the boundaries’ - Acts 17:26 - Holy Bible, English Standard Version 
(Collins, 2002). 
256 M Nazir-Ali, Triple Jeopardy for the West: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islam and Multiculturalism 
(Bloomsbury, 2012) 10. See also ibid 140. 
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use of equality in a non-abstract way in this thesis. This sense of equality is why 
this thesis focuses upon the lead case in religious equality law that was 
introduced at the beginning of this thesis: Eweida v United Kingdom.257 This case 
has been shown to provide freedom from discrimination under Article 9 of the 
ECHR, and so it has resolved problems facing religious equality law. As such, 
engaging with this case suggests that religious equality law involves freedoms 
rather than equality, when in dialogue with (in particular Christian) religious 
discrimination. Religious equality law is concerned with freedom from religious 
discrimination. 
Given this understanding for equality, although ‘common origin’ provides a basis 
for human equality, this basis has subsequently mutated in religious equality law. 
Religious equality law can now be seen to encompass two different versions of 
equality:258 1) equality of persons;259 and 2) equality of lifestyle and behaviour.260 
These two visions are caught in tension which helps to explain current conflicts 
in both case law and competing conceptions for religious equality law. The 
modified concept of reasonable accommodation may here provide a solution for 
accommodation of the person in religious equality law. Such an approach to 
reasonable accommodation is based upon inherent characteristics (work ethic, 
religion, conscience). This advocates a Biblical approach based upon the good 
of the person, while providing a broad-brushed approach to encompass all 
preferences and differences. This may overcome a post-modern focus upon 
habits and lifestyle in line with the NNL human flourishing focus. 
The development of reasonable accommodation 
A further reason for reform is that reasonable accommodation, it has been 
argued, is the culmination of religious equality law. As such, it can be a helpful 
concept in analysing the right to religious freedom. The concept of reasonable 
accommodation is one that can be defined to ‘expect an employer to 
                                                          
257 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
258 Ibid 162-163. 
259 Shown by the ‘common origin’ ideal - Acts 17:26 - Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Collins, 2002). 
Nazir-Ali argues that the value of equality comes from the Biblical teaching of ‘common origin’ which is 
related primarily to equality of persons and not equality of behaviours or relationships - Nazir-Ali, Triple 
Jeopardy for the West: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islam and Multiculturalism (n 256) 162-163. 
260 This has found expression in the litigation surrounding protected characteristics, such as sexual 
orientation and religion or belief within religious equality law: Ladele v London Borough of Islington 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1357; McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880. 
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accommodate an employee’s religious practices’.261 An employer undertakes 
action to permit and protect religion in the workplace.262 In both the US and 
Canada263 there is a duty of reasonable accommodation for religious purposes. 
By the start of the twentieth century, English law had developed to accommodate 
the full range of Christian practice and belief.264 Once more, Pitt has observed 
that guidance provided by the Equality and Human Rights Commission265 in the 
wake of Eweida,266 suggests that the UK, like the US and Canada, may be 
moving towards a situation where ‘effectively employers will have a duty of 
reasonable accommodation in relation to religion or belief’.267 Pitt argues this on 
the basis that following from Ms Eweida’s claim, indirect discrimination in the form 
of individual disadvantage (prohibition on wearing a cross in the workplace) 
requires justification.268 A failure to accommodate a request by a religious 
employee may be a form of discrimination, if not justified. The positive duty for 
reasonable accommodation suggested by the EHRC guidance is found by Pitt 
not to be necessary to comply with the negative injunction ‘not to interfere without 
justification’.269 This form of protection suggested by Pitt is dependent upon the 
legitimate aim defence to indirect discrimination and has found judicial support in 
Bull and another v Hall and another.270 Here it was considered whether 
reasonable accommodation may ‘constitute a less restrictive means of achieving 
the aim pursued.’271 This arguably shows a development in equality law impacting 
                                                          
261 B Hale, ‘Are we a Christian Country? Religious Freedom and the Law’ (Oxford High Sheriff’s Lecture, 
14 October 2014) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141014.pdf> accessed 25th September 
2017. 
262 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [78]. 
263 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpson-Sears Ltd [1985] 2 SCR 53. 
264 Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (n 19) 377.  
265 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Religion or belief in the workplace: An explanation of recent 
European Court of Human Rights judgments (Equality and Human Rights Commission, February 2013) 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/RoB/religion_or_belief_in_the_w
orkplace_an_explanation_of_recent_judgments_final.pdf> accessed 1st September 2015. 
266 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
267 Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ (n 33) 404. 
268 Supporters of religion are likely to welcome this development as previously the Court of Appeal 
judgment in Eweida held indirect discrimination did not apply to a practice that discriminates against 
one individual, rather as confirmed by s.19(1)(b) of the EqA 2010, the practice would need to put 
persons at a disadvantage – Eweida v British Airways [2010] I.C.R 890 [15]–[19]. This has now been 
overturned by the ECtHR in the same case. 
269 Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ (n 33) 404. 
270 Bull and another v Hall and another [2013] UKSC 73. 
271 Ibid [46] (Lady Hale).  
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religious freedom, with reasonable accommodation replacing the old position 
taken by indirect discrimination.  
Pitt’s ‘conceptually important’ distinction here is important to a degree. However, 
it fails to heed McIlroy’s criticism that this was a feature of the minority, as 
opposed to the majority judgment. Moreover, Pitt’s criticism relates to the finding 
of indirect discrimination in Ms Eweida’s case. This case was not held to be an 
instance of reasonable accommodation at all.272 Even despite submissions made 
to the ECtHR surrounding reasonable accommodation, yet again, no assessment 
surrounding the concept was found in the Fourth Section’s judgments,273 despite 
the later EHRC guidance.274  
Further Pitt’s approach contrasts with the logic of Sandra Fredman. Fredman 
contends that a finding of indirect discrimination should trigger a duty to make 
reasonable adjustments (accommodation), rather than a justification for any 
indirect discrimination which would maintain the ‘status quo’.275 These criticisms 
distinguish Pitt’s approach from the broader calls for reasonable accommodation 
made by the interveners in Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom.276 This 
causes doubt about whether the calls made for reasonable accommodation are 
really suitable in order to solve the tensions facing religious equality law. 
Reasonable accommodation and indirect discrimination 
The justification defence for indirect discrimination has received further attention. 
Michael Connolly has noted that in litigation regarding religious discrimination, 
the justification defence for indirect discrimination often amounts to a form of 
reasonable accommodation.277 JH Walker Ltd v Hussain278 involved a claim of 
indirect discrimination brought by Muslim workers who were disciplined for taking 
a day off work to celebrate a Muslim holiday. The tribunal held the rule was not 
                                                          
272 McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 213. 
273 Ibid 213. 
274 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Religion or Belief in the Workplace: A Guide for Employers 
Following Recent European Court of Human Rights Judgments (n 159). 
275 Fredman, Discrimination Law (n 38) 270. 
276 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
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justified because the employers could have made appropriate arrangements in 
advance and exploited willingness by the workers to work extra hours.279 Here 
the tribunal effectively used reasonable accommodation to rebut the justification 
defence, this shows that a justification defence has so far not amounted to 
reasonable accommodation. 
Vickers has argued that a similar accommodating position may arise following the 
Court of Appeal decision in Ladele.280 Within Ms Ladele’s situation,281 Vickers 
has observed that under the Civil Partnership Act 2004, Islington may have 
retained Ladele’s services as a registrar without registering her for civil 
partnerships. This is because as an existing registrar Ms Ladele was not 
automatically designated to carry out civil partnerships.282 Does the government 
need to accommodate civil servants’ consciences?283 Should local government 
not require the same service to be performed by all employees? The decision 
therefore confirms that just because alternative accommodation was identified by 
the claimant, the employer may still justify indirect discrimination.284 This is further 
substantiated by Vickers questioning whether it was necessary for the employer 
to designate Ms Ladele as a civil partnership registrar in the first place.285 This 
was not considered in the judgment. Elias J in the EAT hearing gave credit to the 
pragmatism shown: ‘we would be sorry if pragmatic ways of seeking to 
accommodate beliefs were impermissible … it may be that choosing not to 
designate those with strong religious objections would be a way of reconciling 
conflicts’.286 Following this, Vickers’ conclusion is that it was not necessary to 
designate all registrars as civil partnership registrars, particularly given that 
‘[p]arliament has not automatically designated all registrars under the Civil 
Partnership Act, and others councils clearly did not feel it was necessary to do 
                                                          
279 Ibid 295, 296. 
280 Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357. 
281 As a registrar working for Islington Borough Council, Ms Ladele declined to perform registration 
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the Civil Partnership Act 2004. See chapter 1 and Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 
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282 Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’ (n 134) 291. 
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so’.287 From this, Vickers proposes a new method to analyse accommodation 
within the context of indirect discrimination.  
Does this provide a suitable approach to reasonable accommodation in order to 
help analyse religious freedom in this thesis? Matthew Gibson has argued that 
this approach would lead to a conflict in practice between reasonable 
accommodation and indirect discrimination.288 This is because of the burdens of 
proof required in each claim. In reasonable accommodation, Gibson had 
identified the burden to be on the defendant to establish that accommodation 
would create undue hardship, whereas, in indirect discrimination, the initial 
burden is on the claimant.289 Gibson suggests a clearer stance would be ‘to 
create a separate duty for reasonable accommodation so to keep the duty 
distinct.’290 This does not consider that if reasonable accommodation were 
implemented, religious liberty claimants would likely no longer need to bring 
claims brought under indirect discrimination. A new legal cause of action would 
be present. 
In the context of the Court of Appeal decision in Eweida,291 Vickers continues to 
analyse the concept of reasonable accommodation within the framework of 
indirect discrimination by further suggesting that failure to accommodate one 
employee’s religious request may be more easily regarded as more proportionate 
rather than ‘insisting on a uniform rule which disadvantages a large proportion of 
the workforce.’292 This is a contentious approach. It is unhelpful because it 
disadvantages the religious minority who are discriminated against by, for 
instance, a controversial workplace rule such as in Eweida.293 An approach that 
disadvantages the minority is not one that can be reconciled with reasonable 
accommodation. On the other hand, this may be helpful as Vickers calls for 
equality law to function upon an act utilitarian notion - with the greater good being 
provided by not disadvantaging the numerically higher number of individuals who 
do not hold a protected characteristic upon the basis of religion or belief. This 
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benefits social goals, which can be identified as helping employers that are facing 
discrimination claims294 and that public sector organisations should be secular.295 
The problem is that Vickers here, however, conceives of a system that does not 
appreciate the good of religion: 
… the debate about the extent to which the manifestation of religion should 
be accommodated at work should take place in the context of 
proportionality, rather than by an a priori decision that indirect 
discrimination cannot occur for single adherents of a belief system.296 
Unhelpfully this contradicts the finding of the Court of Appeal in Eweida,297 and 
further fails to engage the priority of the good, by presenting a utilitarian 
understanding of the good and so does not accord with my analysis of George’s 
common good approach or the ‘common origin’ approach outlined earlier. As this 
would not enable flourishing, it is not a suitable basis for reasonable 
accommodation. The analysis of reasonable accommodation within the context 
of indirect discrimination by Vickers is rejected. 
On the other hand, George’s NNL basis for reasonable accommodation has itself 
not been welcomed because of, inter alia, the discriminatory impact it may have. 
Robert Wintemute has argued that, although accommodation causes no direct 
harm, it causes indirect harm. Reasonable accommodation causes indirect harm 
because it ‘exclu[des] from part of the service offered by the employer, which 
amounts to a form of segregation.’298 For instance, in the cases of McFarlane299 
and Ladele,300 it was shown in chapter 1 that the customers were deprived a 
hypothetical service on the basis of their sexual orientation. This demonstrates 
harm being caused to individuals because they are deprived from receiving a 
service. 
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Lim has further formulated the question well: why should courts grant special 
privileges to religious practices or organisations by exempting them from laws of 
general applicability or anti-discrimination law?301 Lim qualifies this question by 
adding the exception that unless (religious organisations) can show that they 
exhibit ‘positive and unique features and benefits qua religion?’302 It has so far 
been argued in this thesis that equality has to yield to religious liberty. Yet, 
conversely, what does religion have to yield to equality within Wintemute’s 
understanding? In other words, what actions and considerations do religious 
individuals need to take in order to make sure that individuals do not suffer from 
lack of service provision? The principles of this demand are outside the scope of 
this thesis; however, Wintemute makes an astute suggestion:  
Consistent, principled protection of the right of employees or students to 
wear religious clothing or symbols could in turn make it easier for religious 
individuals to accept that a necessary limit to accommodation is the harm 
that conscience exemptions from anti-discrimination law would cause to 
others … they could display diversity while serving diversity.303  
Religious liberty would thereby promote equality through limiting accommodation. 
Religious individuals may accept a limit to accommodation in order to promote 
diversity in the name of equality. In this respect the Court of Appeal in Ladele304 
went further than the ECtHR’s judgment in Eweida.305 This was by holding the 
2007 regulations prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in access to 
services306 obliged Islington Borough Council to require all registrars to officiate 
at civil partnership ceremonies.307 However, Wintemute’s criticism fails to engage 
the ECtHR’s own later ruling and recognition in Eweida,308 one which involved 
the balancing of rights and hence the level of proportionality crucial to this area 
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of law.309 In addition to not recognising the later ruling, Wintemute’s criticism also 
does not accept the position for religious freedom developed from George’s work 
which we have seen provides for religion as a public good. This position would 
contrastingly ensure that there is reasonable accommodation for religious belief, 
and we will see later in this chapter the way that religion’s presentation as a public 
good can be beneficial for reasonable accommodation. 
Reasonable Accommodation: proportionality solving a clash of rights (or 
preventing legal liberty)? 
This level of proportionality has been considered by Vickers, who draws into 
question the commensurability of human rights in the context of religion such as 
in Eweida and suggests significant weight is ‘put on the role of proportionality in 
determining the outcomes of cases yet the use of proportionality can itself be 
contested, as it involves measuring incommensurable interests, and can lead to 
legal uncertainty.’310 Proportionality has been shown to require the balancing of 
human rights in a religious context. Common human reason was earlier identified, 
however, to engage the right to freedom of religion in equality law. Common 
human reason ought here to play a role: this assists in considering whether the 
deprivation of services arguably trumps the right to accommodate freedom of 
conscience. This is helpful because it enables us to use the modification applied 
to George’s work in this thesis - the attainment of flourishing through ‘legal 
liberty’.311 
Balanced debate has been provided by Sandberg suggesting that reasonable, 
passive accommodation has been replaced by ‘prescriptive regulation’312 typified 
by the concept of proportionality. He considers this to be initially a positive, 
providing diversity and toleration. However, the ‘pace of change and the 
complicat[ed] overregulation presents a multi-faceted picture’,313 and Sandberg 
comes to the logical conclusion that the growth of the law on sexual orientation 
is faster than the growth of the law protecting religious discrimination.314  
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Sandberg believes this growth in law has led to sexual orientation rights trumping 
freedom of religion rights315 which has been termed ‘crude and unhelpful’.316  
Does this growth signify a move from passive tolerance to the active promotion 
of religious freedom and sexual orientation discrimination, as positive legal 
rights? To put this in context, it has been argued that the courts should not enter 
into the question of whether a particular practice is an indispensable element of 
a religion or system of belief in any analysis.317 This transition surrounding growth 
has been observed by Sandberg as producing a “new’ law on religion and a ‘new’ 
law on sexual orientation.’318 The growth of the law is not the problem here; 
instead, the problem lies in the way the law is consistently applied in a 
proportionality analysis by the courts, in turn dependent upon the jurisprudential 
trends underlying the analysis. In other words, the growth of the law argument is 
a pretext. It moves the reason for the problem from one that can be addressed to 
one that is seemingly inevitable. There exists an ‘increasing discomfort’ in the 
way the state exercises authority to decide upon a ‘plurality of religious beliefs, 
practices, communities and organisations’319 and conducts an analysis that 
provides more than toleration. Lord Hoffmann explained in R (Carson) v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions that ‘it is therefore necessary … to 
distinguish between those grounds of discrimination which prima facie appear to 
offend our notions of the respect due to the individual and those which merely 
require some rational justification.’320 This invites criticism upon the way the state 
distinguishes these grounds. A critique of the state will be seen in the next 
section. There, I will argue that George uses the concept of religious freedom to 
protect matters of conscience being invaded by the state. 
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Accommodating conscience in the workplace: a public good approach 
As the next section will consider the concept of freedom of conscience raised by 
religious equality law, this part will turn to the combination of the concept of 
reasonable accommodation and matters of conscience in the workplace and 
critically apply the analysis drawn from George’s thought. It will do so in order to 
continue analysing the place of religious liberty in equality law and show that 
religion can be protected as a public good. Hill has supported the dissenting 
opinion in Eweida321 on the basis that it distinguishes Ms Ladele from Mr 
McFarlane: a changing job role in the former as opposed to a willing acceptance 
of the job description in the latter.322 Ms Ladele was employed in 2002 before 
officiating same-sex ceremonies became part of her job role. Mr McFarlane 
willingly applied for a job as a counsellor upon the expectation of counselling 
people with differing sexual orientations. In this position Hill argues that Ms 
Ladele should have been accommodated by ‘creative rostering’323 - she had 
consistently invited her employer (Islington) to accommodate her belief.324 It has 
been argued Ms Ladele should not have been compelled to officiate at civil 
partnerships.325  
McIlroy’s criticism for this basis of reasonable accommodation is twofold: first, he 
takes Hill to task for giving no reason why Mr McFarlane’s employers ought not 
to have been asked to consider whether rosters could be re-arranged to 
accommodate his convictions, because ‘[a]ssessing such differences is what the 
doctrine of reasonable accommodation is all about.’326 This is a fair point if one 
sees reasonable accommodation as merely an employer shifting the boundaries 
of a job role. It fails to see reasonable accommodation under the modified 
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approach that I have proposed from George’s thought – as founded upon a 
conception of the good that ensures the promotion of religion as a public good – 
not merely protective of religion, but key to an individual’s religious beliefs as part 
of ‘legal liberty’ rejecting narrow interpretations of religious liberty and as an 
aspect of flourishing.327 It does not see the need to secure human flourishing for 
the individual. It is submitted that Elias J reached a better understanding. This is 
one that termed Miss Ladele’s complaint not that she was treated differently from 
others; rather, it was that ‘she was not treated differently when she ought to have 
been’ and her complaint was ‘about a failure to accommodate her difference, 
rather than a complaint that she is being discriminated against because of that 
difference.’328  
Secondly, McIlroy identifies - correctly, in my view - that Hill’s solution of 
reasonable accommodation provides ‘only an ever-decreasing area of protection 
for religious believers in the workplace.’329 This is the problem identified earlier, 
in that reasonable accommodation is inherently malleable and adaptive: the old 
guard in post prior to the legislation will eventually retire and new/younger 
employees will be faced with taking jobs requiring them to act against their 
conscience/remain jobless/take less suitable work.330 This is not a form of 
accommodation. Rather, it is a temporary compromise that as time passes will 
ultimately favour an employer. 
In contrast, my analysis of George’s thought adopts the concept of reasonable 
accommodation and provides a more expansive approach to equality applied to 
religion and belief. Through embracing the value thesis outlined in chapter 4, 
Rivers views ‘promoting equality’ in Ladele331 to require employees to sign up to 
a definition of equality adopted by the authority, a conception which ‘preferred 
protecting same-sex partners from the presence of others who disapproved of 
their lifestyle over finding ways to accommodate practically the religiously 
motivated convictions of those others.’332 Here a net effect is to require individuals 
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to value what they do not value.333 This is opposite to the effect brought about by 
NNL reasoning. This has led to some commentators suggesting that equality law 
impacting religious freedom is a vehicle (and bias) by which Christianity is being 
marginalised and penalised.334 Admittedly, this is an imposition of a majority 
consensus upon a minority, an imposition that does not value difference in 
equality. Rather, it allows the majority to impose contestable conceptions of 
equality.  
Equality law has been criticised by Alice Donald here for ensuring an ‘undue 
insistence on the assertion of competing identities’.335 Rivers has criticised this 
bias confliction within equality on grounds of religion and belief that necessitates 
reasonable accommodation: starting with the understanding that a liberal 
democracy subjects all beliefs and behaviours to challenge and public 
contestation.336 This basis still requires a commitment to equality, in that the 
‘human person is still valuable, and their identity secure, even when their beliefs 
are mistaken and their behaviour objectionable.’337 Rivers has suggested that an 
aspect of toleration involves willingness to be satisfied with toleration to ‘live 
alongside others who, one knows, disapprove of some beliefs one holds or 
behaviour one adopts.’338 Logically this must be correct; otherwise all beliefs must 
be ignored equally, since they cannot all be equally accepted.339 This would, in 
effect, enable reasonable accommodation within a tolerant, liberal democracy.340 
Democracy would make room for views and practices of which the majority may 
disapprove.341  
The approach taken here by Rivers is problematic. This position does not 
expressly pose any limits. It also is an idealised notion because it does not 
provide any guidelines. A more pressing problem is that is still allows a ‘rich social 
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space for the expression of identities in ‘private’.342 This once again provides a 
high level of respect for religious belief but may not provide any guaranteed 
protection for religion.  
We have seen throughout this chapter that the EqA 2010 does not give religion 
or belief any special protection – for instance, by only listing it as one of the eight 
protected characteristics.343 A liberal democracy could still offer protection from 
discrimination without providing a high mantle for religion or belief, and perhaps 
reasonable accommodation (without formal legislation such as protected 
characteristics) is one way to achieve this. That being said, by discrimination from 
religion and belief being prohibited under Article 9 of the ECHR,344 this ensures 
that there is definite protection in place and there will still remain a focus upon 
religion and belief. 
This position for reasonable accommodation is further dependent upon an 
expansive understanding of the good within George’s NNL – a public good within 
NNL. I argue that ‘legal liberty’ allows beliefs to be contested, and it sets 
guidelines by drawing upon the ‘reasonableness test’ that was identified in 
chapter 4 in order to engage the public good. Yet this public good still needs to 
be seen in relation to reasonable accommodation arising from Eweida. 
Reasonable accommodation and the public good 
Religion as a public good can be read into Eweida. This judgment of the ECtHR 
did not declare a concept of reasonable accommodation to be incompatible with 
the ECHR. McIlroy views the decision to introduce such a doctrine now to lie with 
Parliament, with scope to vary precisely how that freedom is implemented in 
particular contexts.345 The decision, therefore, will benefit from considered, 
applied suggestions in order to move on from a position that holds that religious 
believers, in non-religious contexts,346 are now expected to bear the cost of their 
lack of conformity to conventional standards of behaviour themselves.347  
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So the modified conception of reasonable accommodation may be favoured here, 
I argue that this is one that is founded on a conception of the good that ensures 
the promotion of religion as a public good. This is dependent upon George’s 
‘goods-rights synthesis’ (good is prior to the rights and rights)348 introduced in 
chapter 4. The prominence of the good prevails over individualistic rights. George 
has argued in favour of this priority of the good349 and so really this is only a 
conceptual, definitional, priority given by George. As such, this prominence of the 
good is helpful because it enables a right to religious liberty legitimised by the 
basic human good of religion350 - a natural rights basis. In my view this would not 
merely seek to protect religious believers in public manifestation of their belief 
[Eweida], nor would it seek to accommodate belief in the face of health and safety 
guidelines [Chaplin], but instead it would actively promote an individual’s religious 
beliefs as an aspect of human flourishing. Such an active promotion of an 
individual’s religious beliefs is a normative conclusion built upon practical reason, 
which would ensure Article 9 rights conferred would not be relegated as a ‘matter 
of choice’ [Sedley LJ] but instead as a hierarchical right, a public good built upon 
the intrinsic value and worth of the human person. This is a public good which is 
an ‘indispensable feature of the comprehensive flourishing of a human being.’351 
This would secure individual protection in the form of reasonable 
accommodation, particularly in cases of indirect discrimination for Christian 
employees.352 The promotion of an individual’s religious belief here is an example 
of the modification of George’s thought, which I argue here provides a justification 
for the greater protection of religious freedom in the workplace and so 
strengthens the protection accorded to religion and belief. 
A public good is now evident in the form of support from the judiciary, 
governmental commissions and drafters of the EqA 2010 seriously debating the 
issue of reasonable accommodation. First, in a highly unusual move, Lady Hale 
rejected a costs in the case order and cast doubt on her own previous judgment 
in Bull v Hall,353 to suggest that by ignoring claims for reasonable accommodation 
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the law has done too little to protect the beliefs of Christians.354 This call for a 
‘more nuanced’ approach would seek to develop ‘an explicit requirement upon 
providers of employment, goods and services to make reasonable 
accommodation for the manifestation of religious…beliefs.’355 This further 
suggests that the law should be developing an explicit requirement upon 
providers of employment, goods and services to make reasonable 
accommodation for the manifestation of religious beliefs. It is telling that Lady 
Hale has now reached this conclusion post-hearing. In 2014 Lady Hale gave 
three different speeches on this area.356 It was clearly a troubling issue that Lady 
Hale considered important. However, this further adds to the reasoning that the 
Supreme Court, as the final appellate court, should have given more 
consideration to the calls for Christian conscience when deciding Bull v Hall.357 
Arguably this is too little, too late. 
Lady Hale has further built on this conclusion. In Greater Glasgow Health Board 
v Doogan,358 she invoked discussion about ‘reasonable adjustments’359 in the 
context of discussion about indirect discrimination. This case was introduced 
earlier in the chapter and focused upon statutory construction of the right to 
conscientious objection in section 4(1) of the Abortion Act 1967 and also 
considered indirect discrimination against employees on grounds of religion or 
belief within the EqA 2010. It was earlier noted that in this case the practicalities 
of reasonable accommodation was better suited to resolution in the employment 
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tribunal proceedings.360 Lady Hale’s discussion surrounding reasonable 
accommodation can be seen in line with the decision in Bull v Hall,361 in which no 
finding for reasonable accommodation was made. In Bull v Hall362 there was clear 
direct discrimination found and, even if such was not found, the court held that 
there was indirect discrimination that was unjustified.363 This supports the 
inference that discrimination law is moving to engage with reasonable 
accommodation. 
Secondly, the Equality and Human Rights Commission advised employers to 
adopt where practical ‘mutual accommodation’.364 As it was earlier noted, this 
goes further than Eweida and may lead to employers having a practical duty of 
reasonable accommodation in relation to religion or belief.365 This is an interesting 
development for two reasons: first, it goes further than the leading case law - 
there was no evaluation of reasonable accommodation in the judgments of the 
Fourth Section in Eweida.366 Secondly, I suggest that the guidance provided by 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission is itself evolving to potentially ever 
more promote and develop the concept of reasonable accommodation as a public 
good for employers. For instance, while the 2013 guidance suggested ‘where 
practical’ accommodation was to be ‘in the interests of all parties’,367 a more 
prescriptive 2013 guidance ‘Religion or Belief in the Workplace: A Guide for 
Employers Following Recent European Court of Human Rights Judgments’368 
requires employers to treat all requests relation to religion or belief seriously, 
taking a ‘starting point’ in considering accommodating the request unless there 
are ‘cogent or compelling reasons’ not to.369 This requirement to take requests 
seriously, is an instance where the prominence of the good of religion (via the 
goods-rights synthesis) enables a right to religious liberty. However, in the latest 
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Equality and Human Rights Commission’s report: Review of Equality and Human 
Rights Law Relating to Religion and Belief,370 the EHRC considered the extent to 
which a duty to accommodate religion or belief might be beneficial to employers 
and employees. This report was not so encouraging for reasonable 
accommodation. Here it was found that there are a ‘range of different views … 
about the perceived advantages and disadvantages of such a duty.’371 Taken 
together, all these publications suggest the EHRC has shown commitment to 
debating a concept of reasonable accommodation.  
Thirdly, Hepple, a drafter of the EqA 2010, has called for a more expansive 
approach in the operation of reasonable accommodation, arguing for a ‘clearer 
conceptual framework in the case of religious discrimination’372 by ‘adopting a 
concept of discrimination arising from religion or belief, which combines direct 
and indirect discrimination and reasonable accommodation.’373 It follows from 
Hepple’s analysis, as outlined in chapter 4, that, although something ‘akin’ to a 
duty of reasonable accommodation has been imposed in the public sector via the 
equality duty, no such duty exists in the private sector.374 This has been termed 
the Act’s biggest failure375 and provides a problem as the ‘fundamental values of 
equality of law involve respect for dignity of individuals and freedom of choice.’376 
This approach to the individual has shades of the NNL public good approach. It 
has been shown that the modified NNL approach to reasonable accommodation 
depends upon the goods-rights synthesis to secure flourishing for the individual 
via the public good of religion. By doing so this accommodates matters of 
conscience in the workplace concerning religion. 
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Hepple errs in his approach to reasonable accommodation, however, in two 
respects: first, the public sector equality duty, as earlier mentioned in chapter 4, 
only requires under s.149 ‘due regard’, that is, a regard for accommodation, which 
can also practically equate to a suitable response or, on the other hand, 
exclusion. It does not ensure compliance. In fairness, Hepple qualifies this to the 
extent that reasonable accommodation should only occur ‘where this could be 
done without other hardship to others’.377 ‘Hardship’ would provide an equitable 
relief from wrongs but not address the good prior to the right. This presents a 
‘patch-work solution’ that does not address the underlying rights discourse 
tensions between religion or belief and sexual orientation. Secondly, his 
underlying reasoning that the ‘fundamental values of equality of law involve 
respect for the dignity of individuals and freedom of choice’378 depends upon a 
protective theoretical approach to equality. This is an unsatisfactory conclusion 
because, firstly, it fails to take into account Lord Neuberger’s warning about 
placing too great a reliance upon the question of choice: ‘I do not accept that the 
fact that a condition has been adopted by choice is of much, if any, significance 
in determining whether that condition is a status for the purposes of Article 14’.379 
Secondly, following the analysis in chapter 4, it also fails to see reasonable 
accommodation as founded upon a conception of the human good that ensures 
the promotion of religion as a public good. This position does not merely protect 
an employee’s religious rights through preventing an employer from shifting the 
job description boundaries, but protects and promotes an individual’s religious 
beliefs in the workplace as an aspect of human flourishing beyond the individual. 
As has been shown, reasonable accommodation would secure religious liberty 
as a public good. As earlier identified, the principles of a public good are axiomatic 
with both the judiciary and drafters of the EqA 2010 considering calls for 
reasonable accommodation following the decision in Eweida. It will be detailed in 
chapter 6 that Lady Hale already considers the concept of reasonable 
accommodation to be in force. This section has engaged with the concepts of 
reasonable accommodation and autonomy in order to engage with the leading 
religious equality case law in this section. This section has further used the 
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concept of choice that was introduced in section 5.3. Through engagement with 
these concepts it was held in this section that, firstly, reasonable accommodation 
secures flourishing within the modified NNL basis, through protecting and 
promoting an individual’s religious beliefs as an aspect of flourishing. The ‘goods-
rights synthesis’ provides a natural rights basis to legitimise an individual’s belief 
as a distinctive aspect of human flourishing. Secondly, protecting religion as a 
public good could accommodate matters of conscience concerning religion by 
engaging the modification of George’s thought, in order to provide a solution to 
the tensions surrounding religious liberty. This chapter highlights how reasonable 
accommodation can solve the problem of difference within the protected 
characteristics in discrimination law and further solve the inherent problems 
surrounding the religious liberty provisions in the EqA 2010. This was further 
supplemented with the ‘common origin’ approach to reasonable accommodation 
that displayed the modern concept of equality as caught in tension between a) 
equality of persons and b) equality of lifestyle. It follows that despite different 
understandings of reasonable accommodation, the modified NNL conception is 
to be favoured with the public good of religion as an aspect of human flourishing. 
George’s modified understanding broadly speaking thereby goes further than 
Eweida and is dependent upon freedom of conscience. An examination of 
freedom of conscience will be the focus of the next section. 
5.5 The concept of freedom of religious conscience 
In chapter 2 it was argued that George’s NNL theory is a tripartite reflection on 
human reason, morality and law. This stems from George’s assertion that the 
basic goods, as intrinsic aspects of well-being and flourishing, create a space for 
making ethically autonomous moral decision making. The normative basis for 
moral judgment is built upon practical reasoning, whereby ‘freedom and reason 
are mutually entailed’.380 It is for this reason that, in line with the basic goods, I 
have identified that George understands a basic human right to religious 
liberty.381 By analysing George’s thought this section will argue that religious 
freedom is secured by religious liberty being seen to lead to human fulfilment. 
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Religious liberty is also connected to freedom of religious conscience. The natural 
law argument for religious liberty is founded upon the obligation to ‘pursue the 
truth about religious matters and to live in conformity with … conscientious 
judgments.’382 A basic human right to religious liberty, despite the Roman 
Catholic bias identified throughout this thesis, is dependent upon freedom of 
conscience. Moving from reasonable accommodation, this obligation would 
require therefore an express position for freedom of conscience. It was identified 
in chapter 5.3 that when George talks about the concept of conscience, George 
specifically refers to freedom of religious conscience. This concept of freedom of 
religious conscience is useful because it will be further used to analyse the right 
to religious freedom in equality law throughout this section. 
Rivers observes that Lord Hoffmann in Begum383 set out a conception of 
reasonable accommodation for religion that is ‘diametrically opposed to a 
conception of the rule of law rooted in individual conscience.’384 Trigg has further 
written that the pursuit of equality is leading the courts to fail to respect the 
dictates of conscience.385 This suggests that currently the law is not effectively 
incorporating freedom of religious conscience.  
George, in his approach to freedom of conscience, instead follows the logic 
employed by V. Bradley Lewis. Bradley Lewis views religion to be a function of 
conscience (with conscience being a human capacity) and so freedom of religion 
is based on respect for this.386 He has argued that a justification for religion is 
based on the goodness of religion itself.387 For George, this obligation towards 
religious freedom is rooted in the proposition that religion, as a method of 
ascertaining meaning and value, is ‘a crucial dimension of human well-being and 
fulfilment.’388 This understanding veers quite closely to a philosophical evaluation 
of conscience within value. In such an approach conscience is respected, as this 
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approach to conscience ensures a debate surrounding human flourishing, 
particularly concerning the debate for religious freedom. 
Both George and Bradley Lewis’ approaches to conscience are mirrored by the 
ECtHR holding that freedom of thought, conscience and belief is one of the 
foundations of a ‘democratic society’, a precious asset for both atheists and 
believers alike and their individual conceptions of life.389 The ECtHR has held that 
religious freedom is primarily a matter of conscience.390 The Supreme Court has 
further held that freedom of conscience is an internal, subjective matter that each 
person must work out for herself.391 In this section, my modified natural law 
critique for respecting freedom of conscience will, first, be argued to protect 
matters of conscience from invasion by the state, presenting religious liberty as 
both a basic and public good, and so, religious freedom will once more be 
substantiated as a public good. This will be followed by, second, critically 
analysing Articles 9 and 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Eweida. By applying 
the modification of George’s thought, this presentation of the public good of 
religion will be drawn upon. It will be drawn upon to show that viewing law as form 
of public morality provides an obligation towards freedom of religious conscience. 
This will set out an express reconstructed NNL position for enhanced protection 
of freedom of religious conscience.  
Freedom of Conscience: an obligation towards conscience based upon 
the common good in NNL 
In Conscience and its Enemies,392 George relies upon John Henry Newman’s 
understanding of religion to produce an account of freedom to enable human 
flourishing.393 He draws from Newman’s own Hohfeldian connection between 
autonomy and conscience within public morality and upon an individual basis: 
‘[c]onscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large portion 
of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with 
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51671/10 and 36516/10) [80]; Kokkinakis v. Greece (14307/88) [1993] ECHR 20 [31]. 
391 Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68 [31] (Lady Hale).  
392 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 32). 
393 Ibid 110. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  329 
conscience … It is the right of self-will.’394 This approach supports the earlier 
definition given for conscience and provides George with a conception of freedom 
of religious conscience opposing autonomy. In other words, it draws obligations 
for religious conscience from, for instance, morality. This conflicts with Martha 
Nussbaum’s assessment that the law should protect conscience, defined as a 
‘precious internal faculty for searching for life’s ethical basis and its ultimate 
meaning.’395 That being said, both approaches here recognise that it is important 
to follow conscience.  
For George, with matters of religious liberty, the duty to follow religious 
conscience ‘is a duty to do things or refrain from doing things not because one 
wants to follow one’s duty but even if one strongly does not want to follow it.’396 
As such, my analysis of George’s natural law thought includes religious liberty as 
a basic good following from the ‘dignity of man as a conscientious truth seeker.’397 
I suggest that this provides a higher place for religious freedom – a centrality and 
priority of religious freedom ‘among the basic civil liberties.’398 This is key as it 
suggests that the ‘first freedom’ in the American Bill of Rights (religious freedom) 
and the First Amendment to the American Constitution399 can be analogous to a 
higher position for religion or belief within the protected characteristics of the EqA 
2010 and the basic goods. This is because both would protect an ‘aspect of our 
flourishing as a human person key to the living of life’ which ‘represents our efforts 
to bring ourselves into a relationship of friendship with transcendent sources of 
meaning and value.’400 This is an important observation when analysing the right 
to religious freedom in the EqA 2010. This higher place follows from chapter 4 
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identifying the American Constitution as a paradigm natural rights discourse. This 
I argue, for George, leads the direction of good (prior to the right), and leads 
George to view characteristics and interests that are exercised in ways that have 
integrity.401 Does this favour the view that there should be no other protected 
characteristics/rights? Clearly not as George states, following Finnis’ Natural Law 
and Natural Rights, that:  
Religion is not the only basic human good; nor are the other basic human 
goods mere means to the fuller realisation of the good of religion. But 
religion is an intrinsic and constitutive aspect of our integral human 
flourishing as human persons and also a good that shapes and integrates 
all the other intrinsic and constitutive aspects of human well-being and 
fulfilment.402 
I argue that religion permeates George’s view of equality and conscience through 
the conception of religion as a public good, with religious liberty being a self-
evident ‘moral-knowledge’ thereby leading to flourishing.403 This conceptual 
approach is very helpful because it presents religious liberty as both a basic and 
public good: religious liberty is a public good that provides a form of freedom in 
human flourishing. The approach to religious liberty follows the definition given 
for human flourishing in chapter 4.4, where religious liberty allows individuals to 
flourish. This conclusion is supported by Peter Petkoff who has suggested that 
understanding belief and its manifestations as ‘internal aspects’ of freedom of 
religion, will emphasise flourishing rather than the containment of freedom of 
religion.404 
The strongest defence for religious freedom logically can be based upon the 
intrinsic and foundational goodness of religion itself.405 Yet why for George is the 
good of religious liberty/freedom to be cherished? Religious freedom, for George, 
I identify is a way of ‘limiting the role of the government and checking the power 
                                                          
401 Ibid. 
402 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 32) referencing 
J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) 89-90. 
403 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 32) 75. 
404 P Petkoff, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with a 
Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 7 Religion and 
Human Rights 183. 
405 Bradley Lewis, ‘Religious Freedom, the good of Religion and the Common Good: the Challenges of 
Pluralism, Privilege and the Contraceptive Services Mandate’ (n 386) 26. 
                       
 
© James Gould, 2018  331 
of the state.’406 My analysis of George’s thought here provides a distinctive 
approach to religious freedom, this is because moving from the natural rights 
discourse brought about by the secular humanist tradition,407 contemporary 
religious liberty provides authority structures and ‘where it flourishes and is 
healthy, is among the key institutions of civil society providing a buffer between 
the individual and the state.’408 This is because religious freedom protects all 
those who practise, and logically also all those who do not practise faith,409 
including those who dissent from official teaching.410 The purpose of this is that it 
is a ‘vital way in which religion and religious institutions, when they respect the 
legitimate autonomy of the secular sphere and avoid illiberalism … serve the 
common good.’411 Religion can serve the common good by ensuring that the 
analysis and application of George’s thought effectively functions within the state. 
I suggest that this is why religion has such an important place within George’s 
theory.  
Rivers conversely identifies that claims of religious conscience have given way 
to a ‘neutral conception of the common good as expressed through the law of the 
state.’412 This is because claims of conscience; claims of systems of religious law, 
and claims of alternative religious versions of social flourishing have ‘no publically 
cognisable weight’.413 Certainly this is shown by the lowly protected remit of 
Article 9 of the ECHR and failure of cases taken in this area in English domestic 
courts (see section 4.2), which in turn highlights that contemporary judgments 
involving conscience display misunderstanding surrounding the good of religion. 
However, the common good within George’s theory provides a higher level of 
protection, one that would arguably provide a greater level of protection for 
religious freedom against the state. This protected level of religious freedom then 
protects matters of conscience from being damaged by the state. 
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George’s approach to religious freedom can be seen to be analogous to the 
approach taken by Waldron, for whom satisfaction involves a concern for 
freedom, which in turn is a requirement for individualism.414 Liberty (and the right 
to freedom of conscience) involves the elementary condition of material well-
being. Therefore it follows that ‘rights involve not merely freedom but the active 
protection of this freedom for the securing of this right in material accommodation 
which produces flourishing.’415 Freedom requires security on the basis of 
reasonable accommodation. It is in this sense that to achieve the earlier ideal of 
reasonable accommodation, freedom of religious conscience is already required. 
It has been shown in this section that a high level of freedom of religious 
conscience allowing human flourishing is required, to protect matters of 
conscience from invasion by the state. 
Balancing protection for freedom of conscience 
This higher place and promotion of flourishing is why Edge has identified 
problems occurring within the manifestation of religion: on the whole, the right of 
an individual to hold a belief; to identify with a religion; and to identify as part of a 
religious community, are all uncontentious. The problem arises when the 
individual seeks to act upon one of these statuses.416 Sandberg, writing in 2011, 
predicted that, following the earlier appellate court hearings in Ladele417 and 
McFarlane,418 a ‘growing concern’ would emerge in that laws protecting religious 
freedom would have little effect, while laws protecting sexual orientation would 
constrain religious freedom.419 Following the Court of Appeal decision in 
Ladele,420 Sandberg commented: ‘the laudable aim of preventing discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation was used to annihilate the claim of religious 
discrimination.’421 This is why it has been observed that religion or belief appears 
to be frequently subordinated to sexual orientation with ‘some arguing that any 
hierarchy is a straight-forward by-product of anti-discrimination law 
juridification.’422 Although in chapter 4 it was denied that a balancing of protected 
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characteristics has led to a hierarchy emerging, Sandberg has acknowledged a 
trend in which the United Kingdom has forgotten discrimination is outlawed on 
grounds of religion or belief.423 This has led Sandberg to question whether ‘the 
equality policy protects discrimination on grounds of religion as well as sexual 
orientation.’424 Indeed, it was earlier identified in this chapter that there has been 
academic argument suggesting a different level of protection may be 
emerging.425 This different level of protection applies to discrimination on grounds 
of religion or belief, and protecting conscience within these areas, from the 
protection available for other equality grounds.426 If this is the case, then in order 
to critique the place of religious liberty within equality law what role has balancing 
conscience played within Eweida?  
Hill has identified that in balancing the protection between the consciences of the 
employees against the promotion of principles on equality in the provision of a 
public service, Eweida provides a ‘flashpoint’ in litigation.427 In Eweida,428 the joint 
partly dissenting opinion of Judges Vučinić and de Gaetano identified the role of 
conscience in equality claims. This was not discussed in the majority judgment. 
Interestingly, however, the dissenting judges attached conscience to reason, 
within a religious understanding.  
I argue that this connection between conscience and reason is similar to the 
process within George’s NNL: conscience is a judgment of human reason – 
practical, human rationality which may or may not be informed by religious 
beliefs.429 For George, I submit that human reason actively informs conscience 
through the discernment of the common good, proposed by the earlier identified 
method of ‘common human reason.’430 This would dictate laws on religious 
freedom and provide a place for the conscience of religious believers in the 
critique and modification of George’s thought. Linking into the previous 
discussion of reasonable accommodation, the issue of conscience and reason 
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arising from Ms Ladele’s objection to carrying out civil partnership ceremonies 
was not just an objection that it was contrary to her religious beliefs but ‘also that 
she was being required to act by her employers in ways which were contrary to 
her conscience.’431 Sandberg has provided the context by suggesting that the 
individual cases within Eweida constitute claims brought by employees forced to 
carry out obligations arising from new laws protecting sexual orientation.432 
Should employees be forced to marry a couple against that person’s religious 
beliefs or conscience?433 The important finding to note for Ms Ladele is that in 
the partly dissenting opinion it was not so much about freedom of religion and 
belief as one of freedom of religious conscience.434  
Freedom of Conscience: applying George’s thought indicates that 
conscience violations precede law within a public morality 
George’s understanding of the concept of public morality was very clearly offered 
and analysed in chapter 3. In short, it was shown that the concept of public 
morality is dependent upon law. For instance ‘law is the only public morality that 
we can have.’435 For Robert George, law is a form of public morality and religious 
freedom is part of political morality.436 It was suggested that law by shaping 
morality prescribes a public morality. George believes that the common good of 
public morality generates obligations in justice,437 in order to preserve morals.438 
Further, George’s belief that governmental respect for individual freedom and the 
autonomy of governmental spheres of authority is a requirement of political 
morality439 holds because law and government fundamentally exist to protect 
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human persons and their well-being. As such, it is evident that Ms Ladele’s 
standpoint is one that would be supported by George: to legislate against 
conscience would prove to be an action taken against religious liberty. This would 
be contrary to well-being and hence fulfilment. This is useful in our analysis of 
religious equality law because it identifies that, for Ms Ladele, providing a registrar 
service to those of a different sexual orientation would be an action against her 
conscience motivated by her religious belief and so taken against her religious 
liberty.  
A fundamental tenet of liberalism, a plea for religious liberty, was supported in 
the dissenting opinion in Eweida, that is, ‘that no one should be forced to act 
against one’s conscience or be penalised for refusing to act against one’s 
conscience.’440 For comparative purposes, it is worth remembering that acting 
against conscience would be discriminatory, falling within the ambit of Articles 9 
and 14 of the ECHR and that this would be similar to traditional conscientious 
objections towards abortion and involvement in military service.441  
It should be noted that, in Ladele, the claim of indirect discrimination was defeated 
by the legitimate aim of ‘protecting the rights of others [gay and lesbian 
individuals] which are also protected under the Convention’.442 For the dissenting 
judges this legitimate aim did not arise as ‘the aim of the Borough of Islington was 
to provide equal opportunities and services to all without discrimination and the 
legitimacy of this aim is not and was never at issue’.443 Importantly, the Borough 
of Islington, in the opinion of the dissenting judges, was prima facie liable to Ms 
Ladele’s claim of discrimination. This was because, firstly, no service user or 
prospective service user of the Borough ever seemed to have complained, which 
leads to, secondly, because the legitimacy of the aim was not in issue, then no 
balancing exercise could be carried out between Ladele’s right to conscientious 
objection and a legitimate state of public authority policy to determine whether 
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‘the means used to pursue this aim were proportionate.’444 Following from this 
absence of a rights-based discourse conflict surrounding indirect discrimination, 
it follows that Ladele’s situation primarily centred upon a conscience issue. The 
fact Ms Ladele was prepared to lose her job because of her beliefs indicates the 
centrality of beliefs to her conscience.445 The role of conscience, therefore, 
provides an important factor in the analysis and application of George’s thought 
concerning the protection of rights within the state. 
Rivers has taken against the state implementing freedom of conscience. A theme 
that recurs throughout his Law of Organized Religion446 is criticism of the ‘limiting 
individualistic tendency’447 of regarding religious liberty primarily as a matter of 
freedom of conscience.448 Rivers worries that religious freedom would be unduly 
restricted by the ‘expansive application of the equalities approach … [that] has 
recently started to apply the standards only expected of states to religious 
associations themselves’.449 Dignity within a standardised approach has enforced 
a restrictive public duty of equality which is applicable to the organisation rather 
than the individual. This approach does not, however, engage with the connection 
between common human reason and religious conscience at an individual level. 
Unlike George’s thought it does not therefore recognise the interrelation between 
the good of religion and religious liberty leading to human flourishing. George’s 
approach to religious liberty adjudication that I have analysed is, conversely, 
focused upon the individual’s practical rationality broadly-speaking. 
The provision of services and religious conscience 
The provision of services has also been seen to restrict individual conscience. 
McCrea has suggested that any equality approach concerning provision of 
services further harms the individual. This is because Islington’s policy was called 
‘Dignity for All’ and not ‘services for all’. From this position McCrea has observed 
                                                          
444 Ibid. 
445 Trigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion (n 60) 96. 
446 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (n 7). 
447 McCrea, ‘Book review: J Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and 
Secularism (Oxford University Press, 2010)’ (n 184) 665. 
448 Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and Secularism (n 7) 30. 
449 McCrea, ‘Book review: J Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between Establishment and 
Secularism (Oxford University Press, 2010)’ (n 184) 665; Rivers, The Law of Organized Religions: Between 
Establishment and Secularism (n 24) 36. 
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that a deprivation of services has an impact upon the dignity of individuals.450 For 
McCrea the dissenting judges in Eweida erred here.451 McCrea’s objection is 
misconceived. I argue that the application of George’s understanding of moral 
judgement shows that the good precedes law within a public morality. George 
has viewed the concept of public morality as what he terms a type of ‘public 
good’.452 Here any action preventing an individual from following their conscience 
intrinsically violates the good of an individual. Following George’s logic outlined 
in the earlier sections, the obligation to protect conscience precedes that of any 
rights discourse. Instead the purpose of law as a form of public morality is to 
preserve morals.453 This is dependent upon branches of the state such as the 
legislature and established institutions such as the church upholding the good of 
individual conscience to sustain public morality.454 
The protection for provision of services has been positively noted by the ECtHR.                                      
This has received judicial support in the form of the learned judge, Lady Hale, 
finding in the negative that laws which ignore Christian consciences might not be 
‘sustainable’.455 Further, in response to the ruling in Bull v Hall,456 Lady Hale has 
called for, first, as we have seen, a new proportionality assessment for 
reasonable accommodation457 and, secondly, more importantly, the law to 
develop a ‘conscience clause’458 for Christians who, like the Bulls and Ladele, 
would find providing services contrary to the pursuance of their own conscience 
and manifestation of religious freedom. Here I suggest that the deprivation of 
services would allow the individual to flourish in line with the common good, by 
not violating conscience. Proportionality in judicial attempts to manage clashes 
                                                          
450 McCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ (n 154) 283. 
451 Ibid. 
452 George, ‘The concept of public morality’ (n 437) 19. I take this further and term religion to be a public 
good in chapters 4 and 5. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Ibid 24. 
455 Hale, ‘Religion and Sexual Orientation: the Clash of Equality Rights’ (n 356); Doughty, ‘I may have 
been wrong to condemn Christian B&B owners for banning gay couple because people with religious 
beliefs have rights too, says top judge’ (n 354). 
456 Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73. 
457 ‘[reasonable accommodation] was to be taken into account in the overall proportionality assessment, 
which must therefore consider the extent to which it is reasonable to expect the employer to 
accommodate the employee’s right.’ Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73 [51] (Lady Hale). The dissenting 
judgment in Eweida proposed a more radical method: in cases of individual’s moral conscience, such as 
Eweida, the state’s margin of appreciation does not enter into the equation for individual moral 
conscience. See Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [5] (Dissenting judgment). 
458 Hale, ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief’ (n 354). 
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of interests will, however, only secure religious liberty if claims of religious people 
and their religious freedom have sufficient weight.459 
Ms Ladele was denied this religious freedom for two reasons: first, the majority in 
the ECtHR feared that requiring a religious exemption for Ms Ladele would send 
the Court down a slippery slope, with an exemption which may have to be 
extended from sexual orientation in couple registration services to discrimination 
on any ground (e.g. sex or race). Trigg has opposed this on the basis that 
devaluing religious conscience may in contrast lead to all claims of conscience 
equally being ignored.460 This indicates that there will not be a slippery slope 
impact, but instead lesser protection given to individual conscience. Secondly, 
the fact that Ms Ladele’s job need not have been redefined by Islington to require 
her to act as a registrar of civil partnerships461 - the Council may have 
‘accommodat[ed] her conscientious objection without depriving anyone who 
wished to enter into a civil partnership in Islington the opportunity to do so.’462 The 
fact that the Council did not do so, and the ECtHR reached a comparable 
conclusion, was a flagrant violation of conscience, and so, religious liberty. These 
examples are misunderstandings surrounding the good of religion. The analysis 
of George’s thought indicates that they represent conscience violations of the 
public good of religion within a public morality. The concept of the public good of 
religion does not here receive sufficient protection.  
Religion as a public good: failing to protect religious conscience 
demeans individuals 
A test was proposed by the dissenting judges in Eweida: could Islington have 
accommodated Ms Ladele’s conscientious objection without impinging on the 
rights of service users?463 The question remains: does this go far enough to 
accommodate the good? Applying the test, prima facie the earlier identified 
concept of reasonable accommodation may not under my application of George’s 
thought ensure freedom as a public good or religion as a public good to ensure 
                                                          
459 Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (n 19) 399. 
460 Trigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion (n 60) 106. 
461 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) [25] (Majority judgment). 
462 McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 214. This would in effect be an operation 
accommodating conscience. See also Hill, ‘Religious Symbolism and Conscientious Objection in the 
Workplace: An Evaluation of Strasbourg’s Judgment in Eweida and others v United Kingdom’ (n 10) 202. 
463 McIlroy, ‘A Marginal Victory for Freedom of Religion’ (n 71) 215. 
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the flourishing of believers. The good of religion is fundamentally misunderstood. 
For example, in a hypothetical society that does not embrace conceptions of 
liberty or religion, one which actively discourages such rights, a rights basis would 
be logically prevented from accommodating either of these concepts. 
Reasonable accommodation is thus a fragile concept, one which can provide 
momentary relief, but is not sustainable in a long-term legal landscape. At both a 
level of principle464 and practicality, the problem with reasonable accommodation 
is that religious conscience is susceptible to widespread moral relativism. 
The concept of religion as a public good is instead to be preferred to reasonable 
accommodation: where a claimant argues that she or he has been the victim of 
religious discrimination, what should matter is whether the belief or act which 
triggered the discriminatory conduct ‘was truly religious’.465 This goes further than 
viewing the act of discrimination alone being in and of itself as wrong. This 
approach requires discrimination based upon a particular characteristic triggered 
by a belief or act. The belief or act requires a form of protection, one that could 
be effectively secured if religion was seen to be a good in and of itself. With more 
protection being conferred, space would be given to religious freedom for making 
ethically autonomous decisions. This is a form of religious freedom leading to 
flourishing in line with George’s NNL. Religious freedom in equality law secures 
freedom of conscience.  
Reliance upon the sincerity of the claim to establish religious discrimination differs 
from Hellman’s earlier thesis.466 Both approaches can be applied to the question: 
when is religious differentiation morally permissible? This question provides a 
deeper insight into equality. To answer the question posed above: drawing 
distinctions among people is morally permissible, ‘when doing so does not 
demean any of those affected. We can treat people differently if, in doing so, we 
do not demean them.’467 The problem with the EqA 2010, and religious liberty 
law, as has been shown in this chapter, is that it, through failing to protect religious 
                                                          
464 This goes further than viewing discrimination in and of itself as wrong. It could perfectly well be 
argued that the problem lies in discrimination rather than discrimination based upon a particular 
characteristic. 
465 Hatzis, ‘Personal Religious Belief in the Workplace: How Not to Define Indirect Discrimination’ (2011) 
74(2) MLR 287, 292. 
466 As a reminder, discrimination is wrong when differentiation demeans. See generally Hellman, When 
is Discrimination Wrong (n 254). 
467 Ibid 169. 
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conscience and failing to accommodate religious liberty, demeans religious 
individuals when differentiating them. Religion as a public good, which is drawn 
from the analysis of George’s thought would not do this. Instead, religion can be 
seen within an understanding of the public good. 
This section has outlined a position for the concept of freedom of religious 
conscience. It has been argued that George views law as a form of public 
morality, which provides an obligation towards freedom of religious conscience 
(political morality). This is based upon the public good of religion discerned 
through ‘common human reason’.468 In this chapter, first, analysis indicated that 
George uses the concept of religious freedom to protect matters of conscience 
from invasion by the state. As such, second, Eweida469 has brought to life the 
priority of the good in religious conscience over legal rights within the concept of 
public morality. The analysis and application of George’s thought suggests that 
the EqA 2010 could benefit from presenting religion within the remit of a public 
good to protect religious conscience in a balancing of rights, legitimate interests 
and protected characteristics. 
5.6 Conclusion  
To conclude, this chapter has shown Robert George’s critique of equality law. 
The modification and application of George’s thought has been necessary in 
order to critique the place of religious freedom within equality law throughout this 
chapter. Engagement with George’s thought has been analysed to provide a 
justification for the greater protection of religious freedom. For instance, it has 
been argued, following from the codification prescribed by the EqA 2010 and 
jurisprudence outlined in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom,470 that George’s 
critique of equality law regarding religious freedom would, in contrast, ensure that 
employees do have a right to manifest religion in their workplace. This is a right 
not merely gained by accommodating religious belief, but instead through 
ensuring freedom of conscience is actively promoted. This would correct current 
misunderstandings surrounding the public good of religion. 
                                                          
468 George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (n 32) 121. 
469 Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80. 
470 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
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This chapter has clearly defined and then engaged with concepts that have been 
drawn from George’s thought. This chapter has particularly drawn upon how the 
recurring concepts in this chapter relate to each other. These concepts have then 
usefully analysed the right to freedom of religion in equality law. For instance, 
chapter 5.2 engaged with the concept of human flourishing. It was shown in this 
chapter that following Eweida,471 employees do have a positive right to manifest 
religion in the workplace. It was conveyed that this is a readily enforceable 
position for the manifestation of religious liberty in the workplace as a natural 
right. This was argued to be necessary to protect the good of religion that leads 
to the concept of human flourishing. It was further discussed at length that the 
enforcement of equality law in Eweida472 has forced a practical shift from ‘non-
discrimination to anti-discrimination’473 which limits the scope of Article 9 in 
relation to religion and belief. 
It was further shown that the ECtHR have rejected the ‘specific situation rule’. 
Freedom to change jobs is definitively not seen as sufficient to guarantee freedom 
of religion. I argued that George’s use of ‘legal liberty’ is not confined to the 
freedom to change jobs. Instead, a proportionality assessment and common 
human reason dictate laws on religious freedom. 
A solution to religious liberty restrictions may be evident in the form of the concept 
of reasonable accommodation. George’s goods based NNL approach, however, 
was shown to be favoured over contemporary calls for reasonable 
accommodation. The conclusion was supported for two reasons: first, reasonable 
accommodation secures flourishing within George’s version of NNL. This is 
through the ‘goods-rights synthesis’ providing a rights basis to legitimise an 
individual’s belief as an aspect of human flourishing over rights for service 
provision. This preferable method for reasonable accommodation solves the 
conflict in current equality law between: a) equality of persons and b) equality of 
lifestyle and behaviour. Secondly, religion as a public good was shown to 
accommodate matters of conscience by engaging George’s approach. So 
building from the dissenting judgment in Eweida,474 it was shown that the modified 
                                                          
471 Ibid. 
472 Ibid. 
473 Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (n 45) 157. 
474 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) (Partly dissenting judgment).  
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NNL conception of reasonable accommodation is founded upon the public good 
of religion. This was argued to address the problem of difference in the EqA 2010 
surrounding protected characteristics. As such, the critique of George’s NNL 
conception is to be favoured - the public good of religion as an aspect of human 
flourishing. Religion is here protected as a public good. This will be further 
considered in the conclusion to this thesis. 
This chapter also detailed an express position for freedom of conscience. It was 
argued that George, broadly speaking, goes further than the dissenting judgment 
in Eweida475 by arguing for a basic human right to religious liberty dependent 
upon freedom of religious conscience.  
In this chapter I further argued: a) that George uses the concept of religious 
freedom to protect matters of conscience from invasion by the state. Once again, 
this presented religious liberty as a public good. It was identified that religion has 
a higher place within George’s theory because religion serves the common good 
by ensuring that the George’s thought can effectively function within the state. 
This was followed by identifying b) that this higher, public good of religion 
contributes towards George’s view of law as a form of public morality. This 
enables freedom of religious conscience and argues for enhanced protection for 
freedom of religious conscience.  
In sum, chapter 5 has provided  a modified, altered version of George’s NNL in 
light of earlier criticism provided throughout this thesis. The resolution of George’s 
theory, through the critique of his thought, speaks into a current issue of concern 
within equality law. It has been shown that the current state of reasonable 
accommodation and indirect discrimination law conflicts with my approach to 
George’s thought. The modification and application of George’s thought would 
therefore require religion to be advanced as a form of public morality within the 
guide of the public good. An express position for religious liberty has been 
argued, as both a basic and public good, and so, religious freedom is a public 
good. Eweida476 has brought to life the priority of the good in religious conscience 
over legal rights within public morality.  
                                                          
475 Ibid. 
476 See both - Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80; Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom 
(2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10).  
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The concluding chapter will summarise the themes and issues that have been 
drawn through the critical application of George’s NNL views on equality law and 
will demonstrate that equality legislation could benefit from presenting religion 
within the remit of this public good. This would protect religious conscience in a 
balancing of protected characteristics, legitimate interests and legal rights. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
This thesis has undertaken a critical application of Robert George’s views 
towards the Equality Act 2010. In doing so, it has drawn novel conclusions about, 
and attempted to provide an answer to, George’s NNL approach to English 
religious liberty case law.   
The findings throughout this thesis have presented religion and religious freedom 
as a public good. This arose from a research question considering what George, 
with his view of religion as a basic human good, might think about the religious 
liberty cases taken under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010. In answer to 
this question, the critique and modification of George’s thought was shown to 
engage the public good of religion in order to provide a more effective approach 
towards equality law. It has been argued this position is sufficient to resolve 
irreconcilable tensions within equality law, such as those that have arisen 
regarding the current state of reasonable accommodation and proportionality 
analysis within indirect discrimination law. A new basis was set down for a 
concept of reasonable accommodation regarding the protected characteristic of 
religion or belief within equality law. This was shown to rely upon a conception of 
the good which ensures promotion of religion as a public good. A conception that 
is not merely protective of religion but one that actively promotes an individual’s 
religious beliefs in order to attain human flourishing.
This thesis has also shown that viewing religion as a public good could expressly 
accommodate matters of conscience by reconstructing George’s theory and 
providing a modified NNL approach. The discussion surrounding religious 
conscience developed from the thematic analysis of Eweida.1 This discussion, in 
dialogue with George’s work, emphasises the priority of the good in religious 
conscience over legal rights within public morality. It is a form of public morality2 
providing an obligation towards freedom of religious conscience. This freedom 
would extend to religious freedom under Articles 9 and 14 of the ECHR. Yet, this 
form of freedom is no mere human right, rather it was displayed as, once more, 
the key public good of religion. 
                                                          
1 See both - Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80; Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom 
(2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10). 
2 The definition for the concept of public morality in this thesis was provided in chapter 3 and repeated 
in chapter 5.5. 
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This chapter will bring together the individual conclusions in the chapters of this 
thesis and draw implications from these. By doing so this final chapter will justify 
and support the finding that equality legislation could benefit from presenting 
religion within the remit of the public good. Religion is presented in this manner 
in order to protect religious conscience in a balancing of protected characteristics, 
legitimate interests and human rights.3 
Chapter 2 considered a key theme within George’s thought, namely, the reliance 
upon practical reason. As such, this chapter showed how George’s neo-
scholastic NNL approach differed from Thomist thoughts in several notable ways. 
This provided a basis for application, which also highlighted institutional 
consequences arising from the analysis of George’s thought. George’s ‘minimum 
standard of reasonableness’ approach towards legal validity was shown here to 
suppose practical reasoning as a guiding principle. George was shown to hold a 
unique position within the NNL School and to contribute particularly in the 
understanding of practical ‘common human reason[ing]’, which is a social 
contractarian method to put forward political claims based upon democratically 
informed opinion, one which is drawn from George’s interpretation of practical 
reasoning within Aquinas.4 George was further presented to hold a position which 
subtly differs to that of the rest of the Grisez School by his approach to Rawlsian 
public reasoning. This critique displayed the extent to which George differs from 
existing scholarship in his use of practical reason. Yet disagreement with both 
legal reasoning and legal adjudication is welcome. After all, this is why appellate 
courts have an odd numbers of judges to resolve such disagreement. So despite 
                                                          
3 A recent example of the equality narrative failing to protect religion can be seen by Digital Cinema 
Media (DCM) refusing to screen a commercial advert featuring the Lord’s Prayer. This was due to play in 
cinemas before the Star Wars: The Force Awakens feature film. The advertisement produced by the 
Church of England was banned because of its religious content. DCM suggested they have a policy of not 
accepting ‘political or religious advertising’ content for use in cinemas and that in this regard, they treat 
‘all political or religious beliefs equally’. Once again, this highlights that religion requires further 
protection. See H Horton, ‘Church of England: banning Lord's Prayer adverts will have a 'chilling' effect 
on free speech’ (The Daily Telegraph, 23rd November 2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/12010305/church-of-england-banning-lords-prayer-
adverts-chilling-effect-free-speech.html> accessed 9th December 2015; H Siddique, ‘Cinemas refuse to 
show Church of England advert featuring Lord’s Prayer’ (The Guardian, 23rd November 2015) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/22/cinema-chains-ban-advert-featuring-lords-prayer> 
accessed 9th December 2015. 
4 R P George, ‘Science, Philosophy, and Religion in the Embryo Debate’ (Anscombe Memorial Lecture 
2011, 21 October 2011) <http://www.bioethics.org.uk/page/resources/multimedia> accessed 1st August 
2012. Also see, R P George, Conscience and its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism 
(Isi Books, 2013) 125. 
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the criticisms and tensions outlined in this thesis surrounding George’s work, this 
does not prohibit the critique of George’s thought from successfully providing a 
way forward for natural law reasoning in order to analyse religious equality law.5 
With this in mind, this chapter presented the role of practical reasoning within 
George’s theory, which opened the way for the substantive case law and textual 
analysis carried out within the later chapters. 
To further prepare for the later critique of equality law regarding religion, chapter 
3 concentrated upon the key theme of natural rights within George’s work. This 
theme was established by conveying George’s narrowing from theological 
conceptions of natural law jurisprudence towards non-theological designations 
found in a natural rights discourse. Through these the chapter analysed the 
influence upon George of the modern secular humanist tradition. It was shown 
that this tradition embraced the interplay between the Roman Jurists’ 
classifications of laws to narrow natural law themes into natural rights 
jurisprudence. A motif of fundamental rights to secure liberty repeated throughout 
the chapter, such as George’s movement from Hobbes to provide individual, 
natural rights protection against the state and detailing the Lockean property right 
of liberty. It was argued that George draws upon this property right to provide a 
‘goods based opposition’ in additional disagreement towards certain state made 
law. To further detail the transformation of natural law reasoning into natural rights 
jurisprudence within George’s work, Pufendorf’s influence in contributing to the 
rationalist basis within NNL was analysed. This set the stage for the equality law 
critique which followed by providing a clear basis for opposition towards state 
made religious equality law through, for instance, George’s protective stance 
regarding religion which was argued to be a pro-active stand for the manifestation 
of religion in the workplace. This was argued to provide George with a protective 
approach to religious liberty. 
Equality law: a new balance?  
Only because of the work in the latter chapters of this thesis is it possible to 
conclude that equality legislation can benefit from presenting religion within the 
remit of the public good to protect religious conscience. These chapters critically 
analysed George’s NNL approach towards substantive religious equality law in 
                                                          
5 The working definition for ‘religious equality law’ was given in chapter 4. 
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order to solve those tensions identified earlier.6 The resolution of George’s theory 
spoke into a current legal issue of concern and this process was essential to 
solving the tensions within both George’s theory and equality law impacting 
religion. In chapter 4, first the analysis and application of George’s thought was 
shown to engage the public good of religion in order to provide a more effective 
approach towards discrimination/equality law. The chapter addressed how 
George has dealt with discrimination law, particularly religious discrimination 
law.7 It was shown that George views law as the medium in which it is possible 
to talk about the good and, more specifically, about religion not only as a basic 
human good but also as a public good (in the sense that the good is prior to the 
right and rights within equality law). This arose from discussion that NNL may 
now be dictated under the banner of equality and enforced by a ‘due regard’ 
public sector duty under s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010). Tensions 
here, such as the problems with the public sector equality duty, are unsurprising.8 
It was shown that the courts are attempting to assess the correct parameters for 
the protection of religion at work.9 Secondly, through thereby engaging with the 
concepts of human dignity and religious liberty it was explored why, in part, the 
modification of George’s thought showing religion as a public good is a more 
effective approach and solution for the protection of religion at work.  
Despite this thesis identifying that religion can be viewed as a public good in 
chapter 4, Lady Hale, writing extra-judicially in the Ecclesiastical Law Journal,10 
has recently drawn doubt upon whether religion can, as argued, be viewed as a 
                                                          
6 Such as the ‘unresolvable problems’ between religious rights and sexual orientation rights - P Edge and 
L Vickers, ‘Equality and Human Rights Commission Report 97 – Review of Equality and Human Rights 
Law Relating to Religion and Belief’ Equality and Human Rights Commission (Manchester, September 
2015) 
<http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/RR97_Review%20of%20equ
ality%20and%20human%20rights%20law%20relating%20to%20religion%20or%20belief.pdf> accessed 
5th December 2015, 40. See chapters 1, 4 and 5.  
7 By doing so this thesis addressed key research questions identified in chapter 1: first, has George 
contributed to the discussion of religious equality law? Second, how has George dealt with 
discrimination law, particularly discrimination on grounds of religion and belief? Third, can analysing 
George’s approach to US law provide a set of transferable criteria and concepts to analyse religion? 
8 I agree with the suggestion in the ‘EHRC Report – Review of Equality and Human Rights Law Relating to 
Religion and Belief’ that more research is needed to ascertain how the public sector equality duty has 
been implemented with regard to religion or belief. By doing so this will determine its practical 
effectiveness in this area - Edge and Vickers (n 6) 58. 
9 For instance, these ‘parameters’ are being tested because religious equality was only introduced in 
most member states in response to the need to implement the 2000/78 Directive in 2003 - L Vickers, 
‘Law, Religion and the Workplace’ in S Ferrari (ed), Routledge Handbook of Law and Religion (Routledge, 
2015) 275. 
10 Lady Hale, ‘Secular Judges and Christian Law’ (2015) 17(2) Ecc. L.J. 170. 
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public good. Lady Hale’s initial position is that ‘no special protection is to be given 
to belief in Christianity’11 and that religious freedom, for any religion, is not an 
absolute right.12 In setting down eight general issues governing the secular 
courts’ approach to religious issues,13 she draws doubt upon religious liberty by 
suggesting ‘religious beliefs provides no exemption from having to obey general 
laws which are designed for the common good.’14 What is the common good 
identified here? Does the common good suggest that in legal adjudication 
religious rights will lose? A branch of the state (the judiciary) is here justifying its 
own secular common good. Lady Hale does not outline here what constitutes 
laws designed for the common good. It is not a NNL understanding of the 
common good. As such, this suggestion conflicts with the vision of religion 
provided for in this thesis. It has been outlined that if religion is considered part 
of the common good, when litigated alongside the other protected characteristics, 
then in matters of religious liberty adjudication (Ms. Eweida excluded), religion 
and belief will always lose. The research conducted in this thesis certainly shows 
both a clear direction and a clear development of the law regarding religious 
liberty. This highlights why in analysing the right to religious freedom, religious 
freedom needs to be protected as a public good.  
To build upon this conclusion, an implication for further work may be to analyse 
these comments in the light of future Supreme Court cases. For instance, the 
conception of the common good needs to be assessed in connection with the 
view of religion as a public good.  
A further conclusion in chapter 4 conveyed that George holds the American 
Constitution as a paradigm for natural rights discourse. For George, it was noted 
that this provides authority to enforce the natural law and to protect the natural 
rights held by the legislature or judiciary. The role of common human reason in 
George’s approach to religious liberty was also considered to produce a 
‘reasonableness test’ to balance religious exceptions. The concept of 
‘reasonableness’ provides direction for application to achieve ‘legal liberty’. 
Through combining this test with a ‘responsibilities discourse’, this demonstrated 
                                                          
11 Ibid 173. 
12 Ibid. For instance, it is subject to the limitations in Articles 9(2) and 10(2) of the ECHR. 
13 Ibid 172. 
14 Ibid 175 [Emphasis added]. 
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George’s unique approach to religious liberty adjudication and the institutional 
consequences that arise when addressing this approach to equality law.15  
This responsibilities discourse in chapter 4 also allowed conclusions drawn from 
the analysis and application of George’s NNL thought to answer the conflicting 
rights discourse that has featured throughout this thesis. The discourse reflects 
a current trend where, in order to secure protection for religious beliefs, the 
narrative ‘needs to be in a language that speaks as loudly of responsibility as it 
does of rights.’16 To do so echoes the second Biblical ‘Great Commandment’ to 
‘[l]ove your neighbour as yourself’.17 As such, a responsibilities discourse finds 
connection with the basic human goods because it establishes responsibility to 
pursue human choices which fulfil obligations towards others.18 In George’s 
approach towards religious equality law, the implication is that this conclusion is 
a better way to ground and balance the good of religion. Religion is presented as 
a public good which mitigates the problems surrounding rights confliction. 
George’s NNL approach was further applied in the fifth chapter. It was shown 
that, following from the codification prescribed by the EqA 2010 and jurisprudence 
outlined in Eweida,19 George’s critique of religious equality law provided that 
employees do have a right to manifest religion in their workplace as a natural 
right. George’s use of ‘legal liberty’ was further demonstrated not to be confined 
to the freedom to change jobs. In rejection of the ‘specific situation rule’, freedom 
to change jobs was not seen to be enough to guarantee freedom of religion under 
Article 9 of the ECHR. Instead, proportionality assessments20 and common 
human reason dictate laws on religious freedom.  
                                                          
15 This process addresses the following research question which was identified in chapter 1: does Robert 
George’s natural law theory provide a solution to the identified tensions facing religious freedom within 
equality law? 
16 M Hill, ‘Equality of all faiths under the law is best for religious freedom’ (The Times, Law Section, 11 
June 2015). 
17 Matthew 22:39 - Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Collins, 2002). 
18 N Biggar, ‘”God” in Public Reason’ (2006) 19(1) Studies in Christian Ethics 9, 13. By responsibility 
Biggar means two things: 1) a capacity to respond to ‘respond to goods given in and with the natural of 
things prior to human choices’ and 2) the ‘capacity to respond to a vocation from God to play an 
inimitable part in the salvation of the world’ - ibid. 
19 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
20 The doctrine of proportionality is merely another structured legal mechanism which seeks to 
unnecessarily avoid limiting rights. While the critique of George’s thought applied to adjudication is 
preferred, Vickers provides a good summary of the law concerning proportionality: in negotiating the 
relationships between religion and other human rights, proportionality allows religious interests and 
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This thesis has addressed the contested issue of reasonable accommodation.21 
This chapter allows for deeper insight into, and practical insights to be drawn 
from, the concept of reasonable accommodation. Chapter 5 provided that a public 
good may now be evident in the form of support from both judiciary and drafters 
of the EqA 2010 seriously debating reasonable accommodation. Post Bull v 
Hall,22 Lady Hale was shown to be considering protecting of Christian conscience 
via reasonable accommodation.23 This links to some of the conclusions found 
earlier in this thesis. For instance, it was shown in chapter 5 that the modified 
understanding of reasonable accommodation is founded upon the public good of 
religion.24 Reasonable accommodation under the modification of George’s 
thought was also shown to solve the problem of difference within the protected 
characteristics under the EqA 2010. Yet Lady Hale has come to the conclusion 
that reasonable accommodation is already in force. She believes that, following 
Eweida,25 justification for indirect discrimination has now to be looked at in the 
light of the Convention right to manifest one’s religion without unjustified 
interference, otherwise our law will become ‘deeply incoherent if the analysis 
does not reach the same result in each case.’26 As such, Lady Hale is calling for 
a change in domestic law to incorporate reasonable accommodation. Following 
Eweida, Lady Hale believes that ‘employers and other providers may be expected 
to make reasonable adjustments to their rules and practices to accommodate the 
religious beliefs of their employees.’27 Chapter 5 detailed that no direct 
                                                          
other issues to be taken into consideration – L Vickers, ‘Twin approaches to secularism: organized 
religion and society’ (2012) 32(1) OJLS 197, 209.  
21 The concept of reasonable accommodation was defined and analysed in chapter 5.4. 
22 Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73. 
23 B Hale, ‘Religion and Sexual Orientation: the Clash of Equality Rights’ (Comparative and Administrative 
Law Conference, 7 March 2014) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140307.pdf> accessed 
25th September 2017; B Hale, ‘Freedom of Religion and Belief’ (Annual Human Rights Lecture for the Law 
Society of Ireland, 13 June 2014) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140613.pdf> accessed 
25th September 2017; B Hale, ‘Are we a Christian Country? Religious Freedom and the Law’ (Oxford High 
Sheriff’s Lecture, 14 October 2014) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141014.pdf> accessed 
25th September 2017.  
24 Later in this chapter it will also be repeated that viewing religion as a public good could expressly 
accommodate matters of conscience under the modification of George’s thought.   
25 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10). 
26 Lady Hale (n 10) 177. 
27 Ibid 176. This is troubling, because in cases following Eweida: Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73 and Greater 
Glasgow Health Board v Doogan [2014] UKSC 68, both were earlier noted as rejecting reasonable 
accommodation. Although Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan involved discussion concerning 
reasonable accommodation, Lady Hale believes reasonable accommodation for midwives’ beliefs was a 
separate question - Lady Hale (n 10) 177. Hale notes that the Supreme Court held the right of 
conscientious objection in s.4 of the Abortion Act 1967 did not extend to administrative, managerial and 
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comparison between reasonable adjustment and accommodation can be made. 
And even so, neither reasonable accommodation, nor reasonable adjustment for 
religion, was brought in by the judgment in Eweida. It is submitted that this is likely 
more of a figurative approach to reconciling indirect discrimination adopted by 
Lady Hale. As has been consistently shown, reasonable accommodation is not 
in force. Reasonable accommodation is not, currently, law.  
Equality and Human Rights Commission Report 97 
An important development concerning reasonable accommodation can be seen 
in the recent Equality and Human Rights Commission’s report, Review of Equality 
and Human Rights Law Relating to Religion and Belief.28 It is pleasing to see this 
report agree with my own conclusions in chapter 5 concerning problems with 
Article 9 and the conflict between religion and sexual orientation equality.29 
However, the report highlighted two of its own conclusions regarding reasonable 
accommodation. First, a duty of reasonable accommodation may not be needed 
because it does not materially differ from the protection provided by indirect 
discrimination.30 This is because a failure to ‘accommodate a request for different 
treatment by religious employees may amount to indirect discrimination, unless 
the refusal to accommodate can be justified.’31 Second, an alternative to 
reasonable accommodation might be to introduce a mechanism similar to the 
current right for employees to request flexible working, in order to cover those 
religion or belief workplace issues which are not covered by the right to request 
                                                          
supervisory tasks as opposed to ‘hands on’ patient care during the termination. Further, as was 
discussed in chapter 5, Lady Hale notes that the practicalities of reasonable accommodation was better 
suited to resolution in employment tribunal proceedings where, ‘all agree at that stage the midwives’ 
rights to manifest their religion will come into play.’ As such, reasonable accommodation under this 
logic was not decided here - Lady Hale (n 10) 177.  
28 Edge and Vickers, ‘Equality and Human Rights Commission Report 97 – Review of Equality and Human 
Rights Law Relating to Religion and Belief’ (n 6). 
29 Ibid 41-42. The report notes and welcomes developments such as the protection of the manifestation 
of belief under Article 9 and the rejection of the ‘specific situation rule’ - ibid 24. 
30 Ibid 51.  
31 Ibid 52. Chapter 5 detailed that I disagree with this comparison with indirect discrimination by 
following Fredman’s argument: through the proportionality analysis, justification for indirect 
discrimination would maintain the ‘status quo’ and be detrimental towards those claiming 
discrimination on grounds of religion and belief - S Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 270. 
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flexible working.32 For instance, to adapt a uniform to comply with religious 
teaching or a request to opt out of certain work tasks.33  
The impact of both of these measures can be seen to weaken and discredit calls 
for reasonable accommodation, as neither provide a coherent basis for 
reasonable accommodation.34 Both suggestions do not see the promotion of 
religion as founded upon a public good that is key to an individual’s beliefs. They 
do not see that the right to religious freedom logically requires the protection of 
the right to religious liberty, via accommodation, to produce flourishing.35 
Consequently the suggestions in this recent report are important but inferior to 
the basis set down for reasonable accommodation in chapter 5: one that is 
founded on a conception of the good that ensures promotion of religion as a 
public good, not merely protective of religion but one that actively promotes an 
individual’s religious beliefs in order to attain human flourishing.36 
George’s goods based NNL approach was further shown to be favoured over 
contemporary calls for reasonable accommodation for two reasons in chapter 5. 
First, the ‘goods-rights synthesis’ provides a rights basis to legitimise and 
accommodate an individual’s belief as an aspect of human flourishing in line with 
the common good over rights for service provision.  
An example of why this modified approach is to be preferred can be teased out 
here. The approach solves a problem inherent within equality legislation 
impacting religion. It was identified in chapter 5 that there is current conflict in 
equality law between two different conceptions of equality: 1) equality of persons 
and 2) equality of lifestyle and behaviour. This is why equality is not a concept 
that can provide a sufficient guide to many of the difficult questions in religious 
discrimination law. The legal approach towards secularism brings out value in this 
distinction. To develop this point, it was noted in chapter 4 that the President of 
                                                          
32 Edge and Vickers, ‘Equality and Human Rights Commission Report 97 – Review of Equality and Human 
Rights Law Relating to Religion and Belief’ (n 6) 4-5. 
33 Ibid 56. 
34 This is because the right to request only requires employers to consider the request in a reasonable 
manner - ibid 56. Further in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis Christian litigants have been shown to be 
consistently unsuccessful when claiming indirect discrimination (Eweida and Others v The United 
Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10) [15]). 
35 J Waldron (ed), Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (Routledge, 
1987) 157. 
36 For the working definition of ‘human flourishing’ see chapter 4.4 and chapter 5.2. 
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the Family Division, Sir James Munby, has stated that the courts are secular,37 
with the starting point of the common law being ‘an essentially neutral view of 
religious beliefs.’38 An aggressive form of secularism is present that has been 
shown to exclude religious discourse from the public sphere and promote an 
individualist value of equality.39 Nazir-Ali has drawn attention to this form of 
secularism as deriving from a form of multiculturalism that is rooted in ideas of 
equality. However, this is rooted in the earlier identified ideas of equality which 
are separated from the Biblical foundations of equality.40 The modified account 
that is applied to reasonable accommodation may solve the tensions between 
equality of persons and equality of lifestyle and behaviour. The approach may 
here offer a solution centred upon accommodation of the person. This is based 
upon inherent characteristics of the person. The modified NNL approach is a 
Biblical approach41 to the good in line with flourishing. It takes an inclusive 
approach to accommodate all people, while still providing a broad-brushed 
approach to encompass all preferences and differences. This may overcome a 
secular focus upon habits and lifestyle in line with the NNL human flourishing 
focus. As such, this finding reconciles the tension at the heart of contemporary 
religious equality law discourse. 
The second reason why the modification of George’s thought that is applied to 
reasonable accommodation is to be favoured over contemporary calls for 
reasonable accommodation, is because religion as a public good can 
accommodate matters of conscience under the analysis and application of 
George’s thought. Building from the dissenting judgment in Eweida,42 it was 
shown that the modified understanding of reasonable accommodation is founded 
upon the public good of religion. As such, the critique of George’s NNL conception 
                                                          
37 C Baski, ‘The courts are secular says top family judge’ (The Law Society Gazette, 29 October 2013) 
<http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/the-courts-are-secular-says-top-family-judge/5038456.article> 
accessed 13th November 2013.  
38 R (Eunice Johns and Owen Johns) v Derby City Council and Equality and Human Rights Commission 
[2011] EWHC 375 [41]. See also J Munby, ‘Law, Morality and Religion in the Family Courts’ (2014) 16 Ecc. 
L.J. 131, 137. 
39 M Nazir-Ali, Triple Jeopardy for the West: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islam and Multiculturalism 
(Bloomsbury, 2012) vii; M Nazir-Ali, ‘Calling all Christians: Prepare for Exile’ (Standpoint Magazine, 
January 2012) <http://www.standpointmag.co.uk/node/4797/full> accessed 3rd December 2015. 
40 M Nazir-Ali, Triple Jeopardy for the West: Aggressive Secularism, Radical Islam and Multiculturalism (n 
40) vii.  
41 Acts 17:26 - Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Collins, 2002).  
42 Eweida and Others v The United Kingdom (2013) (Applications nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 
and 36516/10) Partly dissenting judgment.  
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presented the public good of religion as an aspect of human flourishing. This 
understanding (of reasonable accommodation) thereby broadly speaking goes 
further than Eweida and is dependent upon freedom of conscience. Rather than 
a restriction upon flourishing, this may provide a legal system that is 
instrumentally good in ensuring that people are able to participate in a wide range 
of forms of human flourishing. This would coordinate our behaviour in mutually 
beneficial ways. In this way, law is presented in accordance with nature. 
George also goes further than the dissenting judgment in Eweida43 by arguing for 
a basic human right to religious liberty dependent upon freedom of conscience.44 
This was argued in chapter 5 to protect matters of conscience from invasion by 
the state. A basic human right to religious liberty establishes an express position 
for freedom of conscience for religious believers. For an express position given 
to freedom of religion has been described as the paradigm freedom of conscience 
and the essence of a free society.45 Religion was presented as a public good in 
chapter 5. The public good of religion, discerned through common human reason, 
was further shown to contribute towards George’s view of law as a form of public 
morality. This will enable freedom of religious conscience.  
Chapter 5 displayed Robert George’s critique of religious equality law. This thesis 
has critically analysed George’s thought and then found George’s theory, at least 
in part, useful to exploring religious liberty in English equality law. In doing so, the 
presentation of religion as a public good can be seen to adequately protect 
claimants under Articles 9 and 14 of the ECHR in adjudication concerning human 
rights, legitimate interests and protected characteristics. This thesis has clearly 
established that viewing religion as a public good could expressly accommodate 
matters of conscience. Eweida46 has been analysed to promote the priority of 
both the common and public good in religious conscience over legal rights within 
law viewed as a public morality. As a consequence, this provides a viable solution 
to those tensions that have arisen regarding the current state of reasonable 
accommodation and proportionality analysis within indirect discrimination law. 
Human flourishing promotes a form of freedom. This is a religious freedom which 
                                                          
43 Ibid.  
44 The working definition of ‘conscience’ was given in chapter 5.3. 
45 J Dingemans, ‘The need for a principled approach to religious freedoms’ (2012) Ecc. L.J. 12(3) 371, 
378. 
46 Eweida v British Airways [2010] EWCA Civ 80. 
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is dependent upon being promoted as a public good, in order to solve the 
identified contemporary tensions impacting religious liberty within equality law. 
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